As two people asked that I continue this list, I will as time allows, picking up where I left off.

These areas of disagreement tend to be caused, in my opinion, by two things:

1) Haste and sloppiness. In many cases, I think the authors know better and would have no hesitation changing it. Each of these points is relatively minor and insignificant by themselves, but the number of them do add up. Many of them, though, are caused by using Soviet-era material for German data and as such they become part of the second cause of disagreement, which is:

2) An over-reliance and uncritical acceptance of Soviet-era secondary sources. This is a fundmental methodology problem that is being discussed in some depth in the previous thread. It unfortunately, also leads to errors in intepretation and view. On these issues, I suspect I will remain in disagreement with the authors.

Page 18: "For example, on 5-6 July 1943, two companies from the 505th Heavy Panzer Detachment (battalion) destroyed 111 Soviet tanks for a loss of only 3 of their own."

Now....I really don't know if this statement is true or not, but it is presented as a certain statement. I doubt if it has been cross-checked to Soviet records as to plausibility. The footnote addresses a Steve Zaloga book.

One is left with a methodological issue here. The German and Soviet records are full of estimates of enemy strengths and claims of kills. In some cases they are useful for determining what was happening (for example a claim that they came under a battalion-size attack supported by 20 tanks) but, of course, there is no way of knowing if they are really very accurate. There is a posting earlier in this forum where I discuss the German claims of Hs-129s taking out 40 Soviet tanks and single-handedly stopping a Soviet armor attack. In this case, It was specific enough as to time and location that I could cross-check it with Soviet records, and the claim was clearly not correct (as to losses or effect).

Page 19: "During its first five days of fighting in July 1943, Panther strength was reduced to only 10 tanks; 123 were lost or damaged by enemy action and 46 to mechanical breakdowns."

I think I have an extended discussion of this issue in a previous thread and do not accept these figures. My data comes from the unit records, while his comes from Janusz Pikalkiewicz, an author I am not familiar with.

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
My data comes from the unit records, while his comes from Janusz Pikalkiewicz, an author I am not familiar with.

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
...more than 700 tanks, predominantly Pz IV G and H with 75 mm guns, and more than 100 Tiger and Panther tanks, plus heavy Ferdinand assault guns were waiting for the order to attack [Prokhorovka]" on the morning of 12 July.

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There was a Soviet account I read at one time which claimed (or seemed to suggest) Panthers and Ferdinands as being present at Prokhorovka, along with other German tanks types. This may well be where Piekalkewicz derives that fantasy. I will try to find that source.

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
In the end, if one is going to make use of such claims (or even print them), then they should as a minimum cross-check the opposing side to make sure it was plausible (did the units facing these people actually suffer enough losses) and should clearly state that it is a "German claim" or "Soviet claim", vice presenting it as a fact.

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Agreed, that is all it would take to resolve many of my disagreements with the use of Soviet accounts - just say who claimed it and footnote the source! But I suppose making everything you write sound like an iron-clad fact boosts the author's position as an authority, unlike the rest of us meek self-doubters.

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
It claims that "more than 700 tanks, predominantly Pz IV G and H with 75 mm guns, and more than 100 Tiger and Panther tanks, plus heavy Ferdinand assault guns were waiting for the order to attack [Prokhorovka]" on the morning of 12 July.

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That's humorous. Glad I didn't waste any time chasing down this source. By the way, got your package yesterday, thanks.

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Originally posted by Frederick L Clemens:
There was a Soviet account I read at one time which claimed (or seemed to suggest) Panthers and Ferdinands as being present at Prokhorovka, along with other German tanks types. This may well be where Piekalkewicz derives that fantasy. I will try to find that source.

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Actually, at the Battle of Kursk museum at Belgorod they have a semicircular room with a multistory diorama of the Battle of Prokhorovka in it that is quite impressive. It also shows Panthers and Ferdinands. Nothing like that heroic Soviet art.

Its standard Soviet mythology. At my first meeting with Col. Sverdlov back in 1993, he asked about three times in a row if there were Ferdinands there.

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Originally posted by Frederick L Clemens:
PS How did I suddenly become a "senior member" on the forum? - was it age or sheer longwindedness?

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Longwindedness is the only qualification....although I probably should be tactful and say that it is due to brilliant and insightful postings.

Page 20 "...the sixty-seven-ton elephant was not equipped with any machineguns to protect itself against Soviet infantry with short-range antitank weapons. As such, the Elephant had to remain in an overwatching position, well to the rear of the battle."

Now, I have not studied the Northern attack at all, but I would be suprised if the Elephants were kept to the rear and primarily used for overwatch. I could be wrong on this point.

