There are two seperate stories of German tank busting that circulate about Kursk. First is the Rudel story that on or about 7 July he personally killed 12 tanks with the new experimental Ju-87 G-1 (the Stuka with the 37mm cannons) and this lead to the formation and use of the tank busting stuka squadrons.

The second story is the Maj. Bruno Meyer story about seeing a Soviet tank brigade coming out of the woods at Gostishchevo on July 8 and calling in all five squadrons of the IV/9th Ground Assualt Wing of Hs-129s B-2 (the Hs-129 armed with the 30mm cannon) and halting the attack by destroying 40-50 Soviet tanks in a short time.

As the Bruno Meyer story is better documented, I will address it first (and like many of my posts this may take several days).

This story was first published by Hans Seidemann (VIII Air Corps commander at Kursk) in 1947 as part of his write-up he did for the US Army on air operations at Kursk.

It this story, he clearly identifies the time and date (afternoon of July 8), the location ("from the woods east of GOSTCHEVO station"), the unit ("4th Group/9th Antitank Ground Attack Wing"), the German air response ("in a short time, they were on their way to meet the enemy force"), the duration of the battle("after about one hour") and the result ("approximately 40 tanks had been knocked out") and its effect ("the remainder of the enemy force discontinued the attack and turned around"). Furthermore, he identifies elsewhere the strength of the antitank unit as 60 planes.

This story has the advantage of being specific enough that one can acually compare it to the opposing side's records (unlike most war stories).

There is some other confirming evidence for it in the German records. Primarily there is a claim in the VIII Air Corps records that they destroyed 84 tanks on the 8th, including 11 burned and damaged 21 tanks on July 8 and the comment for that day that the "The initial action by the antitank aircraft squadron was quite effective. Given the number of burning [enemy] tanks reported, it must be assumed that there was an even greater number that were just knocked out (more than 6 hits reported), Especially in the late afternoon attack from the northeast against SS Reich and the evening tank battle, the Russians were stopped and driven back."

The VIII Air Corps also reports the loss of two Hs-129s on this day.

Over the years, an expanded version of this story has appeared, I gather first from a German source that I have not identified. It shows up in Robin Cross' "Citadel: The Battle of Kursk" book (pages 198-199) and in a number of web sites about Hs-129s. A German site that has the story is linked below, and it appears to have been drawn from the same source as the Robin Cross version.

The expanded version of the story has Major Bruno Meyer flying reconnaissance in the morning, when "as the morning mist clears" he sees 60 tanks and their supporting infantry emerge from the woods. He calls in all the units of his group with the lead elements arriving from Mikoyanovka airfield within 15 minutes. They are supported by Fw-190s lead by Maj. Alfred Druschel (CO 1st Ground Attack Wing), who bomb the supporting infantry. They usually have the battle resolved in an hour, with Cross' claiming six tanks "within a few minutes" and 50 tanks within an hour. Most accounts claim 40-50 tanks. All the accounts place the attack on the flank of the SS Panzer Corps or the woods near Gostishchevo. The account often provide a detail OB of five squadrons with 16 planes each.

This is clearly the same story, with some detail added.

The German language version of the story is at:
http://www.wehrtechnik.net/wehrtechnik/henschel_129.html

Now, before we take a look at the Soviet data...there are a few problems with the German reports.

First, this attack is noted in the German SS Panzer Corps reports as an attack at 1145 with 20-40 tanks and weak infantry units through the ravine from Visloye and Ternovka to the west agains the defenses at the Belgorod-Kursk highway.

Visloye and Ternovka are both in front of the large woods south of Gostishchevo. This raises questions at to both the time and size of the attack (and therefore casualties).

Next, the sources I have located indicate that the IV/9th SG was created 18 October 1943 and its commander was Bruno Meyer. The III Pz Corps records do make reference to an panzer command as part of the 1st Ground Assualt Wing, but I do not know who commanded it, or what it consisted of. There were two AT squadrons (the 4th and 8th) armed with Hs-129s in the 1st SG. There is clear evidence that the 4.(Pz)/2 SG was also there as was the Pz. Sqdn/51 JG. All four of these squadrons were later used to create the IV/9 SG along with the 8.(Pz)/2 SG. I do not have clear evidence than this last unit was at Kursk, but I assume it was.

A good bio of Bruno Meyer would be of use here.

