It is well known that the Soviets shelled German jump-off positions and airfields immediately before the German offensive was scheduled to start.

There are some books with details about the warnings of the Red Orchestra and also with questions the GRU sent to the Red Orchestra to clarify things. Also, memoirs of members of the Red Orchestra give some details about the episode.

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Originally posted by Thomas Titura:
Will the new book about the battle of Kursk also include details of the information the Soviet General Staff (via GRU) received from the Red Orchestra about German deployment, the technical data of the Panther tanks etc.

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Yes....but.....

My discussion is built from secondary sources, so it does not break any new ground. The main sources I use are the Accoce and Quet book on Lucy, and the Tarrant book on the Red Orchestra (which seems to relied heavily on the previous book). Still, Kursk is specifically discussed in those books. What I do not have is anything from the Soviet side that states what they actually received, what was distributed to the field and what was actually used.

For being able to read the other side's mail, the Soviet dispositions don't reflect this well, having areas not in the German attack plan well defended (the 40th Army area) while areas that are in the German attack plan are lightly defended (the southern half of the Seventh Guards Army). It is almost as if the Soviet positions were set up to defend against the German plan as of 15 April, and never updated to reflect the changes in the German plans.

There is really a need for someone to look into this issue from the Soviet side, but good luck getting access to archival data (I don't know of anyone who has accessed the FSB files).

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It is well known that the Soviets shelled German jump-off positions and airfields immediately before the German offensive was scheduled to start.

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Yea, the effectiveness of this effort seems overrated in many books. Even Zhukov questions its effectiveness in his memoirs, but most people seem to ignor that paragraph.

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There are some books with details about the warnings of the Red Orchestra and also with questions the GRU sent to the Red Orchestra to clarify things. Also, memoirs of members of the Red Orchestra give some details about the episode.

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This is not my area of expertise, but I gather the two main books on the subject I have mentioned. They seem to have drawn heavily from Foote's book and Dulles' report. There may be sources I am missing here (and a few sources that I would best skipping).

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I think that a study about Kursk has to give detailed information about the Soviet Intelligence Service's success and its perceived impact (initial shelling of German concentration areas, layout of mine-fields etc. etc.)

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I do cover that, but the information on what the Soviets received comes from western secondary sources. Its "perceived impact" can only be deduced from Soviet actions. This is the harder one to understand, for with the quality and quantity of data they were receiving, you would think they would have been better deployed. One is left with the impression that there was a very large filter seperating the data the Soviets were recieving from the data that the field was getting. The other option is that the quality and detail of data from the Lucy ring has been overstated.

[This message has been edited by Chris Lawrence (edited 02-13-2003).]

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
The effective of the Lucy ring was probably on par with Mata Hari, in my opinion. Okay, maybe a little better.

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Now....I'm not sure how you came to this determination. The spy ring did exist, with Roessler collecting data and three different operators sending it. Roessler did have contacts in OKW, and many of these have been named (whether the names are correct I cannot tell). So they clearly had access to useful information and the means to get that information to Roessler and from there to the Soviet Union.

What is the basis for you claiming this ring was insignificant?

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Even Ultra reversed their assessment of Zitadelle after German signal traffic from their air assets dried up in the Crimea and Kuban.

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According to Hinsley, only one peice of Kursk Ultra intel was passed to the Soviet Union, and they displayed little interest in excanging intelligence.

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that the date/time of Zitadelle's jump-off wasn't confirmed until the night before via a 'tongue' (captured German prisoner) is at least one indication that Soviet intelligence regarding Zitadelle was mostly conducted via the Red Army through its own organic razvedka services.

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According to almost all Soviet secondary sources, Stalin issue out a memo on 2 July that said the offensive would occur between 3-6 July. The famous prisoner was probably not captured until 3 July.

