Some questions for your “coffee breaks!”

1) From Col. Dupuy’s book “ATTRITION: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War” (1990, Nova Publications) I had a couple of questions:

a) On Page 112 (Chapter 7), after putting forth the equation to calculate Daily Tank Losses (Equation 7), he states:

“This equation applies to most combat situations. When, however, the opposing forces are unbalanced in terms of antitank weaponry, or one of them is exceptionally tank-heavy, or tank-light, additional factors are needed. (The derivation and calculation of these is rather complex; in such cases the reader should seek assistance from people or organizations who possess either QJM or TNDM software.)” – Emphasis added!

Well, IAW Col. Dupuy, I am seeking assistance in getting the QJM equations to enhance Equation 7 from his book. Can you so provide?

b) On Page 113 (Chapter 7), after putting forth the equation to calculate Daily Artillery Losses (Equation 8), Col. Dupuy provides derived Loss Rates for APCs, Infantry Weapons, antitank Weapons, vehicles, etc., and Recovery Rates for all types.

How were those derivations determined? Is there statistical data from WW2 to validate those loss rates? It seems from the detailed loss rates in his “Historical Scenarios of Soviet Breakthrough efforts in World War II” (which had SUPERB force data in it!), the antitank loss rates should be higher, the infantry gun rates lower, etc…

2) From Col. Dupuy’s book “Understanding War,” he made a superb case for the need to further specify the effect of SUPPRESSION, and the more lasting NEUTRALIZATION. The phenomena termed DISRUPTION is likely best dealt with in such a grouping.

a) Any further study on this matter?

b) Would you care to speculate on how to incorporate such in battle predictions?

c) What about the battle occurrence of massive artillery (air possibly as well – say Heavy Bombers like in prep for Allied operations in Normandy)? Per the Soviet Breakthrough Report, it is intuitive that having an Artillery Weapon for every 10 meters of frontage would be effective (given enough munitions) in inflicting a serious level of casualties and “disruption” prior to the infantry/tank attack. Such occurred, I take it, to the 161st German Infantry Division on 4 AUG 1942 (Soviet Breakthrough Report). How would you consider modeling such? With all the added Corps and Army Artillery units, doesn’t it seem this specific bombardment action falls outside of the normal battle conditions modeled by QJM in which standard preparatory artillery fires are considered via Artillery OLI values?

3) Some general QJM Questions:

a) I believe the importance of OPTICS in Weapons OLI calculation has been shortchanged. Specifically the standoff distance concept so well utilized by the US Army of recent decades (TOWs and M1 Abrams) which applies specifically to the German 88mm guns -- towed, self-propelled and tank mounted. Current OLI values for similar caliber and muzzle velocity weapons give similar OLI values. However, Allied, and especially Soviet tanks, were at a distinct disadvantage when terrain and weather considerations permitted 3000 to 4000 meter observation and engagement. I am in process of reviewing some documents on British evaluation of weapons in 1943 that specifically discuss the superior German optics on some weapons. Your comment(s)?

b) Regarding Tanks, Assault Guns, self-propelled AT guns and Tank Destroyers, I am considering the following breakout, for the described reasons. Please comment:

1. Tanks and Assault Guns (AGs) are categorized as “Tanks” for all aspects of the QJM (OLI calculation, battle losses). This breakout was based on Assault Guns, like tanks, being utilized to lead / protect infantry in engagements. Both types are directly exposed to frontline enemy positions.

2. Tank Destroyers and SP AT guns, like towed AT guns, are considered to be AT Weapons regarding QJM usage (not counted as tanks). The reasoning is that TDs and SP ATs are best used as defensive / ambush weapons. They were intended for employment as concealed firing platforms to defeat enemy tanks – not to lead infantry into operations or engage frontline enemy positions.

