I have tried to use the pieces of information I have from Understanding War and a Genius for War to come to some conclusions myself.
For example, German CEV seems to have declined by a consistant monthly factor of 1.0126, (1.013 vs.US,1.012 vs Russians) This supports data presented in the above books, giving a German vs. US CEV of 1.45 in 9.1943 1.25 in 9.1944 and 1.18 in 1.1945,and A German-Soviet CEV of 3.1 in 6.1941 2.66 in 7.1943 and 2.02 in 6.1944 and 1.86 in 1.1945.
One could extrapolate a German-CEV of 1.65 in 11.1942 at the time of Operation Torch, but I cannot find good data to confirm this.

Tentative research would indicate that the premier Waffen-SS Divisions trained in the Hausser/Steiner/Dietrich methods and ideology such as 1.SS LAH,2.SS Das Reich,5.SS Wiking, and 12.SS HJ maintained a 1.30 lead above the German average, which is also consistant with the CEV displayed by the Hermann Goering Panzer-Fallschirmjaeger Div.

I would surmise that similar CEV differences would be found for the Royal Marine Commandos compared to regular British forces, and for the USMC vs the US Army, but have not yet found enough data. In similar light, it might be interesting to look into the differnces in CEVs of various separate national contingents and formations, or branches. Many historians have thrown out claims about things such as the supposed superiority of the Canadian, New Zealand and Auatralian contingents to other Commonwealth forces, or the poor quality of Italian Balckshirt divisions. Some research in this area might support or counter some of these arguments, and provide some insight into the relative effectiveness of different training programs and personnel selection. I am sure it would also be of some interest to the historical wargaming community.

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Originally posted by Joseph Scott:
Has anyone done any additional reseach on CEVs in WWII?

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CEVs, as produced and used as a function of the QJM/TNDM, were used in a study (which was never completed) on measuring the effects of artillery supression. The report for the first stage of this project is available from our publications section (under TDI).

We also did a battalion-level validation of the model using WWI, WWII and Post-WWII engagements. We (I) did some examination and analysis of the CEVs that came from that validation. This was published in depth in a series of articles in "The International TNDM Newsletter". Soon as I get the time to work on this, all ten issues of this newsletter will be posted up on this site for anyone to download. Probably in a month or two.

Outside of the QJM/TNDM, we have also done extensive analysis of causalty exchange ratios and outcomes based upon nationality. Some of this has appeared in the newsletters, but most of the material is in our four reports that were done as part of the Capture Rate Study (the Phase I & II report has the WWII material). We also did a breifing, which was presented at ISMOR of "Measuring Effects in Human Factors in Combat" that summerized the work on this subject from those studies. Additionally, some additional work was also done as part of "The Historical Combat Effectiveness of Lighter-Weight Armored Forces" and our on-going Urban Warfare studies. These are all listed in our website under TDI publications. The link to download them has been temporarily disabled until we can get further guidence from our customer concerning their access.

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For example, German CEV seems to have declined by a consistant monthly factor of 1.0126, (1.013 vs.US,1.012 vs Russians) This supports data presented in the above books, giving a German vs. US CEV of 1.45 in 9.1943 1.25 in 9.1944 and 1.18 in 1.1945,and A German-Soviet CEV of 3.1 in 6.1941 2.66 in 7.1943 and 2.02 in 6.1944 and 1.86 in 1.1945.

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Actually, I would like to see your math on that.

I had not specifically noted this. In our Capture Rate Study, Phase I & II we did do an extensive analysis of the casualty effectiveness (a statistical examination, vice using the model) of German versus US for Italy (Sept 1943 - June 1944) compared to Ardennes (December 1944), and did note that there was a difference in the casualty exchange ratios between the two sets of data. The German army in the Ardennes was not as effective relative to the opposing US forces as they were in Italy, and furthermore the data was more uneven in Ardennes. None of this is really suprising...but it is interesting to be able to clearly see the quantitative differences.

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One could extrapolate a German-CEV of 1.65 in 11.1942 at the time of Operation Torch, but I cannot find good data to confirm this.

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I would be tempted to test this, but cannot justify it for budget reasons.

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Tentative research would indicate that the premier Waffen-SS Divisions trained in the Hausser/Steiner/Dietrich methods and ideology such as 1.SS LAH,2.SS Das Reich,5.SS Wiking, and 12.SS HJ maintained a 1.30 lead above the German average, which is also consistant with the CEV displayed by the Hermann Goering Panzer-Fallschirmjaeger Div.

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I don't know about this. I may do a rough statistical test of this in my Kursk book, as I do have one SS Panzer Corps attacking with an army panzer corps attacking on each side of this. This provides a means for a more direct statistical comparison. I hope to get to this in the next two-three months. It will be interesting to see if there is a statistical difference.

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I would surmise that similar CEV differences would be found for the Royal Marine Commandos compared to regular British forces, and for the USMC vs the US Army, but have not yet found enough data.

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The data is clearly available to do such analysis of the USMC vs the US Army....and there are a number of cases where the forces are fighting side-by-side (which gets you closer to a laboratory-like situation). This is an analysis that I would love to do. I would probably again do a statistical analysis looking at casualty effectiveness, advance rates, outcomes vice using CEV and the TNDM. To date, I have not found a sponsor willing to fund such research, and I suspect I never will.

