p. 14 gives the force "massed in the East to destroy the Red Army" as 151 divisions, equipped with an estimated 3350 tanks, 7200 artillery pieces and 2770 aircraft. No proper source is provided. Reference is made to the OKH schematische Kriegsgliederungen, which gives an overview of forces but hardly equipment numbers as far as I'm aware.

p.84 - It is stated that through July 31, the three army groups had suffered 213,301 casualties and received only 47,000 replacements. This is referenced to an unpublished 1985 Centre for Military History study by Charles Luttichau. Not a source I am familiar with, and of course, not an easy reference to check. The figures do not seem implausible to me.

p.112 "Fighting in the Leningrad region died out in late september and the front stabilised temporarily. Despite the spectacular gains it had recorded since crossing the Western Dvina in early July, Army Group North had suffered 60,000 casualties."

It does not seem clear either when the casualty period in question started, or when it ended (presumably early July-late September?). This is also referenced to Luttichau.

page 141 contains an overview of the strength of the German forces assembled for Typhoon in October. This force is listed at 1,929,406 men excluding Luftwaffe personnel, with 14,000 artillery pieces, 1000 tanks and 1390 combat aircraft. This is referenced to HG Mitte KTB and Klaus Reinhardt's "Moscow - The Turning point". He goes on to point out in the note that the infantry divisions were on average 1500 men short, and that Guderian had 50% of his required tanks, Hoth 70-80% and Höppner roughly 100%. Presumably, most of the figures have been calculated on the basis of this. He also quotes Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina (The Great Patriotic War) 1941-45, edited by V.A. Zolotarev, which curiously puts German personnel strength lower than Glantz (1,8 million) but has an identical number of artillery pieces, giving some cause to suspect that this is Glantz' source for that weapons category. Given some numbers from this source as quoted further down, and that it exaggerates German tank strength greatly compared to Glantz (1700) this is not a happy thought. Especially when one considers that if this artillery figure is correct, the German forces concentrated for Typhoon would have almost twice as much artillery as the entire force assembled for Barbarossa in June, according to Glantz' own numbers (see above).

p. 154 mentions Kluge's 4th Army being "at full strength" on 10 October. This implausible statement is not referenced.

p. 187-88 provides a rather curious example. First he mentions official Soviet figures for the Moscow sector on 6 december, which is 1,100,000 men, 7652 guns and mortars 774 tanks and 1000 aircraft on the Soviet side, and 1,708,000 men, 13500 artillery pieces, 1170 tanks and 615 aircraft on the German side. However, he concludes that these numbers are much too high, and that they incorrectly give the Germans a numerical edge in most equipment categories. Against this, he cites a recently declassified Soviet report giving effective combat strength on 5 December as 388,000 men, 5635 guns and 550 tanks against 240,000 Germans with 5350 guns and 600 tanks.

The discrepancies - both in absolute and relative numbers - are major, even if partially accounted for by different strength definitions (the latter being "effective combat strength." I am not familiar with the specifics of this Soviet definition). In both cases, German numbers are supplied from Soviet sources. The first set of figures are referenced to Zolotarev. Of course, Glantz refutes these numbers. But this is a work that frequently turns up in his notes. Conceivably though, it may of course simply state that these were the official Soviet figures without giving credence to them (although figures from this source elsewhere in the text are clearly much exaggerated). The study from which the modified numbers are taken was authored by Shaposhnikov in 1943, and can hardly be reckoned an authorative source on German strength.

p. 188: It is stated that the Wehrmacht had lost 830,000 men by 6 December, although Hitler only admitted to half a million. This is referenced to Albert Seaton's Moscow book. I do not know where Seaton derived his number from.

All in all, Glantz' book does not contain much numerical information on German forces. What figures he do provide come from a diverse mix of published works of variable reputation, Soviet sources and unpublished studies. Some are not properly referenced. In toto, his information on the German side seem open to legitimate objections.

