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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
The TNDM is the replacement model for the QJM. Is there anyone out there still using the QJM?

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This is probably not the context in which you ask the question, but for some time I have been attempting to adapt the QJM model for use as a wargaming tool with specific application to the horse & musket period and pre-gunpowder era.

I am unfamiliar with the TNDM, but would love to find out more about the differences between the two.

I presume it is NOT possible to acquire the software absent any support contract. I certainly do not have $13,000 to spend on its acquisition.

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Originally posted by Alex H:
Is the QJM system widely used in wargame modeling?

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No, not widely by any means. I don't think it is even widely known to exist by most wargamers.

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
If one is going to use the QJM for the Horse and Musket era or the pre-gundpowder era, then one is on uncharted territory here. <snip>

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What I find most attractive about the QJM is the methodology of the model. I grant that it will take some considerable effort to get the OLI's right, but ultimately the model should I think be able to be used quite effectively.

Near term I hope to come up with a fairly simple program or spreadsheet that will allow me to plug in QJM variable values for various well documented battles and test the results.

Particular areas of concern are the terrain effects and dispersion effects. When weapon effective ranges are limited to significantly less than line of sight it is not clear that the same weight can be attached different terrain types as in the modern era. similarly greater dispersion can be required by the effectiveness of your opponnent's weapons, yet your own weapons employment might well require lesser dispersion for effective employment.

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Originally posted by mtaylor:
Near term I hope to come up with a fairly simple program or spreadsheet that will allow me to plug in QJM variable values for various well documented battles and test the results.

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Recommend you test a series of battles from the same time period at once (20-30 Civil War, or Napoleonic, etc.), and then see what the problems and matches are. Keep us informed of how this goes.

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A third concern is how to model combined arms effect.

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Originally posted by Alex H:
Is the QJM system widely used in wargame modeling?

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The only examples I am aware of are several articles on applying QJM to the Europa system produced by Game Research/Design, by Charles Sharp, Jason Long, and others. These articles were, in fact, my introduction to QJM. I don't think they are available anywhere online, but you might be able to obtain them directly from the authors.

Jason Long runs the Sturmvogel/Panzerkeil sites on the Europa Ring:

http://www.geocities.com/Sturmvogel_66/index.html

and additional members of the Europa community may be contacted via the Europa mailing list, whose address is somewhere on the Europa Web Ring home page:

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
Actually, the model assumes combined arms, and the failure to use that results in a reduced CEV. Call it "doctrine" or lack of "experience" or poor "training", all of which are elements of CEV.

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This goes a long way to addressing the most commonly encountered force mix discrepancy (high/low mobiity and high/low armor and mechanization). It does not address unusual forces mixes, like one side has no artillery, or one side having nothing but artillery. Not sure we really need to address these are they are fairly rare.

As this effectively addresses force mix, then the only other issue is proper use of them in a combined arms environment. This again comes back to "doctrine", "training" and "experience", or CEV. Don't see that we have a "fudge factor" here.

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
Actually, the differences in mis-matched forces is effectively addressed in the Mobility Equation. This is in the TNDM (and I believe later versions of the QJM) but not in the original QJM as published in NPW.

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Chris,

There is an equation for mobility listed on p. 200, Appendix A of NPW. Was this equation updated or revised in later versions of the QJM?

If one wanted to obtain all of the refinements and changes made to the QJM before it became the TNDM, (including revised rules for wargaming) what sources would one need?

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Originally posted by yadernye:
Was this equation updated or revised in later versions of the QJM?

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Yes, I wrote an article on the subject in one of the issues of our newsletters. I'll post up the revision tomorrow and reference the newsletter.

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If one wanted to obtain all of the refinements and changes made to the QJM before it became the TNDM, (including revised rules for wargaming) what sources would one need?

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Part of the revisions were provided in the Appendix to the Attrition Book. The only source describing the entire model is in the TNDM User's Guide, which we restrict distribution of to people who have purchased the model. The model is still owned by the Dupuy family and others, not by the Institute.

