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Author
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Topic: 3rd Period of the war from German primary sources?
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Greg LG
Senior Member
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posted 10-09-2002 01:38 AM
  
What I'd like to see is an in-depth study of the Russian front from 1944-45 using German primary sources. Has this even been done yet? I can't think of anything that seriously attempts this. Sort of a flip-side to Glantz' book on Barbarossa.While I'm partial to the Soviet perspective of their Great Patriotic War, I do realize that political shading is evident in even some 'classified' Soviet works that have been made available. However, as comparison's of German intelligence assessments to Soviet dispositions reveal, maskirovka's effect was substantial at least in the penetration phases of many latter Soviet offensive operations. Might this be an approach to follow, using German primary data to reinforce Soviet secondary or primary sources - or refute, as the case may be? In the end, there might be a very interesting story that unfolds and one that is that much closer to the truth.
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Chris Lawrence
Moderator
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posted 10-09-2002 10:34 AM
quote:
Originally posted by Greg LG:
What I'd like to see is an in-depth study of the Russian front from 1944-45 using German primary sources.
I'm not aware of any. In principal, I strongly object to any history of warfare written from one side's perspective. Warfare is a fight between two sides, acting and reacting to each other. To have any form of meaningful military history, I believe one needs to collect source material from both sides. quote:
I do realize that political shading is evident in even some 'classified' Soviet works that have been made available.
Many of those "classified" works that have been made available are staff studies. As such they are secondary sources. There are considerable problems with them. See Niklas Zetterling's website for his write-up on the Staff Study on Korsun. quote:
However, as comparison's of German intelligence assessments to Soviet dispositions reveal, maskirovka's effect was substantial at least in the penetration phases of many latter Soviet offensive operations.
Can't talk to that period of the war as I have done no work there, but in the case of Kursk, I did go through the German intelligence maps. All the major Soviet units had been identified in the south (including the reinforcing units of the Steppe Front) before the Germans attacked. quote:
Might this be an approach to follow, using German primary data to reinforce Soviet secondary or primary sources - or refute, as the case may be?
I think the only valid approach is use German and Soviet primary sources together to build a complete and correct picture. I do not believe that there is such thing a "good" history written from either a German or Soviet perspective. quote:
In the end, there might be a very interesting story that unfolds and one that is that much closer to the truth.
Unfortunately, primarily because of the language issues and research budget and time, it appears that all histories of the Eastern Front tend to build off one side or the other's material (and rely heavily on secondary sources in either case).
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Niklas Zetterling
Senior Member
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posted 10-09-2002 02:05 PM
As far as German primary sources for the period, judging from the two east front battles I have checked (Korsun Jan-Feb 1944 and Belorussia June-Aug 1944), there are very good records available from army HQ:s. Also, records remain from some corps and in those cases the records are very good, but for some corps, it seems that virtually no records have survived. Few papers from divisions have surivived and perhaps even fewer from units below the divisional level (I have found the war diaries of two panzer battalions (III./Pz.Rgt. 36 and s.Pz.Abt. 505, but these are exceptions). However, I must say that the records from 1st Pz Army, 3rd PzArmy, 2nd Army, 4th Army and 9th Army for those two operations are perhaps the best I have seen. I also know that the armies of Army Group Center have good records remaining well into the autumn 1944 (I have not checked further). Thus I think that there are records available to work with and produce something useful.
[This message has been edited by Niklas Zetterling (edited 10-09-2002).]
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Niklas Zetterling
Senior Member
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posted 10-09-2002 02:09 PM
quote:
Originally posted by Greg LG:
What I'd like to see is an in-depth study of the Russian front from 1944-45 using German primary sources. Has this even been done yet? I can't think of anything that seriously attempts this. Sort of a flip-side to Glantz' book on Barbarossa.
There may be some in German, though they rarely cover more than one operation at a time.
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Niklas Zetterling
Senior Member
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posted 10-09-2002 02:35 PM
quote:
Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
Unfortunately, primarily because of the language issues and research budget and time, it appears that all histories of the Eastern Front tend to build off one side or the other's material (and rely heavily on secondary sources in either case).
This is indeed the reality for most work being done on the eastern front, including my writing. In fact, as few people have the budget, time and knowledge (and perhaps the contacts needed) to do an in depth study of both sides records, we probably have to expect that "definitive" works are indeed rare.
Currently my focus is on the Korsun operation and I have available perhaps some twenty thousand pages of archival records on teh German side and only various dubious secondary sources for the Soviet side.
I have two choices, either wait until I get better soviet sources or proceed with the sources I have. I have a contact in Russia who may be able to provide some archival information, but that is nothing I can count on.
My solution to the dilemma is to use the sources with great caution and not rely on them more than they deserve. For example, German intelligence reports must be regarded as a basis for the decisions made by German commanders, not a source on how or why Soviet commanders decided and Soviet units acted. This must also be clear for the reader. This is not to say that intelligence is always wrong, in fact I am often surprised at how much they did manage to get right, but still, too often intelligence is wrong to some extent.
