Couple of questions:

- Any idea as to usage doctrine?
- Who gets issued the goodies? Engineer units?
- Any info on the performance of this weapons?
- Have they been used in combat (poor Chechens)?
- Does the US have equivalent weapon systems?

quote:

---

Originally posted by Alex H:
Couple of questions:

- Any idea as to usage doctrine?
- Who gets issued the goodies? Engineer units?
- Any info on the performance of this weapons?
- Have they been used in combat (poor Chechens)?
- Does the US have equivalent weapon systems?

---

Actually, I don't know. Is there anyone else out there familiar with this? So far, car and truck bombs seem to have been the most effective urban warfare weapon (Chenya this week, Lebanon 1983, Oklahoma City, etc.). We will probably be doing a study on urban warfare in the second half of this year.
While there is a whole slew of weapons that have been developed over time specifically for urban warfare (the Germans did some during WWII), the problems is that most armies fight most of the time in non-urban environments. Therefore, any specialized weapons and units would have limited usage in a lot (or most) environments. This makes development and deployments of these weapons somewhat questionable from a cost and logistics point of view. Due to our lemming-like over-population of the planet resulting in more urban areas, and the US involvement in these small-scale operations also being more in urban areas (i.e. Mogadishu), this appears to be changing somewhat. Whether the amount of time that armies fight in Urban terrain is now significant enough to justify special weapons and units is more difficult to say.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Alex H:
I came across a couple of articles over at Jane's, that showed two types of weapons, one was a man portable single shot 'flamethrower', that fired either an incendiary round or a 'hyperbaric' round - which I figure is a mini fuel-air type mini bomb - called something like "schmell"(?). The other was a tank chassis (T-72?)with an MRLS system to fire 'hyperbaric' rounds, either direct or indirect.

Couple of questions:

- Any idea as to usage doctrine?
- Who gets issued the goodies? Engineer units?
- Any info on the performance of this weapons?
- Have they been used in combat (poor Chechens)?
- Does the US have equivalent weapon systems?

[This message has been edited by Alex H (edited 03-30-2001).]

---

These weapons have in fact been used in combat, and some have been captured by the Chechens as well, although apparently only the incendiary models of the RPO, not the thermobaric ones. The MLRS-looking thing (the name eludes me at the moment) on tank chassis was also used in Chechnya, although rather few of these weapons have been produced. It was more of an operational trial rather than a combat deployment. RPOs are apparently issued to whichever infantry units that need them, although Russian writings sometimes make references to engineers using these weapons. In any event, airborne troops have definitely used them, and possibly some MR units as well. Scale of issue is not very broad, however, and you are much more likely to see single-shot RPGs being used than RPOs.

Thermobaric rounds have also been produced for RPG-7, which would considerably expand this old weapon's usefulness as an urban warfare weapon.

I don't think any NATO army has deployed any infantry thermobaric weapons, although the British recently put out a requirement for one.

Thanks for your comments.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Mike J:
On the combat simulation side, on the basis of my (admittedly limited) experience with MOUT operations, which includes a couple of force-on-force MILES engagements, I would say that such weapons (indeed, any indirect-fire or area-effect) weapons are very difficult to simulate in training scenarios, and I think that perhaps US MOUT tactics do not fully appreciate their effect.

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
Mike,

I believe the last attempt to take Grozny was conducted with an extended rolling barrage. This appears to be a result of the Russian expereince in MOUT (Mobile Operations in Urban Terrain). This probably does not parrallel current US doctrine and future plans.

---

About a year ago, while still in graduate school, I had a chance to discuss US MOUT doctrine in context of the Groznyy operation with a number of US Army Foreign Area Officers, one of whom was a former infantry company commander with the 101st Airborne. He talked about "low impact" MOUT operations, which to my mind appeared to be roughly the same as police SWAT forced entry operations. I was of the opinion that it would work in small scenarios, but would not if you are trying to storm an entire city. US Army wants to minimize collateral damage in urban warfare, but once casualties begin to mount you'll definitely see greater reliance on firepower.

Russian tactics in Groznyy were very heavily firepower-oriented. One of the lessons of the first Chechen conflict was that own casualties are a potential show-stopper and have to be kept down if public support for the operation is to be maintained. Russian infantry, on the whole, proved to have very low level of tactical skills, and sending it into an enemy-held city without massive fire support would have meant heavy losses. In addition to the barrages, Russian forces used extensive direct fire against buildings identified as defensive strongpoints. There does not seem to have been much Stalingrad-style room-to-room fighting. If you ascertained there were Chechens in a building, you brought up a few tanks or SP howitzers and leveled the place.