Third, the base listings I have put these Hs-129 squadrons at Varvanovka, not Mikoyanovka.

Conveniently enough the Soviet attack is clearly identified in their records and there is only one brigade it could be.

This is the 26th Tank Brigade of the II Guards Tank Corps. It is the only candidate and was reported at attacking from Visloye at 1200 Moscow time (1100 Berlin time).

There are no other candidates. The division operated with two tank brigades forward and one in the second echolon. The other forward brigade (4th Guards Tank Brigade) was to its right at Nepkhayevo while the other tank brigade remained in the rear. The Corps 47th Heavy Tank Regiment (Churchills) was already 7 - 10 kilometers away in the III Panzer Corps area engaged, and the independent 96th Tank Brigade was moving southeast of Gostishchevo and joined that fight.

Therefore, one is left with the 26th Tank Brigade. It reports that it attacked from Visloye at 1200 (Moscow) time. Visloye is at the northwest tip of the large woods south of Gostishchevo. This attack drove onto height 209.5, two kilometers southwest of Visloye. The brigade then reports being attacked by 40-50 planes during the German counterattack (which occurred at 1210 Berlin time according to German reports).

The 26th Tank Brigade as of 0700 July 8th has 26 T-34s and 15 T-70s. The attack also included one regiment from the 4th Guards Motorized Brigade, which may have included up to 20 Bren Gun Carriers. It was also supported by infantry from a Rifle Division.

The Corps reported losing 8 T-34s and 3 T-70s for the day, with effectively only two of its brigades engaged. The 26th Tank Brigade at 0700 July 10 reported having 22 T-34s and 12 T-70s. The Corps reports only losing Churchills on the 9th. From 0700 on the 8th to 0700 on the 10th, the 26th Guards Tank Brigade shows a decline in ready-for action tanks of 4 T-34s and 3 T-70s, while the 4th Guards Tank Brigade shows a decline of 2 T-34s and 2 T-70s. The 25th Guards Tank Brigade's strength actually increases during this time. The Corps did have a coprs reserve of 20 T-34s and 10 T-70s located in Bubnovo on the 8th. This unit is no longer mentioned and may have been used on the 10th or 11th.

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
[b]The Bruno Meyer Story Expanded

Over the years, an expanded version of this story has appeared, I gather first from a German source that I have not identified. It shows up in Robin Cross' "Citadel: The Battle of Kursk" book (pages 198-199) and in a number of web sites about Hs-129s. [/B]

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If I remember correctly, Glantz used this version and refered to Paul Carell.

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
If I remember correctly, Glantz used this version and refered to Paul Carell.

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The actual passage in Glantz states (page 135):

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Burdeiny's 2nd Guards Tank Corps fared little better. It jumped off at 1200 hours, and after limited progress suffered an unmerciful beating from German aircraft and Totenkopf's panzer regiment, losing 50 tanks in the process. German aerial reconnaissance had detected Burdeiny's concentration of armor, and four squadrons of Henschel HS-109 aircraft, specially equipped with 30mm automatic cannon for antitank missions, broke up the Soviet attack, perforating the thin overhead armor of the tanks and leaving a hideous, burning wasteland. This unprecedented action, in which a tank attack was halted by air power alone, set a dangerous precedent. Indeed, throughout the battle, Soviet troop movements had to be conducted at night to minimize such lossees. This in turn delayed the arrival of reserves to block the German penetration.

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Now, I have a number of problems with this passage....

1. They did not loose 50 tanks. The Corps probably lost as reported 11 tanks on this day.

2. I do not have confirmation as to whether the AT Air Group had 4 or 5 squadrons.

3. The planes were Hs-129s, vice HS-109s.

4. Not sure of the details about "perforating the thin overhead armor of the tanks and leaving a hideous, burning wasteland."

5. The actual description of the operations from the 2nd Gds Tank Corps operational report 182, 0700 July 9, 1943 (page Fond: 2nd Guards Tank Corps, Opis: 1, Delo: 32, Page: 187):

"26th Guards Tank Brigade cross the Lipovyi Donets at 1200 in the area of Visloye, along with 1 regiment/4th Gds Motorized Brigade and 89th Gds Rifle Division, attacked height 209.5. The brigade, despite heavy enemy fire, together with 89th Gds Rifle Division, took height 209.5, after which the enemy launched armored counterattacks, supported by aircraft in groups of 40-50 planes. 89th Gds Rifle Division fell back on Visloye and after an hour 26th Gds Tank Brigade's tanks, having taken losses, fell back on the eastern slopes of height 209.5, where they consolidated and continued to fight the enemy.
At 1800 on July 8 26th Gds Tank Brigade attacked height 209.5 for the second time, but was unsuccesful."

