"There is no doubt that the massive economic and numerical superiority that the Allies enjoyed helped them win, yet upon further analysis this answer lacks sufficient explanatory power by itself. First, the Germans rarely enjoyed material superiority or greater economic capacity at any point from 1939 on (they only briefly held a manpower advantage against the Soviets in 1941; Glantz and House 1995). So, if the Allies had economic and numerical advantages from the beginning, why did the Germans win their victories so easily in 1939-1942? During this time, the Germans routinely bested armies that were larger and even qualitatively superior to their own. Soviet counterattacks in 1941 and 1942 often enjoyed tremendous numerical superiority yet failed miserably (Glantz 2002; 1999; 1998a). These situations demonstrate that economic and numerical advantages are neither necessary nor sufficient for victory"

This is of course logical hogwash. What these DO demonstrate is that these advantages are not NECCESSARILY neccessary or sufficient for victory, provided that they are compensated for by other factors. What he fails to note, or at least to take much into account, is that unlike the examples quoted here, allied victories in the latter half of the war WERE generally won with large numerical superiorities, and consequently it cannot be simply inferred from them that they reflect a corresponding presence of such compensatory factors. Nor can it be inferred from this that the explanation for the outcomes must on this basis be chiefly due to other factors than the numerical relation.

He notes, correctly, that in some cases the Red Army were not able to turn large superiorities into operational success in 1941/42, while they did manage this at a later time. However, in 1941/42, the Soviets did not to the same extent as later possess numerical superiority over their opponent. And secondly, while this does of course indicate that the Red Army improved in effectiveness as the war went on (something which few would question), it cannot neccessarily be inferred from this that they improved to a level beyond their adversaries. The fallacy here is "the outcome cannot be wholly explained by A, so it must be wholly explained by B". See also points below.

" This answer also discredits the abilities of the Allied military forces. This matters for more than simple chauvinistic or patriotic reasons, because falsely discrediting the Allies skews our interpretation of the war. Its logic states that with equal force strengths, the Germans would have necessarily won the war. I do not think this is the case, as many studies now show that in 1944 (and maybe 1943 for the Soviet Union), the Allied military organizations were simply better than the German organization (Rush 2001; Mansoor 1999; Bonn 1996; Glantz and House 1995). "

I have frankly no patience at all with the "discrediting" argument - if it's true, then it's true. I do not think I am alone in retaining a good measure of scepticism concerning the conclusions of Mansoor's study. I have not read this particular book by Glantz/House, but if it does draw such a conclusion, it would not fit well with the conclusions of "From the Don to the Dniepr". In any case, this assumes as given that which is to be proven.

"This means that numbers alone can not provide an explanation for the Allied victory in 1945."

No, not in the sense that this was the only thing that changed from 1941 to 1944, but it still CAN provide the better part of the explanation.

"Essentially, the military bureaucracy has to be capable of effectively wielding that economic and numerical advantage (Overy 1998). "

Of course. But this does not mean that you neccessarily have to be MORE EFFECTIVE than the opponent in order to succeed, if you enjoy a great level of material superiority.

"The other common misperception about the Red Army is that, even more so than the western Allies, it won simply due to its overwhelming manpower advantage (in terms of tanks, guns, and troops). While it is true that by 1945 the Red Army enjoyed superior numbers, those numbers were never overwhelming for most of the war"

This quite simply is not accurate, and can only be put down to a peculiar reading of the strength figures, such as not taking into account STAVKA reserves. In terms of manpower, the Soviets had a better than 2:1 superiority already in the summer of 1942, better than 3:1 in the summer of 1943 and more still at alter stages. Advantages in tanks and artillery were larger still than the manpower advantage. Also, it is neccessary to take into account that over such a huge front, the overall advantage turns into local superiorities still much larger than this on chosen points of concentration.

"Furthermore, while the totals may have been in favor of the Soviet Union, at critical spots on the front there often was a
situation of near parity"

This is of course patently absurd. Not just is it self-evident that an attacker enjoying an overall superiority should be able to concentrate even larger superiorities at his chosen points (in the absence of blatant incompetence in planning, intelligence, staff-work and logistics), particularly when possible places of attack were so numerous, the front so long, and the German resources so slender relative to the length of the front. It is also quite evident from some of the literature he uses that reality was pretty much the opposite of his description.

The only backing he offers for this notion is some figures from Zitadelle:

"For example, at the start of July 1943 on the southern face of the "Kursk bulge" the Soviets had a manpower advantage of 1.66:1, an advantage in tanks of 2.12:1, and a disadvantage in artillery of 1:1.87. These ratios are far lower than commonly thought. When considering only units actually fighting, these ratios are much different. At the start of July 1943 on the south face of the Kursk salient, the Germans had a 2.9:1 advantage in manpower, an 11.6:1 advantage in tanks, and a 7.74:1 advantage in artillery (Turkes 2000). Certainly, to make a sweeping statement that the Soviets consistently and vastly outnumbered the Germans is a gross distortion of facts."

Firstly, it should be noted that Zitadelle was a German offensive. Therefore it is not a good indication of the ability of the Soviets to achieve superior concentration on their chosen points of attack. Secondly, if his figures are relevant, this begs the question why the Red Army chose to deploy such inferior forces on the main axis of a German offensive they knew of and prepared for for several months, if we also accept, as he claims, that Soviet organisational effectiveness was higher. Thirdly, his figures are not meaningful. Basically he is tallying the full German assault force against the Soviet elements deployed in the first echelon of the defense, which is not a very relevant measure of force, but just a reflection of the nature of the Soviet deployment - in echelons, and with large reserves. Within a week, the Soviets had committed vastly greater forces than these, while the German strength did not increase (but rather declined as a result of casualties). The Red Army deployed significantly greater forces than the Germans during the relatively short German offensive phase in the South. They also suffered casualties at least three times greater than the German attackers, despite the advantages of defensive posture, superior numbers and extensive defensive preparations.

" At any rate, these advantages by themselves were not enough to ensure victory, as the numerous battlefield defeats of Red Army offensives in 1942 and early 1943 demonstrate. Clearly, something else was required to ensure the numerical advantages were put to good use.
The Red Army that ended the war was qualitatively better, not just in weaponry, but also in organizational effectiveness, than the army that started the war. This is why the Red Army eventually performed well."

This is an argument that falls on its own many logical flaws.

1) While it is valid to say that the outcome cannot simply be reduced to a numerical relation, this does rule out that the numerical relation can have been a great or the greater factor in explaining the outcome. His logical fallacy is basically this: Since the explanation cannot be wholly A, it must be wholly B.

2) While it is valid to claim that the Red Army improved in effectiveness, this does not mean either that this improvement neccessarily put it beyond its adversary, nor that this improvement is the main explanation of its success.

What he entirely fails to appreciate is that numerical superiority and effectiveness impact on each other. The effect of a 3-1 numerical superiority increases with the level of effectiveness. To an extent, you can compensate for inferior effectiveness with superior numbers. To an extent, you can also compensate for inferior numbers by superior effectiveness. But the extent in either case is of course not unlimited. To put the basic logic in maximally simplistic (and of course not ultimately valid) terms: If the Germans are twice as effective as the Soviets, but the Soviets are four times stronger, the Soviets will win. If the Germans are three times as effective as the Soviets and the Soviets twice as strong as the Germans, the Germans will win.

The relevant question to ask therefore would be "How good did the Red Army have to be in order to be able to win with this level of superior resources"? The answer to that question certainly would not plausibly be either "as good as the Germans" or "better than the Germans".

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There are of course many other points to consider in this text. However, the argument pretty much stands and falls with his rejection of material factors as the main explanation. If this rejection is not valid, then most of the resulting analysis becomes superfluous - because there would not then be any neccessity to resort to administrative theory (of all things!) to explain the outcome. And this rejection IMO is, as is evident from the above, severely flawed logically, takes far too much for granted, is in part based on inaccurate data and omits consideration of a very major factor of key importance as an indicator of effectiveness - casualties. For instance, one wonders why, if he is correct in positing an equal (apparently even superior Soviet) level of effectiveness why the Germans in the operationally disastrous year of 1943 still managed to inflict on the Soviets casualties more than five times larger than their own - and retained a very positive ratio in the even more disastrous year of 1944?

regards,

Allow me offer some further commentary to superb responses by Darrin and Kjetil Aasland.

Kjetil addressed very accurately the EXTREME lack of facts and logic in the argument of Prof. Lican. At the risk of stereotyping, I think only a Political Science “type” could state something so ludicrous as “with equal force strengths, the Germans would have necessarily won the war. I do not think this is the case, …”

Prof. Lican may have a PhD in Political Science, but his History level could be characterized as Kindergarten!

Explanation of World War II results require more than looking at the single battle analysis performed via QJM. This is NOT AT ALL to say QJM analysis is incorrect, simply that to explain theatre-level or campaign-level results requires additional considerations. I will contend that the following three (3) considerations, if incorporated into QJM at the level discussed, would exactly explain the course of World War II battles.

These considerations are:
(1) Air Supremacy (all the land battle ramifications deriving there from)
(2) Attrition (effects on QUALITY of fighting personnel)
(3) Logistics (the availability level of ammunition & fuel)

1) AIR SUPREMACY

The following quote is from General Karl Koller, Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff at the end of the war. It appears in the Epilogue section of “The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force 1933-1945” written by a number of unnamed authors (identified as Public Records Office) for the British Air Ministry:

“We have lost the war. Why and Couldn’t it have been different? There are many reasons Germany lost the war; political, economic and military reasons which were our own fault. None of these reasons were decisive in themselves, nor were they together decisive… what was decisive in itself was the loss of air supremacy.

The campaigns in Poland, Holland, Belgium, France and Norway had proved unequivocally how important air supremacy is in modern war.

Not Germany who showed what superior air forces and skill in leading them meant, learned the lesson – but on the contrary the enemy countries, who drew the proper and logical conclusions and with an iron tenacity built up a superior air force which alone could lead to victory.

As long as we had air supremacy … The British fleet did not show itself; no noticeable traffic dared enter the Channel. As long as we had air supremacy, nobody threatened our industries, … ;our lines of communication in the Mediterranean were not interfered with. If our air supremacy had been kept up right from the beginning and at cost of other armaments programs, we would not have been defeated in Africa or the Mediterranean.

German air supremacy – and there would have been no invasion, or it would have been turned back with the loss of much blood. But the political leadership in Germany, in its shortsightedness and in complete misjudgment of the tenacity and mentality of the Anglo-Saxons and the potential war power of the United States, had believed that the War in the West had already been won in 1940 and started on the folly of the Russian War.

We were smothered by the enormous superiority of American and Russian material, because the German High Command undertook too much on the ground in the East, and because it did not direct the main weight of armament right from the beginning towards air superiority and thereby safeguard Germany’s vital zones and armament industry and ward off any attack from the West.

Everything depends on Air Supremacy -- everything else must take second place. Supremacy of the sea is only an appendage of air supremacy. Look at the development of the European War and the developments in the situation in the Pacific area. Even the strongest fleet is of no value if the enemy has air supremacy.”

The explanation of the early German victories, besides the obvious operational quality of the Wehrmacht, can be understood via Air Supremacy ramifications – complete freedom for deep interdiction raids (affecting enemy command and control), Stuka close air support, friendly air reconnaissance and preventing enemy air reconnaissance with the resultant Surprise implications, and adversely impacting enemy ground movement (Mobility) and Logistics.