It's been a while since the US found itself in a city fight, but the next time it happens it probably will not be like Mogadishu. One of the main criticisms of the operation was that the force had no armor, which appears to acknowledge the need for protected mobility and direct firepower in urban scenarios. This means that cities will pose a major doctrinal challenge to forces that wish to storm cities with minimal own casualties *and* minimal collateral damage. Moreover, cities seem to close the gap between highly trained, high-tech forces and poorly trained, low-tech forces. In terms of combat simulation, urban warfare merits some sort of "set-piece modifier" of its own.

Couple of articles from Jane's:

LT GEN JOHN RHODES

COMMANDER OF THE US MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND

Lt Gen John Rhodes, commander of the US Marine Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico, Virginia, spoke to Barbara Starr about the USMC's approach to future warfighting (Photo: US DoD)

As head of the US Marine Corps Combat Development Command (USMCCDC), Lt Gen John Rhodes's top priority is to ensure that the force is prepared for fighting wars.

However, the USMC's official warfighting concept of "operational manoeuvre from the sea" only touches on a part of how Gen Rhodes and other USMC leaders consider future requirements.

Central to that future is the understanding that the USMC is facing "perhaps a different type of warfare which we do not fully understand", Gen Rhodes said. "Surely no-one will take on the USA toe-to-toe and slug it out."

While asymmetric threats, such as chemical or biological weapons, are a likely scenario, the USMC believes that conflict itself increasingly will centre on urban environments.

For the USMC, "there is a good chance we are going to fight in the urban environment, whether its skyscrapers, a slum or urban sprawl" That means in the future marines will fight in the air, in buildings, on the streets, and in subways or sewers - simultaneously.

This view has led the USMC to undertake a new look at how to "capitalise on improvements in technology and warfighting" for small dispersed units in littoral areas, Gen Rhodes said.

As a result, the USMC is in the middle of the five-year `Sea Dragon' advanced warfighting experiment (AWE) process to evaluate new concepts, tactics, techniques, procedures and technologies. "It is a process of true experimentation where we are free to fail or succeed," Gen Rhodes said.

The first phase, known as the `Hunter Warrior' AWE, focused on three objectives: tactical operations on a dispersed, non-contiguous battlefield; enhanced command and control; and enhanced fire support and improved targeting.

"One of the biggest lessons we learned was that we can capitalise on some of the work being done in the air command and control community," Gen Rhodes said. Specifically, the USMC is now considering a ground track control system similar to that used by air traffic controllers.

The initial work also led the USMC to try to improve encrypted communications between dispersed units.

Gen Rhodes pointed out that some ideas did not work well during `Hunter Warrior'. Using an aerostat as a communications relay failed because the USMC did not find a successful means of maintaining flight and stability.

The USMC's Dragon Drone rem-otely-piloted vehicles turned out to be a force multiplier for a variety of tasks. For example, the drone was able to track enemy movements in open terrain, forcing them into dispersed "anthill" patterns. A new night-time camera will be added to improve the capability and the drone is being deployed now to operational units.

Related drone work has tested the ability to drop smoke and pepper spray for crowd control.

The second phase of `Sea Dragon' is under way with the `Urban Warrior' AWE. `Urban Warrior' is a "people intensive" set of experiments that will evaluate various Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) tactics such as `thrust', `penetration' and `swarm'.

It will also test new technologies such as non-lethal foam, small urban tactical vehicles and new small arms.

Fighting in urban environments will lead to some changes in equipment. `Urban Warrior' is testing the M4A1 carbine with a tritium sight system to replace the standard-issue M16A2 assault rifle for MOUT. The carbine is smaller, shorter and lighter for movement in constrained areas.

New scopes and sights are expected to result in greater precision that will allow for improving the chances of first shot on target by as much as 50 percent, said Gen Rhodes. He added, however, that other sight and scope work needs to be accomplished for smoke and obscurant environments.

For diving through doorways and windows, the USMC is testing the same types of kneepads and shoulderpads used by athletes.

The `Capable Warrior' AWE will be the third phase of the `Sea Dragon' programme, linking the previous two experiments and looking at the organisational concepts, command and control, structural concepts and warfighting concepts, Gen Rhodes said.

Although the USMC will remain a combined arms team with both heavy and light forces, there may be some need to reorganise elements once new concepts are better understood. That could mean changes in the structure of command elements as well as operational units.

