I'm looking to analyze the campaign's supply situation and compare corps' and hopefully divisions' deliveries and consumption of food fuel and ammo on a weekly or 10-day basis from 6.22.41 until 9.30.41.

This line of inquiry was triggered by the commander of IX Corps, Hermann Geyer, who states in his account of the campaign that his corps didn't have serious supply problems until the defensive, positional warfare (mostly centered around Elnia) developed. He says (and strongly implies) that if AGC had kept attacking eastwards throughout Aug-Sep, thus keeping the precarious Soviet armies from regaining their balance, the logistical problems would not have been as severe as they were, at least for his infantry divisions.

Simply put, maintaining the advance helps keep overall supply consumption low because artillery ammo consumption is low; staying on the move helps prevent the enemy from forming a defensive line which will require more ammo to break through, etc etc. Apparently POL 'weighs less' than artillery ammo...(?)

This prompts a number of questions about German planning for Barbarossa, and ultimately whether logistical problems were the cause of operational failures - or whether operational (in)decisions made by a certain Supreme Commander exacerbated or possibly caused AGC's logistical problems.

Although many historians have emphatically stated Barbarossa was doomed to failure because of AGC's allegedly insurmountable supply difficulties, I have yet to see any truly good, hard data from AGC's supply records, anywhere.

The only source on this is a 700 page book called 'Logistik im Russlandfeldzug' by KAF Schueler. I have a copy, and have not read all of it, but it seems to focus primarily upon the Reichsbahn's role only, rather than a detailed, comprehensive examination of all aspects of logistics.

The author comes to the rather bland and obvious conclusion that the Reichsbahn had a very difficult task in Russia that failed primarily because nobody planned for the Reichsbahn to embark upon such an ambitious project until a few short months before the invasion.

But what about actual supply consumption over the course of the campaign by formation?

What did other German officers say?

How many tons did the PzDivs consume compared to InfDivs, etc?

Any suggestions?

I noticed the book (Donat) in the bibliography of 'Logistik', and I'll try to get a copy.

The operations of AGC during Barbarossa - especially the Smolensk Campaign - are in need of some serious, in-depth research. I have tried to find material on German operations and there almost no serious books which address Smolensk in detail. I suppose the best is vol. IV of MGFA's history, but it does not go into enough detail.
Far too much of the literature on this period depends almost entirely on Halder's diary and the OKW KTB. Virtually none of the literature available cites German divisional records, mush less corps or army.

To the Dupuy Institute staff; How about taking a crack at researching Smolensk?

I really admire all of you guys' work on Kursk, and other work done by various members, especially Niklas' debunking of several Normandy Myths. But frankly, I think Kursk is 'played out' as far as interesting revelations go (just my opinion, of course).

Smolensk (and the various AGC battles before, after, and to the north and south) on the other hand, is truly one of the most important battles of the war - perhaps more decisive than Stalingrad - and it deserves much much more attention from researchers.