(The importance of Logistics in the France 1940 campaign was that the short depth of the battle area, France itself, did not cause the inadequate German Logistical capability to become apparent – as happened during the depth of the advance into Russia in 1941)

Regardless of the controversial shortcomings of Bernard Montgomery’s operational/tactical leadership, he most clearly understood the critical role of Air Supremacy to land battles. The following quote is from “The Right of the Line” by John Terraine, and is reportedly from a statement by Montgomery in 1943 during the Italian campaign:

“I believe that the first and great principle of war is that you must first win your air battle before you fight your land and sea battle. If you examine the conduct of the campaign from Alamein through Tunisia, Sicily and Italy … you will find that I never sought a land battle until the air battle was won. We never had to bother about the enemy air, because we won the air battle first.
The second great principle is Army plus Air … has to be so knitted that the two together form one entity. If you do that, the resultant military effort will be so great that nothing will be able to stand against it.”

As I mentioned above, the side having Air Supremacy primarily determines the critical QJM factors of SURPRISE and MOBILITY. Consider also the implications of Air Interdiction to prevent the enemy from massing combat power at critical points. Additionally, those who have studied the Battle for France in 1940 realize that one cannot exaggerate the level of combat power provided by the deadly accurate “flying artillery” strikes of Richthofen’s Stukas in support of the Panzer Division advances. As Gen Koller stated, Germany’s enemies (like Montgomery) learned these lessons, the German High Command did not!

The huge size of the Eastern Front prevented the clear dominance of Air Supremacy as occurred in France, however special not is made of the great work of German air reconnaissance in the 1941 summer campaign in the Public Record office book mentioned above (page 167)

“The German Air force was in fact being employed on the now classic lines evolved by pre-war theory and confirmed with such striking success in practice in previous campaigns. In particular it will have been noted that the tactical and long-range reconnaissance elements comprised over 700 aircraft, and the extent to which air reconnaissance was carried out was one of the outstanding features.

Reconnaissance extended deep into the Russian back areas as well as covering the fighting zones, and the German headquarters were constantly able to form a clear picture – not only of Russian movements and of troop and tank concentrations, but also of the general situation on an extensive front, where the fighting was often extremely confused.”

Possibly the best example of the importance of Air Supremacy to a land battle would be the Battle for Crete. This would be a most interesting QJM analysis. The British had forces (not their entire force, of course) with a quality of troops they never surpassed – the 2nd New Zealand Div., the 6th Australian Div., and regular professional British infantry battalions. The lightly armed German Paratroopers were significantly outnumbered, and even with the later arrival of the Mountain troops, their heavy weaponry was considerably less than the prepared defenders.

In my view, the area of Close Air Support is not adequately treated by the present QJM. Specifically, applying the MFM model for aircraft TLI, the lack of aircraft specific air-to-ground capabilities, air-to-ground guns – rockets – bombs, anti-air weapon effects, and the employment of specific anti-tank aircraft, an Air Crew “CEV” for ground attack efficiency – for starters.

My prediction is that a detailed quantification of the Close Air Support issue would determine very high capability for specific ground attack aircraft, such as the JU-87 Stuka, and not so effective capability from the Allied Fighter-Bombers thrown into that role with primarily 50 caliber MGs and a Fighter Pilot who yearns for Air to Air combat.

The additional impact of Air Supremacy facilitated Aerial Reconnaissance – enabling surprise by those who have it, and being surprised for those who don’t – needs to be considered for larger battle conditions applying to campaign/theatre level.

2) ATTRITION

One area that I believe is a necessary enhancement to the CEV concept within QJM analysis is the idea of what I will refer to as Military Combat Aptitude. The idea is that some finite percentage of a nation’s population consists of “knife in the teeth” kind of guys.

When World War II began, the Wehrmacht contained “knife in the teeth” guys from a number of years – the 20 to 30 year olds who chose to be professional soldiers. Each year thereafter, only 1 birth year of potential “knife in the teeth” type recruits came available, which had to be balanced against combat losses.

Additionally, the combination of battlefield experience, and subsequent unit training in the interlude between campaigns – which occurred after Poland and after France – led to the incredibly capable German Army of 1941. The relatively light losses in the campaigns prior to Barbarossa were more than compensated by the tactical improvement from experience and training, along with the minimal percentage of replacement personnel.

The campaign in Russia changed all that. For example, in July 1941, 51,000 Germans were killed, let alone wounds serious enough to end further military service; in AUG 1941 almost 53,000 Germans were killed. In both of these months the number killed exceeded the entire French campaign (46,000). By March 1942, Halder recorded 32,485 officer and 1,040,581 enlisted casualties from a force originally numbering 3.2 million. With an overall 33% casualty figure, one can be sure the combat elements averaged well over 50% casualties. While a significant percentage of these casualties were recoverable wounds, consider the raw numbers of those killed (say 20-25%) and those permanently disabled (wounds and frostbite amputations).

As Williamson Murray stated in his superb book “Luftwaffe” (page 115) referring to the state of things in the Russian campaign in MAR 1942:

“Attrition in the German Army, however, insured that it would never again reach the level of efficiency that it had displayed at the beginning of Barbarossa.”

Each year Germany had about 600,000 young men come of military draft age. That includes the entire spectrum of Military Combat Aptitude, as well as those who do not qualify for military service. From that 600,000 came all branches of the service, as well as workers for industry. It doesn’t take much numerical aptitude to figure that some percentage of 600,000 recruits cannot replace the experienced and veteran losses that occurred from JUN 41 to MAR 42 as described above.

As the Waffen SS especially recruited the higher combat aptitude recruits in later war years, there were clear drops in combat efficiency in the standard Infantry Divisions later in the war as compared to the army of 1941.

Consider a model with base CEV personnel values -- say value V. The base CEV value will increase with combat experience and post-combat unit training, at some level -- say X percent per week of combat or post-combat unit training. The impact of attrition is the replacement of losses with a V CEV rating, in comparison to the V + X value rated casualties lost.

The early war years resulted in German units improving their CEV, as losses were relatively light, and combat experience and post-combat training vastly improved tactical skills. Studies of German Infantry Division performance in Poland vs. Barbarossa will confirm this, although it would be a most interesting QJM analysis to attempt to determine the specific quantitative modeling for this phenomena.

For example, lets say an Infantry Division in the 1940 France campaign improved its CEV rating from 1.3 to 1.4 via combat experience, but lost 1,000 of its 16,000 personnel (killed and disabled wounded). Assume also that the replacement personnel have a CEV rating of 1.2. Using course averaging, the division CEV rating now becomes (15000 * 1.4) + (1000 * 1.2) / 16000 = 1.3875. Therefore the division CEV improved as a result of the campaign’s combat experience (1.3 to 1.39), which overcame the slight influx of inexperienced replacements.

Now a Barbarossa example: This same division improves its CEV to 1.45 by unit training between the French and Russian campaign. By the end of 1941, combat experience has increased the CEV to 1.55, however 6,000 personnel have been lost. With the huge manpower requirements, replacement quality for Infantry Divisions has fallen slightly to a CEV of 1.1.

Scenario A. The division only receives 3,000 replacements for the 6,000 lost. Its new strength will therefore by 13,000, reflecting a loss in combat power. Its adjusted CEV will be (10,000 * 1.55) + (3,000 * 1.1) / 13,000 = 1.44, which is only a slight CEV loss, but a significant drop in combat power of 16,000 to 13,000 personnel – not all of which can be made up of service / non-combat personnel.

Scenario B. The division receives its full 6,000 replacements (If it did it would be the ONLY division on the Eastern Front to do so!). Therefore it will resume full combat power regarding personnel manning weapons, with an adjusted CEV of (10,000 * 1.55) + (6,000 * 1.1) / 16,000 = 1.38. Division CEV goes from 1.45 to 1.38 in 9 months.

Both of the scenarios describe an Infantry Division that is less combat effective due to the high levels of attrition, despite improvements in CEV from further combat experience.

I use these only to illustrate my point about combat quality and attrition – not to advocate the specific CEV ratings utilized.

The later war years showed marked declines in German unit performances – still having the slight 20-30% CEV rating lead over the Western Allies, but I would contend vastly lower CEV than a similar analysis for the 1941 army in say the Western Desert, Greece or Crete would determine (with the same Western Allied opponent).

There is no need to dwell on the obvious regarding German replacement personnel quality in late 1944 and 1945.

Attrition of personnel quality in later war years must accompany the huge material inferiority in explaining the changing battle results vs. the early war years.

3) LOGISTICS

While there are Logistics concepts within QJM (briefly addressed in NP&W), and other studies performed by TDI addressing the topic, I believe it fair to say that this area is far less developed than the other components to QJM analysis.

It is commonly known that a large percentage of the tank losses during the 1944 France campaign, especially after the Normandy breakout, were due to abandonment because of no fuel.

Although German tanks didn’t experience the complete absence of fuel that Luftwaffe units did late in the war, certainly their combat power as a function of mobility had to be significantly reduced. This would be especially aggravated by the massive numbers of relatively fast Sherman tanks moving about to get flanking shots (Panthers) or rear shots (Tigers).

Additionally, the thousands of tons of ammunition to effectively utilize artillery theatre wide has to be considered. Darrin’s response on another forum inferred that the Western Allies Artillery fired 5 times as many shells per gun as German Artillery – I think again referring to the 1944 France campaign.

THIS IS A VERY BIG DEAL! The Western Allies (and the Red Army by 1944 because of lend-lease) had massive logistical support for their combat units.

One can also recall the level of artillery massed by the Red Army for their major offensives – almost “hub-to-hub” when they achieved something like 100 to even 200 Guns per Kilometer in some sectors.

Let me propose a not-so-original idea: QJM would be very much improved by having a “Bombardment” component – to model heavy preparatory fires as well as artillery only attacks. Artillery Lethality would now have additional capability – to cause Suppression as well as inflict losses on “soft” targets and “hard” targets.

Obviously, the frequency, intensity and duration of such Bombardments would be primarily dependant upon logistics providing the huge ammunition tonnages needed. An additional component would be knowledge of enemy positions – through some combination of reconnaissance or spotting. Such reconnaissance and/or spotting could be by air or ground (there I go again on that Air Supremacy kick!)

This is akin to the responses to Darrin on the Feldgrau forum that the QJM does not “deal with neutralization” – Suppression being the term I use. I agree with that -- bombardment attack capability for each Artillery weapon should include something like a Suppression effect value, a soft target effect value, and a hard target effect value. However, that does not nullify the value of the current QJM modeling for Artillery calls for fire during battle to engage targets of opportunity.

I have “fiddled” with “Bombardment Attacks” myself and have achieved quite good correlation to the casualty and advance rates in the 1942 Sychevka battle from the Soviet Breakthrough TDI report, but will be unable to continue such exploration due to personal circumstances.

Massive Artillery Bombardment was in fact the American Army’s principle form of operation. My memory fails to recall specifically who and where this came from, but I recall reading an American Infantry Battalion commander stating something to the effect that his unit essentially became escorts for the Artillery Forward Observers, since they could call on 10 Battalions of Artillery Fire during a battle, and thereby the battle was won.

Consider the following quotes from http://rhino.shef.ac.uk:3001/mr-home/bulge/7-8_25.html regarding the Ardennes Offensive (emphasis added):

Did the American gunners blunt or delay the first German thrust? At Monschau the artillery stopped the attack cold, effectively narrowing the German assault front. In the 99th Division sector the division artillery held its ground until the close of the 17th when the V Corps artillery groupment at Elsenborn took over the fight with such a weight of metal that one infantry battalion was covered by a defensive barrage of 11,500 rounds during the night of 17 December.