The current TNDM mobility equation isL

M = (N + 12J + Wi + 15Wg + 15Wy)*ym/N for "side a" all divided by the same thing for "side d".

N = Number of troops
J = Number of vehicles
Wi = Total OLIS for all armored weapons
Ym = Air Superiority Factor

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
If one is going to use the QJM for the Horse and Musket era or the pre-gunpowder era, then one is on uncharted territory here. Trevor only used four pre-1900 battles for his testing of the QJM in the horse and musket era.

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I have been trying to test several pre-1900 battles for sometime. I have been working on some of Frederick the Great's battles, and some battles from the American Revolution and War of 1812. I did not have the QJM for some time, and had to make up my own version of the
TLI/OLI. Having just gotten NPW from the Institute, I have finally had a chance to see how it would work.

Here are several of my current findings: The TLI/OLI method as it is presented does not seem to address weapons before the mid-19th Century very well at all. I trust no one will
be much offended by tthe assertion, given the admission that Col. Dupuy did not focus much on those periods. Particular problems include:

1.)Poor results for melee weapons. For a start, the Strikes per Hour values seem very low. I have some extremely limited experience with melee weapons, and I would conclude from them that a strike every few seconds would be about right. Of course, if melee weapons were given such high rates, then range factor would have to be reworked considerablely to make projectile weapons useful. Then again,is Strikes per Hour actually the basis of the value? Since the formula uses 2*rpm for automatic weapons and assumes no logisical problems, (which I have taken to mean that infantryman are presumed to have as much ammunition as they can fire readily available.) then perhaps it is really a measure of a smaller time frame. Perhaps it is something more like Strikes per 2 minutes or something? Can anyone comment on that? Obviosly, that does not present any problem for modern weapons, since the same factor, rpm, is being compared in direct proportion, but NPW offers little guideline for older weapons.

2.)The range factor is not signifigant enough.
A pikeman, whose weapon is slower and more combersome than a sword, gains no real advantage for having a much longer reach.

3.)Their is no provision for body armour. In regard to that, Dupuy's use of the RIE becomes more of a problem here, since a.)armour would reduce it, and b.) having a maximum of 1 interferes with reflecting the penetrative power of some weapons. Again, this obviously is not a signifigant issue in post-1900 battles, but can make a great difference in ancient battles.

4.)There is no mention of cavalry's mobility in NPW. Of course, that is not such a great problem. I am pretty sure that if one applies the mobility formula, treating horses as vehicles, and maybe treating cavalry as tanks for OLI calculation purposes, this is very largely remedied.

5.)There is no provsion for skirmishers, jaegers etc. With any battle later than 1915, we might simply assume that bunching one's men together in compact formation would be taken care of be a low CEV for poor training and/or leadership. But this becomes a signifigant problem for the 18th century and Napoleonic Era. I myself am a fan of light infantry, and my initial assumtion was to just give light infantry a higher CEV. But this leads to problems. Though I would like to believe that it would have been a great idea to just turn all of one's infantry into light infantry, that fact that even commanders such as Napoleon, who in his early days had an infantry force that was trained in such a fashion that it could have been used that wau, did not. My sense of humility therefore leads me to the conclusion that massed infanttry must have had some value inherent in their methods too. The repeated insistance of military historians the light infantry were vulnerable to cavalry and melees with massed infntry tend to reinfirce this. This has lead me to the idea of modifiers for having larger propertions of certain troops types. For example, I have been testing out modifiers for preponderance of troops with missile weapons versus troops armed largly with melee weapons, and conversely, for troops who lack melee weapons and/or training. (Riflemen and militia without bayonets, for example). Also, therefore, light infantry. I was also testing something similar for artillery. I tried adapting it to tanks and aircraft before I got NPW the other day. My tentative idea was to take the 6.5 root of a force's Combat power preponderance ratio in such weapons as a multipier, with 20-to-1 as a maximum value. This is pretty arbitrary of course. I was actually trying to get a value that approximated the range of sophistication factors listed in Attrition. It seems to have some hint of promise however. I hope more testing may prove that. But, then, I must admit to having an instinctual and probably unjustified penchant for using high power roots in these kind of calculations.