Gen Rhodes said he believes it may be time to take advantage of the fact that most modern marines are highly capable of undertaking multiple missions and therefore their warfighting specialities should be made more flexible.

Ultimately, the USMC still views itself as the fundamental man-in -the-loop operation for the future. "Technology right now does a fantastic job in wide open spaces," Gen Rhodes said.

Russia is currently the world leader in thermobaric weapons, and has already used them in action, for example to clearing Mujahideen from caves in Afghanistan and more recently Chechen guerrillas from buildings in Grozny. The Russian RPG-7 thermobaric warhead, fired from a manportable rocket-launcher, is said to produce effects comparable to the detonation 2kg of TNT, while the effects of the Russian RPO-A Shmel rocket-propelled incendiary/blast projectile are reportedly similar to those produced by a 122mm howitzer projectile. Russian variants of this latter weapon include one that combines a thermobaric warhead with a small hollow charge, which is designed to penetrate structures prior to detonation of the main warhead, thus considerably enhancing its effects.

The anti-personnel effects of these Russian weapons -- larger than the one under development in the UK -- are devastating: any troops in the target area are crushed to death, while those further away from the blast site experience crushing injuries, concussions, numerous internal injuries or even displacement of the eyes from their sockets.

Russia also built and fielded in small numbers the TOS-1 rocket system mounted on a modified T-72 tank chassis. This has a roof-mounted turret with 30 220mm tubes, each of which can launch a rocket with a thermobaric warhead to a maximum range of 3,500m.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Alex H:
[b]British Army seeks bunker buster[i]

Seems that the US is more geared to fight MOUT/FIBUA battles with 'increased awareness' instead of 'increased lethality' like the Russians and Brits seem to be doing. Is this some kind of bias towards low collateral damage weapons, or just a lack of imagination. This Shmel launcher would seem to be a pretty nasty - and effective - weapon to use in urban fighting.[/B]

---

Time will tell how far the "awareness" approach can go. Cities probably represent the world's most "sensor-opaque" environment, and happen to be populated by lots of civilians as well, which makes "information dominance" considerably more difficult to achieve than, say, in a desert environment.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Alex H:

Why are gas weapons not being developed more aggressively (perhaps they are)? Seems you could saturate an area with knockout gas and waltz in, rather than flatten it with explosives. Although gas masks are readily available, full NBC suits are expensive and not likely to be standard guerrilla equipment.

---

Cities are notoriously bad terrain for using chemical weapons of any sort. If you use non-persistent agents they may dissipate before fully penetrating enemy-held structures, persistent agents pose a hazard to own forces, and in general air currents in cities, as well as individual buildings, are quirky. Since chemical agents tend to be heavier than air, upper stories of buildings would be much less affected, and for a shorter period of time, than, say, the sewers.

You also could not count on these things working with 100% effectiveness, and if even a small proportion of the enemy force remained unincapacitated, their resistance would buy the time for the affected portion of the force to recover.

Obviously, for the former, anything that blows up bigger and better is an improvement. While this is an environment that the Soviet Union and Russia has a lot of experience with (both in WWII and in Grozny), it is not one the US encounters a lot. Since WWII, most of our city fighting has been inside the cities of our allies (Seoul, Hue). In those cases, collateral damage was an issue.

The US is likely to be involved in various small scale operations in the future. These often occur in cities, where there are civilians and there is a concern about collateral damage. It is not just Mogadishu, virtually once a year the US to go into some city in Africa and evacuate a couple of hundred to a couple of thousand people (Monrovia 1990, Mogadishu 1991, Kinshasa 1991, Freetown 1992, Monrovia 1996, Sierra Leone 1997, Tirana (Albania) 1997, Asmara 1998, Guinea-Bissau 1998.....). All of these have the potential for fighting. Plus, we will continue to be involved in various peacekeeping efforts, etc. Therefore, the US concern is not how to best level a city.....but how to minimize own casualties, defuse potential fights, mimimize civilian casualties (including the hostages you may be rescuing?) and minimizing collateral damage.

1/ Non-combatants will not be present in the area of operations; and

2/ Indiscriminate use of force is acceptable.

(One must still be prepared to adopt protective measures against someone who does not follow the same rules.)

I think the "three block war" (name of USMC commanding general who coined this phrase escapes me) will be the reality regardless of the position of the overall conflict in the spectrum. IOW, trying to segregate requirements may be an error.