Of course, it is a relatively short study on a vast subject, and as such cannot be expected to contain a lot of figures (though much more information is provided for the Soviet side). Nor do I believe a study of this type and scope neccessarily have to. Also, (curiously, unlike some people who are quick to jump to Glantz' defense whenever he is criticised) I do not get the impression that he is "biased" in the Soviet favour - overall I thought it was a good and objectively inclined study, albeit with the above reservations.

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:

p. 14 gives the force "massed in the East to destroy the Red Army" as 151 divisions, equipped with an estimated 3350 tanks, 7200 artillery pieces and 2770 aircraft. No proper source is provided. Reference is made to the OKH schematische Kriegsgliederungen, which gives an overview of forces but hardly equipment numbers as far as I'm aware.

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It depends on what is included in "forces massed". If it is reserves that were not immediately available, it seems OK. It mainly depends on what it is compared to on the Soviet side.

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
p.84 - It is stated that through July 31, the three army groups had suffered 213,301 casualties and received only 47,000 replacements. This is referenced to an unpublished 1985 Centre for Military History study by Charles Luttichau. Not a source I am familiar with, and of course, not an easy reference to check. The figures do not seem implausible to me.

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
p.112 "Fighting in the Leningrad region died out in late september and the front stabilised temporarily. Despite the spectacular gains it had recorded since crossing the Western Dvina in early July, Army Group North had suffered 60,000 casualties."

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If this means casualties 22 June to late September it is wrong, but the time period is a little vague.

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
page 141 contains an overview of the strength of the German forces assembled for Typhoon in October. This force is listed at 1,929,406 men excluding Luftwaffe personnel, with 14,000 artillery pieces, 1000 tanks and 1390 combat aircraft. This is referenced to HG Mitte KTB and Klaus Reinhardt's "Moscow - The Turning point".

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I'll see if I can provide something on the rest.

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:

page 141 contains an overview of the strength of the German forces assembled for Typhoon in October. This force is listed at 1,929,406 men excluding Luftwaffe personnel, with 14,000 artillery pieces, 1000 tanks and 1390 combat aircraft. This is referenced to HG Mitte KTB and Klaus Reinhardt's "Moscow - The Turning point". He goes on to point out in the note that the infantry divisions were on average 1500 men short, and that Guderian had 50% of his required tanks, Hoth 70-80% and Höppner roughly 100%. Presumably, most of the figures have been calculated on the basis of this. He also quotes Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina (The Great Patriotic War) 1941-45, edited by V.A. Zolotarev, which curiously puts German personnel strength lower than Glantz (1,8 million) but has an identical number of artillery pieces, giving some cause to suspect that this is Glantz' source for that weapons category. Given some numbers from this source as quoted further down, and that it exaggerates German tank strength greatly compared to Glantz (1700) this is not a happy thought. Especially when one considers that if this artillery figure is correct, the German forces concentrated for Typhoon would have almost twice as much artillery as the entire force assembled for Barbarossa in June, according to Glantz' own numbers (see above).

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There is a general problem with all counting of artillry pieces on the eastern front. Soviet sources include virtually any type of gun and mortar (except the smallest), regardless of whether they are indirect artillery, AA guns, AT guns, direct firing HE weapons etc. The Germans don't use this practise. Thus it is very easy to compare apples with oranges.
I only have scattered figures on the German panzer divisions at the time of Taifun, but as far as I can say, only the recently arived 2nd and 5th panzer divisions could have been at full strength, thus all Hoeppners panzer divisions can hardly have been at full strength.

I have a German report giving the number of artillery pieces on 22 June 1941 and it coincides quite well with Glantz figure. It is utterly unthinkable that AG Center would have twice as many guns on 2 October as the entire Barbarossa force had on 22 June. It seems clear that the figure used by Glantz has Soviet origins.

On the German tank strength in the east, the following is given by Boog/Förster/Hoffmann/Klink/Müller/Ueberschär, "Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion", p. 1156:
22 June 3648
Losses June: 118
Losses July: 732
Additions July: 91
Losses August: 638
Additions August: 11
Losses September: 257
Additions 39

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
p. 188: It is stated that the Wehrmacht had lost 830,000 men by 6 December, although Hitler only admitted to half a million. This is referenced to Albert Seaton's Moscow book. I do not know where Seaton derived his number from.

