Couple of questions:

One was hit by two panzerfaust rounds fired from the right flank -- range about 30 feet. One penetrated 3" is set the tank on fire.

The second hit a US AT mine (left track) and was immobilized. It was then hit by 6 rounds of what was believed to be 88mm at a range of 800 yards from the right front. Hits on the turret side, mantlet, front slope and final drive failed to penetrate, a hit on the right front sponson at an angle of 75 degrees penetrated and caused the tank to burn.

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Originally posted by richard g:
In my view the Jumbo in reality was a British type I tank, suitable for infantry support. Rich's figures are quite impressive, given that the Jumbo in the infantry support role, or attack leader role, would likely be regularly exposed to close range fire of all types.

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Well, doctrinally they were considered to be no different than either the light tanks or the medium tanks. That may sound like an odd statement, but, quite simply the doctrinal use of tanks to support infantry made no distinction between armor thickness or tank weight. In a sense, light, medium, and heavy were terms that applied just to weight -- the logistical cost of moving the vehicle, not it's tactical utility.

Now the importance of heavy in regards to armor was something that was learned by experience -- one result being the change in emphasis organizationally from the light tanks (which had better strategic mobility) for medium tanks (accepting the loss of strategic mobility in return for increased protection and gunpower). That experience was gained (in terms of the Sherman) between 24 October 42 (their intro to combat) and May-July 43 (end of the Tunisian campaign to when the organizational changes were imposed, and when the T20-T25 series experimentation got serious).

Now, from there it gets a bit murky. However, the T20, 21, 22, 23 were all more or less no goes. The 25 appeared to be the way to go -- and, to make it even better, they added some more armor and presto T26! Unfortunately, they then ran into some of the same problems found in the Jumbo, the extra armor overstressed the drivetrain and suspension. In addition, there were the usual little niggly "teething" problems -- like the sights going out of alignment after every round fired. The upshot was that the delivery of the T26 (accepted as the M26 Heavy) slipped from November 44 to February 45. Now Ordnance (being realistic) had earlier realized that the T26 was not going to be available for OVERLORD and produced the Jumbo in sufficient quantanties so that 8 seperate battalions could be maintained with 17 each at standard War Department loss rates from June-November 44. But, another monkey wrench got thrown in -- the ETO, liking the glowing reports of the M26, wanted it, somehow evidently missing the minor caveat that it wouldn't be ready until November -- and failed to request the stopgap Jumbos until May 44! Which then were delivered beginning in August, most arriving and in the hands of the troops in September, with a combat debut in October.

BTW Alex, I'm still putting together the data, but it appears that the ETO was allocated shipping sufficient to move an average of about 500 medium tanks per month to the UK/Continent. The peak in 44 appears to have been September-October when 572 75mm, 212, 76mm, and 208 Jumbos were received (there may have been more, I have been unable as yet to locate complete records for October). Priority wasn't given to tanks until after the first of the year, the peak appears to have been February when 234 75mm, 511 76mm, and 213 105mm Shermans were shipped. (These apparently are for replacement tanks only).

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Originally posted by Alex H:
That shipping info is very interesting Rich, I take it the Zebra mission people had the highest priority?

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Gack! Brain fog. I can't place Zebra for some reason? In any case I am still researching the rather Byzantine methods the Allies used to allocate shipping resources. Evidently, there were preset allocations to the British civilian economy (and later the liberated areas of the continent), Lend-Lease (UK and USSR, and later France), and the various theaters. In theater, the USAAF got to vie with the AGF and Navy, while, of course, the Brit military fought for their requirements. Finally, it appears that all of the end users were allocated only a small proportion of "priority shipping tonnage" which apparently meant that everything else got shipped whenever. So, it appears that when the pie got sliced down to "need of more tanks for 12th Army Group" it was very thin indeed.

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Originally posted by Rich:
Gack! Brain fog. I can't place Zebra for some reason?

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Originally posted by Alex H:
Pershings - the bane of the SLS! Zebra Mission to Europe and later to Okinawa. Shooting at helmets with 90mm guns and all that good stuff.

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Thanx! But actually, no, AFAIK Zebra did not have any particullar priority shipping allocation. And, someone misplaced one-half of the specailly designed tank transporters they came with (yeah, I know, who needs tank transporters, that's why they put tracks on tanks -- sigh, shake my head). As to Okinawa, AFAIK no Pershings got into action there, unless it was at the very end of things. But, by the end of the war in the ETO, 18 were operational with First Army (the original Zebras), 43 with Third Army, and 37 with Ninth Army, a few more than the 20 usually quoted.

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Originally posted by Rich:
As to Okinawa, AFAIK no Pershings got into action there, unless it was at the very end of things.

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No Pershing action in Okinawa. Hunnicutt is adamant about that.

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But, by the end of the war in the ETO, 18 were operational with First Army (the original Zebras), 43 with Third Army, and 37 with Ninth Army, a few more than the 20 usually quoted.

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Very interesting.

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As to Pershing and SLS. I like the Pershing, it was a great tank if you could keep it running (1 of the Zebras never ran, and another couldn't keep a charge on it's batteries).

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Don't you think it has a somewhat undeserved bad rap? In Zaloga's "Pershing" it states that the army found it to be 3.5 times more effective than the Sherman in tank vs tank combat and 3.05 times more effective in general.

Now I don't have a clue as to how they came up with 3.05 times more effective 'in general' (the 3.5 comes from the kill/loss tally), have you ever come across such a report? Do you have any idea as to the methodology used?

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As to Sherm -- you gotta go with what you got sometimes, I wonder if there's a Panzer II Lovers Society out there somewhere?

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Originally posted by Alex H:
I think there are more 'Panzer Lovers' than Sherman lovers. Sherman lovers are overly nationalistic, panzer lovers are just misguided.

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Nah! Panzer lovers just like the keeno black uniforms and the skull and crossbones insignia. And try to tell me there aren't a lot of Russian types that are just a mite nationalistic about the T34 and the IS-ilk -- just try.

As to the Zalogaism??? Maybe the 3.05 is the kill ratio times an operational readiness rate of 0.87??? Honestly, I have no idea where some of these numbers come from, sometimes I think they just pull them out their @ss.

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Originally posted by Rich:
And try to tell me there aren't a lot of Russian types that are just a mite nationalistic about the T34 and the IS-ilk -- just try.

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As to the Zalogaism???...

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