Area weapons must be very focussed - single room/bunker - and usable at fairly close range (verification of target legitimacy?). I may be treading too far out on the sanitized limb of the laws of war, but that is where the politicians mostly reside.

I would guess that new munitions for systems like the Javelin, Eryx, RPG-x, Karl Gustav, etc would be appropriate. (The first two are soft-launch.)

quote:

---

Originally posted by Brad Sallows:
From an offensive perspective, I think there are two assumptions that should be firmly discarded:

1/ Non-combatants will not be present in the area of operations; and

2/ Indiscriminate use of force is acceptable.

......IOW, trying to segregate requirements may be an error.

---

For all practical purposes, unless the the US gets into a major conventional war (meaning larger, more intense and a more capable opponent than the Gulf War), which I consider unlikely, then Brad's statement becomes true for the sake of US policy and planning. This will also apply to most other Western European countries. It may not apply to the rest of the world.
Almost all US operations in the future are going to be sensitive to collateral damage and civilian casualties. We need to plan accordingly (this is one reason why The Dupuy Institute has no problem with an antipersonnel landmine ban).

Russian-Manufactured Armored Vehicle Vulnerability in Urban Combat: The Chechnya Experience
Mr. Lester A. Grau
Foreign Military Studies Office
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
In December 1994, the Russian Army entered the break-away Republic of Chechnya and attempted to seize the Chechen capital of Grozny from the march. After this attempt failed, the Russian Army spent two months in deliberate house-to-house fighting before finally capturing the city.1 The dispirited Russian conscript force was badly mauled by the more- mature, dedicated Chechen force, and the war drags on to this day. During the first month of the conflict, Russian forces wrote off 225 armored vehicles as nonrepairable battle losses. This represents 10.23% of the armored vehicles initially committed to the campaign. The Russians evacuated some of these 225 hulls to the Kubinka test range for analysis. General-Lieutenant A. Galkin, the head of the Armor Directorate, held a conference on their findings on 20 February 1995. The Minister of Defense attended the conference.2 The results of the conference convinced the Russian Minister of Defense to stop procuring tanks with gas-turbine engines.3 Further, the analysis disclosed Chechen anti-armor tactics and the vulnerabilities of Russian armored vehicles in urban combat.

Chechen Anti-armor Techniques

The Chechen forces are armed with Soviet and Russian-produced weapons, and most Chechen fighters served in the Soviet Armed Forces. The Chechen lower-level combat group consists of fifteen to twenty personnel subdivided into three or four-man fighting cells. These cells consist of an antitank gunner (normally armed with the RPG-7 or RPG- 18 shoulder-fired antitank rocket launcher), a machine gunner, and a sniper.4 Additional personnel serve as ammunition bearers and assistant gunners. Chechen combat groups would deploy these cells as anti-armor hunter-killer teams. The sniper and machine gunner would pin down the supporting infantry while the antitank gunner would engage the armored target. Teams deploy at ground level, in second and third stories, and in basements. Normally five or six hunter-killer teams simultaneously attack a single armored vehicle. Kill shots are generally made against the top, rear and sides of vehicles. Chechens also drop bottles filled with gasoline or jellied fuel on top of vehicles.5 The Chechen hunter-killer teams try to trap vehicle columns in city streets where destruction of the first and last vehicles will trap the column and allow its total destruction.

The elevation and depression of the Russian main tank guns are incapable of dealing with hunter-killer teams fighting from basements and second- or third-story positions, and the simultaneous attack from five or six teams negate the effectiveness of the tank's machine guns. The Russians attached ZSU-23-4 and 2S6 track-mounted antiaircraft guns to armored columns to respond to these difficult-to-engage hunter-killer teams.6

Initial Russian vehicle losses were due to a combination of inappropriate tactics, underestimation of the opposing force, and a lack of combat readiness. The Russians moved into Grozny without encircling it and sealing it off from reinforcements. They planned to take the city from the march without dismounting. Due to shortages in personnel, the Russian columns consisted of composite units, and most personnel carriers traveled with few or no dismounts. These initial columns were decimated.