The SS records support this account. Therefore, I must take exception with the conclusion that "a tank attack was halted by air power alone".

Furthermore, this statement about halting a tank attack with air power alone is contradicted by Glantz in his second sentence where he states "suffered an unmerciful beating from German aircraft and Totenkopf's panzer regiment"

6. For number of reasons, I disagree with the conclusion that this "set a dangerous precedent." and that "Soviet troop movements had to be conducted at night to minimize such losses. This in turn delayed the arrival of reserves to block the German penetration."

While the Soviet reserves regularly did travel at night...they also moved surprisingly fast. Any delays in the arrival of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 5th Guards Army could be better explained by the date they were ordered to depart and the fact that they sent the 5th Guards Tank Army off to Oboyan first before they turned it around and sent it to Prokhorovka. As it was, it appears that the Soviet units had a tendancy to go into battle too quickly from the march and may have done better if they rested and prepared. I do not think that the Hs-129 attack on the 8th of July was a major factor in causing the Soviet Army to conduct night marches, as they had been doing this for a while as a matter of course.

So, what does Carell say?

[This message has been edited by Chris Lawrence (edited 08-17-2002).]

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
Therefore, I must take exception with the conclusion that "a tank attack was halted by air power alone".[/B]

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This type of statement has been heard a few times and yet to survive closer scrutiny.

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
So, what does Carell say?[/B]

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In fact I don't know. I have neither the Carell bok nor Glantz Kursk book.

I have long suspected that the story of knocking out 40+ Soviet tanks was unsubstantiated. You have confirmed my suspicions, especially with the Soviet records on losses.

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
This type of statement has been heard a few times and yet to survive closer scrutiny.

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Meaning you have yet to encounter a case of a tank attack stopped purely by air power?

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I have long suspected that the story of knocking out 40+ Soviet tanks was unsubstantiated.

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It was your suspicions that caused me to make sure I looked into it. Thanks.

Now on to Rudel's Stukas.

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
[b]This type of statement has been heard a few times and yet to survive closer scrutiny.

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Meaning you have yet to encounter a case of a tank attack stopped purely by air power?

[b] [QUOTE]I

I just used the edit button to respond to your message....so let me first repost (re-type) your message and then I'll respond:

----posted by Jeff Duquette-----------

Chris: The following is the Bruno Meyer account as told by Paul Carell. From “Scorched Earth” pg 69 – 71

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The Soviet II Guards Tank Corps had a combat group deployed near Gostishchevo, in that gap north-east of Belgorod into which General Kempf's divisions had not yet advanced. It had been placed there to stop Kempf's thrust. But now, at this moment of emergency, Vatutin moved it over to the west. In a small wood east of the village sixty T-34s and several rifle battalions were assembled. About noon the armada moved off. It moved off against the deep flank of Hasueer's unsuspecting corps, against the Belgorod-Oboyan highway, against the supply route of SS Panzer Corps.

Only one pair of German eyes spotted the approaching disaster. Captian Bruno Meyer was leading a formation of three tank-buster aircraft on a reconnaissance mission over the wooded region of Gostishchevo in the morning of 8th July. He knew that in this diffucult terrain the flank of the SS Panzer corps had to be guarded from the air unless the ground forces were to run into some unpleasant surprises. Meyer's eyes swept over clearings and little valleys. Over there! sure that is...

Meyer banked low, hard over the tree-tops. There was not long any doubt: emerging from the cover of the wood were infantry columns. Behind them rumbled tanks. Ten of them. Twenty. Thirty. More and more of them were coming out out of the wood, forming up into a broad wedge and moving off in a westerly direction. From the conferences he had attended at VIII Air Corps HQ Captian Meyer was acquinted with the situation. He instantly realized the threat of this Soviet advance towards the deep flank of SS Panzer Corps. And Meyer also realized that this was his hour.

