Rich

quote:

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Hello,

Below is a text I intend to include in my upcoming book on the air war on the Southern flank of the Eastern Front (June-October 1941).

I would appreciate any comments.

Thank you.

Dénes Bernád

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The Road to the German-Soviet War

Most historical studies – published both in the East and West – still regard the German-Soviet confrontation during World War Two – the largest armed conflict in the history of mankind – as an aggression committed by the up-surging and bellicose Germany against a militarily unprepared Soviet Union, which was first surprised, then overwhelmed by the unexpected onslaught of the Wehrmacht. However, in view of new information that surfaced in the past couple of decades, from previously inaccessible sources, it appears that this outdated view of the origins of the giant armed clash on the Eastern Front cannot be realistically sustained any more in a scholarly and apolitical contemporary study.

It now appears that the opening act of the Eastern Front was neither an unprovoked aggression by pugnacious ‘Nazi’ Germany, nor a legitimate, pre-emptive strike of a ‘clever’ Hitler. It was rather the outcome of a parallel gear-up for a total war by two totalitarian regimes [to the Editor: this must be highlighted!], led by similarly thinking and planning dictators, who acted quasi-independently of the other, with the final scope of annihilating the other side by force.

Despite the non-aggression pact – proposed by the signing parties to be valid for ten years – signed by the foreign ministers of the USSR and the IIIrd Reich – Vyacheslav M. Molotov and Joachim von Ribbentrop, respectively – on 23 August 1939, pact that surprised many, as well as divergent diplomatic moves, both sides actually prepared fervently to attack the other.

On 18 September 1940, the Soviet Chief of the Stavka (short for Shtab verkhovnogo komandovanya, or General Headquarters), Army General Kirill A. Meretskov, and the People’s Comissar for Defence, Marshal Semyon K. Timoshenko, prepared a war plan that envisaged attacking the IIIrd Reich, in form of a giant pincer, starting from Byelorussia and Bessarabia, respectively. Hitler and his generals did not sit idle, either. Despite the vague directions given much earlier by Hitler in his ominous Mein Kampf, and other political pamphlets of the National-Socialist Party (NSDAP), by 1940 there was not clear cut, detailed German military plan to attack the USSR.
In mid-1940 – approximately at the same time with the similar Soviet war plans – Hitler assigned the OKW (short for Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, or the Armed Forces High Command) the task to prepare detailed plans for the eventuality of an anti-Soviet war. Simultaneously, both sides initiated the relocation of troops closer to the other state’s current borders. The Soviets amassed men and matériel to Byelorussia, Western Ukraine, and the newly acquired territory of Bessarabia, while the Germans transferred troops to the conquered Poland, and also moved ‘instructional troops’ to the allied Rumania. Parallel to these military movements, both sides also acted on the diplomatic front as well, in attempt to deceive and outmanoeuvre the other. This travesty had little success, however.

Hitler decided to actually go to war against his Reich’s giant Eastern neighbour following the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov’s visit to Berlin in mid-November 1940. He signed ‘Directive 21’ – code named personally by him as ‘Operation Barbarossa’ probably to stress the idea of a “crusade against Bolshevism” – on 18 December 1940. It was ordered that all war preparations to be commenced immediately, and be concluded by 15 May 1941.

On the opposing side, Stalin did not make up firmly his mind as of yet, and instructed his general staff to work on further stratagems. However, his actual attack timeline was apparently way behind Hitler’s. Stalin actually hoped that Hitler will loose many months in fighting the Western Powers, allowing the Soviets to catch up in building the Red Army and preparing it for war. Stalin regarded the period of enforced peace after the Hitler-Stalin pact as an opportunity to build up and reorganize the Soviet military while Germany was busy in the west. The occupied areas of Finland, the Baltic states, Eastern Poland, Belarus, Bessarabia, no less than the forward-deployed troops, were seen as a barrier behind which this military preparation could be accomplished. Moreover, Stalin was absolutely convinced that Hitler would attempt nothing until he had resolved his conflict with Great Britain. He was encouraged in this preconception by a well-orchestrated German deception operation. When the head of Soviet military intelligence, Lieutenant-General Ivan I. Proskurov, explained Stalin already in August 1940 that Germany could not successfully invade Great Britain, he dismissed him (he was executed in October 1941). Stalin did not want to see the true situation as, at that time, his army needed at least a year to be ready to attack his de jure ally. Thus it was that Stalin was able to ignore the massive military build-up on his borders, and to dismiss every warning of a German attack as disinformation or provocation, right up until the early morning of 22 June 1941.

By early 1941, both sides feared their war plans could be crossed out by the other; therefore, they sped up the build-up of forces, while keeping an apparently diplomatic façade towards each other. The German High Command finished detailing the anti-Soviet war plans in early February 1941, with hostilities to actually start by late spring. The war was predicted to be over in less than half a year, counting on the military and morale collapse of the USSR. Hitler, like Stalin, was a victim of his own preconceptions. But, in contrast to Stalin, he was ill served by his intelligence services, as were most Western governments in regards to the USSR. In mid-1939, the British and French military intelligence specialists did not believe that the Red Army could crush the Wehrmacht. The only confidence was in the Polish Army, which was the "sole, real opponent to the German Army". In fact, almost everybody out of USSR thought that, after Stalin's purges, the Red Army would disintegrate when faced with a powerful invasion of the country. When Hitler met Antonescu on 12 June 1941 (i.e., ten days before ‘Barbarossa’), the self-styled Rumanian Conducãtor told him that the Red Army would collapse very quickly, as the population wanting to be liberated…
The Germans overestimated their own capabilities, as well as they underestimated the Soviet combat force and its capacity to resist an overall attack. The first paragraph of ‘Directive 21’ stated that: “Soviet Russia is to be crushed in a quick campaign, before the end of war with England”.

