quote:

---

Originally posted by Greg LG:
Yes, where they withdrew to Vyborg (Viipuri?)!

---

So it´s the Viipuri (Vyborg)-operation of Leningrad Front you are thinking of. There the Finnish withdrawal was more forced than anything, but the ensuing improvised fighting withdrawal was succesful in avoiding destruction of Finnish forces at Karelian Isthmus, which was one of the operational goals of the Leningrad Front.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Andreas:

Anyway - your basic point to me appears to be that the Germans were not swayed by Maskirovka in the case of Bagration. I disagree. So far you have expressed a strong opinion on this, but not really shown any sources to back it up. I have provided a source (the US Army newsletter), that shows that Maskirovka had an effect, and I am sure others could be found. So if you want to discuss this further with me, I look forward to you offering something more than just your opinion on the topic, otherwise I will conclude that Glantz and the newsletter are right, and you are wrong.

---

I believe the ger were much less fooled by soviet maskiroka than many 'experts' believe. And I think bagtration is an excellent point to show this. Unfortunatly if you are asking me to provide a book reference of some type I can´t. When you look at the OVERALL dispositon of the ger hun and rum forces in rus the and considereing ALL military AND political considerations. Knowing what the rus actually did the defensive positoning was entirly justified.

What the ger should have done was pull back AGC pull back AGN which would now be exposed too. AGN was of zero mil signifigance and the only pol sig was might be trying to encourage the fins to stay in the war. But even though the fins were in the war combat bettween these two armies from 42 to 44 was extremly light and unusual. Maybe keeping the fins in the war was of little mil signifigance.

With 2 mil plus ger troops organized over shorter and slightly closer lines behind rivers the reliance apon the rum and hun troops would have been less. Plus more troops on the line less need for reserves but more reserves even for non mil reasons. ie. To ensure rum and hun troops and thier gov toe the line. Rus would proably have continued to get bloody noses against the axis defences.

Plus many rus wonder army books claim bagtration as thier barbarasso but thier is little evidence to back this up. It took at least two months for millions of rus troops to cause fairly high ger losses to an number of troops who were less than a third thier size. Plus the rus losses were still much higher than the ger loses.

When you compare this to barbarasso thier is little comparison. The rus lost more troops faster and ground in 41 with far less ger cas. The ger having less of a numerical advantage. This generally happened over the whole front almost simultaneously at first except for a couple weeks delay in the south and continued beyond the first two months. Yet bagtration was one LARGE localized battle. Bagtration was a great victory for rus but it was in no way comparable to the ger victories of barbarasoo.

While the last option was best it was not allowed by hitlar. In fact the actual def overall was weak but thier was little reason to suspect it was weak MAINLY due to sov maskirovka. Now at a local level within each AG maybe there were problems caused by mask. I didn´t say the mask played no part but its part was not domintant at the theatre level for bagtration.

The fins were also not fooled by any soviet maskiroka either. They actually demobilized a huge chunk of thier army during the phony years and only remobilized in 44. Just it time to prepare excellent defences against the sov main effort that gained little ground.

Most of the 'experts' say differently but I don´t believe the experts in this case. Glantz being one notable expert and not to nitpick but your web based army newsletter does not list an author or any sources. If not authored directly by glantz it is proably based on his research. So your two different sources are really one and the same. Alhough you will find it easy to find others sources who copy glantzs here. Most of them just resatate Glantzs opion without any independent confirmation.

I could say MOST experts agree with you and therefore you are right and I am wrong. ALL might be closer to the truth but I haven't read anywhere near ALL the books on the subjects and then we could quibble about the title 'expert'.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Darrin:
The ger army had fewer panzer type divs then the soviets tank/mech corps. But the sov had way more divs in total. As a % wise the gers had the higher % of mechanized formations even in 44.

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by Foxbat:
That is true only when taking a birdseye view of the situation. If you take a closer look at the mechanisation of the Red Army it is obvious that it was purposely more skewed, meaning that the "Tsaritsa Polje" (the basic infantry units) never even saw a truck while the units that were actually used in an offensive were mostly mechanised. I guess you could say that in 1944 'A mostly mechanised Army, supported by a non-mechanised rear, attacks a mostly horse-drawn army with superior odds at the point of breakthrough.'