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Chris Lawrence
Moderator
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posted 10-09-2002 11:00 PM
quote:
Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:In fact, as few people have the budget, time and knowledge (and perhaps the contacts needed) to do an in depth study of both sides records
It really is an issue of budget.
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Greg LG
Senior Member
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posted 10-10-2002 04:15 AM
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All the major Soviet units had been identified in the south (including the reinforcing units of the Steppe Front) before the Germans attacked.
Does this include 27th, 53rd and 47th Armies along with 4th Guards Tank Corps and 1st Mech Corps? My understanding from Glantz is that these units were missed on German intelligence maps up to 5 July 1943. There are about 6-7 more armies missed, but they are all further up north, towards Bryansk and Moscow. These three armies with the two armor corps were all within the second echelon of the Kursk salient.In any case, maybe it's nothing more than a pipe dream, but hopefully someday there'll be a joint east-west committee that can dedicate themselves to putting it all together - and have the political clout to access all Russian archival material from WWII.
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Greg LG
Senior Member
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posted 10-10-2002 04:48 PM
Another thing to point out is that not only were those three armies not identified by German intelligence, they never (though very nearly) actively participated in the defensive phase of the Kursk strategic operation.Chris, does this corroborate with your research? [This message has been edited by Greg LG (edited 10-10-2002).]
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Chris Lawrence
Moderator
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posted 10-11-2002 07:42 AM
Yes, but as those units were never involved in the fighting......Looking at a German intelligence map dated 5/23/53 (T313, R321) does show the III Guards Tank Corps but the I Mechanized Corps and IV Guards Tank Corps is missing. It does show a total of 2 Mechanized Corps, 7 Tank Corps and 3 Cavalry Corps with or behind the Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts. The map of 6/28/43 is not showing the I Mechanized Corps or the IV Tank Corps, but does show a total of 3 Mechanized Corps, 9 Tank Corps and 4 Cavalry Corps with or behind the Voronezh and Southwestern Front. They had not identified the 27th, 47th or 53rd Armies. What is the actual quote from Glantz on this? [This message has been edited by Chris Lawrence (edited 10-11-2002).]
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Niklas Zetterling
Senior Member
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posted 10-11-2002 02:45 PM
quote:
Originally posted by Greg LG:
While I'm partial to the Soviet perspective of their Great Patriotic War, …
I am not particularly fond of the German perspective - Soviet perspective (or German view - Soviet view) dicotomy on the eastern front. While the state controlled historiography in the USSR, could assure a relatively homogeneous description of the events and analyses of the causes of the outcome, on the German side there has never been any such unified view or perspective, and with the demise of the Soviet Union, I suspect there will be greater and greater diversity in Russia too.
But in fact, I am not even sure that I have correctly understood the meaning of the Soviet perspective/view either. [This message has been edited by Niklas Zetterling (edited 10-11-2002).] [This message has been edited by Niklas Zetterling (edited 10-11-2002).]
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Niklas Zetterling
Senior Member
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posted 10-11-2002 03:15 PM
[This message has been edited by Niklas Zetterling (edited 10-11-2002).]
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Greg LG
Senior Member
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posted 10-12-2002 05:07 AM
Chris,These three armies are shown graphically as unidentified in his book, Soviet Military Intelligence in War, whereas in Glantz' book, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War, he has two maps that show both the north and south areas for Kursk, and while they definitely show 27th and 53rd missing, the scale of the south map is too small to show the area of 47th. The two German intelligence assessment maps in the deception book have German military map source references. It may be that the two armor corps were ID'ed though. You are correct, they never were involved in the defensive phase, but that's because they were never needed. These armies were all originally closer to the front than 5th Gds Tank Army on 5 July, and all were initially part of Steppe Front (27th and 53rd were assigned to Voronezh Front on 14 July). From what Glantz says in his book, Battle of Kursk, 27th and 53rd Armies were "closing into assembly areas around Oboian' and northeast of Prokhorovka, while lead elements of 47th Army closed up behind Shumilov's 7th Guards and Kriuchenkin's 69th Armies" on the night of 15 July (p.221,223). 1st Mech and 4th Gds Tank Corps were part of the assemblying movement with 27th and 53rd Armies.
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Chris Lawrence
Moderator
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posted 10-14-2002 06:21 AM
In Klink's books there are two OKH intell maps. The one for 20 March shows the 27th and 53rd Army up with the Northwest Front (up towards Leningrad). The is no 47th Army shown. Behind the Kursk bulge they show a "63? Army". It also shows the III Guards Tank Corps with Voronezh Front and the IV Guards Tank Corps with the Southwestern Front (the next front to the south). The I Mechanized Corps is way up north with the Kalinin Front.The map dated "Mitte April" shows the 53rd and 27th Army still with the Northwest Front but in reserve. the show the I Mechanized Corps and IV Guards Tank Corps with the Steppe Front in roughly the right locations, along with the X Tank Corps, 5th Guards Tank Army (with the correct three corps) and the Fifth Guards Army. Behind the Voronezh Front the the III Tank Corps (should have been III Guards Tank Corps).
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