With regard to the RIE value, and a possible expansion of OLI into asystem that reflects older weapons, I have a suggestion which me be too small in scale for such a system. Weapom's power versus humans seems to relate directly to surface area of wound, both internal and external. At least, this is the claim of the FBI's expert on wound ballistics. A mathamatician who has a website about this (James Hall, Kinetic Pulse) has suggested that volume of wound makes a good subsitute for surface area. He puts forward a formula which he says his tests in local clay pits with various calibers of firearms prove too be a measurement of propotional wound volume. He claims that width of the wound is proportional to energy in foot-pounds, while depth is proportional to momentum, so that the total momentum*energy, or velocity^3 * bullet weight^2, if you will.
"wound value" is

I would like to hear anyone's ideas on the matter.

Also, a thought about quality of amour on vehicles. I have heard it asserted on a WWII web site devoted to tank technology, and featuring weapon penetration tables that the Germas used face-hardened steel with greater propertional strength for it's weight, and that the Russians used titanium, with an even greater strength for it's weight, while the British are supposed to have had very poor quality control in the production of armour, and that their system of riveting armour on was poor. Taking note of Chris's response to objections to the PF factor in Criticisms of the QJM, I would agree that this is not a really great problem with the system, but one might try to factor in modifiers for armour quality by simply multiplying the PF factor by some value reflecting the proprtion of density
and hardness in comparison to mild steel of the early 20th Century. Presumably, this would be a factor under 2, and therefore not one that would not presumably unbalance the system. I recall hearing somewhere that face-hardened steel had something like 25% more strength for it's weight, for example. I cannot remember where I heard that, nor present any scientific backing for it, but if modifiers did stay in that range then I would imagine they could be incorporated straight into OLI as modifiers to PF.

Has anyone made any attempt to separate CEV into leadership versus troop components? That is something I having been trying to do with this era, noting that,in my preliminary analysis of Napoleonic and 18th Century battles, that CEV varied greatly depending on who commanded the two armies. Examples: Napoleon seems to have had a harder time against Archduke Charles than anyone else. The British seem to have done considerable better under Cornwallis than say Howe, Burgoyne or Clinton. Of course, I conducted all of these analysis's using the bits of QJM I picked out of Attrition and Understanding War. Now that I have NPW, perhaps it will be a bit different.

If anyone is interested in working on modifying the QJM for used in pre-1900's wargames, than please email me for discussion, project collaboration, or anything.

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Originally posted by Joseph Scott:
The TLI/OLI method as it is presented does not seem to address weapons before the mid-19th Century very well at all. I trust no one will be much offended by tthe assertion...

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The use of OLIs for pre-WWI weapons was always somewhat whimsical. I think it was done more to illustrate an idea, as opposed to any serious analytical use. Col. Dupuy also had an OLI for a nuclear bomb.

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For a start, the Strikes per Hour values seem very low.

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I don't think that figure is based upon any data.

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2.)The range factor is not signifigant enough.

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Again, absolutely no calibration was done for this. The four pre-WWI battles he used wee all from the 1800s, so certianly there was no attempt to balance range weapons with melee weapons. This is all uncharted territory.

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3.)Their is no provision for body armour.

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Again, not an issue for the period the model was tested for.

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4.)There is no mention of cavalry's mobility in NPW.

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Actually, one of our staff members was playing around with the model once putting calvary in as "mobile fighting machines". I'm not sure that is particularly meaningful. The main thing, is that whatever factors are picked for the cavalry are balanced with the infanty.