He commanded the IV (tank-buster) Gruppe of 9th Ground-Support Geschwader based near Mikoyanovka. On its fields stood 68 brand-new Henschel Hs-129 armoured ground-support aircraft. Each of these machines was fitted, in addition to its machine-gun, with a 3-cm cannon. They were the flying anti-tank guns of Operation Citadel. Here now was an opportunity to test the new weapon. By radio Meyer alerted the ground control of his Gruppe and ordered take-off by seperate Staffels--formations of nine machines.

As the first Staffel came zooming up, Meyer instructed the pilots by radiotelphony. Then began a historic battle--for the first time in military history a large armoured formation was opposed from the air alone. The aircraft attacked from low level. Like hawks they pounced on the Russian tanks from behind and from the side. The cannon flashed and barked. Once, twice, three times. Direct hit. Explosion. Fire. In flames the stricken T-34s were careening over the battlefield. In between the low-level attacks by the Henschel tank-buster aircraft, Major Druschel's Focke-Wulf Ground-support Gruppe attacked the Russian infantry columns and the hastily positioned flak guns with high-fragmentation bombs. It was a battle of machines. The Russian tanks were unable to cope with this unaccustomed attack. They drove across each other's paths, got mixed up with one another, and fell an easy prey to Meyer's flying tank-busters.

After an hour the Soviet brigade was smashed. Fifty tanks littered the battlefield, burnt out or heavily damaged. The deadly threat to Hausser's deep flank was averted even before SS Panzer Corps and Fourth Panzer Army had become aware of it.

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The typos are mine.

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The battle for Greznoe and the withdrawal of the 31st Tank Corps to the
Sukhaia Solotinka River. No less intensive were the battles on 8 July which
unfolded on the 31st Tank Corps' and 192d Tank Brigade's front, where the
enemy concentrated up to 300 tanks in a renewed attempt to reach the 1st
Tank Army's rear area by attacking Kochetovka and Sukho-Solotino. By
the end of the day, the corps, with 51st Guards Rifle Division units, had
withdrawn under enemy attacks to the Sukho-Solotino, Kochetovka, and
ll'inskii line. By the day's end the 192d Tank Brigade was still holding on to
Hill 251 and Beregovoi.

Combat on this day on the Oboian' axis was characterized by intense
operations by our aviation. During the day it completed more than 1,000
sorties and took part in 85 air battles, and as a result 106 enemy aircraft were
shot down.

The 10th Tank Corps, which was pre-empted by the enemy, did not
deliver a counterstroke. However, together with units of the 69th Army's
183d Rifle Division, it engaged in positional combat against groups of
enemy tanks which had assumed the offensive on the morning of 8 July. All
enemy attempts to penetrate to the Psel River on this axis were repulsed.

Having launched their offensive at different times (the former at 1000
hours against Kalinin, and the latter at 1200 hours against Nechaevka), the
5th and the 2d Guards Tank Corps advanced a short distance, but, having
encountered strong counterattacks by enemy tanks supported by aviation,
they withdrew to their jumping-off positions. The attack by the 40th
Army's 161st Rifle and 71st Guards Divisions similarly did not produce a
substantive result.

In the sector of the 7th Guards Army, while continuing to develop his
attack northward in an attempt to reach the rear area of front formations
defending along the Lipovyi Donets River, the enemy had captured
Melekhovo by the end of the day as a result of sustained combat.
Thus on 8 July despite continuous attacks and heavy losses, the enemy
was once again unable to fulfill his immediate mission to reach the Oboian'
region. All his attempts to penetrate to Oboian' from the south along the
Belgorod-Oboian' Highway and along the axis to Greznoe through
Kochetovka were unsuccessful thanks to the 1st Tank and 6th Guards
Armies' firm defense. Having widened the apex of his wedge in the Krasnyi
Oktiabr' and Kochetovka sector up to 8-10 kilometers, the enemy was only
able to push the 31st Tank Corps back to the Sukhaia Solotinka River and
advance 4-6 kilometers in this sector. On the whole, the forces of 1st Tank

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You're freakin' me out with this big brother form of answering posts

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The following is the Bruno Meyer account as told by Paul Carell. From “Scorched Earth” pg 69 – 71.

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Thanks. For I think pretty obvious reasons, I don't buy a lot of Paul Carell books.

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But now, at this moment of emergency, Vatutin moved it over to the west.