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Originally posted by Frederick L Clemens:
There was a Soviet account I read at one time which claimed (or seemed to suggest) Panthers and Ferdinands as being present at Prokhorovka, along with other German tanks types. This may well be where Piekalkewicz derives that fantasy. I will try to find that source.

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
What source do Glantz/House give?

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They footnote the previous sentence (the one ending "...with short-range antitank weapons", but do not footnote the sentence about overwatch. The footnotes mention Perret, Knights of the Black Cross, pages 104-105, Guderian, Panzer Leader, 299 and DiNardo, Germany's Panzer Arm, 18.

In the case of Perret's book, it was so bad that I threw my copy away after reading it, so I do not know if it discussed "overwatch". I have not seen DiNardo.

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
I have begun to suspect that some Soviet sources simply mean Sturmgeschutz when they speak about Ferdinands.

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Oh no, they mean Ferdinands...I've seen the paintings in Belgorod I believe this is why Sverdlov asked me several times about the Ferdinands.

Page 21. "Italy and Rumania put out peace feelers, and Turkey finally decided not to attack the Soviet Union in the Caucasus."

Now, the diplomatic history of WWII is hardly my area of expertise, so I could be operating from ignorance here. While both Italy and Romania (and others) brought up the issue a making a peace in either the east or the west with Hitler or the German government, I do not have any specific reference to their governments contacting the allies about possible peace agreements between Jan and June of 1943. I would not be suprised if this occurred, but I do not have a record of it. Can anyone help me here?

On the issue of Turkey, again, I have little expertise on the subject, but I do not have the impression that Turkey ever seriously considered entering the war on the side of the Germans and I seriously doubt if it was being considered in 1943. A brief diplomatic history of Turkey is provided in the following link. although this is certianly not a comprehensive, or even unbiased source:

http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/report2/rpt_9806_ng_turkey.pdf

The only nations I note as actually putting out peace feelers between Jan and June 1943 is Hungary and Finland. Glantz/House does discuss Finland two sentences later.

Page 21:"German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop warned the Helsinki government that Berlin would never approve of a separate Finnish peace with the Soviets."

Now, this is certainly not incorrect...but is a little incomplete. As I understand it (and I'm sure one of our Finns will correct me), the US embassy offered its good services to try to negotiate a seperate peace. The Finnish government then went to the German government to discuss it...and of course, Ribbentrop strongly objected.

This puts a little bit different tone on the whole incident than the Glantz/House simple declarative statement. I am not certain if the Finns at this stage (Jan-June 1943) had actaully put out peace feelers to the Soviet Union before discussing the situation with Germany.

Page 21, next paragraph: "Under the circumstances it was politically impossible for Germany to surrender the initiative on the Eastern Front."

This is a conclusion that is really not supported. Furthermore, a number of senoir people did not feel the immediate political need to take the initiative(i.e. Manstein and Guderian...who specifically states so). The "political impossibility" of not taking the initiative was not universally recognized at the time and certianly not in the post-war memoirs. Therefore, I have to object to the use of the word "impossible" without the presentation of a stronger arguement. As it is, no arguement is provided, just a declarative statement.

Page 21, next sentence: "Although only fanatics believed that the Soviets could be decisively defeated, most senoir leaders recognized the necessity for a renewed offensive."

If most "senoir leaders" recognized the need for a renewed offensive, then why did Manstein (AG South) originally propose the "backhand" approach, Guderian (IG Armor)openly object to the offensive, Model (9th Army) object, Kempf (Prov. Army Kempf) in June (after it had been delayed) object to it and Zietzler (COS OKH) more than willing to forward Kempf's objections on.

Page 21, next sentence: "Given von Manstein's brilliant successes in a mobile, mechanized defense, some of the German leadership considered deferring a renewed offensive until after they had absorbed the next Soviet offensive, an option that was sometimes described as hitting the Reds "on the backhand"........In fact, the general impression among commanders like von Manstein was that the Germans had ended the winter campaign with a relative advantage over the Reds, an advantage that should be exploited by a renewed offensive as soon as the rasputitsa ended in April or early May."

As Manstein originally proposed the backhand approach to Hitler in March as the preferred option (and there are some confirming post-war interviews on this)...then I am a little mystified at these two sentences from the same paragraph.

Page 21, between the two sentences quoted above: "Yet there was no guarentee that the Red Army would obligingly attack when and where the Germans wanted."

Yes, Finland took a contact with the Soviets via the americans but simultaneously told Germans that the contact had been taken. When US ambassador in Finland wanted in very angry tone to know why the secret was revealed to Germany, Finnish response was "they would have known anyway". The reference was to leaks in Finnish government but the result of this exchange was that the next diplomatic telegram from Helsinki to Washington from the US embassy started with the words: "For reasons explained in the next telegram I suggest that we change code". This was a nice call from the US embassy in Helsinki as both Finns and Germans could indeed read US diplomatic code in 1943. It took Finns more than 6 months to break the new code. Don't know if Germans succeeded in doing the same.