3. Treating AGs like tanks requires some level of “letter” deviation from OLI calculation. AGs definitely added armor, like tanks, for protection from fire. Therefore, the massive penalty of reduced PF means of modeling seems less than accurate – in contrast to the very lightly armored SP AT guns. The concern is how to best treat the fixed gun vs. a tank turret’s rotating capability. Such differences, I believe, are less than first impressions -- since AGs utilized in their intended role of Infantry support would not be engaging tanks, but either fixed position emplacements (attacks) or enemy force concentrations (defense). Then, what about fixed gun Tank Destroyers? Recommendations are requested!

c) Regarding the treatment of Air power. Despite the TDI Forum’s assessment that less armored vehicles were destroyed from air attack than was claimed, the overwhelming presence of enemy air superiority on artillery spotting, intelligence from unimpeded aerial reconnaissance, the burden of night-only movement and re-supply (from a number of the TDI Reports I purchased) is huge! Doesn’t it seem Air Superiority is under evaluated? Only a 10-20% effect on the Mobility Factor, Artillery weapons, and Vulnerability seems to not do its effect justice. Comments?

d) Logistics. Col. Dupuy’s assessment that less than 65% daily allowance will affect combat power was an enticing start. Any more work on this? Some specific questions come to mind:

1. What about Fuel (POL) shortages like the Germans faced in WW2? The Afrika Korps occurrences immediately come to mind. The intuitive impact on mobility is apparent, but what QJM enhancement could properly model this effect? Simply reducing the tank’s range or speed factors doesn’t seem sufficient. Comments?

2. Munitions shortages can be considered as “show stoppers.” If Artillery Weapons have no ammunition (say being completely cut-off without aerial re-supplies for long enough to exhaust on-hand stocks), the effect on OLI lethality is obvious. Modeling the Stalingrad combat in January 1943 becomes an obvious example. Comments?

3. Food / Rations shortages. Initial inclination is to raise the level of non-battle casualties (modeling sickness), but as shortages become acute over a long-term duration, unit elimination becomes the ultimate end (surrender). Again, the Stalingrad in January of 1943 scenario comes to mind. Comments?

e) Counterattacks. Intuitively, attackers are very vulnerable to counter-attack by fresh forces / reserves. Since attacking forces are “on the move” they cannot be considered as even a hasty defensive posture – which would at least have delineated fields of fire, artillery targets registered, and all towed artillery fully in-range. Has such been considered by QJM evaluations? Comments?

f) Rapid Counterattack of an Amphibious beach head. The Salerno and Anzio attacks began even later than I am considering here. Lets consider a night of JUN 6 of full scale Panzer Division JUN 7 attack on a Normandy Beach head. The landed divisions would have none of their artillery, few heavy weapons, some amphibious tanks in the British / Canadian sectors. Of course Close Air Support and Naval Gunfire are intended to compensate for the heavy weapons shortage. Is simply the removal of the Heavy Weapons OLIs from the landed division the way to model this? Comments?

g) Combination of DELAY posture with AT range standoff. Current OLI structure would have the strongest German combat factor to be in fortified positions for meeting a Russian attack. I contend that (forgetting Hitler’s lunacy of no retreat policy) a Delay defense conducted by mobile forces, maximizing the use of 88mm standoff ranges (towed 88s and Nashorns), would inflict catastrophic Russian tank and personnel losses, while keeping German losses at vastly lower rates (out of range of massed Russian artillery and normal tank gunnery ranges). I don’t see how the current QJM evaluation implements such a casualty differential from the Delay Posture with Mobility combination. Trading ground for massive loss / casualty differential is precisely the approach that should have been followed, and I contend combat modeling will so show. Can you correct my “Pilot Error” on not seeing this with the current QJM posture factors and loss equations?

Pat

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“This equation applies to most combat situations. When, however, the opposing forces are unbalanced in terms of antitank weaponry, or one of them is exceptionally tank-heavy, or tank-light, additional factors are needed.

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Well....this is touched upon in my post under the heading "QJM and Combined Arms". I do not know of any survey or study done on that subject.

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(The derivation and calculation of these is rather complex; in such cases the reader should seek assistance from people or organizations who possess either QJM or TNDM software.)”

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We could certianly produce such material, but it would require a somewhat extended study. You were probably assuming that "seeking assistance" would be free

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IAW Col. Dupuy, I am seeking assistance in getting the QJM equations to enhance Equation 7 from his book. Can you so provide?