---

I´m cetainly willing to admit I´m wrong and learn new things.

The mech and tank corps numbered about 37 by the end of the war. Each tank corp which made up most of these had a str of around 9000 with the mech corp being much less common and having a str of around 16,000. Thier were clearly OVER 400 rifle divs which made up the vast majority of the rus divs and these divs were not soley equipped with trucks. Nor were they significantly better equipped with trucks then the ger inf div even in 44. The rus and ger inf walked 90+% of the time and used horse pulled carts and trucks to carry and pull things. Things such as arty, ATG, ammo, food, wounded etc...

Now if you could give me a reference that those 400+ rus inf div had trucks instead of horse drawn wagons I would be interested in the source. Sov panzer grendier rifle divs I don´t believe were too common. The rus had many more tanks the germany overall they may also have had slighlty more trucks in 44 overall. But the biggest reason for slightly more trucks was the much larger number of divs and troops rather then the rus being a mech army and the ger not.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Darrin:
The fins were also not fooled by any soviet maskiroka either. They actually demobilized a huge chunk of thier army during the phony years and only remobilized in 44. Just it time to prepare excellent defences against the sov main effort that gained little ground.

---

So good intel is why they had one good defence line, one half-finished and one that was almost entirely imaginary? I was under the impression that that was caused by politcicians wanting to take the strain of the civilian economy.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Darrin:

When you compare this to barbarasso thier is little comparison. [..] Yet bagtration was one LARGE localized battle. Bagtration was a great victory for rus but it was in no way comparable to the ger victories of barbarasoo.

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by Foxbat:
So good intel is why they had one good defence line, one half-finished and one that was almost entirely imaginary? I was under the impression that that was caused by politcicians wanting to take the strain of the civilian economy.

[This message has been edited by Foxbat (edited 01-13-2003).]

---

Hmmm...In fact the second defensive line at Karelian Isthmus (VK-line) was better prepared than the first, and about 80% of the "imaginary" VKT-line was behind major waterways...

I think the basis of your opinions wrt Soviet forces and operational art are not well grounded. I may be wrong, and please correct me if I am, but you don't appear to be well read wrt Soviet forces. One of the cardinal sins of historical research is to be so focused on a subject that you lose sight of the subject's relationships and its environment. While I am confident that your knowledge of German forces in WWII is competent, if any sort of comparative assessment is to be put forward by yourself, then a study of Soviet forces and sources is practically mandatory.

I myself have been guilty of not honing my knowledge of German forces in WWII on the Russian front, but I've been trying to amend that, because of one crucial fact: my studies of Soviet forces invariably sends me back towards a need for knowledge of German forces and how they operated. It's not enough to rely on Soviet sources to get an in-depth look at the German Army (the whole, tired propaganda issue aside) , since nothing beats home sources. The really interesting thing is I'm finding new insights into Soviet methods because of this, while my respect for German forces has increased as well.

Your quote, "[Bagration] was a great victory for [the USSR] but it was in no way comparable to the [German] victories of [Barbarossa]," is either a result from lack of in-depth knowledge of the Soviet Belorussian operation, or an unwillingness to accept the reality of this excellent campaign, a campaign that compares quite favorably with Barbarossa. To get you started, I'll offer you a piece of German information. Gehlen put in his situational report for the summer of 1944 that AGC was in for a quiet summer. Why do you think he made that assessment?

quote:

---

Originally posted by Darrin:
3. I stand by what I said about the ger army escaping mainly unhurt not largly unhurt as you misquote me. Thier own reports confirm the overall situation regardless of one div. One div escaping hurt does not equal all ger div in the south suffering grevious losses.