... the [German] troops in the Ardennes operation did suffer from a shortage of ammunition. [9] This shortage was reported as early as 21 December by the divisions attacking at Bastogne. Thereafter, as the American front solidified, the Germans consumed ammunition at a rate of 1,200 tons per day, a rate much higher than predicted by the OKW planning staffs but less than the tactical requirements of the battle. The lack of ammunition should be charged to transport failure rather than to paucity of artillery shells at the Rhine dumps.

The American troops, by contrast, never suffered any notable failure of ammunition at the guns… The Third Army, for example, was able to move an average of 4,500 tons of ammunition per day during the last half of December and consumed, on the average, only 3,500 tons per day.

This kind of differential, 1200 tons per day for the entire German offensive vs. 3500 tons per day by only the U. S. Third Army reflects a substantial difference in effective combat power. QJM determines the TLI to OLI based on the Weapons Factors, modified by battle conditions. This kind of firing capability difference is not, in my view, modeled by the present QJM.

The U. S. Army under Gen Ridgeway’s leadership in Korea reverted to this style of fighting in 1951 – the massive use of Artillery in such operations as “Killer” and “Ripper” which in the spring and summer of 1951 decimated the Chinese Army it was opposing.

The inclusion of some form of “Bombardment Only” attack, requiring the necessary ammunition expenditure, would more accurately model the combat power differential that led to the later war German defeats.

But then such would likely lead to the very politically incorrect view of an even higher German CEV relative to the Western Allies and Soviets. Bad for business, huh?

The need for a more embellished treatment of Logistics within the present QJM is also not a new idea. Something as simple as determining the tonnage of ammunition required for a Bombardment attack of some duration, determining the tonnage available, and using a square root multiplier for the bombardment effects might be a starting point ( SQRT( tonnage avail / tonnage reqd) ). Detailed quantification of specific Bombardment effects has always been elusive – my start was with the following website: http://members.tripod.com/~nigelef/

CONCLUSION

The QJM development achieved its directed purpose – to use quantitative data to predict battle outcomes with accuracy much too high to attribute to simply coincidence. This irritates those who make their livelihood on opinions instead of facts (such as political science “types”).

Any objective, factual and un-biased student of the European Theatre in World War II can clearly recognize that the German CEV differential proposed by QJM analysis, if anything, is understated!

Criticizing the QJM method based on the results of World War II is just plain stupid! It shows someone who clearly is unversed in QJM as described in NP&W, or possibly has a political agenda to advance and doesn’t want such things as facts to get in the way.

While there are some improvements / enhancements that would better converge historical results with QJM analysis more accurately for larger scale and longer duration battles than it was originally intended for, such in no way invalidates QJM’s essence.

The QJM method is a great leap forward in historical analysis. Like all great things, there will be trivial and jealous minds that cannot see value because of a self-centered and/or agenda-driven orientation. Pay no heed to such nay Sayers.

quote:

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Originally posted by J Gilbert:

2) ATTRITION

The campaign in Russia changed all that. For example, in July 1941, 51,000 Germans were killed, let alone wounds serious enough to end further military service; in AUG 1941 almost 53,000 Germans were killed. In both of these months the number killed exceeded the entire French campaign (46,000). By March 1942, Halder recorded 32,485 officer and 1,040,581 enlisted casualties from a force originally numbering 3.2 million. With an overall 33% casualty figure, one can be sure the combat elements averaged well over 50% casualties. While a significant percentage of these casualties were recoverable wounds, consider the raw numbers of those killed (say 20-25%) and those permanently disabled (wounds and frostbite amputations).

Each year Germany had about 600,000 young men come of military draft age. That includes the entire spectrum of Military Combat Aptitude, as well as those who do not qualify for military service. From that 600,000 came all branches of the service, as well as workers for industry. It doesn’t take much numerical aptitude to figure that some percentage of 600,000 recruits cannot replace the experienced and veteran losses that occurred from JUN 41 to MAR 42 as described above.

For example, lets say an Infantry Division in the 1940 France campaign improved its CEV rating from 1.3 to 1.4 via combat experience, but lost 1,000 of its 16,000 personnel (killed and disabled wounded). Assume also that the replacement personnel have a CEV rating of 1.2. Using course averaging, the division CEV rating now becomes (15000 * 1.4) + (1000 * 1.2) / 16000 = 1.3875. Therefore the division CEV improved as a result of the campaign’s combat experience (1.3 to 1.39), which overcame the slight influx of inexperienced replacements.

Now a Barbarossa example: This same division improves its CEV to 1.45 by unit training between the French and Russian campaign. By the end of 1941, combat experience has increased the CEV to 1.55, however 6,000 personnel have been lost. With the huge manpower requirements, replacement quality for Infantry Divisions has fallen slightly to a CEV of 1.1.

Scenario A. The division only receives 3,000 replacements for the 6,000 lost. Its new strength will therefore by 13,000, reflecting a loss in combat power. Its adjusted CEV will be (10,000 * 1.55) + (3,000 * 1.1) / 13,000 = 1.44, which is only a slight CEV loss, but a significant drop in combat power of 16,000 to 13,000 personnel – not all of which can be made up of service / non-combat personnel.

Scenario B. The division receives its full 6,000 replacements (If it did it would be the ONLY division on the Eastern Front to do so!). Therefore it will resume full combat power regarding personnel manning weapons, with an adjusted CEV of (10,000 * 1.55) + (6,000 * 1.1) / 16,000 = 1.38. Division CEV goes from 1.45 to 1.38 in 9 months.

Both of the scenarios describe an Infantry Division that is less combat effective due to the high levels of attrition, despite improvements in CEV from further combat experience.

I use these only to illustrate my point about combat quality and attrition – not to advocate the specific CEV ratings utilized.

The later war years showed marked declines in German unit performances – still having the slight 20-30% CEV rating lead over the Western Allies, but I would contend vastly lower CEV than a similar analysis for the 1941 army in say the Western Desert, Greece or Crete would determine (with the same Western Allied opponent).

There is no need to dwell on the obvious regarding German replacement personnel quality in late 1944 and 1945.

Attrition of personnel quality in later war years must accompany the huge material inferiority in explaining the changing battle results vs. the early war years.

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Air
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I don´t have many comments about the air issues as I don´t consider myself knowlegeable. The ger could maintain short term air sup but could never hope to have long term air sup with the west and rus all working togeather.

Attrition
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The exp of many units in jun 41 was not that high. Half of the ger PzD had been created post france. Only about 100 div took part in combat prior to barbarasso and the ammount of combat could be measured in weeks sometimes not months.

The dead numbers I suspect are for jul and aug of 41 are not just for the east front but all ger forces everywhere. Also the number of ger div in france was just 100 for 6 weeks when you do the math for 150 a month in rus its very similar level of losses. A higher leval and duration ger may not have been able to surrive.

The % of loses in combat troops would be far higher then just 33% overall to 50% combat. Infantry men suffered the highest of all arms of survice and 90% of the loses would be this cat. The trunover rate during an 9 month tot cas period of 1.1 mil would proably be over 100%.

According to ger records the ger suffered about 1 mil KIA on the EF from jun 41 to dec 44. A total of 1.5 mil died of of all causes kia, wounds, sick, acc during this same period. One of the biggest drains of manpower was mia which counted almost 1 mil during this time. Almost half of them were during the summer of 44 though so this was really a late war limited time phenomeon.

We have a total of 2.5 mil peole lost perm on the EF alone from luft, SS and Herr in ground combat. Now during this time of 3.5 years we would see about 2.1 mil people come of age if your 600,000 a year numb is correct. There is obviously starting to be a major shortage by late 44 even without taking into acount other fronts, navy, luft, rear area perm losses and perm wounded.

While most of the wounded would come back to service perhaps only half might fight at the front. The rest might only be capable of limited service or might work in the economy to free up workers to to fight at the front. As the war went on more production could also be taken over by non ger people freeing up more workers again to fight in the economy.

The CEV numbers is a relative number that depends on the enemy force. For examle the ger in 44 are probably 1.25 better at normandy agsint the west. But still 2.5 better in 43 aginst the rus. That doesn´t imply the ger got better from 43 to 44 but the difference in enemy is the major consideration.

While the replacments per div might be small the rep pre inf men in inf bats was much higher. Even if we have a div with a full 9 bats and each bat had 600 inf we are looking at 5400 men so the loss of even 1000 perm men is much more serious without having adaquet time bettween campaigns to train. Even if loses in the rest of the unit are marginal.

To help alivate this the ger had a rep bat with each unit. Actual perm losses from above during the first 3.5 years in rus were 2.5 mil. That would avg out to only 400 perm dead and missing per div per months. Not counting wounded even the ones who would be back would have to be replaced to start most of the time. By late 43 the inf bats had decresed in number to 6 making the same 1000 perm cas out of the much smaller 3000 inf men much more sig.

The actual dead and missing rate for ger in rus was 2% a month. This might sound low but for the whole year it could turn into 24% and we are still not talking wounded who survive of all types.

quote:

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Originally posted by J Gilbert:

3) LOGISTICS

While there are Logistics concepts within QJM (briefly addressed in NP&W), and other studies performed by TDI addressing the topic, I believe it fair to say that this area is far less developed than the other components to QJM analysis.

It is commonly known that a large percentage of the tank losses during the 1944 France campaign, especially after the Normandy breakout, were due to abandonment because of no fuel.

Although German tanks didn’t experience the complete absence of fuel that Luftwaffe units did late in the war, certainly their combat power as a function of mobility had to be significantly reduced. This would be especially aggravated by the massive numbers of relatively fast Sherman tanks moving about to get flanking shots (Panthers) or rear shots (Tigers).

Additionally, the thousands of tons of ammunition to effectively utilize artillery theatre wide has to be considered. Darrin’s response on another forum inferred that the Western Allies Artillery fired 5 times as many shells per gun as German Artillery – I think again referring to the 1944 France campaign.

This is akin to the responses to Darrin on the Feldgrau forum that the QJM does not “deal with neutralization” – Suppression being the term I use. I agree with that -- bombardment attack capability for each Artillery weapon should include something like a Suppression effect value, a soft target effect value, and a hard target effect value. However, that does not nullify the value of the current QJM modeling for Artillery calls for fire during battle to engage targets of opportunity.

CONCLUSION

The QJM development achieved its directed purpose – to use quantitative data to predict battle outcomes with accuracy much too high to attribute to simply coincidence. This irritates those who make their livelihood on opinions instead of facts (such as political science “types”).

Any objective, factual and un-biased student of the European Theatre in World War II can clearly recognize that the German CEV differential proposed by QJM analysis, if anything, is understated!

Criticizing the QJM method based on the results of World War II is just plain stupid! It shows someone who clearly is unversed in QJM as described in NP&W, or possibly has a political agenda to advance and doesn’t want such things as facts to get in the way.

While there are some improvements / enhancements that would better converge historical results with QJM analysis more accurately for larger scale and longer duration battles than it was originally intended for, such in no way invalidates QJM’s essence.

The QJM method is a great leap forward in historical analysis. Like all great things, there will be trivial and jealous minds that cannot see value because of a self-centered and/or agenda-driven orientation. Pay no heed to such nay Sayers.

John Gilbert

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Logistics
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Tanks des due to lack of fuel. In the post normandy breakout the number of ger tanks found by op res crews following the troops was 90 where the cause was det and 6 were it wasn´t. Of these 30 were reported as abn it seems unlikly many of these were just abn due to lack of fuel. In fact 44 tanks were reported as des by thier crews or almost half. While a large portion of these were undoubtably abn due to lack a fuel it seems a sig number were des because they couldn´t cross the rivers.

While a sig number of tanks were des by thier crew in the last three weeks of aug this was not the norm for the ger army even at the ardenens. The situation here was very unusuall and desperite and should not be taken as a a normal supply problem.