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Well, Col. Dupuy has been gone since 1995. I would love to provide such data, and we do have the tools to produce it, but this is not a small study. It does not currently exist. This is something that would have to be funded and is well beyond the ability of most individuals to do so. Sorry.

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2) From Col. Dupuy’s book “Understanding War,” he made a superb case for the need to further specify the effect of SUPPRESSION, and the more lasting NEUTRALIZATION. The phenomena termed DISRUPTION is likely best dealt with in such a grouping.

a) Any further study on this matter?

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Yes, back in 1994 we did a preliminary study on this to show that we could measure suppression effects. This is available in our TDI reports. We were then given a larger contract to come up with an actual formulation and apply it to the combat model MODSAF.

Unfortunately this effort was done as a teaming agreement with another small company, with them as the lead. They managed to waste the money on the contract without producing anything useful. They then went into financial collapse leaving three months of billings unpaid to us (which we were never able to collect) and work undone, then their program manager lied to us and the customer about the status of the work and the status of the payments. They then disappeared, having produced absolutely nothing for the large amount of money they wasted.

As such, our work on this was never completed and nothing was ever submitted.

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b) Would you care to speculate on how to incorporate such in battle predictions?

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What we found was that when we compared engagements with a high degree of bombardment to them with similar engagements without entensive bombardement was a difference in the CEV, implying that the suppressive effect of the artillery was reducing the defender's capability to fight.

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...How would you consider modeling such? With all the added Corps and Army Artillery units, doesn’t it seem this specific bombardment action falls outside of the normal battle conditions modeled by QJM in which standard preparatory artillery fires are considered via Artillery OLI values?

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Well, the problem is a lack of a logistics module to the model. This effort did lead us to examine what would be involved in preparing a logistics module and also led us to doing a battalion-level validation of the model (the results of the validation were published in our newsletters).

In the case of the suppression study, I believe they had taken the step to calculate OLI by round (i.e. divided the OLI of a peice by its rate of fire or basic load or something like that). They then used this to account for the difference in effect of weight of firepower (assuming that the casualty and combat power effect is linear). Then they looked at the differences in CEV with weight of firepower "factored out".

I was not involved in this particular study except at the end and would have taken a slightly different tact.

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Originally posted by Patrik:
It will sure take some coffee breaks to answer this one.

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"Well, Col. Dupuy has been gone since 1995. I would love to provide such data, and we do have the tools to produce it, but this is not a small study. It does not currently exist. This is something that would have to be funded and is well beyond the ability of most individuals to do so. Sorry."

I inferred, from the late great Col.'s semantics that such did exist in ready form within QJM software. You correctly infer I could not afford you to do it!!

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"In the case of the suppression study, I believe they had taken the step to calculate OLI by round (i.e. divided the OLI of a peice by its rate of fire or basic load or something like that). They then used this to account for the difference in effect of weight of firepower (assuming that the casualty and combat power effect is linear). Then they looked at the differences in CEV with weight of firepower "factored out".

I was not involved in this particular study except at the end and would have taken a slightly different tact."

Could you point me specifically to where I could obtain the specifics of this study, to include the quantifiable results. I would also very much appreciate your "detailed review" of how you would have done it, why, and how you think the results would change based on your approach. Now how much per hour are you? :rolleyse:

Thanks,

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3) Some general QJM Questions:

a) I believe the importance of OPTICS in Weapons OLI calculation has been shortchanged....

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Well, its not in the QJM at all. In contrast, optics (and other such factors) are included in the revised formulas for the TNDM for armor, and this is discussed to some extent in a much earlier post. If the optics for both sides are roughly the same, then it is not going to matter much for modeling purposes

<<Current OLI values for similar caliber and muzzle velocity weapons give similar OLI values. However, Allied, and especially Soviet tanks, were at a distinct disadvantage when terrain and weather considerations permitted 3000 to 4000 meter observation and engagement.>>

This is not a common scenario, nor are casualty rates usually high at that range, and even rarer does such an event significantly influence the outcome a division-level battle (although the QJM can be used for any level of combat, it was validated with mostly division and brigade size engagements).