---

Now this has bothered me to some degree, since I am sure it is completely understating the amount of destruction wrought unto AG South Ukraine. I therefore inquired on a German forum (forum.panzerlexikon.de), where the resident Guru of all things German, Jörg Wurdack, was kind enough to reply. I'll post the original in German for those who can speak that language and translate the pertinent bits.

quote:

---

Fast vollständig gingen bei Kishinew-Jassy die nach Stalingrad neuaufgestellte 6. Armee sowie Teile der 8.Armee verloren:

- Korpskommandos: IV, VII, XXX, XXXXIV, LII
- Infanterie-Divisionen: 9, 15, 62, 79, 106, 161, 257, 258, 282, 294, 302, 306, 320, 335, 370, 376, 384
- 153. Feldausbildungs-Division

Dazu natürlich noch zahlreiche Heerestruppen.

Mit geringen Teilen konnten nach Westen ausweichen:
- 10. PzGrenDiv
- 13. PzDiv
- 76. Inf.Div

Deutsche Verluste etwa 180.000 bis 200.000 Mann. Wenn man die zahlreichen, im rumänischen Bereich zu diesem Zeitpunkt verloren gegangenen, RAD und OT-Einheiten miteinbezieht, wird man nochmals etwa 15.000 - 20.000 Mann dazuzählen können. Ganz eindeutige Zahlen sind nicht zu erhalten, weil - ähnlich wie beim wenige Wochen vorher erfolgten Zusammenbruch der HGr. Mitte - eine ungeheure Zahl von Vermißten zu verzeichnen ist, deren Verbleib nicht geklärt werden konnte.

-Frießner, Hans: Verratene Schlachten. Die Tragödie der deutschen Wehrmacht in Rumänien und Ungarn. Hamburg 1956
-Kissel, Hans: Die Katastrophe in Rumänien 1944. Darmstadt 1964
-Mazulenko, W. A.: Die Zerschlagung der Heeresgruppe Südukraine, August - September 1944. Berlin 1959
-Rehm, Walter: Jassy - Schicksal einer Division oder einer Armee? (= Die Wehrmacht im Kampf, 21) Neckargemünd 1959

---

Almost completely destroyed at Iassy-Kinshinjew were the newly raised (post-Stalingrad) 6th Army and parts of 8th Army.

The Corps Commands that were lost were: IV, VII, XXX, XXXXIV, LII

The infantry divisions that were lost were: 9, 15, 62, 79, 106, 161, 257, 258, 282, 294, 302, 306, 320, 335, 370, 376, 384 , also 153rd Field Training Division

Also numerous Heerestruppen [I guess that would be independent artillery etc. - Andreas].

Partially escaped:

- 10. PzGrenDiv
- 13. PzDiv
- 76. Inf.Div

[Note how the more mobile divisions made it out, while the infantry died in encirclement. The 13th could escape, but needed to be rebuilt completely according to the divisional history.]

German losses 180,000-200,000 men. If you also count units from RAD and OT you would probably have to add another 15,000-20,000. It is impossible to get certain figures because (as with the collapse of AGC a weeks before), there was a huge number of MIAs, whose fate could never be fully established.

This comes from someone who I consider to be an expert on German unit history. It appears pretty catastrophic to me, and certainly does not look like the German army escaped 'mainly unhurt' from Romania. I see a massive disconnect between this and Darrin's statement of "mainly unhurt". May I ask what the reports were you have for the basis of that statement Darrin?

The ger lost in ground combat in aug 44 on the rus front entirely not just AGC roughly 31,000 killied 192,000 missing and 152,000 wounded. In sep across the whole front it droped to 18,000 killed, 87,000 wounded and 16,000 mia. In oct it rose slighlty to 22,000, kia, 101,000 wia, 27,000 mia. In nov and dec it dropped back to the lowest levels of almost any month on the eastern front.

These figures are from Normandy 44 by Zetterling on p95. Which are taken directly from ger archive ref T78, R414, F6383234f. Now my friend on some forum said such and such is not a very valid refernce. Even pointing out losses without even deliating type timeframe and AGs covered is an error.

The ger losses in jun on the eastern front were high but normal. It was the losses in jul and aug that were extremly high and except for the 6th army at stalingrad totally without presedent on. After these losses the level of losses for ger on the eastern front was extremly normal for almost any month of a real war.