I suspect the weapon effects and people numbers and loses were difficult enough to get from very old sonetimes inaccesible archives at which no one might be an expert. To get all those supply effects would be even more difficult to gather.

TDI model
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Glad to see "you're back!" See, Rich isn't so overzealous in editing your posts after all!!!

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Darrin:
[B]
Air
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I don´t have many comments about the air issues as I don´t consider myself knowlegeable. The ger could maintain short term air sup but could never hope to have long term air sup with the west and rus all working togeather.

The idea here, as per the quote from Gen koller, was that the lessons from the early victories should have been as clear to the Germans as it was to their enemies -- that Air Supremacy is the decisive factor in determining campaign/theatre victory. The Battle of Britain lesson, clearly learned by the Allies (American observors in particular) was the the Luftwaffe Force Structure( Number and types of Aircraft) was insufficient to establish Air Supremacy. As in land battle, the Homeland Defenders have significant advantages, and the attacking forces must have a decisve numerical superiority to achieve Air supremacy (quality of opposing air crews affecting the level of numerical superiority needed). The German High Command had no business allowing the Russian campaign to start with an Air Force that was not sufficiently large enough or properly equipped to deal with the RAF solely -- than add to that a 2nd Front! Stupidity at its ultimate. Germany's decision not to expand their Aircraft Production, Air Crew training, and Synthetic Fuel output in the JUN 1940 to the JUN 1941 period determined the war's result to a large degree (given Roosevelt's intention to get the USA into the war no matter what he had to do).

Attrition
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The exp of many units in jun 41 was not that high. Half of the ger PzD had been created post france. Only about 100 div took part in combat prior to barbarasso and the ammount of combat could be measured in weeks sometimes not months.

Darrin, I must fully disagree with the above for the following reasons: 1) Germany doubled their Panzer Divisions by dividing their tank park from 10 to 20 Divisions -- so the Panzer crews were all highly experienced, regardless of which division they ended up in. 2) Combat experience is much more important to leaders than each individual soldier, and the core leadership was, after the France campaign followed by the rigorous unit training executed, was extremely experienced and competent. 3) The base around which the new Panzer Divisions were created was normally an exisitng Infantry Division -- not raw recruits -- although there were Light / Mot Inf Div conversions as well. 4) The 7 week campaign in France gave combat experience to almost every existing 1st line German Division, very few units remained in Poland, and I believe most of thosae that did were best categorized as 2nd rate establishments. Additionally, in AUG 1940 a number of the 2nd rate untis were disbanded. 5) The increase in Inf Divisions prior to Barbarossa was accomplished in the normal manner of using a veteran Inf Regt or two, added to a newly raised Regt of which leadership was cadred from existing units.

Look at the preformance of the un its in the Balkan and Greece campaigns -- yes, against "minor league" opposition primarily, but UK units were made very short work of when encountered.

The German Army of 1941, in terms of tactical and operational quality, should properly be classified as one of the best in history. Attrition was to adversely affect this proficiency level dramatically -- per my original post.

The dead numbers I suspect are for jul and aug of 41 are not just for the east front but all ger forces everywhere.

What else was going on -- other than a couple of Divisions in the Western Desert? These losses were Eastern Front losses -- and the really big deal is that there was no end in sight to losses of this level, or close to it, continuing.

The % of loses in combat troops would be far higher then just 33% overall to 50% combat. Infantry men suffered the highest of all arms of survice and 90% of the loses would be this cat. The trunover rate during an 9 month tot cas period of 1.1 mil would proably be over 100%.

Fully agreed -- notice my intention not to overstate the example calculations I provided. A case could be made for a much more adverse impact on "CEV" than my simple numerical examples provided for clarity.

We have a total of 2.5 mil peole lost perm on the EF alone from luft, SS and Herr in ground combat. Now during this time of 3.5 years we would see about 2.1 mil people come of age if your 600,000 a year numb is correct. There is obviously starting to be a major shortage by late 44 even without taking into acount other fronts, navy, luft, rear area perm losses and perm wounded.

Exactly -- raw number shortages, but an even more serious impact on declining Infantry Division quality that began in Winter of 41-42 and continued.

While most of the wounded would come back to service perhaps only half might fight at the front. The rest might only be capable of limited service or might work in the economy to free up workers to to fight at the front. As the war went on more production could also be taken over by non ger people freeing up more workers again to fight in the economy.

This is a huge topic in and of itself, but huge percentages of armament workers ended up being foreign -- from occupied country drafts, POWs, Ukrainian volunteers, etc. In some industries over 1/3, even up to 1/2 of the workers were non-German. Serious manpower shortages existed inn the Armaments industry even in 1940, and became out of control by 1944. Attrition, Attrition, Attrition!

The actual dead and missing rate for ger in rus was 2% a month. This might sound low but for the whole year it could turn into 24% and we are still not talking wounded who survive of all types.

EXACTLY! I attempted to point out, with some level of detail, the adverse impact on quality of the standard German Inf Div vs. the 1941 level

John Gilbert

I've been lurking on this forum for quite some time now. I noticed that about six weeks ago a paper of mine got some comment, so naturally I was curious to see what those critiques were. First, however, I should explain the paper. It really is not a finished product by any stretch. The paper instead is the result of a month-long brainstorming session for a book on the organizational effectiveness of militaries in WWII. I make no claims to have even properly addressed certain issues, much less provide any answers to some of the larger questions surrounding the war. Instead, it was just a big blast of thoughts onto the written page, useful to "get started" on a project such as this. It provides me with items to flesh out, do more research on, or discard. It also is useful to provoke discussion. So, "Michate's" complaint that there are problems with the paper, "especially the lack of any arguments to detail for what reason or in which way the Allied militaries were superior and the failure to differentiate between necessary and sufficient factors to explain the outcome of WW2" are rather irrelevant. In fact, I make a statement in the conclusion that the paper can not make any statements that "Michate" wishes it did, for the very reason that no analysis has yet been done. Once the analyses are done, I'll (hopefully) be able to satisfy "Michate". However, I must thank "Michate" for trying to provoke some reasonable critiques of the paper. (Sorry for always putting your user name in quotes, but I am not sure if it is an actual name or just a login ID).

Mr. Kjetil Aasland makes some valid comments on my paper, and I thank him for providing some food for thought. He seems particularly concerned about my rejection of the importance of material/numerical superiority. Although perhaps in places the draft is unclear about my thoughts on this issue, on pages 14-15 I tried to demonstrate that I do indeed see that these advantages played a role. My disagreement with Mr. Aasland's critique is that he portrays my argument about material/numerical superiority incorrectly. Perhaps this is my fault, as a result of some internal inconsistencies in the paper (remember, it is a product of brainstorming). My argument is, however, not as black-and-white as Mr. Aasland makes it out to be. My position is more nuanced:

"There is no doubt that the massive economic and numerical superiority that the Allies enjoyed helped them win, yet upon further analysis this answer lacks sufficient explanatory power by itself…certainly, outnumbering your opponent does no good unless there is a proper doctrine, the ability to adapt and learn, and decision making structures that allow for proper analysis and choices. Essentially, the military bureaucracy has to be capable of effectively wielding that economic and numerical advantage."

In fact, I am trying to answer precisely this question that Mr. Aasland poses toward the end of his critique, which I think is a very good query: "How good did the Red Army have to be in order to be able to win with this level of superior resources"? Thus, the use of Public Administration theory is still appropriate, and indeed for my arguments, required. However, Mr. Aasland's position that "The answer to that question certainly would not plausibly be either 'as good as the Germans' or 'better than the Germans'" is a hypothesis rather than a statement of objective fact. I intend to examine that hypothesis in the context of aswering his question.

Now, given the material in the paper, and given where this forum is hosted, I did not expect glowing reviews. Also let it be known that I have been in academics long enough to have grown a thick skin. However, it is clear that the posts made here were done more for "internal consumption" rather than with me in mind as an audience member. Mr. Aasland's review, while rather intemperate in places, was at least useful. I must confess to Mr. John Gilbert, however, that once I read: "Kjetil addressed very accurately the EXTREME lack of facts and logic in the argument of Prof. Lican. At the risk of stereotyping, I think only a Political Science “type” could state something so ludicrous…" and "Prof. Lican may have a PhD in Political Science, but his History level could be characterized as Kindergarten!" I simply stopped reading his post. I do have a few observations, though.

First, Mr. Gilbert, you are not "at risk" of stereotyping, you simply are stereotyping (as well as engaging in the logical fallacy of appealing to ridicule). Anyway, I'm not sure what exactly you refer to (or what your logic is) when you identify a Political Science "type" that presumably would be predisposed to acting in a certain way. After all, there are/were members of TDI that have/had degrees in Political Science or that were members of programs or departments in related subfields (even the founder was a member of an IR program, no?).

Second, if you are going to engage in ad hominem attacks, I suggest you at least identify your target correctly. My last name is Licari, not Lican. And I suppose it is appropriate to remind you that you have very little evidence as to my level of history proficiency.

Third, after flipping to the end of the post to see if Mr. Gilbert had a meaningful conclusion, I found more strange rants: "This irritates those who make their livelihood on opinions instead of facts (such as political science 'types')." I must say that I do not, sir, make my livelihood on opinions. Perhaps Mr. Gilbert does not understand the field of political science (it is neither the field of politics nor punditry), and he is certainly not familiar with the rest of my research. Mr. Gilbert concluded that "there will be trivial and jealous minds that cannot see value because of a self-centered and/or agenda-driven orientation." I must admit that I chuckled pretty hard at this one. I have basically nothing professional at stake regarding the QJM, nor regarding my research on the organizational effectiveness of the various militaries in WWII. If I am wrong, I have at least provided others with that information, which will save them the trouble of going down the path I took. If I am right, I gain basically nothing save the professional satisfaction of providing that information, which might cause others to take the path I took. Either way, my job is unchanged. I will not suffer a reduction in pay if wrong, nor a giant increase in pay if right (if I do publish my book eventually, I suppose I might make some small royalties, but Political Science books do not sell like hotcakes). The reason why I chuckled is that those at TDI do have a "self-centered and/or agenda-driven orientation" although I do not blame them for it, nor do I think it is necessarily bad. TDI must defend the QJM/TNDM if only for business reasons. Their profits, as a private company, would be seriously jeopardized if military historians and professionals doing OR ceased using it.

My post here is not intended to revive this thread. In fact, I doubt it is of much value for me to even continue visiting this Forum, particularly since the critique of the QJM is very unlikely to find its way into the book. As such, it is not a key concern of mine, at least in terms of that project. My point here was simply to acknowledge the fact that I had indeed read the posts, to thank Mr. Aasland for some interesting comments, and to defend myself against Mr. Gilbert's ad hominem attacks and other illogical arguments.

Cheers,
Mike

"My disagreement with Mr. Aasland's critique is that he portrays my argument about material/numerical superiority incorrectly. Perhaps this is my fault, as a result of some internal inconsistencies in the paper (remember, it is a product of brainstorming). My argument is, however, not as black-and-white as Mr. Aasland makes it out to be."

Oh, that was just the initial reaction, and I might well have worded it more politely. Actually, I have been thinking a good deal about your article, and have been writing on and off on a more lengthy reply to it.

"In fact, I am trying to answer precisely this question that Mr. Aasland poses toward the end of his critique, which I think is a very good query: "How good did the Red Army have to be in order to be able to win with this level of superior resources"? Thus, the use of Public Administration theory is still appropriate, and indeed for my arguments, required." However, Mr. Aasland's position that "The answer to that question certainly would not plausibly be either 'as good as the Germans' or 'better than the Germans'" is a hypothesis rather than a statement of objective fact. I intend to examine that hypothesis in the context of aswering his question.