I think you are not right as regards Enigma messages being sent to Stalin. It is possible that the British did only send one piece of information "from very reliable sources" to Stalin. But the GRU managed to obtain a huge number of Enigma transscripts via the Cambridge Four Spy ring, especially via J. Cairncross. Also, the Soviet espionage managed to penetrate the US quite well. It has been alleged, that the Soviets also were able to read the Japanese traffic starting already before the war (see General Krivitsky's memoirs, see the biography's of Richard Sorge. Sorge also supplied German code-books, copied from Mr. Ott of the Embassy, to Moscow). And on top of all that, the Soviets had captured a number of Enigma machines prior to Kursk (battle of Moscow and especially Stalingrad - this is also documented).

You can find a lot of Details about this in the following books (an excerpt only):

„The Enigma Spy - an Autobiography: The Story of the Man Who Changed the Course of World War Two“ by John Cairncross (ISBN: 0712678840),

„Hitler's Japanese Confidant: General Oshima Hiroshi and MAGIC Intelligence, 1941-1945“, by Carl Boyd, Peter Paret (University Press of Kansas)

Hitler's Traitor : Martin Bormann and the Defeat of the Reich by Louis Kilzer, Louis C. Kilzer (Presidio Press)

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Originally posted by Thomas Titura:
I think you are not right as regards Enigma messages being sent to Stalin.

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Hinsley, in what is the official history, specifically stated that the Lucy Ring was not recieving data from the British and had nothing to do with the British efforts. He does discuss the attempt of Churchill to open up an intel exchange with the Soviet Union by providng some Kursk data in the spring of 1943.

Now...that only covers what was done deliberately, Cairncross and company could have been also providing Kursk data to the USSR.

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But the GRU managed to obtain a huge number of Enigma transscripts via the Cambridge Four Spy ring, especially via J. Cairncross.

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Understood, and I have not looked into this in depth. I do not know to what extent they were specifically passing Kursk data. Whereas, the Lucy Ring was very clearly passing Kursk data (if the secondary sources are to be believed). These sources name what was passed and the date it was transmitted.

Considering the quality of the Lucy Ring sources, it would appear that it would be trusted as the primary intel source, with everything else providing confirmation and substantiation (and perhaps details).

In the case of the Lucy Ring, I gather the basic documentation for its activities consists of Allen Dulles reports (he was station cheif in Switzerland at the time, or something like that), Foote's book (one of the radio operators), and the documentation and trail papers from his and his associates arrest in 1944 by Switzerland and Roessler's later arrest in the 1950s by Switzerland for spying for Eastern European nations.

I am not sure of the documentation on the Cambridge Ring, but I have the impression that it is primarily documented by books by its participants (Kim Philby and Cairncross). As it is the most written about spy ring in history, I have heard all kinds of things attributed to it and have some problem seperating fact from speculation, so I have stayed away from it. I will take a look further at it.

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Also, the Soviet espionage managed to penetrate the US quite well. It has been alleged, that the Soviets also were able to read the Japanese traffic starting already before the war (see General Krivitsky's memoirs, see the biography's of Richard Sorge.

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Again, is there anything specific to Kursk?

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Sorge also supplied German code-books, copied from Mr. Ott of the Embassy, to Moscow).

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Sorge was arrested in 1941 and Ott was the commander of the 52nd Corps at Kursk.

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And on top of all that, the Soviets had captured a number of Enigma machines prior to Kursk (battle of Moscow and especially Stalingrad - this is also documented).

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Yes....but did they have an effective code breaking apparatus? The codes were periodically changed (after all, I've seen the movie .

Thanks for the book references. Do they specifically address Kursk or spring/summer of 1943?

The other big question, is to what extent did all this intel get to the field? Considering the very comparmentalized nature of the war effort, with everything eventually reporting to Stalin, I am not convinced that large amounts of the intel data was ending up in the hands of the field.

my reference to Sorge was just to demonstrate that Moscow had German code-books.

If you would like primary sources for the Red Orchestra, I recommend the following book by members of the RedOrch:

Sandor Rado: Codename Dora. ISBN 0-8094-8566-4

The book by Red Orchestra "Grand Chef" Leopold Trepper, titled "Die Wahrheit", is less usefull.