Which proves my assertion that the ger escaped mainly unhurt for rummaina. So it seems you are the one who is wrong about losses in the south post bagtration. It seems you are the one who is wrong about the rus army being much more mechanized than the ger. While I will agree you have at least one real source glantz that says the ger were bambozzalled backwords and fwd by maskirovka. I pointed out already why I don´t belive his claims about the overall situation on the east front just before bagtration.

The few books of glantz I have read he makes many staments but proves very few of them. In fact some of his statments seem unbleiveable to me. I´ve actually heard his art of war symposia books were better than this but those were published back in the mid 80's and I haven't read them. I find most of his books biased in his preceptions of the rus and ger army. Nowadays he seems more proccupioed with publishuing books too frequently to do the reserch. He even goes so far as to publish on his own. There is nothing wrong with doing all this but he seems to have lost touch in the few books I´ve read.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Darrin:

Well obiously you are still not in touch with reality about the ger losses in the south post bagtration ie sept to dec acording to thier own reports.

---

I am sorry Darrin, but you don't expect me (or anyone else for that matter) to take you seriously anymore after this post.

I have given you references, and exact numbers which are not incompatible with your numbers. Your total number for irreplaceable losses is 257,000. The lower estimate for August/September losses in AG SU that I quoted is 185,000. Therefore there are 72,000 irreplaceable losses elsewhere, which is plenty, considering that the slaughter of Bagration and the L'vov-Sandomierz operation was over by August (L'vov-Sandomierz ended on July 28th according to Koniev; Bagration pretty much ended on July 16th). Most of the killing in the Iassy-Kishinjew operation happened in the first few days following August 23rd.

Your assertions are quite frankly silly. If you think that quoting some random numbers from Mr Zetterling back at me, and putting them in connection with operations that had long since ended, is going to convince me that you are right, I can only urge you to think again. I think it is fairly clear from your post that if this is the extent of your knowledge, than your knowledge of the history of the war in the east is sorely lacking.

Again I ask - which reports do make you believe that AG SU escaped "mainly unhurt", apart from the one which you have completely misinterpreted just now?

Which area do your numbers cover anyway?

How do they break down between Army Groups?

Do they include RAD and OT or is it just Wehrmacht?

quote:

---

Originally posted by Darrin:
Now my friend on some forum said such and such is not a very valid refernce. Even pointing out losses without even deliating type timeframe and AGs covered is an error.

---

Err, come again? Maybe you should actually read my post?

It is pretty clear that these are the losses from the iassy-kinshinyew operation. I leave it up to you to check on the timeframe. Since they are Iassy-Kinshinyew, even the most casual observer should be able to understand that they are AG SU losses.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Darrin:
The real rus army was MUCH improved but in no way equal to the ger and fins at least. If you happen to think anything you read in a book, website or forum is automatically the one and only 'truth' that could be a problem.

---

That really is the funniest thing you said so far.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Patrik:
Is there a definition of what maskirovka means? What is the difference between maskirovka and other means of hiding the attackers intentions?

---

The general Russian definition of maskirovka is "mask; disguise, camouflage." The Soviet military definition is:

quote:

---

The means of securing combat operations and the daily activities of forces; a complexity of measures, directed to mislead the enemy regarding the presence and disposition of forces, various military objectives, their condition, combat readiness and operations, and also the plans of the command ... maskirovka contributes to the achievement of surprise for the actions of forces, the preservation of combat readiness, and the increased survivability of objectives.

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by Andreas:
I am sorry Darrin, but you don't expect me (or anyone else for that matter) to take you seriously anymore after this post.

I have given you references, and exact numbers which are [b]not incompatible with your numbers. Your total number for irreplaceable losses is 257,000. The lower estimate for August/September losses in AG SU that I quoted is 185,000. Therefore there are 72,000 irreplaceable losses elsewhere, which is plenty, considering that the slaughter of Bagration and the L'vov-Sandomierz operation was over by August (L'vov-Sandomierz ended on July 28th according to Koniev; Bagration pretty much ended on July 16th). Most of the killing in the Iassy-Kishinjew operation happened in the first few days following August 23rd.