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Actually, the II Gds Tank Corps first attacked on the 6th....so it was already there, not moved to the west "at this moment of emergency".

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It moved off against the deep flank of Hausser's unsuspecting corps,...

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It had attacked on this flank on the 6th and remained in the area on the 7th. Why would they be unsuspecting?

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On its fields stood 68 brand-new Henschel Hs-129 armoured ground-support aircraft.

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Some of these squadrons had been in action with Hs-129s in 1942....I seriously doubt if they were brand new. Furthermore, the actual statis report of the five (or four) squadrons in question are available (on the web) and it does not add up to 68.

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Here now was an opportunity to test the new weapon.

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The Hs-129 B-2 became operational during 1942.

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...and ordered take-off by separate Staffels—formations of nine
machines.

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How does this equal 68? (4 x 9 = 36)

quote:

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The deadly threat to Hausser's deep flank was averted even before SS Panzer Corps and Fourth Panzer Army had
become aware of it.

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
Chris:

You're freakin' me out with this big brother form of answering posts

Best Regards
Jeff

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
The following is from “The Battle For Kursk, 1943. The Soviet General Staff Study” Translated and edited by D. Glantz and H. Orenstein.

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A source that must be used with extreme caution.

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...and as a result 106 enemy aircraft were shot down.

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Actually, the German VIII Air Corps reports only losing five planes that day (1 Fw-190, 2 Hs-129s, 2 Ju-87s).

quote:

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Having launched their offensive at different times (the former at 1000
hours against Kalinin, and the latter at 1200 hours against Nechaevka), the
5th and the 2d Guards Tank Corps advanced a short distance, but, having
encountered strong counterattacks by enemy tanks supported by aviation,
they withdrew to their jumping-off positions.

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This is correct as far as it goes. The 5th Guards Tank Corps was to the northeast of the SS Panzer Corps. The attack on Nepcheyevka was done by the 4th Guards Tank Brigade of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. The famous attack out of woods south of Gostishchevo (actually Visloye) was the 26th Tank Brigade.

On page 145 he notes the following:

quote
During the preparations for the attack ,[Zitadelle] each Hs 129 Staffel's establishment was increased from 12 to 16 aircraft and with all units up to full strength, a total of 68 combat-ready Hs 129s was available for the coming offensive. Moreover, in June, 4.(Pz.)/Sch.G 1 had been sent to Germany where it was equipped with aircraft fitted with the new MK 103 cannon. This weapon was of the same 30mm calibre as the original MK 101 but its main advantage was a higher rate of fire. "Zitadelle" was to mark the operational debut of the MK 103 as an anti-tank weapon but it was at first to prove disappointing in service as early models were susceptible to jamming.
end of quote.

I am not familiar with Carell's book or the other sources regarding the July 8 activity in the Hs 129 of many Soviet tanks. In Pegg's book he notes the following actions regarding the initial days of action by 4.(Pz.)/Sch.G 1.

On July 5 and 6 no significant missions of importance occurred. The pilots were sent out to fly one sortie each in four-aircraft sections aganist a few stray tanks, but this was more for the purpose of orientation and familiarisation then to relieve any great danger to the ground forces.

He notes that on July 7 units fron SS-LAH encountered a strong force of T-34 and KV-1 tanks some 15km east of Belgorod. 4.(Pz.)/Sch.G 1 and Pz.Jg.St./JG 1 along with Sch.G 1's Fw 190s engaged in a two-hour battle that suceeded in beating of the Russian attack as dusk fell. Meyer is quoted as it was impossible for us to count exactly how many tanks we had knocked out since the whole success was shared with army units.
Pegg then goes on and covers the action on July 8. Meyer notes that in the morning a Schwarm of his aircraft was sent to search for hostile armor but none were found. A Schwarm came across a weak force of Soviet tanks to the north and north-west of Belgorod and destroyed a few tanks. It is noted that by using single Schwarms of Hs 129s at set intervals and replacement Schwarms sent to replace at set intervals and the relieved Schwarm retuning in the same route the entire southern front could be covered.
It is then reported that to the east and north-east of Belgorod in a wooded area a large force of Soviet armor and infantry was encountered. 4.(Pz.)/Sch.G 1 and the entire I. Gruppe of Sch.G 1 took off to engage this threat. The treatment of this encounter in Pegg's book quotes not only Meyer but also Oblt. Georg Dornemann [ from letters sent to the author from Dornemann in 1989] . Interestingly there is no mention of the number of tanks destroyed but only ther mention that the battlefield was covered with burning armor. Dornemann only mentions that they were successful in beating back the Soviet armor. Pegg only notes the following quote from Luftflotte 4's war diary.
quote
The Panzerjäger were especially successful. Eighty tanks were completely destroyed and a further number damaged.
end of quote

That basically ends the discussion in Pegg's book concerning these initial actions of the Hs 129s from Meyers's unit at Zitadelle.