Looking for Kursk-related messages of both the agents of Rote Kapelle and Moscow centre I recommend: V.E. Tarrant "The Red Orchestra. The Soviet Spy Network inside Nazi Europe", paperback edition, ISBN 0-304-35129-6. There is a separate chapter about Kursk.

For example, on April 16, 1943 Foote transmitted the operational order for Zitadelle to Moscow. The order itself is of course from the 15th.

As regards your question about Soviet code breaking: this is confirmed by a KGB Officer in a footnote in the excellent book "Stalin's ocean-going Fleet. Soviet Naval Strategy and shipbuilding programmes 1935-1953" by Jürgen Rohwer and Mikhail S. Monakov. Published by Frank Cass. I will search for the details as soon as I'm back to my library.

Another confirmation of Soviet codebreaking is, as far as I remember, in the book "Barbarossa. The Axis and the Allies" edited by John Erickson. I will try to find the relevant information asap.

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Originally posted by Thomas Titura:
I recommend the following book by members of the RedOrch:

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Thanks for the original sources. Is there anything in there not covered by Tarrant (who appeared to borrow heavily from Accoce and Quet).

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I would recommend Tarrant "The Red Orchestra. The Soviet Spy Network inside Nazi Europe", paperback edition, ISBN 0-304-35129-6.

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Already made extensive use of that.

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For example, on April 16, 1943 Foote transmitted the operational order for Zitadelle to Moscow. The order itself is of course from the 15th.

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Aware of that. I gather it comes from Foote himself (I have not read Foote).

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As regards your question about Soviet code breaking...I will search for the details as soon as I'm back to my library.

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Yes, I think I will need details. I mean the UK enigma effort was a major undertaking. Did the Soviets really maintian a parrallel effort?

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
Now....I'm not sure how you came to this determination. The spy ring did exist, with Roessler collecting data and three different operators sending it. Roessler did have contacts in OKW, and many of these have been named (whether the names are correct I cannot tell). So they clearly had access to useful information and the means to get that information to Roessler and from there to the Soviet Union.

What is the basis for you claiming this ring was insignificant?

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
Well, I guess I could ask the same of you, Chris

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Well, I am not sure...but the evidence does seem to point towards the Lucy Ring being a significant intelligence source, and probably the most significant one.

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You state capabilities, but that doesn't equate to ability.

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Well, there is more evidence than just capabilities. They clearly were sending material on Kursk that came from OKW and this is given by document name and date. Now, this could be wrong if someone was lying, but I doubt if that is the case (although the dates may be a little off in some cases).

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And spywork is well known for its inconsistency.

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Exactly, and the practioneers are often flakes, BS artists, liars and people with sustance abuse problems. This makes me suspicious of anything written, which is why I tend to put more stock in what Hinsley wrote and the material on the Lucy Ring (which I gather is fairly well documented)than some of the other material in print.

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Where's the proof that the Soviets made use of anything the Lucy spy ring produced?

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I have no significant material on the actual Soviet use of the Lucy material, or any other material, for that matter. This is one of my questions (that will remain unanswered), for it does appear that the Soviet defenses in the south were organized to defeat the attack as outlined in the 15 April orders, as opposed to the later plan that the Germans actually used. This is why I am suspicious that there was a disconnect or incomplete intelligence.

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My argument is grounded on the fact that other Soviet capabilities in obtaining this intelligence existed.

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No doubt they had other capabilities. Again, all the questions you posed in arguing against Lucy being important can be made against these other sources, and I beleive with more weight.

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Through the network of partisans, resistance members, and agents within the occupied Soviet Union, largely coordinated by the NKVD.

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Yea, but how do these guys get copies of OKW/OKH plans?

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Through the more conventional means of intelligence collection by the Red Army via aircraft, radio, troop, artillery and engineer razvedka.