Stalin and his marshals lagged behind with their preparation. In January 1941, a major command war game took place with the participation of a handful of important Soviet military leaders. The details of this command-level drill were further refined in May 1941 by the new Chief of General Staff, Army General Georgi K. Zhukov, and Marshal Semyon K. Timoshenko. Stalin himself held a far-reaching speech at the Kreml, on 5 May, declaring, among others: “The Red Army is a modern army, and a modern army is an offensive army”, which clearly was at odds with the USSR’s official defensive policy. It has to be said, however, that the Soviets’ war preparations appear to be somewhat lesser in scope than the Germans’, not envisaging to conquering the entire IIIrd Reich, only the occupied Poland, Eastern Prussia and most of Rumania, while Hitler intended to occupy the whole European area of the USSR.

In the meantime, Soviet war production also had geared up to full steam, simultaneously with the mobilization of manpower. Germany, too, built up its forces on the Eastern areas that were under Berlin’s military or political control. Both sides tried to conceal their real goals, by attempting to outmanoeuvre the other side on the diplomatic arena, and to hide the strategic movements of their troops towards the common borders. Neither side truly believed the other one would actually attack beforehand. Both Moscow and Berlin relied on the effect of a surprise attack, followed by an envisaged quick victory.

In mid-June, the Red Army had overall superiority over the Wehrmacht and the small Axis allies in almost all military aspects. The ratio was approximately 1.1:1 in manpower, 3.6:1 in armour, 2.5:1 in aircraft, and 8:1 in artillery to the Soviets’ advantage (it has to be noted, however, that the dry figures are somewhat misleading, as the majority of Soviet aircraft and armour was obsolete to the day’s military standards. A much lesser percentage of the Germans’, and somewhat more of the Axis allies’ war matériel could be considered obsolete. Also, the majority of the German soldiers and aircrew had built up combat experience in the previous war years, which cannot be said of most of the Soviet soldiers and flyers – except of those who fought in Spain, Finland, Mongolia and Manchuria, and were still active in VVS). Nevertheless of its numerical superiority, the Red Army was still in full build-up on 22 June 1941, and thus was caught by surprise, when the Wehrmacht and its Rumanian ally struck Sunday at dawn, at 3:15.

The Reich’s Small Axis Allies Join In

On 26 June 1940, the Soviet Foreign Minister, V. M. Molotov, demanded Rumania to cede Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina – incorporated into the country some 21 years earlier, a move Moscow never acknowledged – within twenty-four hours. This demand came at a hard time for Rumania, who was isolated internationally. France – Rumania’s traditional ally – had been defeated, while Great Britain, another supporter of Rumania, was under siege. Hitler declined to intervene in the dispute, as under terms of the German-Soviet pact, Bessarabia was within Moscow’s sphere of influence. Therefore, abiding to the ultimatum it could not refuse, two days later Rumania ceded these territories to the USSR.
This significant territorial loss further increased tensions between the two countries. Armed clashes on the new frontier along River Pruth became regular, on ground and in air, too, as detailed later on.

On the political front, during the same time period, tensions in Bucharest increased to a boiling point. In the wake of massive anti-government protests in opposition to the territorial losses, King Carol II abdicated in favour of his son, Michael I, on 6 September 1940. On the same day, the young new king asked General Ion Antonescu to lead the country, assigning him unlimited powers. The general, who declared himself Conducãtor (i.e., Leader), decided to form a new, one-party government with the far-right Iron Guard (a.k.a. "The Legion of the Archangel Michael"), and declared the Kingdom a "Legionary State". All other political activity has been banned. On 23 November 1940, Antonescu signed in Berlin the ‘Tripartite Pact’, following the arrival of the German Military Mission to Rumania from 12 October on. These Wehrmacht troops were sent to train the Rumanian army and air force, as well as to protect the vital Ploieºti oilfields and refineries. Later on, they would become the spearhead of the sizeable German armed force that would strike the USSR next June. By March 1941, a total of 680,000 German troops were stationed in Rumania.

On 14 January 1941, in Berlin, Hitler revealed to Antonescu his general plan to attack the Soviet Union. The Führer asked for full co-operation of the Rumanian armed forces. Antonescu enthusiastically agreed, fuelled in part by the wish the recover the territories lost a year earlier and in part by his anti-Communist convictions. Both sentiments were largely shared by most of the Rumanian officer corps and political élite. The Rumanian armed forces were thus unhesitatingly committed by the Rumanian dictator to the “Anti-Bolshevik Crusade”. In exchange for his unequivocal support, the ‘Conducãtor’ asked for Hitler’s help to destroy the Iron Guard, in order to have free hands to prepare his Army for the imminent war. Rumania became the only ally of Germany, which took active part in the anti-Soviet campaign from the very first day of war. Rumania also committed, by far, the largest military resources to the anti-Soviet campaign among all of Germany’s allies.

