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Author Topic:   Soviet Military Staff Studies
Chris Lawrence
Moderator
posted 09-03-2002 05:47 PM     Click Here to See the Profile for Chris Lawrence     Edit/Delete Message   Reply w/Quote
Niklas Zetterling has conducted an analysis of the Soviet Military Staff Study for Korsun, which he has posted on his website. It serves as a good warning about the dangers of using these one-sided wartime studies.

http://www.militaryhistory.nu/

We have seen similar problems with the Kursk Staff Study.

[This message has been edited by Chris Lawrence (edited 09-03-2002).]

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Foxbat
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posted 01-12-2003 12:15 AM     Click Here to See the Profile for Foxbat     Edit/Delete Message   Reply w/Quote
These critiques certainly give a good impression of where various historians stand with regards to methodology and pov.
One thing though, while you guys are always harping on the skewed reporting of german forces and strengths (and deservedly so) in those general staff studies I think Glantz et al actually get a bit of a bad rap because on the one hand he is quoted as claiming the studies to be "candid and accurate" and on the other hand the studies are shown to be less accurate then one would like.
In reality Glantz's stand on this is not as black&white as is often suggested, from the foreword of the Soviet General Staff Study on Kursk:

" The volume, however, is not without fault and error. Either intentionally or coincidentally, while opening new horizons on the famous battle, the work also perpetuates myths. It does so by over-glorifying the scale of the Red Army's victory and by magnifying the grandeur of its accomplishments at Kursk. For example, long before the postwar histories did so, it overstates the scope and impact of the tank battle at Prokhorovka. In particular, like other classified studies and postwar works, it overestimates the strength of the Germans and understates or simply neglects the ultimate terrible cost of the victory. Therefore, while of immense value, the work must be weighed accordingly. "

And that seems to be very much in line with mr Zetterling's critique of the Korsun study.

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Darrin
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posted 01-12-2003 10:49 AM     Click Here to See the Profile for Darrin     Edit/Delete Message   Reply w/Quote
quote:
Originally posted by Foxbat:
These critiques certainly give a good impression of where various historians stand with regards to methodology and pov.
One thing though, while you guys are always harping on the skewed reporting of german forces and strengths (and deservedly so) in those general staff studies I think Glantz et al actually get a bit of a bad rap because on the one hand he is quoted as claiming the studies to be "candid and accurate" and on the other hand the studies are shown to be less accurate then one would like.
In reality Glantz's stand on this is not as black&white as is often suggested, from the foreword of the Soviet General Staff Study on Kursk:

" The volume, however, is not without fault and error. Either intentionally or coincidentally, while opening new horizons on the famous battle, the work also perpetuates myths. It does so by over-glorifying the scale of the Red Army's victory and by magnifying the grandeur of its accomplishments at Kursk. For example, long before the postwar histories did so, it overstates the scope and impact of the tank battle at Prokhorovka. In particular, like other classified studies and postwar works, it overestimates the strength of the Germans and understates or simply neglects the ultimate terrible cost of the victory. Therefore, while of immense value, the work must be weighed accordingly. "

And that seems to be very much in line with mr Zetterling's critique of the Korsun study.



A glantz quote from one study to prove what he thought of another study is irrelevent. He said the korson study was candid and accurate it certainly seems it wasn´t accurate about the ger forces at least.

Its interesting to note he self published the kursk study in 98 almost 3 years after evidence had emerged from the kosave study that at least the rus info on ger losses at prok was very wrong. Why claim it was candid and accurate when someone else had already proved it wasn´t.

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Greg LG
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posted 01-13-2003 12:26 AM     Click Here to See the Profile for Greg LG     Edit/Delete Message   Reply w/Quote
Darrin,
The "candid and accurate" comment is for the Korsun study, not the Kursk study. In fact, if you had read Glantz' book on Kursk, you'd know Prokhorovka was far from the fantastic victory it has been depicted as. Soviet losses were very, very heavy at Prokhorovka and in Kursk overall, but it was the operational handling of Soviet flanking attacks that kept the Germans from consolidating or regrouping effectively, and this is what kept the German advance at a snail's pace.

As for Korsun, even I have never thought much about it. An encirclement battle fought in the worst weather that results in a partial success is all it was, and that is from a Soviet bias, no less. Much more interesting and important are the Lyutezh, Belorussian, Lvov-Sandomir, Yassi-Kishinev, and Vistula-Oder operations.

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Chris Lawrence
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posted 01-17-2003 12:36 PM     Click Here to See the Profile for Chris Lawrence     Edit/Delete Message   Reply w/Quote
While publishing the Kursk study was useful....it did not really break any new ground. It clearly was the starting point for most Soviet era books on Kursk and one sees the same figures and maps in other books (i.e. Kultonov). It is useful to have the source, and I do make use of it....but it is still a very one-sided secondary source that can only be used with the utmost caution. It is not very candid, simply ignoring the very large issue of unfavorable casualty exchanges and why that was. It is not a very good staff study, as it seems to avoid all major issues and shortfalls, focusing only on smaller shortfalls. What is not discussed is far more important than what they do discuss.

We did ask our researcher (Col. Sverlov) to get a copy, but it was difficult at the time (1993). In light of the material we had, he considered it not very important.

Of course, the big issue on Kursk is why virtually every Sovietologist and historian (except Ziemke) got the Prokhorovka story wrong (see "When Titans Clash") when the German records have been available for decades.

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WWII=interest
Senior Member
posted 01-17-2003 10:07 PM     Click Here to See the Profile for WWII=interest     Edit/Delete Message   Reply w/Quote
I believe Glantz was just trying to get some Soviet material out into the public eye to see. It's a document from WWII that, as Chris said, many have used to write books and articles and such, but the exact thing was not released to the public.

Now people have the option of looking at a genuine Soviet study, regardless of how accurate it is. It is still Soviet study.

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