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I didn't come back to my house with my library, but I can remember for sure that in the memoirs of NKVD General Pavel Sudoplatov there is a special section dealing with the battle of Kursk and the Red Orchestra.

Sudoplatov also identifies the famous "German agent" Max as his own agent, disinforming the Germans also about Soviet preparations vis a vis Operation Zitadelle (ie a diversionary counter-offensive by Rokossovsky; the importance of Max is confirmed in the memoirs of General Schellenberg and also by Bundesnachrichtendienst chief Gehlen).

Sudoplatov also confirms that he transmitted the information he received via Red Orchestra to the Soviet General Staff.

Sudoplatov also confirmed the fact that the Soviets received detailed information, among other things, about Kursk via the Cambridge Spy ring and that these informations were much more detailed that the Red Orchestra versions.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
Okay, it's probably much more likely that data collected from the Lucy spy ring was delivered to the Soviet Union, and acted upon to some degree. I'll agree to that.

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According to Tarrant, he claims that 12,000 pages were sent during the course of the war.

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However, where I qualify this is to the degree of importance or significance these had as indicators of Zitadelle. This operation went into numerous revisions or delays, and trying to keep up with that would've been a tall task for any spy network.

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Again, according to Tarrant the entire Operational Order #6 was sent 16 April. On 20th April Rado reported that the offense was postponed. On April 29th Rado reported that the new date was June 12 (this last reporting date seems odd, as this was clearly before the decision had been officially made to postpone the operation). Tarrant also reports that one of the members of the ring (Gen. Erich Fellgiebel) was at the July 1 conference and the following day the notes of the conference were sent to Moscow.

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Rather, I tend to see such information more in the sense of the 'whistleblower' or of a supportive nature, to be corroborated, then confirmed, by the NKVD or the GRU through their own intelligence means and methods.

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If the above claims Tarrant makes are correct....that is pretty much all you need.

Konev does state that by May 12 they knew the Germans were coming. He also reports that they knew that the plan was approved at a conference at the beginning of May in Munch(the probably means the May 4 meeting in Berchesgarden).

Unless the Tarrant and Konev accounts are in error, this kind of covers all the bases.

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Finally, just because the Lucy spy ring had (possible?) access to OKH/OKW plans doesn't tell me the extent of detail the ring was able to collect of such plans.

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Well, its is operational order #6, which is the actual top-level plan for the offensive, including listing units to be involved. I think you can find a copy of it in Glantz (although I have a different translation).

The Lucy Ring (the sources) supposedly consisted of:

Lt.Gen Fritz Thiele - 2nd in command of OKW communication branch

Baron Col. Rudolf von Gersdorff - Chef of intel, AG Center

In May 1939, these were the two men to supposedly traveled to Switzerland and delivered an enigma machine to Roessler. Thiele would then just send messages directly to him as part of his regular work.

It also included:

Gen. Erich Fellgiebel (Thiele's boss)
MG Hans Ostler (COS of Abwehr)
Hans Bernd Gisevius (vice-council in Zurich)
Carl Goerdeler, former mayor of Leipzig
Col. Fritz Boetzel, CO of Intel Evaluation Office of SE Army Group (Athens)
3 Luftwaffe officers (names unknown)

Of those Gisevius and Boetzel survived the war. See Tarrant pages 159, 161 and 172 and Accoce and Quet page 22 for a slightly different set of names.

Now, I have not chased down the bios and histories of each of these people to determine if these claims are plausible. But, if they are, then one can see the extent, detail and nature of material available.

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Originally posted by Thomas Titura:
..but I can remember for sure that in the memoirs of NKVD General Pavel Sudoplatov there is a special section dealing with the battle of Kursk and the Red Orchestra.

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I have not checked these. When were they written?

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Sudoplatov also identifies the famous "German agent" Max as his own agent, disinforming the Germans also about Soviet preparations vis a vis Operation Zitadelle (ie a diversionary counter-offensive by Rokossovsky; the importance of Max is confirmed in the memoirs of General Schellenberg and also by Bundesnachrichtendienst chief Gehlen).