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5.)There is no provsion for skirmishers, jaegers etc.

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This is an aggregate model mostly used for division-level engagement, although we have also validated it for battalion-level engagements also. For the examples where I've seen the model used for battles for the 1800s, Col. Dupuy used the entire force for each side for his calculations. No attempt was made to break the battle down into its component parts. Again, you are in new territory here.

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This has lead me to the idea of modifiers for having larger propertions of certain troops types.

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Maybe. We don't attempt to do such modifiers for modern forces (although RAND does...you may want to check the tread on that). The problem is finding any data measuring what the impact of that may be.

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...but one might try to factor in modifiers for armour quality by simply multiplying the PF factor by some value reflecting the proprtion of density
and hardness in comparison to mild steel of the early 20th Century.

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One British OR report from WWII used a multiplier of 1.1 when comparing German vs British armor.

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Has anyone made any attempt to separate CEV into leadership versus troop components?

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Only just playing around. Also, what is meant by "Leaadership"..the entire NCO and officer corps, or just the guy in charge (Leadership or Generalship).

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Lastly, I hope it is apparent that I am not attempting to attack the validity of the QJM/TNDM by discussing ways to possibly improve upon it.

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Col. Dupuy revised it many times. No reason it should be cast in stone.

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Originally posted by mtaylor:
The problem with this approach is that it assumes that the mix of forces required for an effective combined arms presence are in fact available in the engagement being modelled. An army might well understand, have, and use a combined arms doctrine, but might at times find themselves forced to fight with a force mix that does not allow them to execute the doctrine. Just lowering their CEV for that engagment smacks of a fudge factor and is unsatisfactory as it has little predictive value.

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I started a thread on this question recently in a topic in this forum. I repeat my comments below:
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The Situational Force Scoring technique from the RAND corporation (Allen, 1992) appears to specifically deal with the concept of combined arms and of the realisation of combat potential being related to the combat power of the adversary.
For example, the lack of sufficient (i.e. a multiple of the adversaries armour power, the multiple depending on the type of attack and the terrain present) anti-armour potential (contributed by all combat arms) would tend to increase the perceived combat power of adversary armour and thus contribute to a better force ratio for him.

This interplay between combat power (actual) and anti-combat potential for both sides, leads to non-linear performance effects (synergies of combined arms) as well as interesting (game theory like) resource allocation (ie optimal combined arms mix) problems.
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Not much reply then (only from C Lawrence), so would be interested in more comment.

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Originally posted by A_Gill:
Not much reply then (only from C Lawrence), so would be interested in more comment.

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Yes...but I had a question...which was what data did they use to determine the factors for situational scoring?

This is clearly an obvious factor in accurate modeling of Force Combat Power. The mix of Armor, accompanying Infantry, supporting Engineers and supporting Indirect Fires will play a role, in my view, more critical than the specifics of each Weapon system modeled standalone (ie, OLI).

What your post implies is the equally apparent notion that the Opposing force mix is critical to the determination of the optimal friendly force mix.

The obvious examples are attacking a dug-in force of Infantry with plentiful anti-tank guns vs. a meeting engagement of tank vs. tank.

Those with military experience -- firsthand and/or via study -- will readily confirm the importance of force mix.

The BIG QUESTION is how to model such? How can one reduce the variables in the relatively few battles in which reliable force make up is known -- to accurately determine force composition's role? Only then can it be quantitatively extracted.

Further complication for quantitative extraction entails the USE of a force mix. Just because a force has "the proper" mix, does not insure it will be tactically employed optimally. The CEV rating is used to model this sort of thing -- but the complication is how to ISOLATE the role of force mix in force combat power determination.

Unfortunately, the force mix question may be one of those to which "military judgement" may have to be applied -- in contrast to the more objective quantitative determination. I myself would be skeptical that enough accurate data exists to resolve the involved variables to objectively and quantitatively extract force mix factors.

