When looking at the Pz IV present it was mainly the type G model which had been in production for a year by this point. It had 80 mm of armour on the front hull that probably resistated slighlty less than the T34-76 hull. Yet the PzIV had a much better gun in terms of AP pen over the T34-76. Plus the panzer IV had a better turrent layout. In order for the 76 mm and lesser guns used by the rus to pen the front of the the obsolete panzer IVs they had to get even closer than the side of a tiger. The Pz IV even if glantz considers them obsolete was at least equal to a T34.

One aspect of Kursk that has not been thoroughly covered is what role artillery played in the battle. Both sides had considerable amounts of artillery at their disposal and it could most of the time be deployed to support major attacks. For example in Prokhorovka Soviet armour attacked against SS-Leibstandarte that was just about to launch it's own attack. Artillery was ready to give support. So, how many Soviet tanks were actually put out of action by AT guns and how many were damaged by indirect fire? What was the role of the air forces?

In itself Panzer IV was not outdated eny more than Sherman or T-34 during WWII. Constant updates kept it at par with the most common adversaries. It is an other matter that it was not better than the opposition and that Germans had better equipment already in production.

What comes to Panzer III Glantz is correct in stating that it was outdated.

Regards,

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Originally posted by JariL:
Hi,

In itself Panzer IV was not outdated eny more than Sherman or T-34 during WWII. Constant updates kept it at par with the most common adversaries. It is an other matter that it was not better than the opposition and that Germans had better equipment already in production.

What comes to Panzer III Glantz is correct in stating that it was outdated.

Regards,

Jari

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The germans kept producing the panzer IV for two full years until the end of the war. And it really only entered large scale production after barbarasso. Before that the ger conc on PzIII production which was thier main battle tank. To call it obsolete in 43 would only apply if we are comparing it to the other better german tanks. It was more than sufficent compared to the main sov tank the T34 for all of 43 as the ger were able to show.

While I have no beef with calling the PzIII outdated it was no more outdated then the sov own T70 tank. Both sides stoped production of the outdated tanks at about the same time and switched to sp-gun versions. Again the stug III was no more obsolete the su-76m.

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But his statment that they are obsolete doesnīt hold much water.

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The on-line Merrian-Webster dictionary gives the following definition of obsolete:

"1 a : no longer in use or no longer useful b : of a kind or style no longer current"

If one is using the second part of the definition, then one could argue that Pz IV's became obsolete on 5 July 1943, when the latest version of the German medium tank (Pz V) was sent into action.

Many people take the word "obsolete" to mean the first part of the defination. It has become a wonderfully perjorative term that DOD makes way to much use of.

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Originally posted by Darrin:
Glantz claim that the ger suffered from lack of fuel for thier airforce also seems to be a bit of a stretch.

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That comes from Plocher. It did not seem to have been a major hinderance of German air operations in the south (I have not looked at the north). The few surviving German air records that I've located do not discuss fuel one way or the other.

The fact that they had three months to stockpile fuel and there was plenty of fuel for the ground forces (which we do have records for) leads me to believe that is was not a major problem for this offensive. German air activity on the Eastern Front in the three months leading up to Kursk had been very limited.

Its a good thing he didnīt use sov claims for his calculation since they are off much more then ger by about a factor of five. So were western numbers as well. I have never heard of the sov or west actually realizing this or figuring out close approximations methods like the ger did. In fact Patton seemed to think his numbers were highly accurate.

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Originally posted by JariL:
For example in Prokhorovka Soviet armour attacked against SS-Leibstandarte that was just about to launch it's own attack. Artillery was ready to give support.

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It would appear that the Soviet attack had little artillery support.

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So, how many Soviet tanks were actually put out of action by AT guns and how many were damaged by indirect fire?

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The only real data on that is the First Tank Army report, which I believe has been posted elsewhere in this forum.

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What was the role of the air forces?

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It appears to have been pretty limited over the tank fields of Prokhorovka on 12 July.

The three ger div slowly withdrew from sicily at the end of the battle mainly intact. The italian army fought sparodically but they were italian. No wholesale surrender of forces or country happened until after the allies landed in southern Italy. This could only occur after sicily was conquered and a brief time for preperations were made. So we are looking at the end of aug to the beg of sep that any further threat in the med could be seen. ie After the dual rus off around kursk before that they were too tied down in sicily.

Glantz states that the II SS Pz corps was sent to Italy but that is incorrect. The corp HQ might have been but only 1 of the three div actually made the trip. The other two div stayed on the eastern front and kept fighting for most of the fall. Even then the 1 div was sent to northern Italy for a bit of R&R. Followed by preperation for the disarament and defence of Italy if they surrendered. Which was still almost two months away.