In contrast to Rumania, Hungary did not have any territorial claims against its big Eastern neighbour. The differences between Budapest and Moscow were rather ideological. Hungary’s Regent, Vice-Admiral Miklós Horthy – a highly decorated, experienced veteran officer and battleship commander of the Austro-Hungarian Navy of W. W. 1 – was a fervent anti-Communist, as was most of the Hungarian officer staff. Hungary was the first power to adhere to the ‘Tripartite Pact’ on 20 November 1940. However, this was not enough to persuade Budapest to join Berlin in attacking the Soviet Union.
Initially, Hitler did not count on Hungary’s participation in the upcoming war either. Hungarian troop build-up at the country’s North-Eastern borders, dully observed by the Soviets, were more of a precautionary role than other. It was an unexpected incident, the bombing of city of Kassa (now Košice, Slovakia) on 26 June, which triggered Hungary’s entrance in the anti-Soviet war. Next day, war with the USSR was officially declared. With it, Hungary became the last of the small Axis powers to join in the “Anti-Bolshevik Crusade”.

Tiny Slovakia, a newly created state on the ruins of Czechoslovakia following the German occupation of the Czech Lands in March 1939, signed the ‘Tripartite Pact’ on 24 November 1940. However, President Monsegnior Dr. Jozef Tiso committed his country only reluctantly to Hitler’s aggression against the big neighbour, inhabited by fellow Slavs. It was mostly done as a ‘thank-you’ to Hitler for helping create the Slovak state.
The Slovak government began its preparation for war with the Soviet Union already in March 1941. There was a massive propaganda campaign to persuade the population that the war against bolshevism is vital, and that only the victory of the IIIrd Reich will assure the perpetuation of the Slovak State. The Slovak Army also planned ahead, so the decision to join the Wehrmacht in attacking the USSR came promptly. Accordingly, Slovakia declared war on the Soviet Union already on 23 June, the second day of the war.

Although Mussolini’s Italy declared war on the Soviet Union already on 22 June, alongside Germany and Rumania, it did not commit troops to the new front from the onset. Later the summer, a few Italian volunteer pilots did fly several combat missions over the southern front, which will be briefly noted.

Finally, Bulgaria – another Slavic nation with close historical and cultural ties to Russia, and thus the Soviet Union – although signed the ‘Tripartite Pact’ on 1 March 1941, managed to remain neutral in the Soviet-Axis confrontation, until Soviet troops reached its frontiers in early September 1944. Nevertheless, Bulgarian warplanes on coastal patrol service did clash occasionally with Soviet aircraft swaying into Bulgarian airspace.

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Addendum, here is Denes' website information:

http://aviatia.cda.ro/denes/Books_Denes.html

If however you would prefer to avoid placing yourself squarely in the middle of an ongoing battle with frontlines as rigidly defined as that surrounding the preventive war debate, and with such strong emotional and quasipolitical overtones, I think it would help if you went more into a bit of critique of Suvorov and the preventive war thesis, bringing out the differences between that interpretation and your own.

A more general problem is that any aggresisve Soviet intentions cannot be nearly so well sourced as the German. The Germans of course DID attack, at a specific time and for fairly easily identifiable reasons, there is little ambiguity or room for interpretation involved. On the Soviet side, there is no concrete decision to attack, no plan of attack and no actual attack - everything depends more or less on conjecture and interpretation of future intentions from statements. That will always be a strong argument against any interpretation that basically puts German and Soviet intentions on the same level.

Your force comparison: I would reword that, because as presently phrased it is not correct. The Wehrmacht was considerably larger than the Red Army in mid-June 1941. I assume that what you are really referring to is forces along the Eastern border. Even so, your present ratio seems to me to significantly understate Axis strength. But 2206 force comparison is a tricky business, with numerous difficult inclusiveness issues, and I do not know how you arrived at these ratios.

All the best

Since only Mr. Kjetil Aasland tackled the raised issue in detail, I will answer his post, item by item.

>>I am sure you are aware that by suggesting both sides were jockeying to be in a position to attack the other at an appropriate time, you are putting your hand into the hornet's nest.

Yes, I am. I will probably be targeted by both camps. However, this does not convince me to back down with publishing my thesis I believe in.

>>The position you take up is neither the traditional (since you argue that there was an intended Soviet attack down the pipeline somewhere), nor the preventive war thesis (since you argue that Hitler's decision to attack in the East was not fundamentally a product of fear of Soviet attack).

That is, again, correct. I clearly identified this in the first part of the study.

>>But your thesis is much more compatible with the latter than the former, hence it will be identified with it.

I would disagree with this. There is no objective reason why I would be identified with the preventive war thesis, as I clearly noted “the opening act of the Eastern Front was (…) [not] a legitimate, pre-emptive strike of a ‘clever’ Hitler.” Therefore, anyone who attempts to push me to this side does it unjustly.

>>Also, you seem to make a point out of underlining the essential equivalency of the nazi and Soviet regimes as totalitarian dictatorships, which many will disagree with

Yes, I do imply that basically both regimes were in the same category, i.e., totalitarian, led by dictators, albeit they differed in many aspects.

>>which is not strictly neccessary for the point you are making and which does tend to suggest that this equation is both the fundament of and the purpose of this part of the analysis. If this is what you want and is prepared for, fine.