Your assertions are quite frankly silly. If you think that quoting some random numbers from Mr Zetterling back at me, and putting them in connection with operations that had long since ended, is going to convince me that you are right, I can only urge you to think again. I think it is fairly clear from your post that if this is the extent of your knowledge, than your knowledge of the history of the war in the east is sorely lacking.

Again I ask - which reports do make you believe that AG SU escaped "mainly unhurt", apart from the one which you have completely misinterpreted just now?

Which area do your numbers cover anyway?

How do they break down between Army Groups?

Do they include RAD and OT or is it just Wehrmacht?

I have provided sources for you to go to and check. You have provided a source which you completely misinterpreted, and yet you accuse me of not being in touch with reality. Do you have anything else to back up your opinion?[/B]

---

NOT 252,000 irreplacable after aug in any way manner. 40,000 kia and 43,000 mia during sep and oct add up to 83,000 irreplacable losses across the entire eastern front. Which is what I said after bag after aug losses rates returned to normal levels for the rest of 44. Bagtration although a great victory for rus was a pinicle of thier achievments not the avg across the entire front for the entire year. Even then bagtration was no barabossa type victory.

What I specifically knew from looking at this info was that losses outside of bagtration ie after aug for ALL 4 ger army groups was pretty normal. All ger ground forces in the eastern front including heer, waffen ss and luft ground forces but not rear support services. Now I NEVER claimed the losses of just one army group were anything go back and read my post. You are the one who all of a sudden starts limiting it to AGSU without even telling any of us. I proably mentioned south as in all AG south of AGC but the overall losses in the east were low meaning any losses in the south and anywhere else was normal wartime conditions and managable. There is a war on they were't playing criket...

You gave us a fiigure of 200,000 losses from my friend with out specifing type, AG and time frame. Your friend could have been including wounded into his tot per loses. The seems more lickly to be the case and you have just been mis reprsenting your anymous friends numbers. Thats why we need refernces and sources.

Also go back to my post. I not only gave you the book refer but also the ger army archive referce you can order it yourself and check it if for some reason you doubt zetterling. Meanwhile all you give me is a friend from a forum no name, no book, no sources. A refernce is NOT just a number BUT where the numbers came from. Go check an english dictionary if you have problems with this because it is the truth.

Seems you are 0 for 3 concerning the ger army. Bagtration over by july 16th maybe we should say 0 for 4.

You say twice in your message that you provided a source. DID YOU WRITE WITH INVISIBLE INK? No source or any proper definitions of AG, timeframe or loss types was given by you. All we see is a number included just a number of 200,000 losses period no def or sources.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Darrin:
Meanwhile all you give me is a friend from a forum no name, no book, no sources. A refernce is NOT just a number BUT where the numbers came from. Go check an english dictionary if you have problems with this because it is the truth.

---

I guess you missed it, but Andreas did give a name (Jörg Wurdack) and a listing of sources:

quote:

---

Originally posted by Foxbat:
I guess you missed it, but Andreas did give a name (Jörg Wurdack) and a listing of sources:

-Frießner, Hans: Verratene Schlachten. Die Tragödie der deutschen Wehrmacht in Rumänien und Ungarn. Hamburg 1956
-Kissel, Hans: Die Katastrophe in Rumänien 1944. Darmstadt 1964
-Mazulenko, W. A.: Die Zerschlagung der Heeresgruppe Südukraine, August - September 1944. Berlin 1959
-Rehm, Walter: Jassy - Schicksal einer Division oder einer Armee? (= Die Wehrmacht im Kampf, 21) Neckargemünd 1959

---

You are right foxbat.