Unfortunatly the prod of turrented tanks esp meds was baically tapped out. So the production of unturented assult guns was drastically increased mostly due to the light SU-76M.

Generally armies made large number of unturerented sp ATGs when they were in dire straits such as ger in 44. They were considered sutible for only def actions normally. Other armies before during and since did not emphasis spATG esp of the light varity when they were on the offensive. It's lucky sov losses decreased in early 44 so they were not as dependent on this vehicle as they might have been.

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In truth the sovs got it backwards they should have made the light open toped SU-76M. Early or mid in the war. Then switch to the even lighter T60/T70 tanks as recon. Just like the ger use of PzIIs early and US sturats late. Of course the T60/70 had two man crews with no radio and internal comm (except T70). It would need a radio something the SU-76M had along with a larger 4 men crew but it was completly open at top and had no bulit in MGs.

The T70 was not just a recon tank, it was a chassis looking for a job. Th SU76 had a doctrinally very different role. That the Soviets got it backwards by not producing the T60/T70 late in the war is a statement that just does not make sense. Well, unless you expect the Soviets to do everything the German way. I suggest you read up on Soviet recce, and how it was done, and you will see how off the wall that statement really is.

Well the ger early in the war and the west late in the war used plenty of light reccon tanks with radios and actually achived better result then whatever method rus used.

The germans produced jag panther and jag tiger at the same time they were still producing these tanks. They even made some panzer IV sp non turented guns at the same time as the the normal panzer IVs. Even the stug was started from the PzIII in small quaites long before the PzIII ceased production. German % production of non turrented vehicles increased each year from very small numbers in 1940 to around half the overall production in 45. The cost, time and manpower to produce turrents is much higher. But the non turrented vehicles were considered sutable to only very limited off activites by the gers. Most non turrented tanks were used defensivly by the gers.

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
I guess it depends on which point in 1942 and 1943 you're looking at. If you compare June 1942 to June 1943, there certainly is a very healthy increase (actually, almost a doubling on the basis of the tables provided in Zetterling/Franksson, if I remember correctly). One would think a significant part of that increase would have come between the end of the Kharkov counterstroke and the beginning of Zitadelle, considering that this was a long lull in which no significant casualties were incurred.

regards, K.A.

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If you are talking about rus tanks on the main front you are correct. I was never saying that thier wasn't an increase. The increase was mainly due to a three months of relative silence before kursk were the russia was able to double the number of tanks present on the front. 3 months of 2000 tanks and spguns production a month is 6000 new tanks+.

In the south this stament doesnīt seem to hold true either. The highest cas for Army det kempf happened on the first day 3500 then slowler then above went down overall. Never rising abouve 1000 after 10th of july. The 4th panzer army which most of glantz increasing high attrition was directed at and actually contributed twice the number of panzer corp to the attack as kempf actually suffered similar cas numbers for july. Strating highest on the first day again about 2500 then even slower then above gradual going down overall. Droping below a 1000 on the 15th of july and never going above that level.

The 48th Pz corp which glantz says was savaged from the 10 to 11 of july. Was one of two Pz coprs and it was on the left flank of the other corp the II SS Pz Corps. The cas for the entire 4th panzer army on the 10th and 11th were less than a 1000 tot. The cas the day before and the day after was double this unusually low numbers. So it seems even this viscous battle either was on different days, was not vicous or never happened.

Leaving aside the new tanks for now. So in terms of tanks des only the III Pz corps really was attrited if we are talking about tanks des. Although I canīt actually say which days each of those tanks was des to answer th increasing attitrion question.

One more bit of info about ger tanks and op rediness. The ger were able to attain high op rediness across the entire front only when they had an extended period of time to repair tanks. So say 90+% op rediness in summer 41, summer 42 and summer 43 was normal. But once comitted to battle the op rediness declined drastically. It generally stabilized around 70% across the entire front. Indivadiual PDs would decline much more then that esp if they were in constant battle and movment. But the overall avg amoung all armour units would generally hold true. Now I donīt know what a normal decline from 90% to 70% on avg would look like in terms of time. But you have to expect a big drop after the first day. Unfortunatly you shouldnīt expect a 4 fold drop over 1-2 days and no recovery which is why I leave the panthers out of my discussions. One last point since we are talking about a battle taking place so far away from ger and over 1-2 weeeks. The number of new replacment vechiles that might have arrived to replaces tanks des would be minimal. Iīm ignoring them for now. Also the ger op readiness reports were made after the days combat somthine bettween 1700hrs and 2400hrs. These are lower numbers then might be found the next morning.