As the Russians regrouped, they brought in more infantry and began a systematic advance through the city, house- by-house and block-by-block. Russian armored vehicle losses dropped off with their change in tactics. Russian infantry moved in front with armored combat vehicles in support or in reserve. Some Russian vehicles were outfitted with a cage of wire mesh mounted some 25-30 centimeters away from the hull armor to defeat the shaped charges of an antitank grenade launcher, as well as to protect the vehicle from a Molotov cocktail or bundle of explosives. The Russians began establishing ambushes on approach routes into a selected area and then running vehicles into the area as bait to destroy Chechen hunter-killer teams.7

Vulnerabilities of Russian Armored Vehicles

Shoulder-fired antitank weapons and antitank grenades knocked out the bulk of armored vehicles, and each destroyed vehicle took an average of three to six lethal hits.8 Fuel cells and engines are favorite aiming points for Chechen antitank gunners. The following illustrations have a grey area superimposed which shows the area where 90% of the lethal hits occurred.9

Figure 1 - BMD-1. (Graphics support by LTC Stephen H. Gotowicki, FMSO)

The BMD-1 is a personnel carrier assigned to airborne forces. As such, it is lightly armored. See Figure 1.

It was vulnerable to front, rear, flanking and top-down fire. The front portion of the turret is reinforced and, subsequently, is not vulnerable, but the rear of the turret is. See Figure 2.

Figure 2 - BMP-2

There is more armor on the BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle. However, its top armor is weak, its fuel tanks are within the rear doors, and the driver's compartment is vulnerable. See Figure 3.

Figure 3 - BTR-70

The BTR-70 wheeled armored personnel carrier showed many of the same vulnerabilities as the BMD and BMP.

Figure 4 - T-72

Sixty-two tanks were destroyed in the first month's fighting in Chechnya. Over 98% (apparently 61 tanks) were knocked out by rounds which impacted in areas not protected by reactive armor. The Russians employed the T-72 and T-80 tank in Chechnya. They were both invulnerable to frontal shots, since the front is heavily armored and covered with reactive armor. Kill shots were made at those points where there is no reactive armor: the sides and rear and, on top shots, on the driver's hatch and the rear of the turret and rear deck. Early in the conflict, most Russian tanks went into combat without their reactive armor. They were particularly vulnerable to damaging or lethal frontal hits without it.10

Figure 5 - T-80

Conclusions
The Chechen forces developed effective techniques to defeat Russian armored vehicles on the streets of a large city. Many of their techniques can be adapted by other armed forces which might fight Russian-manufactured armored vehicles (or other types of armored vehicles) in urban combat. These techniques are:

1. Organize anti-tank hunter-killer teams which include a machine gunner and a sniper to protect the antitank gunner by suppressing infantry which is accompanying the armored vehicles.

2. Select anti-armor ambush areas in sections of the city where buildings restrict and canalize the movement of armored vehicles.

3. Lay out the ambush in order to seal vehicles in the kill zone.

4. Use multiple hunter-killer teams to engage armored vehicles from basements, ground level, and from second- or third-floor positions. Problems with the RPG-7 and RPG-18 antitank weapons are the backblast, signature and time lapse between shots. The Chechens solved the time lapse problem by engaging each target simultaneously with five or six antitank weapons. (From this, the obvious requirement for a future anti-armor weapon for urban combat is a low-signature, multi-shot, recoil-attenuated, light-weight weapon which can be fired from inside enclosures. The AT-4 and Javelin do not appear to meet these requirements).

5. Engage armored targets from the top, rear and sides. Shots against frontal armor protected by reactive armor only serve to expose the gunner.

6. Engage accompanying air-defense guns first.

Endnotes

1. For a discussion of changing Russian urban tactics, see Lester W. Grau, "Russian Urban Tactics: Lessons from the Battle for Grozny", Strategic Forum, Number 38, July 1995.BACK

2. N.N. Novichkov, V.Ya. Snegovskiy, A.G. Sokolov and V.Yu. Shvarev, Rossiyskie vooruzhennye sily v chechenskom konflikte: Analiz, Itogi, Vyvody [Russian armed force in the chechen conflict: Analysis, outcomes and conclusions] (Moscow: Kholveg-Infoglob-Trivola, 1995), pp. 138-139. For the same period of time, forward-support Russian maintenance personnel repaired 217 armored vehicles, while depot maintenance repaired another 404 armored vehicles, according to Sergey Maev and Sergey Roshchin, "STO v Grozny [Technical Maintenance Stations in Grozny]", Armeyskiy sbornik [Army digest], December 1995, p. 58. These were not all combat-induced losses, but it seems to indicate that 846 of 2221 armored vehicles (38%) were out of action for some period of time during the two-month battle for Grozny.BACK

3. Mikhail Zakharchuk, "Uroki Chechenskogo krizisa [Lessons of the Chechen crisis]", Armeyskiy sbornik, April 1995, p. 46.BACK

4. "Pamyatka lichnomu sostavu chastey i podrazdeleniy po vedeniyu boevykh deistviy v Chechenskoy Respublike [Instructions for unit and subunit personnel involved in combat in the Chechen Republic]", Ameyskiy sbornik, January 1996, p. 37.BACK

5. Novichkov, p. 145.BACK

6. Ibid, p. 123.BACK

7. Sergey Leonenko, "Ovladenie gorodom [Capturing a city]", Armeyskiy sbornik, pp. 31-35.BACK

8. Novichkov, p. 137.BACK

9. All illustrations are taken from Novichkov, pp. 140-144.BACK

10. Novichkov, p. 145.BACK

You can see the actual vehicle diagrams in the original article.