I'll go "out on a limb" and propose the following -- Force Mix could be implemented as multiplicative factors in the Force Vulnerability variable, in the Personnel Casualties value, and the Armor Loss value.

But then how important? What value should be attached to having a force mix of supporting Infantry (low OLI) as opposed to Tanks only (high OLI) -- when attacking dug-in anti-tank gun positions? What about the role of Self-Propelled vs Towed Artillery in such a situation?

I would consider this to be an area for QJM enhancement -- assuming the data exists to do so --

"Again, not an issue for the period the model was tested for."

I note that we seem to be entering an age when armour is again beginning to actually have signifigance against modern infantry weapons. Have you done any studies of modern engagements which show any possible effects of armour on the model?

With regard to your comment on point 5 Chris:
Even from a division-level prospective, wouldn't differrences in available skirmishing forces have an affect outside of their OLI? In that vein, the American Revolutionary War seems to be a good source for studying that. Does anyone know of any accurate sources for force strength and casualty data? Most of the sources I have found seem extremely biased toward the American Rebels with regard to casualties,in a way that does not balance with
battle outcome at all, or even make much sense in relation to the consistantly high CEV the British have had in all the 18th Century battles I have looked at. (although again with only a partially complete QJM system.)

When discussing Leadership in my earlier post I was specifically referring to force commanders, and not the officer/NCO corps itself.

For that matter, has anyone tried to differentiate CEV caused by purely troop factors like marksmanship training, vs. officer/NCO leadership vs. force commander ability? For example, since the German system has been looked at more than most in Dupuy's works, has anyone tried to examine how muuch the general staff affected training and selection quality at those three levels?

One more problem I have had with ancient weapon values is the idea of the value of a set of weapons as opposed to a single one. From a discussion I had,it has become apparent that the alteranate system I am using in place of OILs may be accurate when considering one on one encounters,where a pike is a cumbersome awkward weapon, giving it a low value, but poorly represents the effect of a mass of pikes in a phalanx,vs an mass of shorter weapons with individually higher values, but apparently, collectively lower ones. Any thoughts on that?

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
Actually, the differences in mis-matched forces is effectively addressed in the Mobility Equation.

This goes a long way to addressing the most commonly encountered force mix discrepancy (high/low mobiity and high/low armor and mechanization). It does not address unusual forces mixes, like one side has no artillery, or one side having nothing but artillery. Not sure we really need to address these are they are fairly rare.

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In Dupuy's report Tha Factors of Combat, he mentions the idea of quantity being a qulalitative factor. Using the Battle of the River Platte, between the SMS Graf Spee and a British cruiser squadron as an example, he suggests that having a superiority in number of weapons over 1.5, regardless of their relative TLIs adds a seperate multiplier representing the flexibilty that it allows the side that has superiority. He mentions this separarely from the mobility equation, which he also dicusses in the report. He discusses it having three separate cases, for infantry, artillery and armour. This seems to be something like combined arms factors Mike J is looking for. They are also reminiscent of the Sophistication factors in Attrition. In fact, in Attrition they seem to be very much the same thing. I find this all the more suprising, since I was using something like this as a substitute for the SO factors. The SO factor itself bothered me because Dupuy doesn't provide a real explanation of it in Attrition. He discussed is solely as a judgemental factor, which makes it seem like a fudge factor. I substituted factors for infantry,armour, artillery and air weapons by taking the 6.5th root of the ratio of weapons of a given type as a multiplier for the side with superiority. While this is,admitedly pretty arbitrary too, it seemed less so than the SO factor as presented. Naturally, I am intrigued to find that Dupuy seems to have been contemplating something similar. But I am at the same time confused, because, while this seems to be what he used that SO factor for, as well as a substitute for the mobility and air superiority factors, which I don't recall being mentioned in Attrition, he also makes mention of a separate Sophistication factor in The Factors of Combat report,which seems to be an odd cross of C3 and technology.