Strictly speaking yes, but I would say it is more than a mere hypotheses - given the fact that there was a very large force level superiority, which must be at least part of the explanation for the outcome. Anyway, I actually am not too happy with the way I put any of those questions, and do not think it is in fact possible to determine in isolation "how good the Soviets had to be in order to win with a given level of numerical superiority".

But I do agree that you could use your approach anyway - the main issue is really whether the performance differential changed significantly over time, not if it crossed into the plus side from the allied point of view.

" ....while rather intemperate in places"

That is a fair accusation. Sorry about that, and glad to hear you have a thick skin .

As said, I am working on a more systematic reply. It is not wholly finished, and is too long to post here anyway. But I will post some parts of it.

There are quite a few interesting points in it, and some that I agree wholeheartedly with - such as your rejection of the ridiculous Blitzkrieg myth. Generally, my main concerns with are is still by and large those raised in my first post. Specifically, I have some problems with the logic with which you approach the force relation as a factor. Also, I am skeptical towards tying such an investigation to a notion of eventual allied performance superiority. there are several reasons for this. One is connected with the above point - even if there was such a superiority, one would still need to consider the very favourable force relation. more on this in following posts. Another is that I consider it a very doubtful proporsition. In the East, in fact, I think the casualty figures alone rule out any plausible notion of Soviet performance parity with the Germans through 1944. In the West, such a notion is at the very least questionable and would not appear well supported as the state of research currently stands. Thirdly, I do not actually think it is neccessary to postulate this in order for your investigation to be relevant - the main thing is if allied performance relative to German improved.

Regards,

.....Firstly however, you are of course right that numerical superiority is neither the only factor of interest, nor the sole explanation of the development of the war and its outcome, and this is I think a fairly self-evident conclusion. However, you seem to imply from this that since it cannot be the whole explanation, the explanation must be sought wholly elsewhere. The relevant question would rather be ¡¨HOW MUCH of the explanation is it?¡¨ Before we can turn to that however, I think there is a need to make some conceptual clarifications.

- There is one important and fundamental difference between force relation and performance. The former can be exactly defined numerically on the basis of sources. The latter is and will always remain basically a judgment, something to be inferred ¡V and it must be inferred in some way or other in reference to data, if it is to be anything more than a mere opinion or preference.
- Numerical superiority as a factor is not monolithic, which you seem to imply by noting that the Red Army frequntly failed to win with numerical superiority in 1941-42, but succeeded in doing so in 1943-45. Obviously, there is a very great difference between a 2:1 numerical superiority and a 4:1 numerical superiority, and the latter is far more likely to be a decisive explanatory factor for the outcome than the former. Equally, while it is true that the Germans won some of their early victories in a situation of numerical inferiority, in these cases the inferiority was quite marginal, and in such cases other factors such as performance figure more heavily in the outcome. Conversely, most allied victories in the late phase of the war were won with much larger numerical superiorities, and consequently the force ratio in these cases must figure more heavily in the explanation. Simply put ¡V numerical superiority may not impact that much on the situation if it is 1.5:1, but it certainly will if it is 4:1. It simply has no meaning to claim that since numerical superiority did not explain the outcome in one (or a set of) given situation(s), it cannot do so in others. (Please see the overview of Soviet personnel committed to various major operations given below, for an impression of the increasing ability of the Red Army to achieve larger superiorities as the war went on).

- It is crucial to bear in mind that force ratio and performance are both parts of the same explanatory compound, and that their impact on each other¡¦s weight as explanatory factors follow certain general patterns:

„h As explanatory factors, the two are relative to each other in each given situation. If there is a great difference in performance but only a marginal difference in forces, the former carries the heavier weight in the explanation. If there is only a marginal difference in performance but a great difference in force levels, the latter carries the heavier weight in the explanation.
„h Performance impacts on the effects of possessing numerical superiority. The better your performance level relative to the adversary, the greater the effect of whatever numerical superiority you have.
„h The main points consequently are not that there existed numerical superiority for one side or the other and that one was more effective than the other, but rather the extent of the numerical superiority that existed at various times and the scope of whatever performance differentials existed.

The basic alternatives that confront us are fairly straightforward:

- If it is assumed that both sides were roughly equal in performance, then the effect of this is in fact to put a premium on the force relation as an explanatory factor in the development of events AND the ultimate outcome of the war ¡V if performance were roughly equal, it logically cannot explain why the outcomes were not. On the basis of such an assumption, force relations becomes the primary focus for any investigation into the development of the campaigns and the causes for its ultimate outcome.

- If it is assumed that German performance remained superior, then the issue of performance becomes much more crucial to the analysis of the fighting, whereas the numerical relation of course assumes an even greater weight than above as an explanation of why the allies ultimately won ¡V if German performance was better, then the Allies must have won the war because they managed to more than compensate for this through other factors.

- If it is assumed that allied performance was better from 1943 or 1944, then numerical superiority and performance are both crucial to the analysis of the fighting as it developed, and both becomes part of the explanation of eventual allied victory. The task then is to determine their importance relative to each other, in which case the issue becomes the extent of the allied superiority in performance (since the extent of their numerical superiority is already known). It is clear that in any case numerical superiority must neccessarily remain a large part of the explanation, given the sheer scale of the allied advantage in forces (in personnell, generally in the 3-1/4-1 range from 1943 (east)/1944 (west, following overlord).

In other words ¡V no matter how you evaluate the performance side, the force relation will remain a crucial explanatory factor. In my estimation I think it is in fact fairly obvious that in all three of the above options, it is by far the most important one. Even if the Germans were more effective, we know that this cannot have outweighed allied numerical superiority as a factor shaping events, because if it did, they would not have lost the war. And I think it can safely be assumed that allied superiority in performance at least was not as crushingly superior as their advantage in forces.

Another crucial point (and I here I am somehwat ahead of myself in starting to address the next point on the agenda) particularly with regard to the sort of analysis you are proposing, is that it is not actually neccessary for the performance differential to change from favoring one side to favoring the other in order for the development in it to have an impact. The really fundamental issue is rather whether or not the difference between the two sides was a very significant one. Since you posit, and I think with obvious justification, that there was such a significant difference in the German favour during the early part of the war, and everybody agrees that the relation changed to some extent or other in the allied (East and West) favour as the war progressed, an investigation of how and why this develpment occurred is in any case a vital point. Put differently ¡V the main thing is not whether the performance differential from the allied point of view crossed into the +-zone, but rather how much it changed, and particularly if it changed from a state of significant inferiority to one of relative parity. The implication is however in any case a fundamental weight on the force relation as an explanatory factor! In other words ¡V the analysis you propose does not fundamentally require either rejection of the relation of forces as a primary explanatory factor to a large extent or a thesis of allied performance superiority. What is more, I think it would be an obvious benefit to it if it didn¡¦t, because the former is IMO clearly untenable. And as regards the latter ¡V through 1944 at least, (after which the paucity of German data is a crippling handicap for such analysis) for the EF this judgment is IMO also clearly untenable, whereas in the West, it is at the very least questionable.

More to follow, here or per email.

regards,

quote:

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Originally posted by mlicari:

Now, given the material in the paper, and given where this forum is hosted, I did not expect glowing reviews. Also let it be known that I have been in academics long enough to have grown a thick skin. However, it is clear that the posts made here were done more for "internal consumption" rather than with me in mind as an audience member. Mr. Aasland's review, while rather intemperate in places, was at least useful.

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Professor Licari:

Welcome Mike, and I hope you stick around to continue this discussion. Please don't imagine that simply because this is the forum of the Dupuy Institute that we would have any problem with questions and criticisms of the QJM/TNDM. We also have "thick skins" here and in any case have heard practically all of the criticisms at least once already. And I am unsure who is replying here for "internal consumption" since mine is the first posting in this thread from a staff member - I'm afraid we've been rather busy of late and there really hasn't been much here I've needed to comment upon - until now. Unfortunately, Chris Lawrence who is our Executive Director and resident keeper of QJM/TNDM lore has been even busier, but I hope he may break free some time soon to add his comments on the criticism of the model.

About the only "criticism" that ever manages to raise my ire now is that Trevor "cherry-picked" his selection of engagements so that they "all" (or "most") involve "elite" German divisions versus "average" Allied divisions. The first ignores the limitations - especially at the time - in documenting two-sided engagement data for anywhere other than Italy between September 1943 and June 1944 (it remains one of the best areas for research). And the second simply displays a fair degree of ignorance as to the condition and origin of most of the German divisions in the Italian engagements.

In any case, we rarely utilize QJM/TNDM methodologies in analysis. And if sales of the TNDM were all that kept TDI funded, then I would have been out of a job long ago. So please stick around, although I may not agree with all of your points, and may strongly disagree with some of them, your input and attention is valued.

Richard Anderson
The Dupuy Institute

Professor Licari, thank you very much, for posting your comments on the paper you have written and your reply to the posts in this thread.

As you have shortly addressed some comments of me personally, I would like to respond to that.

I was aware that the paper in the current state is a collection of ideas for investigation and therefore no conclusive arguments can be expected. Of course when discussing some weaknesses it contains at the moment I should have taken its status much more into account.

Also should I have stated my opinion that a comparative institutional analysis of the military forces of WWII using theories of public administration and political science may indeed increase the knowledge and understanding on that conflict.

Besides, 'Michate' is indeed just a login name for this forum, and I have no reason to hide my real name, it is Michael Teucke.

You have stated you do not want to continue the discussion in this thread and certainly I have to respect that.
However, out of interest for your work on the topic and the results gained there, may I humbly suggest you post a short message here in case you publish some results of your work?

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The basic thrust of your outline seems to be:

1. To dismiss a number of possible explanations for the development and outcome of the war
2. To postulate that allied organisational effectiveness eclipsed German (In the East possibly from 1943 and in the West only in 1944)
3. To attempt to explain why 2) was the case using a theoretical framework of bureaucratic theory

The problem I see with this is basically the following:

1. While I agree with several of your criticisms of other explanations put forward, I believe your treatment of one of them – that of numerical superiority – to be very inadequate in a very fundamental way

2. Because of this, your postulate under 2) will lack the relevance you ascribe to it

3. Your postulate remains essentially unbacked by any evidence in your article, and I also believe it to be fundamentally untenable

4. As a consequence of this, the question you attempt to answer through bureaucratic theory does not really exist – at least not in the form posited here.

a. Your critique of existing explanations

I agree entirely with your critique of the ”blitzkrieg myth”, and with the conclusions you draw from it. Also, I agree that the existing memoir literature on the German side have been allowed to influence especially the older literature to far too great a degree, and that the ”Hitler’s fault” theory of course cannot account mainly for the outcome of the war. That being said, the unwholesome influence of this literature is not exactly unique in the historiography of the war. One need only think of the impact of such works as the memoirs and writings of Churchill, Patton, Montgomery or Bradley, or that of official Soviet historiography on important segments of the literature (such as John Erickson or Alexander Werth). There is, I think, a general need to move away from the inadequate approach of much of the older literature, and to a mode of analysis based rather on the utilisation of the extensive documentary sources available. From Werth to Carell, there is a great deal of older historiography that should not be allowed to serve as the starting point for current research, but rather be recalled for what it is – the products of a phase of WWII historiography that knew how to tell a compelling story, but did not bother too much with its sources and with systematic data even less. There is, alas, a huge legacy of myths, errors and misconceptions – but far from all of them is in the direction of playing up to the German tune.

b. Your critique of the numerical superiority argument
Which brings us actually into the heart of the above issue, because an adequate picture of the numerical and material factors of the war on the basis of systematic investigation of the documentary sources rather than haphazard sprinkling of the narrative with more or less arbitrary figures (Erickson! Carell!), and analysis based in a more fundamental way on the perimeters established by more comprehensive and reliable data, is exactly where gains can be made vis-a-vis the older and more unreliable historiography. The numerical issue is both a larger one and more significant one than whether or not the ultimate allied victory can be entirely explained by numerical superiority. Consequently, while some of the other points you dismiss can indeed be dismissed relatively light-heartedly, this is one that requires a much, much more elaborate argument. And, more importantly, even if you dismiss it successfully as THE explanation of the outcome, the question of material factors and force ratios remain at the very heart of the issues you investigate (as is also evident from the fact that the issue turns up in several more places in your text). In light of this, I frankly think your treatment of the issue suffers from some grave inadequacies, logically and in other ways.