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I have seen nothing in the Germans actions to indicate that they were reacting to this disinformation, and have seen nothing in the Germans records to indicate that they were aware of such a threat.

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Sudoplatov also confirms that he transmitted the information he received via Red Orchestra to the Soviet General Staff.

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The Soviet Union controlled the three transmitters (the Red Orchestra)...but did not control (nor supposedly know who was)Roessler (the Lucy Ring).

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Sudoplatov also confirmed the fact that the Soviets received detailed information, among other things, about Kursk via the Cambridge Spy ring and that these informations were much more detailed that the Red Orchestra versions.

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It is my understanding that the only thing Cairncross provided was Luftwaffe data, as that is all he had access to at Benchley Park. Is Sudoplatov saying that Cairncross provided more detailed data than his man "Max" provided to the Red Orchestra...or is he saying that Cairncross provided more detailed data than the Lucy Ring provided (this last point I have a hard time beleiving...see my previous post).

Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness: a Soviet Spymaster.
By Pavel Sudoplatov, Anatoli Sudoplatov, transl. by J. Schecter
Paperback - 520 pages (6 April, 1995), Time Warner Paperbacks; ISBN: 0751512400 (revised edition)

The original Russian version is from 1991 or 1992 I believe.

Sudoplatov was the department head for "Special Tasks", ie he was responsible for the murder of Trotzky and the Partisan formations during the war. His direct boss was Pavel Fitin, head of foreign intelligence.

Sudoplatov claims that the Enigma transscripts from Cairncross were much more detailed than the information coming from the Red Orchestra, leading to the believe that the British were feeding edited material to the Red Orchestra.

The reference to Max is in the memoirs of SS General Walter Schellenberg and in the memoirs of Gehlen, BND chief, formerly with Fremde Heere Ost.

Sudoplatov does not make a comment on the origin of sources of the Red Orchestra apart from the alleged British input. He also downplays the importance of the Red Orchestra for the Soviet Union.

It is interesting to note however, that many of the soviet "handlers" of the Red Orchestra were allowed to survive both the war and Stalin. So I conclude that Stalin was pleased with their work, otherwise ...

One example is Yuri Modin: "My Five Cambridge Friends: Burgess, Maclean, Philby, Blunt, and Cairncross by Their KGB Controller", Publisher: Farrar Straus & Giroux; ; (February 1995) .

The Soviets also received intelligence material of the British via the British coordination with the US intelligence services, because one of the Cambridge five was the MI6 contact-man in Washington...

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Originally posted by Thomas Titura:
The book by Sudoplatov I referred to is:

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Thanks, I'll look into it.

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The original Russian version is from 1991 or 1992 I believe.

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That doesn't give me a warm fuzzy feeling. There was still limitations on what was being discussed and what was not back then. The KGB was still very much in existance.

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Sudoplatov claims that the Enigma transscripts from Cairncross were much more detailed than the information coming from the Red Orchestra, leading to the believe that the British were feeding edited material to the Red Orchestra.

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Hinsley, in the official history, very clearly stated that they were not providing material to the Red Orchestra. I have no reason to doubt the veracity of this statement.

On the whole, I find it difficult to beleive that material (primarily on Luftwaffe?) ferreted out clandestinely by Cairncross was far more detailed (useful?) than material that appears to have been coming directly from OKW (see my last response to Greg LG).

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The reference to Max is in the memoirs of SS General Walter Schellenberg and in the memoirs of Gehlen, BND chief, formerly with Fremde Heere Ost.

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Thanks, I will take a look further into that. Still it does not sound like "Max" was providing significant Kursk data.

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Sudoplatov does not make a comment on the origin of sources of the Red Orchestra apart from the alleged British input.

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But the British firmly deny it, and other sources indicate its "home grown" nature (at least of the Lucy Ring).

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He also downplays the importance of the Red Orchestra for the Soviet Union.