Quoting from the Wehrmacht Verlustwesen (BA-MA RW 6/v. 559) provided by Niklas Zetterling in "The Journal of Slavic Military Studies" (JSMS) Volume 9 #4:

Army Group Centre sufferred 399,096 KIA / WIA / MIA between 20 June and 31 August 1944

Specifically:

2nd Army: 7,080 KIA - 32,833 WIA - 12,976 MIA
9th Army: 2,955 KIA - 13,957 WIA - 64,762 MIA
4th Army: 8,015 KIA - 29,838 WIA - 113,155 MIA
3rd Pz Army: 8,311 KIA - 33,508 WIA - 72,066 MIA

Where the total German losses for the entire Eastern front from 1 June - 31 August 1944 were:

71,685 KIA
325,381 WIA
503,564 MIA
_________________
900,630 Total losses

If you are just concerned with the losses from the L'vov - Sandomir operation, then losses for the month of July 1944 for the entire Eastern Front were:

30,420 KIA
131,732 WIA
238,284 MIA

The total loss figures are also referenced by Niklas Zetterling from the JSMS 9#4, as: NA, Microfilm T78, roll 414, frame 6383234.

These losses should be compared with the total available German forces on 1 June 1944:

South Ukraine Iststärke 477,676 Gefechtstärke 231,679
North Ukraine Iststärke 532,738 Gefechtstärke 263,489
Centre Iststärke 644,396 Gefechtstärke 316,200
North Iststärke 434,749 Gefechtstärke 211,968

Total Iststärke 2,089,599 Gefechtstärke 1,023,336

Now the important point is that the figures are compatible. Iassy-Kishinyew started on Aug 23rd. Most of the damage was done to the German AG SU within the first few days, i.E. in August. E.g. the history of 13.PD ('Die Magdeburger Division') states that the division had lost its coherence after two days fighting (that is at the end of day three, Aug. 26th).

An interesting analysis (for me at least is to look at the relation between the number of WIA and KIA/MIA. IMO it does bear out the great speed at which the Soviets moved. In August it is 152,000 WIA and 223,000 KIA/MIA. That is a ratio of 1:1.47. In September, when the front stabilised again, it is 1:0.4. In October it is 1:0.5. This to me indicates that Soviet advances in August were so quick that most of the wounded could not be evacuated and became MIA/KIA.

I have done some reverse math, and as a ballpark figure the one I posted could be roughly correct, although it looks to be overstating the losses somewhat.

AGC 400k
AGSU 240k
Total 900k
Difference 260k total.

I believe the information you want can be found in "Personelle blutige Verluste des Feldheeres, Berichtigte Meldung für die Zeit vom 1 Juni 1944 bis 10 Jan. 1945, Der Heeresarzt im Oberkommando des Heeres, Gen.St.d.H/Gen.Qu Az 1335 c/d (IId)"

A copy of which can be found in the National Archives, Washington DC on Microfilm Publication T78, Roll 414, Frame 6383234.

Maybe Niklas Zetterling has a copy of this frame and maybe able to help?

quote:

---

Originally posted by Lawrence Sims:
Andreas, Sorry I don't have figures specific to AG South Ukraine.

I believe the information you want can be found in "Personelle blutige Verluste des Feldheeres, Berichtigte Meldung für die Zeit vom 1 Juni 1944 bis 10 Jan. 1945, Der Heeresarzt im Oberkommando des Heeres, Gen.St.d.H/Gen.Qu Az 1335 c/d (IId)"

A copy of which can be found in the National Archives, Washington DC on Microfilm Publication T78, Roll 414, Frame 6383234.

Maybe Niklas Zetterling has a copy of this frame and maybe able to help?

---

Lawrence, that report summarizes the dekade reports through 10 January 1945 and evidently includes some corrections. Unfortunately, it only gives casualties by theater (i.e., Osten, Geb.AOK 20, AOK Norwegen, OB Sued-West, OB-Sued-Ost, and OB-West) rather than by army group or army.

But, for what its worth, here are the original dekade reports for AOK 6:

1-10 August 1944 165 KIA, 559 WIA, 0 MIA
11-20 August 295 KIA, 862 KIA, 87 MIA

The 21-31 August report is missing.

21 August-10 September 242 KIA, 208 WIA, 0 MIA

So it is rather obvious that in this case the original reports were somewhat inaccurate.

Ubfortunately I do not have access to the Nachmeldung correcting the dekade reports (they were evidently not filmed in the NARA miecrofilm series). I rather suspect Niklas has found them though and perhaps he will comment more on this.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Rich:
So it is rather obvious that in this case the original reports were somewhat inaccurate.

---

LOL!

I hope someone else can help out then!