Russian-Manufactured Armored Vehicle Vulnerability in Urban Combat: The Chechnya Experience
Mr. Lester A. Grau
Foreign Military Studies Office
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
In December 1994, the Russian Army entered the break-away Republic of Chechnya and attempted to seize the Chechen capital of Grozny from the march. After this attempt failed, the Russian Army spent two months in deliberate house-to-house fighting before finally capturing the city.1 The dispirited Russian conscript force was badly mauled by the more- mature, dedicated Chechen force, and the war drags on to this day. During the first month of the conflict, Russian forces wrote off 225 armored vehicles as nonrepairable battle losses. This represents 10.23% of the armored vehicles initially committed to the campaign. The Russians evacuated some of these 225 hulls to the Kubinka test range for analysis. General-Lieutenant A. Galkin, the head of the Armor Directorate, held a conference on their findings on 20 February 1995. The Minister of Defense attended the conference.2 The results of the conference convinced the Russian Minister of Defense to stop procuring tanks with gas-turbine engines.3 Further, the analysis disclosed Chechen anti-armor tactics and the vulnerabilities of Russian armored vehicles in urban combat.

The decision in favor of T-90 over T-80 was also due to economic and political factors. Diesel is cheaper to manufacture and operate, and easier to maintain. Gas turbine maintenance in field conditions proved to be too much, and it's a big part of the reason why no T-80s were sent during the second conflict. But T-80 was not more vulnerable to attack than T-72 (which is not saying much).

Chechen Anti-armor Techniques

The Chechen forces are armed with Soviet and Russian-produced weapons, and most Chechen fighters served in the Soviet Armed Forces. The Chechen lower-level combat group consists of fifteen to twenty personnel subdivided into three or four-man fighting cells. These cells consist of an antitank gunner (normally armed with the RPG-7 or RPG- 18 shoulder-fired antitank rocket launcher), a machine gunner, and a sniper.4

In all likelihood this is something they picked up from Russian Spetsnaz. I've seen photos of '80s-era Spetsnaz combat teams organized exactly the same way.

The elevation and depression of the Russian main tank guns are incapable of dealing with hunter-killer teams fighting from basements and second- or third-story positions, and the simultaneous attack from five or six teams negate the effectiveness of the tank's machine guns. The Russians attached ZSU-23-4 and 2S6 track-mounted antiaircraft guns to armored columns to respond to these difficult-to-engage hunter-killer teams.6

And lost nearly all of them in combat. Their armor was too thin, and they had too many vital parts (like gun water cooling jackets) that were unprotected. The conclusion was that SPAAGs are good in open terrain, where they can stand off and pour automatic fire from outside RPG range, but in cities they are very vulnerable.

Initial Russian vehicle losses were due to a combination of inappropriate tactics, underestimation of the opposing force, and a lack of combat readiness.

It also seems that the units which entered Groznyy were very short on dismounted infantrymen. An entire brigade (the 131st) went into combat with a full complement of vehicles, but with less than half of assigned personnel.

The Russians moved into Grozny without encircling it and sealing it off from reinforcements. They planned to take the city from the march without dismounting. Due to shortages in personnel, the Russian columns consisted of composite units, and most personnel carriers traveled with few or no dismounts. These initial columns were decimated.

Given the fact they had so few dismounts, a coup de main was their main hope.

As the Russians regrouped, they brought in more infantry and began a systematic advance through the city, house- by-house and block-by-block. Russian armored vehicle losses dropped off with their change in tactics. Russian infantry moved in front with armored combat vehicles in support or in reserve. Some Russian vehicles were outfitted with a cage of wire mesh mounted some 25-30 centimeters away from the hull armor to defeat the shaped charges of an antitank grenade launcher, as well as to protect the vehicle from a Molotov cocktail or bundle of explosives.