Firstly however, you are of course right that numerical superiority is neither the only factor of interest, nor the sole explanation of the development of the war and its outcome, and this is I think a fairly self-evident conclusion. However, you seem to imply from this that since it cannot be the whole explanation, the explanation must be sought wholly elsewhere. The relevant question would rather be ”HOW MUCH of the explanation is it?” Before we can turn to that however, I think there is a need to make some conceptual clarifications.

- There is one important and fundamental difference between force relation and performance. The former can be exactly defined numerically on the basis of sources. The latter is and will always remain basically a judgment, something to be inferred – and it must be inferred in some way or other in reference to data, if it is to be anything more than a mere opinion or preference.
- Numerical superiority as a factor is not monolithic, which you seem to imply by noting that the Red Army frequntly failed to win with numerical superiority in 1941-42, but succeeded in doing so in 1943-45. Obviously, there is a very great difference between a 2:1 numerical superiority and a 4:1 numerical superiority, and the latter is far more likely to be a decisive explanatory factor for the outcome than the former. Equally, while it is true that the Germans won some of their early victories in a situation of numerical inferiority, in these cases the inferiority was quite marginal, and in such cases other factors such as performance figure more heavily in the outcome. Conversely, most allied victories in the late phase of the war were won with much larger numerical superiorities, and consequently the force ratio in these cases must figure more heavily in the explanation. Simply put – numerical superiority may not impact that much on the situation if it is 1.5:1, but it certainly will if it is 4:1. It simply has no meaning to claim that since numerical superiority did not explain the outcome in one (or a set of) given situation(s), it cannot do so in others. (Please see the overview of Soviet personnel committed to various major operations given below, for an impression of the increasing ability of the Red Army to achieve larger superiorities as the war went on).

- It is crucial to bear in mind that force ratio and performance are both parts of the same explanatory compound, and that their impact on each other’s weight as explanatory factors follow certain general patterns:

· As explanatory factors, the two are relative to each other in each given situation. If there is a great difference in performance but only a marginal difference in forces, the former carries the heavier weight in the explanation. If there is only a marginal difference in performance but a great difference in force levels, the latter carries the heavier weight in the explanation.
· Performance impacts on the effects of possessing numerical superiority. The better your performance level relative to the adversary, the greater the effect of whatever numerical superiority you have.
· The main points consequently are not that there existed numerical superiority for one side or the other and that one was more effective than the other, but rather the extent of the numerical superiority that existed at various times and the scope of whatever performance differentials existed.

The basic alternatives that confront us are fairly straightforward:

- If it is assumed that both sides were roughly equal in performance, then the effect of this is in fact to put a premium on the force relation as an explanatory factor in the development of events AND the ultimate outcome of the war – if performance were roughly equal, it logically cannot explain why the outcomes were not. On the basis of such an assumption, force relations becomes the primary focus for any investigation into the development of the campaigns and the causes for its ultimate outcome.

- If it is assumed that German performance remained superior, then the issue of performance becomes much more crucial to the analysis of the fighting, whereas the numerical relation of course assumes an even greater weight than above as an explanation of why the allies ultimately won – if German performance was better, then the Allies must have won the war because they managed to more than compensate for this through other factors.

- If it is assumed that allied performance was better from 1943 or 1944, then numerical superiority and performance are both crucial to the analysis of the fighting as it developed, and both becomes part of the explanation of eventual allied victory. The task then is to determine their importance relative to each other, in which case the issue becomes the extent of the allied superiority in performance (since the extent of their numerical superiority is already known). It is clear that in any case numerical superiority must neccessarily remain a large part of the explanation, given the sheer scale of the allied advantage in forces (in personnell, generally in the 3-1 range from 1943 (east)/1944 (west, following overlord).

In other words – no matter how you evaluate the performance side, the force relation will remain a crucial explanatory factor. In my estimation I think it is in fact fairly obvious that in all three of the above options, it is by far the most important one. Even if the Germans were more effective, we know that this cannot have outweighed allied numerical superiority as a factor shaping events, because if it did, they would not have lost the war. And I think it can safely be assumed that allied superiority in performance at least was not as crushingly superior as their advantage in forces.

Another crucial point (and I here I am somehwat ahead of myself in starting to address the next point on the agenda) particularly with regard to the sort of analysis you are proposing, is that it is not actually neccessary for the performance differential to change from favoring one side to favoring the other in order for the development in it to have an impact. The really fundamental issue is rather whether or not the difference between the two sides was a very significant one. Since you posit, and I think with obvious justification, that there was such a significant difference in the German favour during the early part of the war, and everybody agrees that the relation changed to some extent or other in the allied (East and West) favour as the war progressed, an investigation of how and why this develpment occurred is in any case a vital point. Put differently – the main thing is not whether the performance differential from the allied point of view crossed into the +-zone, but rather how much it changed, and particularly if it changed from a state of significant inferiority to one of relative parity. The implication is however in any case a fundamental weight on the force relation as an explanatory factor! In other words – the analysis you propose does not fundamentally require either rejection of the relation of forces as a primary explanatory factor to a large extent or a thesis of allied performance superiority. What is more, I think it would be an obvious benefit to it if it didn’t, because the former is IMO clearly untenable. And as regards the latter – through 1944 at least, (after which the paucity of German data is a crippling handicap for such analysis) for the EF this judgment is IMO also clearly untenable, whereas in the West, it is at the very least questionable.

c. Evaluations of effectiveness

You seem to have a quite firm view on this, and it does not emerge from your article on what this view is based exactly. Mansoor seems to be one inspiration for the Western front. I have unfortunately not read his book, but I cannot say from what I know of this particular aspect of it that his argument inspires much confidence. At the very least, I do not think he can be regarded as having settled the issue. Your conclusion for the EF seems to draw on Glantz, which surprises me a little. ”From the Don to the Dniepr” at least contains nothing that can be interpreted in this direction, rather the opposite.

Central to the arguments of such writers as Mansoor and Brown, and apparently also to you, is a critique of some writers deemed to uphold ”The myth of German superiority” (Dupuy, van Creveld, Hastings, Ellis and others), and this I think deserves some comments on its own. These various critiques may or may not have some validity – for myself, I have read neither Mansoor, Brown or Doubler, nor the works they apparently criticise, with the exception of Max Hastings, though I am broadly acquainted with the approach and the thrust of argument of both sides. But valid or not, to critique one particular conclusion is not to establish the opposite one. In your paper too, far more space and energy is devoted to such critique than to establishing any basis for a different conclusion.

And – if I may redraw your attention to my points concerning performance and force levels as explanatory factors above – the impact on the explanation of events of establishing a degree of allied performance superiority is not the same as concluding with a degree of German performance superiority – because the force relation is in any case what it is. If it is considered that the Germans were superior, then regardless of how great this superiority was, allied success must be explained entirely by other factors, and predominantly the force relation. But if the allies are deemed to be superior, this does not mean that allied superior performance becomes the basic explanatory factor – because they would then possess a qualitative superiority in addition to a large numerical superiority. The logical implication in any argument that posits an equal performance level, or one where one of the sides had a relatively marginal level of performance superiority, should be to shift the emphasis of analysis exactly towards the force relation. Contrary to this, Mansoor & co, and you, appear to reason that if the notion of German performance superiority can be discounted, this also means a reduced weight for the force relation in the analysis. With regard to explanations for the outcome of the war as such, this is valid to a limited extent (providing, of course, that the conclusion on performance is valid), but with regard to the analysis of the development of the campaign, it is not. The implied link between a revised judgment on performance levels in the allied favour and the rejection of the ”numerical superiority argument” is therefore, as far as I can see, an illogical one, and to demonstrate that the allies were not inferior to the Germans in performance is not to demonstrate that this was the main reason the war was won.

Effectiveness can be defined narrowly, for instance in terms casualty infliction relative to force levels on the tactical level, or broadly, as encompassing such factors as logistics, strategic plans, operational implementation etc. Regardless, it is reasonably essentially a question of achievement relative to resources – which again makes it neccessary to always bear the force relation in mind when pondering this issue.

In any case, there are several ways in which one can attempt to draw conclusions on effectiveness, some more systematic, some less. One is through statistical modelling, such as QJM or ATLAS. Another is through comparisons of relevant data on the macro level – force relations, casualty figures, advance rates and so on. A third is quite simply to acquaint oneself with operations against a background of systematic, adequate and relevant data – and such data is the essential precondition for any type of analysis. That I think applies to your analysis as well, and I must say I see little trace of the presence of such data in your argument. The analysis is of course not wholly reducible to data, but the data does establish certain perimeters, and should provide the main thrust for choosing credible hypothesis. Figures are not everything, but they are what they are – a measure of certain specific things. In some cases, the perimeters established through the basic data are so clear as to virtually in themselves rule out certain interpretative possibilities. A case in point is the casualty figures in the East in 1943 (see below), which are so lopsided that there appears to be no conceivable way in which they can be conciled with any notion of effectiveness parity – and far less of Soviet performance superiority. And conciled they have to be if such a notion is to be tenable. Simply put – if the Soviets were more effective than the Germans, and given that they could field more than twice as many men and about four times as many tanks and artillery pieces, then why are they losing almost five men for every man the Germans are losing? If you can think of a good answer to that question, please let me know, because I can’t

- There is a further serious flaw in your argument. If, as you claim, allied performance superiority was only a fact in 1944 (or possible somewhat earlier on the EF), then arguably it only begins to be a factor, after the outcome of the conflict by most reckonings was already basically settled.

Some thoughts on this passage:
For example, at the start of July 1943 on the southern face of the "Kursk bulge" the Soviets had a manpower advantage of 1.66:1, an advantage in tanks of 2.12:1, and a disadvantage in artillery of 1:1.87. These ratios are far lower than commonly thought. When considering only units actually fighting, these ratios are much different. At the start of July 1943 on the south face of the Kursk salient, the Germans had a 2.9:1 advantage in manpower, an 11.6:1 advantage in tanks, and a 7.74:1 advantage in artillery (Turkes 2000). Certainly, to make a sweeping statement that the Soviets consistently and vastly outnumbered the Germans is a gross distortion of facts.

The figures are not wrong as such, but in the context of your argument and the inferences you draw from them, there are very serious problems.

Firstly, the overall ratio quoted reflects just the strength of 4th Pz Army and AD Kempf (indeed the whole German attacking force in the South) compared to that of the Voronesh front. The trouble is that the German southern drive was not just opposed by Voronesh Front, but also eventually by most of Steppe Front, which constituted the Soviet operational reserve. For instance, an action as notable as Prokhorovka was fought entirely by units from Steppe Front (5th Guards Tank Army) on the Soviet side. As a result, the force ratio is misleading and inaccurate, if we wish to investigate the correlation of the forces that were committed to the battle. It is worth noting, incidentally, that if Soviet defenses had consisted of just Voronesh Front, the battle would have had a different outcome. By mid-July, 4th Pz Army had effectively broken clean through the Front’s defensive system, and the Front possessed no further significant reserves with which to oppose them. Which , of course, is why large formations from Steppe Front was comitted against them.