Yes, this is part of my thesis, namely to show that both regimes who were sharpening their axes against the other, while putting a diplomatic façade to it, were actually in the same class. This, in my opinion, has to be spelled out clearly, even with the risk of getting more flak fire from even more people.
>>If however you would prefer to avoid placing yourself squarely in the middle of an ongoing battle with frontlines as rigidly defined as that surrounding the preventive war debate, and with such strong emotional and quasipolitical overtones, I think it would help if you went more into a bit of critique of Suvorov and the preventive war thesis, bringing out the differences between that interpretation and your own.
Unfortunately, I have no more room to use for further details, as the page count is fixed to only 96 and the word count to 50,000 (I actually delivered 91,000 words, causing severe headache to the editor). Therefore, I have to stick to the existing extent, plus/minus a few sentences. That’s also the only reason why I cannot include the sources and a bibliography either.
>>A more general problem is that any aggresisve Soviet intentions cannot be nearly so well sourced as the German. The Germans of course DID attack, at a specific time and for fairly easily identifiable reasons, there is little ambiguity or room for interpretation involved. On the Soviet side, there is no concrete decision to attack, no plan of attack and no actual attack - everything depends more or less on conjecture and interpretation of future intentions from statements. That will always be a strong argument against any interpretation that basically puts German and Soviet intentions on the same level.
Of course, the ultimate proof - the Soviet attack itself - never actually happened. Therefore, any indirect proofs can be dismissed as being ‘only’ plans, or war games, etc. Nevertheless, if one is interested in analysing unbiased and apolitically the issue, should be able to take a new sheet of paper and draw up the most probable situation based on the available secondary, or indirect evidences and demonstrate it “beyond reasonable doubt”. That’s what I did and came up with the conclusion presented in the thesis.
>>Your force comparison: I would reword that, because as presently phrased it is not correct. The Wehrmacht was considerably larger than the Red Army in mid-June 1941. I assume that what you are really referring to is forces along the Eastern border. Even so, your present ratio seems to me to significantly understate Axis strength. But 2206 force comparison is a tricky business, with numerous difficult inclusiveness issues, and I do not know how you arrived at these ratios.
Thanks to your point I already reworded the paragraph. Of course, I was referring to the forces amassed on the would-be front zone in June 1941.
Due to not writing down the sources when compiling the introduction – which grew over the time from a few pages to over ten pages – knowing that they would not be included anyways, now I cannot trace back with certainty where did I take the numbers from. I know that I have calculated them myself. Therefore, due to the lack of time – I have to close the edited manuscript by Sunday midnight - I decided to eliminate the ratios altogether, stating only: “In mid-June, the Red Army had overall superiority over the Wehrmacht and the small Axis allies in almost all military aspects. It has to be noted, however, that the dry figures are somewhat misleading, as the majority of Soviet aircraft and armour was obsolete to the day’s military standards.”
Finally, I would like to ask any of you if the uncensored Zhukov Plan of May 15, 1941 is available anywhere in English. I only have an intriguing excerpt, which I plan to include in my thesis: “In order to prevent a surprise German attack and to destroy the German Army, I consider it essential that under no circumstances should the initiative for freedom of action be given to the German High Command. [I consider it essential] to pre-empt enemy deployment, to attack the German Army when it is still in the stage of deployment and has not yet had time to organize his front and the interaction between his service arms.”
Thank you, again, Mr. Aasland for taking the time to answer my post in a positive and scholarly manner. If you would have more to add or comment, please do not hesitate to do it, preferably by the Sunday deadline.

Clearly, it's a brutal life in the world of publishing.

Thanks for the clarifications. Clearly you have made up your mind regarding the basic thrust of your argument, and with a deadline on Sunday there can't be much scope for any fundamental changes, so I will let that part rest. However, in all honesty I must say that to challenge the ruling interpretation on such a major issue in a short text without any references is not going to give you an easy time, and will carry the risk of your thesis being simply dismissed. At the very least, I would follow up with a future publication or article arguing the case more thoroughly (and with sources), and say so in the text. Personally I must say I am sceptical towards your conclusion, but that is not the point in this context (and I have also not seen the material on which you base it).

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I would disagree with this. There is no objective reason why I would be identified with the preventive war thesis, as I clearly noted “the opening act of the Eastern Front was (…) [not] a legitimate, pre-emptive strike of a ‘clever’ Hitler.” Therefore, anyone who attempts to push me to this side does it unjustly.
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Logicallly speaking, you are right. But the traditional interpretation is the ruling paradigm, while the preventive war thesis is a largely discredited theory. Hence, though I may be too cynical here, the adherents of the former will scorn you for implying they are half-wrong, while the adherents of the latter will love you for implying they are half-right.

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Thanks to your point I already reworded the paragraph. Of course, I was referring to the forces amassed on the would-be front zone in June 1941.
Due to not writing down the sources when compiling the introduction – which grew over the time from a few pages to over ten pages – knowing that they would not be included anyways, now I cannot trace back with certainty where did I take the numbers from. I know that I have calculated them myself. Therefore, due to the lack of time – I have to close the edited manuscript by Sunday midnight - I decided to eliminate the ratios altogether, stating only: “In mid-June, the Red Army had overall superiority over the Wehrmacht and the small Axis allies in almost all military aspects. It has to be noted, however, that the dry figures are somewhat misleading, as the majority of Soviet aircraft and armour was obsolete to the day’s military standards.”
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As it stands, your sentence is still factually incorrect - the Red Army didn't have manpower superiority over the Axis (or even over the Germans) in Mid-June, whether you count just forces along the border or overall military forces. To make the point float uyou would have to compare the Axis forces deployed along the border to the whole Red Army and Navy everywhere, but that would not be a very valid comparison.