I hope this information adds to the discussion and is of help. I might note that Pegg's book was published in 1997 by Classic Publications in England.

In this book he does include Carell in his bibliography.

enjoy

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Originally posted by Ron Klages:
This is my first response on this forum so bear with me regarding any errors made in protocol.

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We have no protocols. Welcome aboard.

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I noticed that no reference sources we used from the book "Hs 129 Panzerjäger! by Martin Pegg."

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No, I was not aware of it.

Well, this actually clears things up a bit further.

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During the preparations for the attack ,[Zitadelle] each Hs 129 Staffel's establishment was increased from 12 to 16 aircraft and with all units up to full strength, a total of 68 combat-ready Hs 129s was available for the coming offensive.

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According to the data on "The Luftwaffe, 1939-1945" Website, as prepared by Micheal Holm (from archival data...RL 2 III/876-879), the squadrons in question had the following strengths on 1 July:

4./Sch.G.1 17 Hs-129 B-2
8./Sch.G.1 16 Hs-129 B-2
4./Sch.G.2 17 Hs-129 B-2
8./Sch.G.2 10 Hs-129 B-1/2 (although received 8 more sometime during the month)
PzJg./JG 51 15 Hs-129 B-1/2

Now, I still have no confirmation that 8./Sch.G.2 was at Kursk.

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He notes that on July 7 units fron SS-LAH encountered a strong force of T-34 and KV-1 tanks some 15km east of Belgorod. 4.(Pz.)/Sch.G 1 and Pz.Jg.St./JG 1 along with Sch.G 1's Fw 190s engaged in a two-hour battle that suceeded in beating of the Russian attack as dusk fell.

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LSSAH was north northwest of Belgorod on July 7.

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It is then reported that to the east and north-east of Belgorod in a wooded area a large force of Soviet armor and infantry was encountered. 4.(Pz.)/Sch.G 1 and the entire I. Gruppe of Sch.G 1 took off to engage this threat.

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One squadron makes a lot more sense. The VIII Air Corps does record this day 53 sorties of Hs-129s with 30mm cannons.

quote:

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Pegg only notes the following quote from Luftflotte 4's war diary.
quote The Panzerjäger were especially successful. Eighty tanks were completely destroyed and a further number damaged.
end of quote

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Well, this matches the overall claims for the day for the VIII Air Corps. I have not seen the the Luftflotte 4 war diary (nor was I aware it still existed).

quote:

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I hope this information adds to the discussion and is of help. I might note that Pegg's book was published in 1997 by Classic Publications in England.

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Thanks, this is very useful to know and I will take a look further into it. In case you were not aware, I'm in the process of finishing up a book on Kursk that is to be published by Westview Press next year. Niklas Zetterling in the author of two books on Kursk (one in English and one in Swedish).

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
The following is from “The Battle For Kursk, 1943. The Soviet General Staff Study” Translated and edited by D. Glantz and H. Orenstein. The extract is from Chapter 4, “The Defensive Battle for the Kursk Bridgehead”.

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As I stated, this is a source that must be used with some caution. For example:

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The 10th Tank Corps, which was pre-empted by the enemy, did not
deliver a counterstroke. However, together with units of the 69th Army's
183d Rifle Division, it engaged in positional combat against groups of
enemy tanks which had assumed the offensive on the morning of 8 July. All
enemy attempts to penetrate to the Psel River on this axis were repulsed.

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I have no idea of what "pre-empted" the 10th Tank Corps attack or how. This appears to be glossing over mistakes by the senoir commanders. Vatutin planned on the 8th to launch a counterattack with four tank corps (10th, 2nd, 5th Guards and 2nd Guards). It does not appear that the 10th and 2nd Tank Corps arrived in time to participate in the attack. Instead, Vatutin went ahead and launched the attack using only the 5th and 2nd Guard Tank Corps, which of course failed with high losses to the 5th Guards Tank Corps.