Secondly – the other set of figures provides basically the relation between the whole German attacking force, and just the portion of the Soviet first echelon that was assaulted on the first day. The reason why this ratio is as it is is simply the Soviet chosen mode of deployment – in echelons, and with large operational reserves. Needless to say, it changed swiftly and dramatically as the Soviets committed reserves against the now identified German effort.

The example of XXXXVIII Pz Corps of 4th Pz Army is highly instructive in this regard.. Since the Soviet defense was deeply echeloned and relied to a large extent on reserves, and the initial German thrust was quite concentrated, the Corps enjoyed on the first day a wide margin of superiority over the defenders in the portion of the line they hit (chiefly 22nd Guards Rifle Corps) – some 86,000 men against 29,000, 461 to 219 guns and 568 tanks to 51. However, this situation changed rapidly and dramatically. By 11 July, six days later, such numerous formations had been brought forward to face the Corps that the correlation of forces (cumulative, casualties not subtracted) was 86,000 men to 90,000, 461 artillery pieces to 420 and 568 tanks and assault guns to 873 – this while the main effort of the Soviet reserves were directed elsewhere, towards II SS Panzer Corps.

Furthermore – this is a singularly uninstructive example with regard to the normal ratio of forces in contact, and certainly cannot serve as the basis for a claim that this was often one of approximate parity at critical points. One very important reason why this is so is that Zitadelle was a German offensive, whereas virtually all other situations in this period were Soviet offensives. And the kind of ”starting point force relation” we see here is in fact a typical product of a situation where a densely concentrated attack is being launched against defensive lines containing only a portion of the forces available to the defender (whether this is by design or by necessity from the defenders point of view). We may compare it to the opening stages of Operation Rumantsyev in August 1943, and here I quote David Glantz:
“ The Soviets massed overwhelmingly superior forces in the penetration sector. 5th Guards Army, 1st Tank Army, and 5th Guards Tank Army, with a combined strength of 160,000 men and over 1100 tanks, would descend on four German infantry regiments, and the 85,000 men and 200 tanks of 6th Guards Army would strike two German infantry regiments and 69th Army (60,000 men) two German infantry Divisions.”

Needless to say, the correlation of forces were far less favourable than this for the Soviets for the operation as a whole (though, incidentally, much more favourable than the one enjoyed by the Germans at Zitadelle): 2.6:1 in men and 6.3:1 in tanks. (Note also, for point under discussion further down, that the ratio here is more favourable than the general ratio along the whole front, in both men and tanks). In other words – when the Soviets were the attacking side, which they almost invariably were after Zitadelle, they too were able to enjoy astronomically better force ratios at the initial point of onslaught than they did for the operation as a whole. If anything then, to the extent that these particular figures indicate anything much at all concerning force ratios at critical points of contact, it would be that the attacking side was usually able to achieve much better force superiorities than generally in the initial stages. More than anything else, such a ratio reflects what proportion of his forces the attacker commits to the initial onslaught, and to what extent the defender has chosen to concentrate his available forces in the sector to be assaulted, and well forward. Since the Germans assaulted initially in the South during Zitadelle with virtually every unit available for the offensive while the Soviet defense was probably more deeply echeloned than in any other defensive operation during the war, this starting point ratio is likely even less representative here than usual. Even in the best of cases, it will not indicate much more than the attackers odds for success during the first day or so of operations.

Concerning this passage:

Furthermore, while the totals may have been in favor of the Soviet Union, at critical spots on the front there often was a situation of near parity

I am sorry, but this is patently, obviously and blatantly wrong! Firstly, barring exceptional ineptitude in logistics, staff work and intelligence, the side possessing numerical superiority and the initiative will always be able to create better than average ratios at his chosen points far more easily . This tendency increases with the length of the front relative to forces available. (ie – any given front requires a given number of troops to achieve an absolute minimum of continously manned frontline, which in practice means that only a portion of each side’s forces are available for deployment at chosen points of effort, or as reserves. Since this requirement is equal for both sides, it will in effect cause that the superiority in “operationally available forces”, or whatever we would like to call it, will be higher than the average superiority along the whole front – unless the forces to frontage relation is so high that it is not practically possible for the side with the numerical advantage to deploy all his
Forces (as was to an extent the case in f.e.Normandy). Conversely, the lower the forces to frontage relation is, the bigger this superiority becomes. On the Eastern front this relation was quite low, due to the enormous extent of the front. Illustrational example, with figures rather arbitrarily chosen – consider minimum frontage covering requirement to be 1.5 million men. The Germans have 3 million, the Red Army 7 million, for an overall force ratio of 1:2.3. Subtracting 1.5 million men from each gives 1.5 million for the Germans, 5.5 million for the Soviets, for a relation of 1:3.7). But there is little need to rely on such general insights, because it can easily be demonstrated that the relation of forces at “critical spots” was in fact more favourable to the Soviets than the average ratio. Consider the figures for Rumantsyev quoted above, from Glantz. Consider also the figures for Soviet force sizes for major operations 1941-45, quoted below (Krivosheev). Consider finally that even at Kursk, where the Germans had made a maximum concentration of forces at the time when their forces in the East had reached their numerical peak, they still did not achieve a force ratio in men or artillery pieces that was better than the average along the whole front (though they did do so in tanks). All of these examples are illustrative of what is indeed fairly intuitive and obvious – that the side with an overall advantage in forces would normally be able to achieve even better advantages at chosen points.

d. DATA
This generally seems to be absent in any systematic form from your argument, both in the sense that you quote little such, and also in the senses that what you do quote appears somewhat arbitrary (as well as occasionally misunderstood and/or inaccurate) and that significant parts of data that cannot be omitted from consideration is not referred to at all – casualties f.e.

G.F. Krivosheev’s overview of Soviet casualties, which you may already be familiar with, can be found here:

http://www.magweb.com/sample/sgmbn/sgm80sov.htm

German annual casualties can be found in Zetterling, Normandy 1944, p.91. The ratios when one compare these figures are 1:5.38 (1941), 1:6.82 (42), 1:4.91 (43) and 1:3.53 (44). Admittedly, Krivosheev’s figures are more inclusive (air force & navy personnel, non-combat casualties), but the margin here is very wide.

G.F. Krivosheev’s autorative book on Soviet casualties also includes a breakdown of forces committed in major operations. This is quite instructive with regard to the increasing Soviet ability to concentrate steadily larger forces at chosen points. I do not possess the resources to enumerate the exact strength of German opposition in each of these cases. But since German strength on the Eastern front remained pretty stable from 1941 through 1943 and then dropped significantly, this generally would translate into increasing levels of Soviet force superiority – unless the Germans for some hitherto undiscovered reason were increasingly able to concentrate a much greater proportion of their forces at chosen points as time went on.

1. Defensive operation Lithuania/Latvia 22 June-9 July 1941: 498,000 men
2. Defensive operation in Belorussia 22 June-9 July 1941: 627,000
3. Defensive operation in Western Ukraine 22 June-6July 1941: 864,000
4. Kiev strategic defeniosve operation 7 July – 26 September 1941: 627,000
5. Leningrad strategic defensive operation 10 July-30 September 1941: 517,000
6. Battle of Smolensk 10 July-10 September 1941: 581,600
7. Donbass-Rostov strategic defensive operation 29 September-16 November 1941: 541,600
8. Moscow strategic defensive operation 30 September-5 December 1941: 1,250,000 men
9. Tikhvin strategic offensive operation 10 November-30 December 1941: 192,950 men
10. Rostov Strategic offensive operation 17 November- 2 December 1941: 349,000
11. Moscow strategic offensive operation 5 December 41 -7 January1942: 1,021,700

1941: Operations deploying at least 1 million men: 2 out of 11
Operations deploying at least 1.5 million men: 0 out of 11

12. Rzhev-Vyazma strategic offensive operation 8 January-20 April 1942: 1,059,000 men
13. Voronesh-Voroshilovgrad strategic defensive operation 28 June-24 July 1942: 1,310,800
14. Stalingrad strategic defensive operation, 17 July-19 November 1942: 547,000
15. North Caucasus Strategic defensive operation 25 July-31 December 1942: 603,200
16. Stalingrad strategic offensive operation, 19 Nov-2Feb 42/43: 1,143,500

1942: Operations deploying at least 1 million men: 3 out of 5

17. North Caucasus strategic offensive operation 1 Jan-4 Feb 1943: 1,145,300
18. Operation “Iskra” (Leningrad) 12-30 Jan 1942: 302,800
19. Voronesh-Kharkov strategic offensive operation, 13 Jan-3 March 1943: 502,400
20. Kharkov defensive operation 4-25 March 1943: 345,900
21. Kursk strategic Defensive operation, 5-23 July 1943: 1,272,700 (but not including Steppe Front forces! – which pushes the total to close to 2 million)
22. Orel strategic offensive operation: 1,287,600
23. Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation, 3-23 Aug 1943: 1,144,000
24. Smolensk Kharkov strategic offensive operation, 7 Aug-2 Oct 1943: 1,252,600
25. Donbass strategic offensive operation, 13 Aug-22 Sept 1943: 1,011,900
26. Chernigov-Poltava strategic offensive operation, 26 Aug-30 Sept 1943: 1,581,300
27. Lower Dniepr strategic offensive operation, 26 Sept-20 December 1943: 1,506,000
28. Kiev strategic offensive operation, 3-13 Nov 1943: 671,000

1943: Operations deploying at least 1 million men: 8 out of 12
Operations deploying at least 1.5 million men: 3 out of 12

29. Dniepr-Carpathian strategic offensive operation, 24 Dec 1943-17 April 1944: 2,406,000
30. Leningrad-Novgorod strategic offensive operation 14 Jan-1 Mar 1944: 822,100
31. Byelorussian strategic offensive operation23 June-29 Aug 1944: 2,400,000
32. Lvov-Sandmierz strategic offensive operation 13 July-29 aug 1944: 1,002,200
33. Iasai-Kishinev strategic offensive operation 20-29 Aug 1944: 1,314,200
34. Baltic strategic offensive operation14 September-24 November 1944: 1,546,400
35. Belgrade strategic offensive operation, 28 Sep-20 Oct 1944: 300,000
36. Budapest strategic offensive operation29 October 1944-13 Feb 1945: 719,500

1944: Operations deploying at least 1 million men: 5 out of 9
Operations deploying at least 1.5 million men: 3 out of 9
Operations deploying at least 2 million men: 2 out 0f 9

37. Vistula-Oder strategic offensive operation12 Jan-3 Feb 1945: 2,200,000
38. Western Carpathian strategic offensive operation 12 Jan-18 Feb 1945: 593,000
39. East Prussian strategic offensive operation 13 Jan-25 Apr 1945: 1,669,200
40. East Pomeranian strategic offensive operation 10 Feb – 4 Apr 1945: 996,000
41. Vienna strategic offensive operation 16 Mar-15 Apr 1945: 744,700
42. Berlin strategic offensive operation 16 Apr-8 May 1945: 2,062,000
43. Prague strategic offensive operation6-11 May 1945: 2,100,000

1945: Operations deploying at least 1 million men: 4 out of 7
Operations deploying at least 1.5 million men: 4 out of 7
Operations deploying at least 2 million men: 3 out of 7

I have discounted some of the more necessarily limited operations, such as those on the arctic front and the Crimea. As you see – in 1941, when the Germans could generally field more than 3 million men in the East and also substantial allied forces, Soviet strength in major operations are mostly on average around half a million, and only exceptionally just over 1 million.In 1942, when German strength was little less and the allied element stronger still than in 1941, the Soviets in many more cases could field about a million men for individual operations (but never much more than this). In 1943, when German strength varied more than before but at it’s peak was on Barbarossa levels (though the allied contribution was now far less), strength concentrations around the 1.5 million mark begin to be the rule, and concentrations under 1 million rather the exception. In 1944, they are fielding hitherto unprecedented numbers in the biggest single operations – up to 2.5 million men. It should be noted that this is roughly equal to the strength of the whole German army in the East at that time. 1945 also contains no less than 3 operations with a strength of more than 2 million.