If you deduct the Karelian forces from the Red Army Western MD's strength, this brings the Soviet total down to ~2.3 million. They work out like this, if broken down by sector (Krivosheev for the Soviet strengths, BA-MA RW6-535-3 for the German)

NW Front had 440,000 men (plus 58,000 men of the Baltic Fleet) on 22 June. At the same time, AOK 16 had 225,481 men, AOK 18 184,249 and PzGr 4 152,285, for a total of 562,015. Ratio: 1.3:1 without Baltic Fleet, 1.1:1 with it.

W Front had 625,000 men, and was opposed by AOK 4 (490,989), AOK 9 (382,273), PzGr 2 (181752) and PzGr 3 (130657), for a total of 1,185,671. Ratio: 1.9:1.

SW Front and S Front had 864,400 and 364,700 men respectively, for a total of 1,229,100. They were opposed by AOK 6 (378919), AOK 11 (172208), AOK 17 (284784) and PzGr 1 (158466), for a total of 1,004,377. Ratio: 1.2:1 in the soviet favour. Alternatively, we can disregard AOK 11 and S front, which gives totals of 832,169 German troops and 864,000 Soviet, or a 1:1 ratio. This would however not be quite correct, as some parts of S Front (18th Army) were engaged on this sector.

In other words, a slim German advantage in the North, a clear German advantage on the central sector, and a slim Soviet advantage in the South. In total (without Baltic Fleet, S Front, Karelia, AOKs 11 and 20, Finns and Romanians): 2,569,855 German, 1,929,400 Soviet, or a 1.3:1 German advantage. The Soviet figures do not include NKVD/Border guards (some 100,000 if I recall correctly), but on the other hand they do include Front aviation while no air elements are included on the German side. Also, no Romanian or other axis allied forces are being considered here.

However, very large Red Army forces were fed into the battle in the course of the summer, partly from reserves in the interior but mostly as a result of mobilisation. Hence, the Red Army's short-term force potential must certainly have exceeded that of the axis. But not in terms of forces in the field on 22.6. (and thereafter the enormous force generation was significantly offset by enormous losses).

If I can help in any way with further data, please let me know.

quote:

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Finally, I would like to ask any of you if the uncensored Zhukov Plan of May 15, 1941 is available anywhere in English. I only have an intriguing excerpt, which I plan to include in my thesis:

“In order to prevent a surprise German attack and to destroy the German Army, I consider it essential that under no circumstances should the initiative for freedom of action be given to the German High Command. [I consider it essential] to pre-empt enemy deployment, to attack the German Army when it is still in the stage of deployment and has not yet had time to organize his front and the interaction between his service arms.”

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I have seen translations that use the words 'suprise' instead of 'preempt'.

I have also been told this is a better translation:

In order to avoid this (and destroy the German army), I consider it imperative to UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES give initiative for action to the German Command and/or warn the enemy; and to attack the German Command at the moment when it is in the process of deployment and will not manage to organize the front(line) and the mutual support of the different forms of troops."

As this 'speech' is of critical importance to revisionists can anyone give an authorative translation?

"Regarding Zhukov's ominous report of May 15, 1941, I just received a link to the original Russian language version:
http://osteuropa.bsb-muenchen.de/dig/1000doktest/0024_zuk/@Generic__BookTextView/502;cs=default;ts=default;pt=502

Can you please post it on the forum, with the request to someone proficient in Russian to translate it, at least partially (emphasis being on the quote mentioned in my post).

Also, please note from my part that this report to Stalin is highly important not only to 'revisionist' (a rather derogatory term), but to everyone genuinely interested in history, who has an open mind to any substantial new information that sheds a different light on this his slice of recent history.

Best wishes,

Dénes"

“In order to prevent a surprise German attack and to destroy the German Army, I consider it essential that under no circumstances should the initiative for freedom of action be given to the German High Command. [I consider it essential] to pre-empt enemy deployment, to attack the German Army when it is still in the stage of deployment and has not yet had time to organize his front and the interaction between his service arms.”

As a personal refinement, I'd say:

In order to prevent [a surprise German attack] and destroy the German Army, I consider it essential that under no circumstance should the initiative be given to the German High Command. [It is essential] to preempt the enemy's deployment and attack the German Army while it is still deploying and has not had time to organize a frontline or cooperation between the service arms.

quote:

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I enclose the final version of the study, sent to the Publisher yesterday. Please post it on the forum on my behalf.
I don't know if the text formatting is right, hopefully it is.

Please mention my special thanks to Kjetil Aasland, for his generous help.

The Road to the German-Soviet War
- By Dénes Bernád, 2007

Most historical studies; published both in the East and West; still regard the German-Soviet confrontation during World War Two the largest armed conflict in the history of mankind as an aggression committed by the belligerent Germany against a militarily unprepared Soviet Union, which was first surprised, then overwhelmed by the unexpected and unwarranted onslaught of the German Army. However, in view of new information that has surfaced in the past two decades, from previously inaccessible sources, for example, the uncensored version of the Zhukov Plan of 15 May 1941 (1) addressed to Stalin, and mentioned below, or in published works, such as M. I. Meltyukhov, Stalins Missed Chance (2); it appears that this outdated view of the origins of the giant armed clash on the Eastern Front cannot be sustained realistically any longer in a scholarly and apolitical contemporary study.