Six years later, Russian light AFVs in Chechnya still rely on improvised RPG screens (or have none at all). At the same time, NII Stali is supplying ERA suites for BMP-3s to UAE...

There is more armor on the BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle. However, its top armor is weak, its fuel tanks are within the rear doors, and the driver's compartment is vulnerable. See Figure 3.

I've seen some of the BMPs lost in Chechnya, and am of the opinion that BMPs do not have any particular "vulnerable areas." When loaded with fuel and ammunition, they are so susceptible to catastrophic kills that any distinctions between "vulnerable" areas and the rest are academic. There is a reason why in Chechnya, in spite of the sniper threat, Russian infantry prefer to ride on, not in, their APCs or IFVs.

4. Use multiple hunter-killer teams to engage armored vehicles from basements, ground level, and from second- or third-floor positions. Problems with the RPG-7 and RPG-18 antitank weapons are the backblast, signature and time lapse between shots. The Chechens solved the time lapse problem by engaging each target simultaneously with five or six antitank weapons. (From this, the obvious requirement for a future anti-armor weapon for urban combat is a low-signature, multi-shot, recoil-attenuated, light-weight weapon which can be fired from inside enclosures. The AT-4 and Javelin do not appear to meet these requirements).

There exists an AT-4CS variant which can be used from enclosed spaces. From practical standpoint, I think that multi-RPG salvo is a better way to solve the "time lapse" problem than designing a "multi-shot, lightweight, low signature" AT weapon. Barring that, preparing more than one AT weapon for firing prior to engagement would do the trick as well.

5. Engage armored targets from the top, rear and sides. Shots against frontal armor protected by reactive armor only serve to expose the gunner.

But they also force the crew to button up, leaving their AFV more vulnerable to subsequent shots.

Thanks. We just finished up our "medium weight armor study" this week and we about to shift gears to our urban warfare study. It is my understanding though that a significant number of the Russian armor losses occurred before they entered Grozny (and therefore not as a result of urban combat).

Also, do they report anything about losses to mines.

As for deploying armor in built up areas, I guess everyone is looking to reduce personel losses through the use of armor/firepower. Airstrikes are out of the question (except in Palestine ), so the only other alternative is armor. The Russians seem to be ahead of everyone else in specialized weapons/vehicles to tackle MOUT, but mainly through conversions to existing vehicles or chassis.

Thanks. We just finished up our "medium weight armor study" this week and we about to shift gears to our urban warfare study. It is my understanding though that a significant number of the Russian armor losses occurred before they entered Grozny (and therefore not as a result of urban combat).

There were friendly fire incidents on the outskirts of Groznyy and at least one case of air attack on an airborne company, which left a number of BMDs incapacitated, but the city fight did account for lots of AFVs. The 131st MRBde from Maikop entered the city with nearly a full complement of AFVs, and lost most of them in the space of a few days. Novichkov book cited in the Grau article provides more details, I'll be happy to scour it for info if you are interested.

Also, do they report anything about losses to mines.

I think that mines became a major threat later on in the campaign. I don't remember reading any comments about Chechen mine warfare during the fight for Groznyy.

Grozny does make the point that using armor in cities may not be the best idea.

Late WW2-era Soviet units organized themselves into combined arms assault groups for urban warfare. These units usually included a small armor component (tanks or assault guns), and also had direct-fire artillery pieces. They reverted to this tactic after the initial defeats, and used it in the second war as well. The main threat to AFVs in cities appear to be lightweight HEAT weapons, and it's not too difficult to make even light AFVs reasonably well protected against them. Russian losses in Groznyy probably would not have been as dramatic if they actually prepared for the operation.

There does seem to be a need for protected direct-fire weapons in city warfare, to suppress strongly fortified fire positions, create breaches in buildings, etc. Other countries' WW2 urban warfare experiences also seem to bear this out, since nearly everyone used AFVs of some sort in urban combat. Perhaps the new generation of manportable "bunker-buster" assault weapons would alleviate this requirement somewhat, but I haven't seen any evidence one way or the other.

Also it points to the need for infantry. I do suspect that the US Heavy Divisions are too infantry shy.

I think so too.

As part of our "medium wieght armor" study we did look at 122 SSCOs (Small Scale Contingency Operations). Of those 78 were in "primarily urban terrain" (lots of civil disorders and riots in this data base). Of these 78 cases, the number of cases where the "indigenous forces" deployed armor was zero! The question becomes, why is one concerned about deploying armor in cities when the opposing forces are not usually deploying armor in cities?

