I obtained a 2nd hand book entitled "The Soviet Air Force in World War II The Official History" translated by Leland Fetzer, published by Doubleday in 1973.

If EVER there is a more hilarious rendition of WWII "history" than the below, please post it for continued amusement.

From Pages 382 & 383:

What Really Caused the German Defeat? Bourgeois falsifiers of World War II history attempt by any means at their disposal to minimize the role of the Soviet Air Force in the defeat of the Luftwaffe. They affirm that the power of the Luftwaffe was undermined by the Anglo-American bombing raids on German aircraft factories. However, historical documents and facts overthrow these unfounded assertions. Before 1943, when the fascist Luftwaffe was still strong and the battle for the control of the air was still in question, the American and English air forces had flown almost no raids against air targets in Germany. In 1943, they dropped only 2 percent of their bombs on aircraft factories, and the effect of their raids was not great.
The opening of the second front in Europe in the summer of 1944 had no real influence on the struggle of our air force with Fascist air power. The increased efforts of the Anglo-American air force against industrial targets (including aircraft plants) did not give the desired results. In 1944, Germany increased its aircraft production in comparison with 1943, from 24,365 aircraft to 40,482.* The most effective Anglo-American raids were against synthetic fuel plants in 1945, but they occurred when Germany was already on the verge of an unavoidable catastrophe.
In spite of great losses , the Germans were still able to maintain their original air armies on the Soviet-German front, where most of their experienced air units and groups were located even after the opening of the second front. About 30 percent of the German aircraft located on the Western Front and other theatres of war were in fact reserves of the German command.
Thus, the loss of the control of the air, which the Germans suffered in 1943 can be explained not by the English and American air raids on German aircraft plants, but by the defeat of its best squadrons on the Soviet-German front.
In the first half of 1944 the Soviet Air Force was strengthened by more than 3000 aircraft and had nearly a fourfold advantage over the enemy. This additional growth made it possible for the Soviet Air Force to complete its assignment of defeating the Fascist air forces without Anglo-American help.

Refers to Cajus Bekker, Luftwaffe War Diaries (London 1967), Page 377 – count modified by removing Gliders.

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First is established, as a counterpoint to the own thesis, a position that is easy to demolish and which is not representative for the historiography the argument is put forward against: That bombing of German aircraft industry won the war in the air. Then it proceeds to overlook entirely the more relevant aspects of the air war in the West, such as the fact that the majority of German air power was dedicated to it. Interestingly, it does not have to tell too many actual lies (except in its main conclusions).

This is in a very fundamental sense of the word propaganda - and very skilled propaganda too.

regards,

I am a member of a Group that is attempting to rectify this problem. We have contracted with a Russian researcher to obtain from both of the Russian military archives a complete regimental order of battle of the SAF. This will include: 1) the identification of the Regiment, 2) where it was based at, 3) what high headquarters it was assigned to, 4) what the service units were, and 5) how many aircraft the Regiment and what models.
We're currently working through the pre-June 1941 period, since the researcher works at the military Archives in Moscow. He is currently visiting the main military archives in Podolsk and i hope to hear back from him sometime next week.
The date of book suggests in was in the Brezhnev-era propaganda period. There has become more information availble since 1973, but still no details.
That is why I am particpating in this Group, to get these details.

quote:

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Originally posted by Rich:
Very amusing. As Kjetil has already said, it is a skilled piece of propaganda, telling part of the truth, but not all of it. It ignores the simple facts that after late 1942 about two-thitds of German airpower, and about two-thirds of their air losses, occurred in the west. And that during the same period well over 800,000+ Luftwaffe personnel were devoted to the flak defenses of the Reich. And so on and so on.

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H. Boog (in "Die Welt im Krieg 1941-1943", Vierter Teil) stated that due to the lack of Jagdgeschwader in the west many training and replacement units were used as substitute on a regular base.

So many pilots could die while assigned to training units but still be genuine KIA.

Darrin, do you have better data (percentage of KIA, accidents ... in training units?)

The same source gives a good discussion on the efficiency (or better inefficiency) of Flak units in the west.

quote:

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Originally posted by Darrin:

While this info might be technically correct it might also be ignoring some important info. Many of the aircraft lost were on training missiions. Plus while perhaps most of the ftr were lost in the west in combat fewer bombers of any time were until late in the war.

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Darrin, it is both technically correct and includes some inportant info. My statement was based upon the losses recorded by the operational units as "Abgang durch Feindeinwerkung" - losses due to enemy action. It does not include losses due "ohne Feindeinwerkung, Ueberholung" - not through enemy action or overhaul - or "an andere Verbaende" - transfers to other units.

Losses to enemy action for bomber units (Kampfverbaende) roughly by front from March 1942 through December 1944(Eastern/Western) were:

1942 957/826
1943 933/1,164
1944 425/1,326

Losses in Stuka and Schlachtverbaende were:

1942 457/169
1943 905/518
1944 1,237/345

Losses in Zerstroerverbaende were:

1942 178/61
1943 132/182
1944 185/275

Losses in Nachtjaegdeverbaende were:

1942 0/83
1943 23/274
1944 94/1,063

Losses in Jagdverbaende were:

1942 707/536
1943 1,135/2,359
1944 972/6,818

Total losses from units was:

1942 2,299/1,675
1943 3,128/4,497
1944 2,913/9,827

To this the following may be added:

Losses against Britain 1 July-6 October 1940:

Kampf and Stuka 545
Jagd and Zestroer 675

Losses against Britain 7 October 1940-31 May 1941:

Kampf 481

Luftflotte 3 losses against Britain July-December 1941

Kampf 129
Jagd 93
Aufklaerer 13

Luftflotte 3 losses against Britain Jan-Feb 1942

46 all types

Fliegerkorps X losses against Malta January-May 1941:

44 aircraft all types

Losses in the assault on Crete:

73 transports and 138 other aircraft

Losses in the East 22 June-27 September 1941

2,377 all types/all causes

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Originally posted by Ulenspiegel:
Darrin wrote
/quote:
While this info might be technically correct it might also be ignoring some important info. Many of the aircraft lost were on training missiions. Plus while perhaps most of the ftr were lost in the west in combat fewer bombers of any time were until late in the war.
/quote

H. Boog (in "Die Welt im Krieg 1941-1943", Vierter Teil) stated that due to the lack of Jagdgeschwader in the west many training and replacement units were used as substitute on a regular base.

So many pilots could die while assigned to training units but still be genuine KIA.

Darrin, do you have better data (percentage of KIA, accidents ... in training units?)

The same source gives a good discussion on the efficiency (or better inefficiency) of Flak units in the west.

Ulenspiegel

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Thanks and yes you are quite right about loses due to enemy action.

quote:

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Originally posted by Darrin:
Rich,

Thanks and yes you are quite right about loses due to enemy action.

Darrin

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Ah! The millenium has come at last - Darrin and I agree to agree!

Seriously though, I did forget to mention that operational losses (accidents and other non-combat losses) were important. The vast majority of those of course occured in primary flight training schools and the Erganzungsstaffeln and Gruppen of the operational units. Worse - for the Germans - those losses appeared to tend to increase during the war, mostly due to the accelerated training schedule. IIRC, Price indicates that by 1944 operational losses on the various fronts amounted to about 25% of the combat losses. Combined with losses in primary and advanced training schools that was a tremendous drain of pilots that added to an already overworked training system.

But then those losses can't really be attributed to enemy actions, which was the original point of our argument - remember?