It now appears that the opening act of the Eastern Front was neither clear aggression by the pugnacious Nazi Germany against the undoubtedly defensive USSR; the common view currently hold by most historians nor a pre-emptive strike of Hitler in order to beat Stalins plans; as alleged, for example, by Russian author V. Suvorov in his controversial book, Icebreaker (3). Rather, it was the outcome of a parallel gear-up for a total war by two totalitarian regimes led by similarly thinking and planning dictators, who acted quasi-independently of the other, with the final scope of annihilating the other side by force.

Despite the non-aggression and mutual assistance pact, which was proposed by the signing parties to be valid for ten years, and signed on 23 August 1939 (a pact that surprised many) as well as producing divergent diplomatic moves, both sides actually prepared fervently to attack the other.

The Generalniy Shtab (General Staff) (5) of the Red Army had already begun developing a sketchy plan for an assault on Germany in October 1939; almost simultaneously with the defeat of Poland conducted in co-operation of the Wehrmacht (which attacked first, from the West) and the Red Army (which followed suit, from the East, 17 days later).
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1, Source: TsAMO RF, f. 16, op. 2951, d. 237, l. 1-15. Original (as in http://osteuropa.bsb-muenchen.de/dig/1000doktest/0024_zuk/@Generic__BookTextView/502;cs=default;ts=default;pt=502)
2, Mel'tiukhov, M. I., Upushchennyi shans Stalina: Sovetskii Soyuz i bor'ba za Evropu: 1930-1941. Dokumenty, fakty, suzhdeniia. Vеchе, 2000 (ISBN 5783811963)
3, Suvorov, Viktor. Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War? (Viking Press/Hamish Hamilton; 1990) ISBN 0-241-12622-3
4, By the foreign ministers of the USSR and the Third Reich Vyacheslav M. Molotov and Joachim von Ribbentrop, respectively
5, Forerunner of Stavka (short for Shtab verkhovnogo komandovanya, or General Headquarters), which was former soon after the Axis attack
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The planning process intensified in March 1940, and at least four different versions of the plan were developed throughout 1940 and 1941. On 18 September 1940, the Soviet Chief of the Generalniy Shtab, Army General Kirill A. Meretskov, and the Peoples Commissar for Defence, Marshal Semyon K. Timoshenko, prepared a detailed war plan that envisaged attacking the Third Reich and implicitly Rumania, by means of a giant pincer, starting from Byelorussia (to the north) and Bessarabia (to the south). Hitler and his generals did not sit idle either. Despite the vague directions given much earlier by Hitler in his ominous Mein Kampf and other political pamphlets of the German National Socialist Workers Party (NSDAP), by 1940 there was no clear-cut, detailed German military plan to attack the USSR.

In mid-1940; at approximately at the same time as the similar Soviet detailed war plans; Hitler assigned the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, or the Armed Forces High Command) the task to prepare detailed plans for the eventuality of an anti-Soviet war. Simultaneously, both sides initiated the relocation of troops closer to the other states current borders. The Soviets amassed men and matériel to Byelorussia, Western Ukraine, and the newly acquired territory of Bessarabia, while the Germans transferred troops to the conquered Poland, and also moved;instructional troops; to the allied Rumania. Parallel to these military movements, both sides also acted on the diplomatic front as well, in an attempt to deceive and outmanoeuvre the other. This travesty had little success, however.

Hitler decided to actually go to war against his Reichs giant Eastern neighbour following the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotovs visit to Berlin in mid-November 1940. He signed Directive 21 code named personally by him as Operation Barbarossa; probably to stress the idea of a crusade against Bolshevism on 18 December 1940. It was ordered that all war preparations were to be commenced immediately, and be concluded by 15 May 1941. However, the unexpected Yugoslav about-face and the subsequent quick German attack on the country on 6 April, as well as the swift parallel Greek campaign, upset and delayed Hitlers plan for a major spring offensive against the USSR by a critical five weeks.

On the opposing side, Stalin had not yet decided decisively, and instructed his general staff to work on further stratagems. However, his actual attack timeline was apparently way behind Hitlers. Stalin actually hoped that Hitler would loose many months in fighting the Western Powers, allowing the Soviets to catch up in building the Red Army and preparing it for war. Stalin regarded the period of enforced peace after the Hitler-Stalin pact as an opportunity to build up and reorganize the Soviet military while Germany was busy in the west. The occupied areas of Finland, the Baltic states, Eastern Poland, Belarus, Bessarabia, no less than the forward-deployed troops, were seen as a barrier behind which this military preparation could be accomplished. Moreover, Stalin was absolutely convinced that Hitler would attempt nothing until he had resolved his conflict with Great Britain. He was encouraged in this preconception by a well-orchestrated German deception operation. When the head of Soviet military intelligence, Lieutenant-General Ivan I. Proskurov, explained to Stalin as early as August 1940 that Germany could not successfully invade Great Britain, he dismissed him (he was executed in October 1941). Stalin did not want to see the true situation since, at that time, his army still needed time to be ready to attack his de jure ally. Thus it was that Stalin was able to ignore the massive military build-up on his borders, and to dismiss every warning of a German attack as disinformation or provocation, right up until the early morning of 22 June 1941.