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In similar light, it might be interesting to look into the differnces in CEVs of various separate national contingents and formations, or branches.

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This can all be done, given enough research, examples and time.

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Many historians have thrown out claims about things such as the supposed superiority of the Canadian, New Zealand and Auatralian contingents to other Commonwealth forces, or the poor quality of Italian Balckshirt divisions.

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Makes you wonder what these claims were based on.

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I am sure it would also be of some interest to the historical wargaming community.

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I am sure it would be. Unfortunately, the historical wargaming community does not have the ability to fund such work.

I am sure it would be. Unfortunately, the historical wargaming community does not have the ability to fund such work.

TJ: Two brief points:

1. I make use of the CEV concept in my series of games (Master Europa), and have done so with success since around 94. Making use of the data that is available from the Dupuy books, and some studies available from TDI.

2. Funding is always an issue with any projects, but I have found Chris to be most helpful if asked specific questions that can be replied to 'briefly'.

The funding reference also ties back to the comments earlier in another part of this forum, where the 'money = research & publishing' connection was lamented. 'Tis the nature of life unfortunatley. What is needed is a VERY rich chap to get hooked into gaming (grin). OR, as a group of us are involved in, jointly financing research.

Chris - What do you think it would run for you to look into the CEV point raised above?

Well, I was noting the decline in German CEVs in Understanding War, and I decided to see if, by comparing different CEVs at different times, and on differnt fronts, any constant rate was found.

With the Eastern Front, we start with a CEV of 3.1 in 6-7.1941 in the Ukraine. My own analysis of Kursk in 7.1943 gave a 2.66. (Perhaps you confirm or deny the accuracy of that, since you are doing a much more detailed analysis of the battle.) Assuming a constant rate, a 1.1654 decline, over 13 months is 1.0118 per month. Dupuy gives an average CEV of 2.00 in 1944, so, again assuming a constant rate, I figured that this should be the CEV right in the middle of the period,in 6.1944. From 6.1941 to 6.1944, that is a decline of 1.55 over 36 months, or 1.0122 per month. From 7.1943 to 6.1944, that is a 1.33 decline in 11 months, at 1.026 per month. Dupuy states an estimated value of 1.88 or so at the beginning of 1945. From 6.1941 to 1.1945 that is a 1.649 decline over 41 months, or 1.0123 per month. From 7.1943 that is 1.415 over 18 months, at 1.019 per month. From 6.1944 to 1.1945 that is 1.064 over 7 months, at 1.009 per month. Since all of the original CEV values were rounded to two digits, and Dupuy postulates a 10-20% margin of error, I decided to average all of the rates and recalculate the CEVs, based off of the 3.10 value in 6.1941. I got a 1.012, and the values of 2.66 in 7.1943, 2.02 in 6.1944 and 1.86 in 1.1945. Since it seemed to work so far, I tried it with German/US CEVs. Understanding War lists a 1.45 at Salerno in 9.1944, and a 1.15 for Lorraine in 9.1944, and A Genius for War lists a 1.16 for the Ardennes. I did the same process,and came up with a 1.013 average rate per month, with a 1.16 in 1.1945. I then used that rate backwards from Salerno to get a 1.65 in 11.1942.

Of course, my methods are not as rigourous as yours, and I have do not have as much data at my disposal, but it seems to work out pretty consistantly.

My assumptions about CEV's in German elite formations is based off of data in A Genius for War, concerning Hermann_Goering Pz-FJ,and my own very brief analyis' of several battles involving 12.SS Panzer in 7.1944, versus miscellanious British and Canadian formations, from which I got a 1.63, and from my reworking of the extrememely odd formula Dupuy gives for Mortain in Attrition. I added in the value for the Allied aircraft straight into Allied Strength, which Dupuy did not do, for some reason, as well as giving them their air superiority value, which I upgraded to a 1.6, based on German recollections of the effect of Allied airpower in the battle, and also on the fact that the Allies had what amounted, as I undertstand it,to air supremacy,not just air superiority. I also tried to add in mobility factors, though I have had to guess at QJM methodology on that. I derived a 1.56 CEV for the Germans. Then I attempted to sort German formations into elite or average, to and get a ration,to determine an approximate CEv for the elite units. I counted Germanic SS, as well as Fallschirmjaegers and 116. Panzer in this category, and got a 1.65,against the 1.25 for line units. I used data out of Reynold's Steel Inferno and Dupuy's Attrition for both studies.

I would be very curious to see what you find when you study this phenomena at Kursk. My knmowledge of the Waffen-SS leads me to believe that their should be a sharp contrast in quality between the Hausser/Steiner/Dietrich divisions like 1,2,5,9,10 and 12, and all of the others, including the divisions raised out of the Totenkopfverbaende, like 3,6,7, etc, as well as divisions like 4 and hodgepodge of other divisions formRussia and the Balkans.

You mention available data for USMC vs. US Army comparisons in WWII. I am very much a novice when it comes to finding research sources. I have several dozen assorted WWII books, but most are of the standard variety, featuring a dearth of actual hard number data. Can you point me towards some likely sources?

Thanks,
Joseph