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To Mr. Zetterling:

Regarding the STAVKA Study of Korsun 1944, I believe this actually was published in 1944. If this is so, then Soviet assessments of German strengths and losses would've been dependent upon their own AARs. Thus, their data would've been limited to their own combat reports from the time, rather than postwar German archives. If the study was never updated, then as a report it would be considered 'candid and honest,' since all information and assessments were limited to studies done in 1944. Now, had the publication been republished with new information, then one might be able to label it otherwise.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:

Regarding the STAVKA Study of Korsun 1944, I believe this actually was published in 1944. If this is so, then Soviet assessments of German strengths and losses would've been dependent upon their own AARs. Thus, their data would've been limited to their own combat reports from the time, rather than postwar German archives. If the study was never updated, then as a report it would be considered 'candid and honest,' since all information and assessments were limited to studies done in 1944. Now, had the publication been republished with new information, then one might be able to label it otherwise.

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True, but it is not only labeled candid, but also accurate, which it clearly is not on many occasions.
Also, I doubt its candidness on some points, mainly the claim that the Germans were fooled by the Maskirovka operation, despite the fact that the Red Army can hardly have missed the German countermeasures. Indeed in at least one case the report contradicts itself. This is when it first claims that all German panzer divisions were retained on the wrong axis due to the maskirovka operation. Somewhat later, the report tries to explain the difficulties duriing the 2 UF breakthrough with the fact that the German 11th and 14th Panzerdivisions had been placed in a position to blunt the Soviet attack.
Another example is the overall German losses given by the study. I have found that these figures are identical to a communiqué given by Moscow only hours after the battle. It is clear that at such an early stage the true picture could not have been clear, even if there had been an honest intention to obtain an accurate picture. Nevertheless, this official figure was iterated in the study, as in all Soviet works on the battle I have seen. A rather good example of the Soviet system versus the western.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
Part of the problem is that you are critiquing Glantz' book based on his German research. Glantz' focus in his research is not German, but Soviet. I agree that Glantz would be a poor source for study of German forces in the Russian Front, but this was not his intent. He is far more concerned with building a basis of understanding for the Red Army during that struggle, since so little exists on the subject.

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Well I could have accepted but …
If the books had been on the Red Army, why do they contain so many statements on the Germans. It could be accepted if it had been written for example "according to Soviet estimates, the German forces numbered …" or simlilar phrases.
If we wan't to know how decisions were made, it is of course not the true situation that matters, but the information available to the decision makers at the time that matters. If Soviet commanders lived with an inflated view of German strength and losses, well that's a piece of information that can be used to explain their decisions and actions. However, I don't see Glantz used it that way. Rather, he tries to analyse events in more general terms, in ways that requires accurate information on the Germans too.
Hence, I don't accept that the idea that his focus is on the Red Army, since he not only writes about the Red Army, he also tries to analyse battles and operations with two partcipants.

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Rather, I am not critiquing Glantz' book based on his research on the Germans or anything else. I am not in a position to do a critique even of one limited aspect of the book (as I lack the appropriate source material), and am certainly not attempting to do so in a general sense. I am simply giving an overview of the limited number of cases where he makes statements on German strength and losses and the sources he bases these statements on, and making some observations on this. I would disagree with you that Barbarossa 1941 is a book about the Soviet Army, it both purports to be and reads as a general history of the campaign. In any case, it is neccessary to have a reasonably accurate picture of the state of the German side to be able to understand Soviet operations correctly. As stated, I don't have a negative view of the book, and from Niklas' comments it seems clear that much if not all of his information is reasonably accurate.

Many thanks for the taking the time and effort to provide the information I do not possess. A most interesting exercise.

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
Well I could have accepted but …
If the books had been on the Red Army, why do they contain so many statements on the Germans. It could be accepted if it had been written for example "according to Soviet estimates, the German forces numbered …" or simlilar phrases.
If we wan't to know how decisions were made, it is of course not the true situation that matters, but the information available to the decision makers at the time that matters. If Soviet commanders lived with an inflated view of German strength and losses, well that's a piece of information that can be used to explain their decisions and actions. However, I don't see Glantz used it that way. Rather, he tries to analyse events in more general terms, in ways that requires accurate information on the Germans too.
Hence, I don't accept that the idea that his focus is on the Red Army, since he not only writes about the Red Army, he also tries to analyse battles and operations with two partcipants.