Apart of the obvious problems on agreeing on peace terms, Moscow felt strong again and demanded 1940 borders, the biggest obstacle to peace was Germany. Finnish government knew exactly what was going to happen if Finland tried to leave the train with 200.000 German soldiers in the country and sea routes controlled by Germany. So peace was possible first when Germany was so weak that it could not launch a major operation against Finland. This same factor carried most weight also in April 1944 when Finland and Moscow had their next contact.

That time Germany retaliated by stopping arms deliveries to Finland. They were resumed first when the Soviet assault in the Karelian Isthmus started June 9, 1944. It is a little known fact that Germans started arms deliveries again several days before Ribbentrop arrived to Helsinki and forced Ryti to sign the personal letter to Hitler that made Finland an ally of Germany. What was at stake when Ryti signed was continuation of the German help. Here planes and AT weapons are usually mentioned but the most important help was probably the promise to supply Finns with artillery ammunition. From mid June onwards there were no restrictions in use of ammunition. Actually the inspector of the artillery demanded to know at one point why the artillery units were not shooting more;-)

When the Soviet attack ran out of steam Finns waited until German troops had been driven out of most of Estonia before negotiations were openned with Moscow. Germany was no longer in a position to threaten main population centers of Finland militarily because the Estonian bases had been lost and German Navy was pushed back to the Western part of the Baltic Sea.

Regards,

Thanks. Do have the dates for the events in 1943? (US contact with Soviet government, Finnish meeting with Ribbentrop, etc.). I take it this was the only contact (peace feelers) until 1944?

My unit was the 216. Sturmpanzer Abteilung, and we were used as "fire brigade", each platoon having four 150mm (short-barreled) howitzers; we were sent to numerous focal points to either help infantry in the attack, or discourage attacking Soviet units, which always were much larger than our own units so attacked.

Glantz/house speak of a ratio of 2 or 3 to 1. Thinking back, i firmly believe that the actual ratio, as far as all losses are concerned, should be 7 to 1, the first number showng the Soviet side.

It is my firm belief that neither one of the authors had any substantial access to German records. This probably was due to the fact that the Soviets captured tone of material at Zossen, when that headquarters was overrun in May 1945. These records have vanished into Russian archives and are unaccessible, until a Russian regime in the future will permit them to be viewed. After all, they still speak of this war as the Great Patriotic War.

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Originally posted by Joscha:
Having participated in the battle of Kursk, albeit in the Northern sector near Malo Arkhangelsk,

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Joscha, thank you for posting. I would like to talk to you outside the newsgroup about your personal experiences in the battle. While my upcoming book (which I am still furiously working on) covers only the southern German offensive, I am sure in a while (a few years) I will get around to the North or to doing a book that covers the entire battle (including the massive Soviet counter-offensive). For the south, I had 28 interviews gathered from veterans (I had someone gather them for me as I do not speak German). I would not mind starting to collect interviews from other parts of the battlefield for later use.

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Glantz/house speak of a ratio of 2 or 3 to 1. Thinking back, i firmly believe that the actual ratio, as far as all losses are concerned, should be 7 to 1, the first number showng the Soviet side.

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In the case of my book, and the Kursk Data Base project, we assembled our losses from each side by going through the unit records for each side. While average exchange ratios in personnel and tanks in the south for the Germans versus Soviets were in the range of around 1 to 3....in individual sectors, it is clearly more lopsided than that, and we do see cases of 1 to 15 (German vs Soviet) armor exchange ratios in some major actions (keeping in mind that not all tanks are killed by other tanks).

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It is my firm belief that neither one of the authors had any substantial access to German records.

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"Access" to German records is relatively easy, especially as copies of most of the German records are in US (DC area) in the national archives. It does not appear that they made extensive use of them though. In their defense, it really does take a lot of time to systematically go through the records of every unit involved in a major battle. I was only able to do so for the south because I had a research budget and a research team.

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This probably was due to the fact that the Soviets captured tone of material at Zossen, when that headquarters was overrun in May 1945.

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As the Germans records (at least the KTBs) appear to have been bundled up and sent back to the rear every six months, one finds that most units at Kursk have good records, regardless of what happened to the unit later.

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These records have vanished into Russian archives and are unaccessible, until a Russian regime in the future will permit them to be viewed.

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The records they have captured from the Germans, as far as I understand, are not available to general researchers. On the other hand, it is possible for any researcher to request permission to access the Soviet unit records (although permission can be denied).