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This is suspicious, especially considering the publication date. There are any number of reasons I can think of why he (or his agency) might wish to do this.

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It is interesting to note however, that many of the soviet "handlers" of the Red Orchestra were allowed to survive both the war and Stalin. So I conclude that Stalin was pleased with their work, otherwise ...

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I believe several of them (including Rado) spent about 10 years in Siberia and were only release under Khruschev. Foote choose to go to England and change sides (to the English).

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
Well, its is operational order #6, which is the actual top-level plan for the offensive, including listing units to be involved. I think you can find a copy of it in Glantz (although I have a different translation).

The Lucy Ring (the sources) supposedly consisted of:

Lt.Gen Fritz Thiele - 2nd in command of OKW communication branch

Baron Col. Rudolf von Gersdorff - Chef of intel, AG Center

In May 1939, these were the two men to supposedly traveled to Switzerland and delivered an enigma machine to Roessler. Thiele would then just send messages directly to him as part of his regular work.

It also included:

Gen. Erich Fellgiebel (Thiele's boss)
MG Hans Ostler (COS of Abwehr)
Hans Bernd Gisevius (vice-council in Zurich)
Carl Goerdeler, former mayor of Leipzig
Col. Fritz Boetzel, CO of Intel Evaluation Office of SE Army Group (Athens)
3 Luftwaffe officers (names unknown)

Of those Gisevius and Boetzel survived the war. See Tarrant pages 159, 161 and 172 and Accoce and Quet page 22 for a slightly different set of names.

Now, I have not chased down the bios and histories of each of these people to determine if these claims are plausible. But, if they are, then one can see the extent, detail and nature of material available.

[This message has been edited by Chris Lawrence (edited 02-17-2003).]

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(Taken from Yuri Modin: My five Cambridge friends, pp 113-114):

"Cairncross came up with two distinct categories of documents. The first involved technical data about the new German Tiger tank. (...) Thanks to the documents obtained by Cairncross, we were able to analyse the thickness of the armour and assess the quality of the steel - and then to manufacture armour-piercing shells capable of knocking out the Tiger. (...) The Soviet triumph in the great tank battle at Kurskaia Douga in July 1943, ... , was thus partly attributable to John Cairncross."

and

"The second category of documents he sent through to Moscow concerned the German offensive itself. In the spring of 1943, the British Government informed the Soviet general staff of the imminence of an attack on the strategic Kursk salient. They also told the Red Army that the Germans knew the exact position of every Soviet unit in the region. This was all. Cairncross, however, went much further; he was able to furnish Krechin with the full texts of the intercepted messages, which contained the identifications fo the Soviet units, their proportionate strenght and their exact locations. Given this forewarning, the Soviet commander was able to move all his regiments in the last minute and completely outmanoeuvre the enemy. Even more important, Krechin obtained a precise list of all the Luftwaffe squadrons based in the area, which enabled our air force to carry out surprise bombing attacks on no fewer than fifteen aerodromes alon the line extending from Smolensk to the Sea of Azov, several weeks in advance of the German offensive at Kursk." ...

Cairncross was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for his work.

Krechin was his NKVD handler at the time, also known in the spy literature as Krotov (but his real name was Boris Krötenschield).

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Originally posted by Thomas Titura:
Take as a confirmation of the importance and detail of the intelligence information that the Red Army General Staff received:

(Taken from Yuri Modin: My five Cambridge friends, pp 113-114):

"Cairncross came up with two distinct categories of documents. The first involved technical data about the new German Tiger tank. (...) Thanks to the documents obtained by Cairncross, we were able to analyse the thickness of the armour and assess the quality of the steel - and then to manufacture armour-piercing shells capable of knocking out the Tiger. (...) The Soviet triumph in the great tank battle at Kurskaia Douga in July 1943, ... , was thus partly attributable to John Cairncross."

