While Niklas is probably right that it is relatively simplistic analysis, the report would still have been very valuable in the 1980s, because it would show western staff officers how their opposing numbers would go about approaching a battle, making it easier to figure out what they would do next.

All the best

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The report would still have been very valuable in the 1980s, because it would show western staff officers how their opposing numbers would go about approaching a battle, making it easier to figure out what they would do next.

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As far as I recall, this was indeed the purpose of the report.

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
As far as I recall, this was indeed the purpose of the report.

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The authors admit that all they had to go on was open source material, probably supplemented by emigres/defectors, so the underlying data may be more complicated than we know. Or not, of course.

I have not read most of the reports being discussed on this board I admit. I do have familiarity with the Soviet by the numbers theories. My first area of study was a NATO/WARPAC confrontation. Having read many books on the subject from “Team Yankee” to Army Books Reference and Field manuals on organization and tactics of the time and the more modern equivalents. They all discuss Soviet theory in varying degrees of depth. Some of the basic highlights were how political thinking was ingrained in the command structure. The Political officer was discussed of course. But also how the enlisted ranks were restricted in communication back up the chain of command. Individual initiative was discouraged and was detriment to the theories of higher level centralized planning of battles for battalion formations and larger.
Examples of cited by some of this material included. Only platoon leader and higher tanks had two way radios. Minimal Artillery batteries allocated for “On Call” duty. Un planned fire missions required approval though the chain of command to an Artillery officer. This officer used the mention calculations to determine if the mission should be authorized while having little to no situational data from the area that the caller was in. The strict Attack formations they use are available in publications like the OPFOR field Manual. I will see if I still have mine around. Otherwise more modern versions from 1997 can be found on Global security. Along with the Formations, was the theory of never reinforcing defeat. Sounds logical enough but the perception was Soviets leave large numbers of broken but not completely eliminated formations to their death.

There were more but, the basic “moral of the story” was that Soviet Doctrine was hopelessly inflexible and restrictions on the low level soldier to adapt to a changing situation led to excessive casualties in the Second World War. Exploiting these perceived flaws in Soviet Doctrine was a cornerstone to the plan for defending against a possible incursion by the Warsaw Pact. Throughout these publications examples of this theory in operation and descriptions on how the Germans successfully exploited them.

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Originally posted by Wittmann_101:
Exploiting these perceived flaws in Soviet Doctrine was a cornerstone to the plan for defending against a possible incursion by the Warsaw Pact. Throughout these publications examples of this theory in operation and descriptions on how the Germans successfully exploited them.

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There is of course a big problem with that, already shown by Niepold in the early 80s in 'Battle for White Russia'. The Germans lost on the battlefield, because despite their undeniable tactical sucesses and the individual technical superiority of their kit, in 1944 they were beaten with a clockwork regularity on the operational level.

He draws IIRC the comparison between Hitler's stand-fast orders in Byelorussia 1944, and NATO's doctrine of 'Forward Defense'.

Moral of the story is that if you develop doctrine, it pays to listen to both sides, not just to the loser with a grudge.

All the best

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
I can not see that the Germans achieved many tactical successes in 1943-45. They did perform well, but performance does not imply success.

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We may have a definition problem here, since I would certainly say that e.g. the performance of Group Sauckel during Bagration was a tactical success. It just had no impact at higher level.

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
Likewise, I can not see any significant Soviet operational skills as a major factor behind the Soviet operational successes. Essentially, the Red Army operational successes were accumulated tactical successes.

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What is an operational skill? Do skills such as Maskirovka, concentration of force, operational reconnaissance, deployment of operational-level anti-tank formations in the path of enemy counter-attacks, rapid ability to switch the axis of corps/army type formations count? All of these are in evidence from 1944 onwards.

All the best

Andreas

All the best

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Originally posted by Andreas:
What is an operational skill? Do skills such as Maskirovka, concentration of force, operational reconnaissance, deployment of operational-level anti-tank formations in the path of enemy counter-attacks, rapid ability to switch the axis of corps/army type formations count? All of these are in evidence from 1944 onwards.]