Probably mainly as a protected direct-fire platform against fortified buildings, etc. There is also the "intimidation factor", which may have some deterrent value. If you bring in tanks, everyone knows you mean business.

Some of these vehicles ended up in Bosnia or Kosovo, where they are used by UAE peacekeepers. Russians must be jealous...

As for deploying armor in built up areas, I guess everyone is looking to reduce personel losses through the use of armor/firepower. Airstrikes are out of the question (except in Palestine ), so the only other alternative is armor.

After initial friendly fire problems, the Russian AF scored some successes when it used concrete-piercing PGMs against the "Presidential Palace" in Groznyy. I don't think they repeated this in the second war, where direct fire artillery and 240mm mortars seemed to be the preferred option.

The Russians seem to be ahead of everyone else in specialized weapons/vehicles to tackle MOUT, but mainly through conversions to existing vehicles or chassis.

Actually, that distinction goes to Israel, which has a whole range of "heavy APCs" in service. Russian models are apparently only prototypes.

Perhaps we'll see a purpose built vehicle soon? Lots of ERA & autocannons, perhaps some AT missiles and an MLRS.

There is the BMPT, a strange mix of MBT and IFV. T-72 chassis with a weapon pod which has a 30mm cannon, 30mm AGL, a couple of MGs, and an ATGM quad pack. Only two dismounts, though. It was displayed at Omsk last year, I believe. It seems to be designed for fire support more than anything else.

I was just reading about this on an old JSMO issue. The article was very critical about the readiness of the air units (less than 50%, even when given priority), and their usefulness was limited because of the lack of real time intelligence.

The big success came early in the campaign, when they knocked out over 100 Chechen aircraft and 7 Chechen passenger jets on the ground, virtually wiping out the Chechen air force.

What was the name of the book about the Chechen War that Col. Glantz recommended over at the RMZ? It was similar to "something/someone went over the mountain" ???

I was just reading about this on an old JSMO issue. The article was very critical about the readiness of the air units (less than 50%, even when given priority), and their usefulness was limited because of the lack of real time intelligence.

That's right, and the fighting in Chechnya has only accelerated the deterioration of Russian aircraft and helicopter fleet. They are more maintenance-intensive than AFVs, their engines have shorter service lives, and the intensive operations in Chechnya accelerated their aging process considerably, with no corresponding funding for new aircraft or upgrades for existing ones. The Russian army has been eating through its Soviet reserves of ammunition, spare parts, even foodstuffs, at a rapid rate due to the war in Chechnya and has not been replenishing these stocks. In some cases (like ammunition, which has a limited shelf life) it's a case of "use it or lose it", but spare parts are a different matter altogether.

The big success came early in the campaign, when they knocked out over 100 Chechen aircraft and 7 Chechen passenger jets on the ground, virtually wiping out the Chechen air force.

It was a success, but the Chechen "air force" existed mostly on paper. The 100 aircraft were L-39 jet trainers, and the Chechens had only a handful of qualified pilots for them. Dudayev, who was an air force general and commanded a strategic bomber division at Tartu, Estonia, reportedly sent a message to the Russian AF commander stating "congratulations on winning the air war, but we'll meet on the ground", or words to that effect.

What was the name of the book about the Chechen War that Col. Glantz recommended over at the RMZ? It was similar to "something/someone went over the mountain" ???

I think it's "The Bear That Went Over a Mountain" or something like that.

>why is one concerned about deploying armor in cities

>Probably mainly as a protected direct-fire platform against fortified buildings, etc.

I concur. The question is not about armour for the sake of armour, but how to successfully bring to bear systems that are either not infantry-portable or impose a significant ammunition burden. For example, a direct fire platform might be less necessary if equivalent multi-purpose rounds were developed for launchers such as Javelin. Regardless there will probably always be circumstances where vehicles are useful, but they must not be employed stupidly.

Contrary to what was expressed above, I think soft-launchers such as Javelin or Eryx may be suitable when provided with the proper ammunition suite and the option to use "dumb" sights (ie. no guidance to target - aim and fire); the chief problem is weight. As to anti-armour tactics, salvo firing is not new. As a reserve private in 1983 I was cautioned that the M-72 should be used in salvos (by section/squad) fired against flanks, top, and rear since we could not expect to achieve frontal kills.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Mike J:
Novichkov book cited in the Grau article provides more details, I'll be happy to scour it for info if you are interested.

---

We have it, but have not had anyone translate it yet. Is there a clear count of number of vehicles lost in the city as opposed to outside the city?