and

"The second category of documents he sent through to Moscow concerned the German offensive itself. In the spring of 1943, the British Government informed the Soviet general staff of the imminence of an attack on the strategic Kursk salient. They also told the Red Army that the Germans knew the exact position of every Soviet unit in the region. This was all. Cairncross, however, went much further; he was able to furnish Krechin with the full texts of the intercepted messages, which contained the identifications fo the Soviet units, their proportionate strenght and their exact locations. Given this forewarning, the Soviet commander was able to move all his regiments in the last minute and completely outmanoeuvre the enemy. Even more important, Krechin obtained a precise list of all the Luftwaffe squadrons based in the area, which enabled our air force to carry out surprise bombing attacks on no fewer than fifteen aerodromes alon the line extending from Smolensk to the Sea of Azov, several weeks in advance of the German offensive at Kursk." ...

Cairncross was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for his work.

Krechin was his NKVD handler at the time, also known in the spy literature as Krotov (but his real name was Boris Krötenschield).

Krechin was

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I don't think this really makes that case that Cairncross was the major source. The Tiger's have already been addressed by Darrin.

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Originally posted by Thomas Titura:
(Taken from Yuri Modin: My five Cambridge friends, pp 113-114):

"...The Soviet triumph in the great tank battle at Kurskaia Douga in July 1943, ... , was thus partly attributable to John Cairncross."

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This is an odd statement, as I don't know how having the technical specifications of the Tigers made a difference in the battle. When one considers that in the south there were about 100 Tigers out of 1500 tanks, then the part attributable to John Cairncross must have been a small part.

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In the spring of 1943, the British Government informed the Soviet general staff of the imminence of an attack on the strategic Kursk salient. They also told the Red Army that the Germans knew the exact position of every Soviet unit in the region.

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The first sentence agrees with Hinsley. The second sentence appears to be nonsense, as the Germans clearly did not know the exact position of every Soviet unit and I doubt that the British would be inventing such a think to say to the Soviets.

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Cairncross, however, went much further; he was able to furnish Krechin with the full texts of the intercepted messages, which contained the identifications fo the Soviet units, their proportionate strenght and their exact locations.

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This is very odd, as I have not seen such data in the German archives. Where did German intelligence get information of the strength and "exact" locations of Soviet units? There appears to be some exaggeration here.

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Given this forewarning, the Soviet commander was able to move all his regiments in the last minute and completely outmanoeuvre the enemy.

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When and where did this happen? This appears to be pure fantasy.

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Even more important, Krechin obtained a precise list of all the Luftwaffe squadrons based in the area, which enabled our air force to carry out surprise bombing attacks on no fewer than fifteen aerodromes alon the line extending from Smolensk to the Sea of Azov, several weeks in advance of the German offensive at Kursk." ...

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This is the only statement I don't have a problem with, although the suprise bombings mostly ran up Soviet casualties with little effect on the Germans.

It would appear that Lucy remains the primary Soviet intel source.

Thanks, this has been very useful, but in this case, I have chosen to keep my chapter covering this subject as is. I did mention Cairncross as a source of Luftwaffe intel, but that appears to be about it. It would appear that Modin exagerrates the importance of his source, the effects from that intelligence and makes a number of odd or incorrect statements in the process. This does not give me a lot of confidence in this source.

Sorry for the delay in responding.

It contains the following item that may be of interest to you:

- Atlas and Survey, Prelude to Kursk: The Soviet Central Front Offensive, February-March 1943 (46 pages of text and
34 maps, 20 in 11 x 17 inch format), consisting of daily situation maps derived from formerly classified Soviet archival materials and German archival maps. Provides operational and tactical details concerning the culminating phase of the Soviet Winter offensive 1942-1943. This failed offensive, which was designed to split the German Eastern Front, failed and has since been covered up by Soviet historians. $50.
- Atlas of The Battle of Kursk (July-August 1943) (74 maps). Consisting of 18 daily situation maps in 11 x 17 inch
format, 28 11 x 17 inch tactical situation maps of 1: 50,000-scale prepared on translated original Soviet base maps, German operational and intelligence maps, and selected strategic overview maps. $60.