1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
1 m + 2 3 8 5 4
1.5 m + 0 0 3 3 4
2 m + 0 0 0 2 3

1. I very clearly do not think you will be able to make a convincing case that there was even performance parity on the EF through 1944 - because the basic data more or less rules this out completely.
2. I think it will be an extremely hard task to establish any convincing case for allied performance superiority in WE at any point before 1945, and I am doubtful it is feasible to do so at all (though the case is less clear than in the East).
3. Even if you could have succeeded in 1 and 2, you would still have to convincingly account for the impact of these relative to that of the force relation. The only established methodology I know of for doing this is quantified models, and these are a) not sufficiently broadly applied to allow such general conclusions as are required here and b) largely conclude differently than implied in 1 and 2.
4. A further argument is that it is not neccessary to establish either 1 or 2 for your analysis to be relevant.

I would instead suggest this:

1. Demonstrate that allied performance, East and West, gradually improved relative to German. By contrast to the options above, this is in fact more than just feasible - it is even likely J
2. Note, with a maximum degree of precision, that the force relation
similarly improved in the allied favor.
3. Put this against the background of the following two facts: a) If the performance differential is not very marked, the force relation becomes increasingly decisive and b) the more relative performance improves, the greater the effects of the force superiority becomes.
4. It can be convincingly argued that there was a marked performance
differential in the German favour early in the war, but that allied relative performance had improved sufficiently by 1944 (and it should be feasible to demonstrate that it had) that performance differentials no longer had a decisive impact on events.
5. Thus, it is clear that allied relative improvement in performance
interacted with an increasing force level superiority to produce a decisive result
6. This means that there is a clear need to explain how and why allied performance improved markedly - which you can then do, with administrative theory or otherwise.

There are several advantages here IMO.

- Rather than having to prove that allied performance eclipsed German, which I think will ultimately prove impossible, you will just need to make a convincing case that it developed to a comparable level, which is much more feasible (though that is admittedly still a bit of a stretch in the East)
- Rather than having to more or less dismiss the force relation or
demonstrating that the force relation is not the better part of the
explanation for the outcome in order to establish the focus on performance (which is IMO clearly untenable), you will be able to treat the two as complementary and related, which is also the more logical approch.
- You will be able to dismiss the question of who performed best as such, which has proven to be a not very constructive angle IMO, in the sense that it tends to overshadow all other aspects of the analysis
- Since you would postulate that the decisive factor is the combination of allied performance IMPROVEMENT and allied force superiority, and since you would base this on an analysis of data and not on an assessment on the ability of organisations your learn, you no longer have to establish that allied organisations were more adept at learning than their opposite numbers - you just need to explain how and why they improved.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
His argument is fundamentally flawed, in that it in effect simply discounts the huge disparity in human and material resources as a main explanatory factor on a basis that is wholly insufficient.

"There is no doubt that the massive economic and numerical superiority that the Allies enjoyed helped them win, yet upon further analysis this answer lacks sufficient explanatory power by itself. First, the Germans rarely enjoyed material superiority or greater economic capacity at any point from 1939 on (they only briefly held a manpower advantage against the Soviets in 1941; Glantz and House 1995). So, if the Allies had economic and numerical advantages from the beginning, why did the Germans win their victories so easily in 1939-1942? During this time, the Germans routinely bested armies that were larger and even qualitatively superior to their own. Soviet counterattacks in 1941 and 1942 often enjoyed tremendous numerical superiority yet failed miserably (Glantz 2002; 1999; 1998a). These situations demonstrate that economic and numerical advantages are neither necessary nor sufficient for victory"

This is of course logical hogwash. What these DO demonstrate is that these advantages are not NECCESSARILY neccessary or sufficient for victory, provided that they are compensated for by other factors. What he fails to note, or at least to take much into account, is that unlike the examples quoted here, allied victories in the latter half of the war WERE generally won with large numerical superiorities, and consequently it cannot be simply inferred from them that they reflect a corresponding presence of such compensatory factors. Nor can it be inferred from this that the explanation for the outcomes must on this basis be chiefly due to other factors than the numerical relation.

He notes, correctly, that in some cases the Red Army were not able to turn large superiorities into operational success in 1941/42, while they did manage this at a later time. However, in 1941/42, the Soviets did not to the same extent as later possess numerical superiority over their opponent. And secondly, while this does of course indicate that the Red Army improved in effectiveness as the war went on (something which few would question), it cannot neccessarily be inferred from this that they improved to a level beyond their adversaries. The fallacy here is "the outcome cannot be wholly explained by A, so it must be wholly explained by B". See also points below.

" This answer also discredits the abilities of the Allied military forces. This matters for more than simple chauvinistic or patriotic reasons, because falsely discrediting the Allies skews our interpretation of the war. Its logic states that with equal force strengths, the Germans would have necessarily won the war. I do not think this is the case, as many studies now show that in 1944 (and maybe 1943 for the Soviet Union), the Allied military organizations were simply better than the German organization (Rush 2001; Mansoor 1999; Bonn 1996; Glantz and House 1995). "

I have frankly no patience at all with the "discrediting" argument - if it's true, then it's true. I do not think I am alone in retaining a good measure of scepticism concerning the conclusions of Mansoor's study. I have not read this particular book by Glantz/House, but if it does draw such a conclusion, it would not fit well with the conclusions of "From the Don to the Dniepr". In any case, this assumes as given that which is to be proven.

"This means that numbers alone can not provide an explanation for the Allied victory in 1945."

No, not in the sense that this was the only thing that changed from 1941 to 1944, but it still CAN provide the better part of the explanation.

"Essentially, the military bureaucracy has to be capable of effectively wielding that economic and numerical advantage (Overy 1998). "

Of course. But this does not mean that you neccessarily have to be MORE EFFECTIVE than the opponent in order to succeed, if you enjoy a great level of material superiority.

"The other common misperception about the Red Army is that, even more so than the western Allies, it won simply due to its overwhelming manpower advantage (in terms of tanks, guns, and troops). While it is true that by 1945 the Red Army enjoyed superior numbers, those numbers were never overwhelming for most of the war"

This quite simply is not accurate, and can only be put down to a peculiar reading of the strength figures, such as not taking into account STAVKA reserves. In terms of manpower, the Soviets had a better than 2:1 superiority already in the summer of 1942, better than 3:1 in the summer of 1943 and more still at alter stages. Advantages in tanks and artillery were larger still than the manpower advantage. Also, it is neccessary to take into account that over such a huge front, the overall advantage turns into local superiorities still much larger than this on chosen points of concentration.

"Furthermore, while the totals may have been in favor of the Soviet Union, at critical spots on the front there often was a
situation of near parity"

This is of course patently absurd. Not just is it self-evident that an attacker enjoying an overall superiority should be able to concentrate even larger superiorities at his chosen points (in the absence of blatant incompetence in planning, intelligence, staff-work and logistics), particularly when possible places of attack were so numerous, the front so long, and the German resources so slender relative to the length of the front. It is also quite evident from some of the literature he uses that reality was pretty much the opposite of his description.

The only backing he offers for this notion is some figures from Zitadelle:

"For example, at the start of July 1943 on the southern face of the "Kursk bulge" the Soviets had a manpower advantage of 1.66:1, an advantage in tanks of 2.12:1, and a disadvantage in artillery of 1:1.87. These ratios are far lower than commonly thought. When considering only units actually fighting, these ratios are much different. At the start of July 1943 on the south face of the Kursk salient, the Germans had a 2.9:1 advantage in manpower, an 11.6:1 advantage in tanks, and a 7.74:1 advantage in artillery (Turkes 2000). Certainly, to make a sweeping statement that the Soviets consistently and vastly outnumbered the Germans is a gross distortion of facts."

Firstly, it should be noted that Zitadelle was a German offensive. Therefore it is not a good indication of the ability of the Soviets to achieve superior concentration on their chosen points of attack. Secondly, if his figures are relevant, this begs the question why the Red Army chose to deploy such inferior forces on the main axis of a German offensive they knew of and prepared for for several months, if we also accept, as he claims, that Soviet organisational effectiveness was higher. Thirdly, his figures are not meaningful. Basically he is tallying the full German assault force against the Soviet elements deployed in the first echelon of the defense, which is not a very relevant measure of force, but just a reflection of the nature of the Soviet deployment - in echelons, and with large reserves. Within a week, the Soviets had committed vastly greater forces than these, while the German strength did not increase (but rather declined as a result of casualties). The Red Army deployed significantly greater forces than the Germans during the relatively short German offensive phase in the South. They also suffered casualties at least three times greater than the German attackers, despite the advantages of defensive posture, superior numbers and extensive defensive preparations.

" At any rate, these advantages by themselves were not enough to ensure victory, as the numerous battlefield defeats of Red Army offensives in 1942 and early 1943 demonstrate. Clearly, something else was required to ensure the numerical advantages were put to good use.
The Red Army that ended the war was qualitatively better, not just in weaponry, but also in organizational effectiveness, than the army that started the war. This is why the Red Army eventually performed well."

This is an argument that falls on its own many logical flaws.

1) While it is valid to say that the outcome cannot simply be reduced to a numerical relation, this does rule out that the numerical relation can have been a great or the greater factor in explaining the outcome. His logical fallacy is basically this: Since the explanation cannot be wholly A, it must be wholly B.

2) While it is valid to claim that the Red Army improved in effectiveness, this does not mean either that this improvement neccessarily put it beyond its adversary, nor that this improvement is the main explanation of its success.

What he entirely fails to appreciate is that numerical superiority and effectiveness impact on each other. The effect of a 3-1 numerical superiority increases with the level of effectiveness. To an extent, you can compensate for inferior effectiveness with superior numbers. To an extent, you can also compensate for inferior numbers by superior effectiveness. But the extent in either case is of course not unlimited. To put the basic logic in maximally simplistic (and of course not ultimately valid) terms: If the Germans are twice as effective as the Soviets, but the Soviets are four times stronger, the Soviets will win. If the Germans are three times as effective as the Soviets and the Soviets twice as strong as the Germans, the Germans will win.

The relevant question to ask therefore would be "How good did the Red Army have to be in order to be able to win with this level of superior resources"? The answer to that question certainly would not plausibly be either "as good as the Germans" or "better than the Germans".

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There are of course many other points to consider in this text. However, the argument pretty much stands and falls with his rejection of material factors as the main explanation. If this rejection is not valid, then most of the resulting analysis becomes superfluous - because there would not then be any neccessity to resort to administrative theory (of all things!) to explain the outcome. And this rejection IMO is, as is evident from the above, severely flawed logically, takes far too much for granted, is in part based on inaccurate data and omits consideration of a very major factor of key importance as an indicator of effectiveness - casualties. For instance, one wonders why, if he is correct in positing an equal (apparently even superior Soviet) level of effectiveness why the Germans in the operationally disastrous year of 1943 still managed to inflict on the Soviets casualties more than five times larger than their own - and retained a very positive ratio in the even more disastrous year of 1944?

regards,

K.A.

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