Now, this caused me to take a look at Glantz' "Battle of Kursk" (page 134) and he claims that the 10th Tank Corps launched brigade size attacks in the afternoon and the 2nd Tank Corps attacked in the late afternoon.

My records show no such attacks. As of 1700 (Moscow time), the 10th Tank Corps is reported around Prokhorovka, with one tank brigade with the 183rd Rifle Division at the soon to be famous hill 252.2 (which was not attacked this day). Furthermore, the 10th Tank Corps records losing only 2 tanks in an aggregate casualty report covering the 7th through the 11th of July. These were certianly the two T-34s they reported losing the afternoon of July 9 facing the 48th Panzer Corps.

The 2nd Tank Corps records are sparse, but the 5th Guards Tank Corps report for 2200 July 8th reports that the 2nd Tank Corps assembled in Vingradovka "and did not attack this day".

Based upon this, I have concluded that neither of these Corps saw action this day and were probably not involved in the attack because they arrived too late. I have not chased down Glantz' sources yet.

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However, together with units of the 69th Army's 183d Rifle Division, it engaged in positional combat against groups of enemy tanks which had assumed the offensive on the morning of 8 July.

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Again, I have no record of the 10th Tank Corps taking casualties this day. The 183rd appears to have only been in a limited engagement this day, reporting the loss of 7 killed and 11 wounded on the 8th.

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The attack by the 40th
Army's 161st Rifle and 71st Guards Divisions similarly did not produce a
substantive result.

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True statement.

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Thus on 8 July despite continuous attacks and heavy losses, the enemy
was once again unable to fulfill his immediate mission to reach the Oboian'
region.

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Putting a good face on an otherwise poor day for the Soviets

To date I have been unable to locate much on the use of the 37mm armed Ju-87 G-1 at Kursk. Seidemann (VIII Air Corps CO)writing from his memory in 1947 mentions that Rudel's anti-tank squadron was at Kursk, but there are other errors in his order of battle.

The only detailed reference I have is from Rudel's book....which states that he had returned to his old squadron in May and brought one of the experimental G-1s with him. Sometime around the 6th-8th of July, he decided to use it and claimed 12 tanks (the VIII Air Corps claims heavy Soviet tank losses to air on both the 7th and 8th -- and no other days). It was damaged and had to be repaired.

He then claims that this lead to the quick formation of a new tank-busting squadron.

Various secondary sources have placed this event on the 7th of July...but this may be a date derived from Rudel's book (which does not give a specific date, but one could conclude that it occurred the 7th).

The 10./StG 1 and 10./StG 2 (Rudel's Wing)were supposedly formed 17 June 1943 from the 1.Versuchstaffel and 2.Versuchstaffel (respectively). As of 1 July, the 1.Versuchstaffel had 8 Ju-87 G-1s while the 2.Versuchstaffel had none (but did have various Ju-87 Ds). It did not get any Ju-87 G-1s until August.

It would appear from all this, that assuming Rudel's story is correct as given (not that I really believe the number of claimed kills), that he may have flown the only Ju-87 that appeared over the Kursk battlefield in the south. It may have only flown for one day.

It does not appear that the 10./StG 2 had any Ju-87 G-1s in July...so unless the 1.Versuchstaffel was used (of which there is no evidence of) or planes were borrowed from it temporarily, then Rudel's Stuka tank-busters did not come into action until August.

The III/StG 2 does not record any Ju-87 G-1 in July, casting doubt on Rudel's story (which requires one to be true).

Although Rudel's story has been repeated in any number of secondary soruces, I have not seen anything to indicate that it was drawn from anything other than his book.

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
[b]Rudel's Stukas[/B]

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:

It seems that this story is far to vague to make it possible to confirme/refute the claim on tank kills by Soviet records?

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What is missing is a specific location on a specific day. In the case of the Bruno Meyer story, where I have that data, the claims of 40 tanks is quickly disproved...and even the claim of six tanks may be high. There is reason to wonder about Rudel's claim of 12 tanks killed.

As it is, I have no independent confirmation of Rudel's story.

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
...given sufficiently detailed data on where and when Rudel was supposed to have "scored".

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