By early 1941, both sides feared their war plans would be compromised by the other; therefore, they sped up the build-up of forces, while keeping an apparently diplomatic façade towards each other. The German High Command finished detailing its anti-Soviet war plans in early February 1941, with hostilities planned to commence by late spring. The war was predicted to be over in less than six months, relying on the military and morale collapse of the USSR. Hitler, like Stalin, was a victim of his own preconceptions. But, in contrast to Stalin, he was ill-served with intelligence. All intelligence submitted to the Führer at this time went through Ribbentrop, who was passing only a fraction of what came to him from Germanys intelligence agencies. It was thus Ribbentrops actions, which lead to Hitler having incomplete assessments, not the information gathering services. Similarly, most Western governments were misinformed in regards to the USSR. For example, in mid-1939, British and French military intelligence specialists did not believe that the Red Army could crush the Wehrmacht. The only confidence was in the Polish Army, which was the sole, real opponent to the German Army. In fact, almost everybody outside the USSR thought that, after Stalins purges, the Red Army would disintegrate when faced with a powerful invasion of its Motherland. When Hitler met General Antonescu the de facto iron-handed leader of Germanys most important East European ally, Rumania on 12 June 1941 (i.e., ten days before Barbarossa), the self-styled Rumanian Conducãtor (Leader) also told him that the Red Army would collapse very quickly, as the Russian population wanted to be liberated from the Bolshevik yoke. However, the Germans overestimated their own capabilities, and also underestimated the Soviet combat force and its capacity to resist a significant attack. The first paragraph of Directive stated that: Soviet Russia is to be crushed in a quick campaign, before the end of war with England.

Stalin and his marshals lagged behind with their war preparation. In January 1941, a major command war game took place with the participation of a handful of important Soviet military leaders. The details of this command-level drill were further refined in May 1941 by the new Chief of General Staff, Army General Georgi K. Zhukov and Marshal Semyon K. Timoshenko to a comprehensive war plan. The Zhukov Plan of 15 May 1941 discovered in the Archives of the President of the Russian Federation several years ago outlines the Soviet Commands proposal of the time to Stalin. For ultimate security, the original twelve-page text had been handwritten by then Major General, later Marshal, A. M. Vasilevski, and addressed to the chairman of the USSR Council of Peoples Commissars, Josef Stalin. The document, marked Top Secret! Of Great Importance! Stalin's Eyes Only! One Copy Only! was authorized and approved by Timoshenko and Zhukov. A key passage in this plan, not previously cited, reads: In order to avoid this [a surprise German attack], and to destroy the German Army, I consider it imperative that under no circumstances the initiative for freedom of action be given to the German High Command and/or warn the enemy. [I consider it essential] to attack the German Army when it is still in the stage of deployment and has not yet had time to organize his front(line) and the mutual support of between his different services.
Thus Zhukov had proposed to Stalin precisely what the German Army would do only five weeks later.
Stalin himself made a far-reaching speech at the Kremlin, on 5 May, declaring, amongst other things: The Red Army is a modern army, and a modern army is an offensive army which clearly was at odds with the USSRs official defensive policy. It has to be said, however, that the Soviets war preparations appear to be somewhat lesser in scope than the Germans, not envisaging to conquering the entire Third Reich, but only occupied Poland, Eastern Prussia and most of Rumania, while Hitler intended to occupy the whole European area of the USSR.

In the meantime, simultaneous to the mobilization of manpower, Soviet war production also had geared up to full steam. Germany, too, built up its forces in the Eastern areas that were under Berlins military or political control, along with intensifying war production. Both sides tried to conceal their real goals, by attempting to outmanoeuvre the other side on the diplomatic arena, and to hide the strategic movements of their troops towards the common borders. Neither side truly believed the other one would actually attack beforehand, however. Both Moscow and Berlin relied on the effect of a surprise attack, followed by an envisaged quick victory. It happened that Berlin was the first one to act. The ultimate proof for Stalins real intentions – the attack itself of course never actually happened, Hitler being the first one to strike. Therefore, any indirect proof is dismissed by traditionalist historians as being plans on paper, vague intentions, and war games. Nevertheless, the circumstantial evidence to the contrary starts to emerge.

In mid-June, along the would-be front zone, the Red Army had overall superiority over the Wehrmacht and the small Axis allies in almost all military matériel aspects, except for manpower, where the Axis enjoyed slight advantage(6). However, very large Red Army forces were fed into the battle in the course of the early summer, partly from reserves in the interior, but mostly as a result of overall mobilisation. Hence, the Red Armys short-term human potential had certainly well exceeded that of the Axis. It has to be noted, however, that the dry figures are somewhat misleading, as the majority of Soviet aircraft and armour was obsolete to the days military standards. A much lesser percentage of the Germans, and somewhat more of the Axis allies war matériel could be considered obsolete. Also, German troops and aircrews had built up combat experience in the early war years, which cannot be said of most of the Soviet soldiers and flyers except of those who fought in Spain, Finland, Mongolia and Manchuria, and were not purged and executed. The Red Army was still in full build-up on 22 June 1941, and thus was caught by surprise, when the Wehrmacht and its Rumanian ally struck on Sunday at dawn, at 0315 hrs.
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6, Except for the South-Western and Southern Fronts – discussed in this book – where the Red Army held approx. 1.2 to 1 advantage over the Axis
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The Reichs small Axis allies join in

On 26 June 1940, the Soviet Foreign Minister, V. M. Molotov, demanded Rumania to cede Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina incorporated into that country some 21 years earlier, a move Moscow never acknowledged officially within twenty-four hours. This demand came at a hard time for Rumania, which was isolated internationally. France, Rumanias traditional ally and advocate, had been defeated, while Great Britain, another supporter, was under aerial assault. Hitler declined to intervene in the dispute, since under terms of the German-Soviet pact, Bessarabia was within Moscows sphere of influence. Therefore, abiding to the ultimatum she could not refuse, two days later Rumania ceded these territories to the USSR. This significant territorial loss further increased tensions between the two countries. Armed clashes on the new frontier along the River Pruth became regular, on ground and in the air, too, as will be detailed later on.