48th Pz Corps

The 3rd PD did not drop too much in op readiness during the first few days. On the 10th their was a big drop mainly in its small Pz IV numbers. The panzer IVs op ready increase markedly each day until the 12th. Afterwards their is a further small decline follwed by stationary numbers. The pz IIIs decline slowly as well at first followed by a smaller drop on the 10th but a contiuned drop on the 11th. Followed by steady number on the 12th and A sig increase on the 13th. Follwed by a fall back on the 14th and another sig increase on the 15th. Followed by a fall back on the 16th and a sig increase on the 17th and stady numbers afterwards.

High attrition from an op perspective is more tanks getting damaged or broken then coming back from repair so thier is a net drop in op rediness. For the 3rd PD it is only really true for the 10th and 11th overall. There after the Panzer IIIs fluctuate day by day but thier overall avg was steady or increaing. Attrition or a decline in op rediness was not increasing more and more each day as Glantz would like to say.

Now I am not going to go into the same detail for each of the other div or this will take a week.

11th PD

Again slow steady decline at first intil the 8th wehre both the larger numbers of panzer IIIs and smaller numbers of IVs both decline. After his it steadyies out or slightly increases. So high attrition on one early day way before his 10/11 battle claims for the 48th and no incresing attrition afterwards.

Now the GD PG div next. First a comment on makeup it has much fewer pz III then the other two and more panzer IVs plus a sig number of stugs and a small number of tigers. It has a much sharper drop on op readiness after the first day then the other two. Very Very significant drop on the first day. Then it stayed more or less steady at the lower levl for 3 days. Followed by a sig increase on the 10th and stedy numbers till the 12th. The 13th is followed by a decline to the earlier low levels amoung the tanks but not stugs were it stays steady. On the 16th the panzer IVs and tigers recover and remain steady. On the 17th th panzer IIIs increase and remain steady. This div certantly doesnīt support glantz claim to have been attritited highly on the 10th or 11th. Nor does it support the increasing attrition claim either.

This corps unlike other ones had no corps level armor units. ie all armour was in its divsions. Also this corp as glantz keep pointing out had to defend its entire right flank for most of the battle and a good portion of its left flank as well.

1st SS PGD lieb... was similarly equipped to the GD PGD. Thier are no numbers listed for the 6th for most elements and no report listed for the 7th. On the end of the first day the 5th little decline in op rediness is seen. During the gap of 3 days till the end of the 8th decline in rediness is severe. From the 8th onwards the op % is more or less steady until the end of the 15th were it stops a slow decline. Yet again showing that attrition did not increse over time. If anything attrition was highest during the early 3 day gap then declined with time.

The 2nd SS PGD das reich was similarly equiped to the 1st but it had a greater share of panzer IIIs then IVs. During the first few days thier is a slow gradual decline in op rediness. On the 9th the decline increased slightly. It remained steady until the 12th when it started to increse steadially. Yet again increasing attrition can not be seen.

3rd SS PGD totenkopf was similar in make up to the 3rd SS div above. Decline in op rediness was slow to start with. With a bottomig out around the 9th of july follwed by a bit of a jump on the 11th of july. Then a big drop on the 13th followed by slow steady rise till the 16th were it remains steady. No increasing attrition seen.

For the II SS Pz corps which went the farthest and had the most to defend thier is little evidence to suggest increasing levels of attriton arising latter.

The 6th PD was made up of more Pz IIIs then IVs. The op readiness decresed severly during the big gap at the begining. Another slight decline on the 10th followed by similar levels the next day. No report on the 12th followed by a slight decline on the 13th. From the 14th on the op rediness holds steady. Now this div was severly attrited and never showed much improvment. Part of the missing op tanks compared to other div was a higher des rate than most other divs. But the attirtion still did not happen mainly at the end or with increasing frequency towards the end.

The 7th PD was also made up similar to the 6th SS PD. During the first gap from the 5th to the morning of the 9th decearse in op was even more severe then for the above 6th PD. Slight increases on the 10th and 11th are follwe by a slight deccline in rediness on the 12th. Steady on the 14th folllowed by a drop to a steady level from that day on. Now although this div is still not in great shape it is a little better than the 6th PD. The vast majority of the attrition again happened early not late and certainly not with increseing frequency.

19th PD unlike its cousins had equal numbers of panzer IIIs and IVs. The 19th PD like the 7th just above suffered very severe decrease in op rediness during this inital gap. This severe decrease continued on the 10th. Then it remained at this steady very low level until the 13th. On the 13th in increased slightly followed by a steady peiod for the last of the battle. Even though this div was even more severly attritied at first than any other in this corp it had at least as many tanks op in the end as the 7th PD even though it also lost more tanks des the the 7th PD did. No late increasing attrition evidence again.