In the introduction, Glenn notes criticisms of Marshall's Ratio of Fire, detailing opposition to and criticism of Marshall by Dr Roger Spiller of the US Command and Staff College, as well as Harold Limbaugh.

I came across further critcism of Marshall while reading "About Face", by Colonel David Hackworth, although this was not of Marhsall's methods directly, but more of his motivations and general approach.

I am presently reading "On Killing", by Colonel Dave Grossman, pub. BackBay books, 1995. In the book, Colonel Grossman (to my mind) glosses over the critiques of Marshall, dismissing the criticism while not really addressing the criticisms, especially those of Dr Spiller.

It is important, I believe, for Colonel Grossman's thesis as he presents it in his book, that not only were General Marshall's concepts correct, but that his figures (as well as those produced during the Viet Nam war) accurately reflected reality.

So, gentlemen, how good are General Marshall's figures? Is his ratio of fire a trustworthy concept?

Thanks

quote:

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Originally posted by Tim:
I have recently finished reading SLA Marhsall's "Men Against Fire", University of Oklahoma Press edition, 2000, with an introduction by Russell W. Glenn.

In the introduction, Glenn notes criticisms of Marshall's Ratio of Fire, detailing opposition to and criticism of Marshall by Dr Roger Spiller of the US Command and Staff College, as well as Harold Limbaugh.

[Snips]

So, gentlemen, how good are General Marshall's figures? Is his ratio of fire a trustworthy concept?

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Roger Spiller's piece, "S L A MArshall and the Ratio of Fire", in the Winter 1988 issue of "RUSI Journal", criticises Marshall's methods, but does not really disagree with his conclusions.

The main criticism of Marshall, from the point of view of methodological soundness, is that he did not, in fact, obtain the vast mass of data from combat interviews that he claimed to have done. However, it is possible to arrive at a correct answer from inadequate data. Spiller claims that Marshall saw statistics as "an ornament to belief", rather than a rigorous means of establishing proof. Nonetheless, his broad conclusions appear to be right (although I suspect most infantrymen will cavil at his neglect of the importance of terrain), and I believe this is why they have been so widely accepted by soldiers and analysts alike.

By way of corroboration of Marshall's findings -- indeed, I think, of prior art -- one may cite Lionel Wigram's ("The Forgotten Apostle of Battle Drill", as a recent article in the British Army Review called him) account of British Army platoon attacks in Italy. According to Wigram, platoons were never organised and never operated "by the book". They always had a strength of about two dozen men, and the pattern of attack was always that a few waverers would hang back, the Platoon Sergeant or some similar responsible person would organise a base of fire with the platoon's Brens, and a handful, say half a dozen, of "gutful men", usually led by the platoon leader, would take the enemy position.

All the best,

John.

[This message has been edited by John D Salt (edited 11-18-2005).]

quote:

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Originally posted by John D Salt:
Roger Spiller's piece, "S L A MArshall and the Ratio of Fire", in the Winter 1988 issue of "RUSI Journal", criticises Marshall's methods, but does not really disagree with his conclusions.

The main criticism of Marshall, from the point of view of methodological soundness, is that he did not, in fact, obtain the vast mass of data from combat interviews that he claimed to have done. However, it is possible to arrive at a correct answer from inadequate data. Spiller claims that Marshall saw statistics as "an ornament to belief", rather than a rigorous means of establishing proof. Nonetheless, his broad conclusions appear to be right (although I suspect most infantrymen will cavil at his neglect of the importance of terrain), and I believe this is why they have been so widely accepted by soldiers and analysts alike.

By way of corroboration of Marshall's findings -- indeed, I think, of prior art -- one may cite Lionel Wigram's ("The Forgotten Apostle of Battle Drill", as a recent article in the British Army Review called him) account of British Army platoon attacks in Italy. According to Wigram, platoons were never organised and never operated "by the book". They always had a strength of about two dozen men, and the pattern of attack was always that a few waverers would hang back, the Platoon Sergeant or some similar responsible person would organise a base of fire with the platoon's Brens, and a handful, say half a dozen, of "gutful men", usually led by the platoon leader, would take the enemy position.

All the best,

John.

[This message has been edited by John D Salt (edited 11-18-2005).]

[This message has been edited by John D Salt (edited 11-18-2005).]

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Thank you very much. I am very interested in this from two perspectives : firstly, the application of operational and tactical analysis to real world scenarios (i.e., warfare); but secondly, from the point of view of Colonel Grossman's book.

One of the major thesis in his book is that US training techniques have increased the ratio of fire (and the kill ratio) since Marshall wrote Men Against Fire.

He leads on from this by postulating that violence in modern media and computer games simulates the training that has produced the higher kill ratios in the US armed forces; and leads on from that by saying that there is something seriously wrong with any society that allows this kind of "training" or "conditioning" to happen.

A bit like giving an 8 year old a firearm.