On the political front, during the same time period, tensions in Bucharest increased to boiling point. In the wake of massive anti-government protests in opposition to the territorial losses to the USSR, Hungary and Bulgaria i.e. Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the USSR, Northern Transylvania to Hungary and Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria, King Carol II abdicated in favour of his son, Michael I, on 6 September 1940. On the same day, the young new king asked General Ion Antonescu to lead the country, assigning him unlimited powers. The general who declared himself Conducãtor, i.e. Supreme Leader decided to form a new, one-party government with the far-right Iron Guard (a.k.a. The Legion of the Archangel Michael), and declared the Kingdom a Legionary State. All other political activity was banned. On 23 November 1940, Antonescu signed in Berlin the Tripartite Pact, following the arrival of the German Military Mission to Rumania from 12 October. These Wehrmacht troops were sent to train the Rumanian army and air force, as well as to protect the vital Ploieºti oilfields and refineries. Later on, these German units would become the spearhead of the sizeable German armed force that would strike the USSR the following June. By March 1941, a total of 680,000 German troops were stationed in Rumania.

On 14 January 1941, in Berlin, Hitler revealed to Antonescu his general plan to attack the Soviet Union. The Führer asked for the full co-operation of the Rumanian armed forces. Antonescu enthusiastically agreed, fuelled in part by the wish the recover the territories lost a year earlier and in part by his anti-Communist convictions. Both sentiments were largely shared by most of the Rumanian officer corps and the political élite. The Rumanian armed forces were thus unhesitatingly committed by the Rumanian dictator to the Anti-Bolshevik Crusade. In exchange for his unequivocal support, the Conducãtor asked for Hitlers help to destroy the Iron Guard, which had grown to a threat to his power and obstacle to his ambitions, in order to have free hands to prepare his Army for the imminent war. Rumania became the only ally of Germany, which took an active part in the anti-Soviet campaign from the very first day of war. Rumania also committed, by far, the largest military resources to the anti-Soviet campaign among all of Germany allies.

In contrast to Rumania, Hungary did not have any territorial claims against its giant Eastern neighbour. The differences between Budapest and Moscow were ideological. Hungarys Regent, Vice-Admiral Miklós Horthy a highly decorated, experienced officer veteran and battleship commander of the Austro-Hungarian Navy of the First World War was a fervent anti-Communist, as was most of the Hungarian officer staff. Hungary was the first power to adhere to the Tripartite Pact& on 20 November 1940. However, this was not enough to persuade Budapest to join Berlin in attacking the Soviet Union. Initially, Hitler did not count on Hungarys participation in the upcoming war either. Hungarian troop build-up on the countrys North-Eastern borders, dully observed by the Soviets, was more of a precautionary move than anything else. It was an unexpected incident, the bombing of the city of Kassa (now Košice, Slovakia) on 26 June by three warplanes, identified at that time as Soviet, which triggered Hungarys entrance in the anti-Soviet war. Next day, war with the USSR was officially declared. With it, Hungary became the last of the small Axis powers to join in the Anti-Bolshevik Crusade.

Tiny Slovakia, a newly created state built upon the ruins of Czechoslovakia following the German occupation of the Czech Lands in March 1939, signed theTripartite Pact on 24 November 1940. However, President Monsegnior Dr. Jozef Tiso committed his country only reluctantly to Hitlers aggression against its big neighbour, which was inhabited by fellow Slavs. The two countries did not have territorial claims against each other, and did not even share a common border. It was mostly done as a thank-you to Hitler for helping create the Slovak state.

The Slovak Government began its preparation for war with the Soviet Union as early as March 1941. There was a massive propaganda campaign to persuade the population that the war against Bolshevism was vital, and that only victory by the Third Reich would assure the perpetuation of the Slovak State. The Slovak Army also planned ahead, so the decision to join the Wehrmacht in attacking the USSR came promptly. Accordingly, Slovakia declared war on the Soviet Union and sent its troops to combat.

Although Mussolinis Italy had declared war on the Soviet Union on 22 June, alongside Germany and Rumania, it did not commit troops to the new front from the onset. Later that summer, a few Italian volunteer pilots did fly several combat missions over the southern front, which will be briefly noted in the following text.

Finally, Bulgaria a nation with close historical and cultural ties to Russia, and thus to the Soviet Union although having signed the Tripartite Pact on 1 March 1941, managed to remain neutral in the Soviet-Axis confrontation, until Soviet troops reached its frontiers in early September 1944. Nevertheless, Bulgarian warplanes on coastal patrol service did occasionally pursue Soviet aircraft swaying into Bulgarian airspace.

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My thanks go again to Kjetil Aasland from this forum, who kindly offered his 'peer review' on the study.
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