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Originally posted by Gary Dickson:
All of the Soviet officers in WWII must have gone though the hell of the purges, and, if they survived, learned just how dangerous it could be to go against the Party line. To me the amazing thing about these internal studies is that even in a document supposedly intended to teach officers how to fight successfully, the material was slanted to suit higher ups because the fear of offending the bosses was greater than the fear of losing to the enemy by teaching the wrong lessons.

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I really don't think it is a political slant, but a military one - something typical of all armies. Granted, we're talking of the Soviet Union, so a political slant is a given at certain points, but overall the study was a candid one within the confines of the Soviet military circle (completely accurate is questionable, but probably within acceptable norms to be instructive).

In Soviet memoirs there are numerous examples of Soviet officers questioning their superiors' commands, going all the way up to Stalin (Rokossovskii and Zhukov come to mind immediately). That the dual command system was dropped for good by 1942 is an indication in itself that the Soviets recognized the harm political interference was having on military operations. 1941 is a clear case of political interference hampering military operations (not that the Soviets had a military that had enough experience, training or equipment to conduct military operations at that time, but you get my point). In 1943, the only real Soviet criteria was success. In WWII, the Soviet military could definitely be draconian at times, but this was due more to military expectations surpassing capabilities.

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In Soviet memoirs there are numerous examples of Soviet officers questioning their superiors' commands, going all the way up to Stalin (Rokossovskii and Zhukov come to mind immediately).

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This was tied to Soviet internal politics after the war. As you know, during the "destalinisation" period critisizing Stalin´s war time decisions (and praising Khrushchev´s) became popular. When Brezhnev was the "boss", there was sudden urge to edit war history material, including memoirs, for his war-time views. This all was done in very "orwellian" way.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
Part of the problem is that you are critiquing Glantz' book based on his German research. Glantz' focus in his research is not German, but Soviet. I agree that Glantz would be a poor source for study of German forces in the Russian Front, but this was not his intent. He is far more concerned with building a basis of understanding for the Red Army during that struggle, since so little exists on the subject.

To Mr. Zetterling:

Regarding the STAVKA Study of Korsun 1944, I believe this actually was published in 1944. If this is so, then Soviet assessments of German strengths and losses would've been dependent upon their own AARs. Thus, their data would've been limited to their own combat reports from the time, rather than postwar German archives. If the study was never updated, then as a report it would be considered 'candid and honest,' since all information and assessments were limited to studies done in 1944. Now, had the publication been republished with new information, then one might be able to label it otherwise.

[This message has been edited by Greg LG (edited 11-26-2002).]

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The first 100+ pages of the korsun study were written in 44 but the last part was added post war. This later part does not contain any corrections regarding earlier errors and is just as error prone about the german forces.

Its amazing to see the report claim the germans had 12 divs present when not more than 8 were around. Not before battle observations alone but including all captured info, pows, intercepts etc. Analyzed up the yin yang until late 44 and no better aprroximations or corrections are given in the post war section.

It seems the rus were subject to german marskarova operations that they still failed to idenitfy MONTHS after the battle was over. Not quite the line glantz wants us to believe about sov and ger deception operations.

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Originally posted by Darrin:

The first 100+ pages of the korsun study were written in 44 but the last part was added post war. This later part does not contain any corrections regarding earlier errors and is just as error prone about the german forces.

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Originally posted by Darrin:
It seems the rus were subject to german marskarova operations that they still failed to idenitfy MONTHS after the battle was over. Not quite the line glantz wants us to believe about sov and ger deception operations. ]

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Originally posted by Darrin:
Its amazing to see the report claim the germans had 12 divs present when not more than 8 were around. Not before battle observations alone but including all captured info, pows, intercepts etc. Analyzed up the yin yang until late 44 and no better aprroximations or corrections are given in the post war section.

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