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Originally posted by Andreas:
We may have a definition problem here, since I would certainly say that e.g. the performance of Group Sauckel during Bagration was a tactical success. It just had no impact at higher level.

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Well I feared my poor writing would effect this. I should have been more clear that my focus was on tactical level.

This much I know. NATO commanders did study German tactics and certain engagements to find ways to deal with potential conflict with the Soviets. There were War veterans in the rebuilt German Forces. They did lecture on their experiences. I liken it to watching films after an American Football game. Perhaps you won’t but were beaten in special teams plays. So you watch the opponents special teams to learn where you can improve and what tactics you could yield from them to use against other opponents.

As far as individuals and grudges. Personally I never question a firsthand account until it is been contradicted by many other sources. I don’t write books though either, and I don’t know much about that. I assume though a different standard for assuring authenticity must be applied if you’re a published author.

Clearly I am outclassed in knowledge and research here. I maintain though that there is plenty out there to point to German successes on a tactical level.

I quote Jay Karamales in a March of 1999 article from a wargame. I don’t think that discredits its validity. I will not bombard this board with a whole article but please read these paragraphs of the article:
"A number of people have pointed out some apparent discrepancies in the Prokhorovka scenario "Dead End on the Road to Kursk." My short answer: stop relying on 50-year-old Soviet propaganda as your information source on the battle. Dig into the original German and Soviet strength reports and after-action reports. That's what the Dupuy Institute did, compiling over a three-year period the most comprehensive collection of data on the southern front at Kursk anywhere in the world. I was lucky enough to be privy to that data (I translated much of the German data myself) and to the experts that gathered and analyzed it"

“"So how did the story of the gigantic tank clash at Prokhorovka get started?"
By Russian generals who were terrified of telling Stalin how roughly they'd been handled. To save their own hides they inflated German strengths and losses. By the time Stalin died in 1953 and the truth could be told, the story was too entrenched and too many decorations had been handed out. Plus, it makes a better story to say that there were hundreds of burning tanks on each side. This problem of playing down Red losses and inflating German losses is common to all Soviet sources.”

The article also mentions Mr. Lawrence’s book on the Subject. I am sure this ground has been covered here at these forums. My intent was not to rehash anything but only to provide a basis for my thoughts.

Definition of success can vary I suppose. I have browsed through some of the discussion here about tank losses and tank effectiveness. The detail is astounding and I only brushed the surface I admit. It’s all very fascinating. Through all that vast information, though I still don’t see anything that m changes my view in the most general terms. That view is: Facing the veteran German Armored K.G.'s may not lead to defeat of Allied forces but would lead to substantial casualties at least. In Reading Western Allied accounts, It was obvious the arrival of any quantity of German Mechanized troops was very alarming to them. IE Tiger Phobia.

In the East von Manstein indicates the vast damage done to the soviet forces at the main points of effort often. . They are staggering. I have had read and heard many call him a boaster and even a liar. Weather that is true or not. The very basics of Battles like Kursk, Kharkov, and Korsun Pocket for a few examples are indications to me of competence at a tactical level.

This competence is what led to the teaching some German tactics and doctrine and applying them to a potential future war. People may disagree with the assessments taught, but it was taught. American, West German, and British forces were similar in some respects to Germans in the late part of the war. These were:

1.NATO was outnumbered vastly but had qualitative superiority.
2. Air cover would be questionable if not totally non-existent.

And lastly the part about the original subject of the thread.
3. Soviet Doctrine would be inflexible and their behavior somewhat predictable based on the "by the numbers" approach they would use. Exploiting that weakness was one of the primary goals to defeating them in tactical actions.

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...
And lastly the part about the original subject of the thread.
3. Soviet Doctrine would be inflexible and their behavior somewhat predictable based on the "by the numbers" approach they would use. Exploiting that weakness was one of the primary goals to defeating them in tactical actions...

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I found a few newer ones but they are not of the cold war era and thus not of any worth for this discusion they are written from a post cold war mantality where the OPFOR must siualte much different militarys then the old USSR.

NO as I said my knowledge comes from what I was taught and that focused on 99 percent tactical situations.

I did find this from The DTIC.mil website. It hints at my assertions. Now I was not a Marine. I have no idea why this quote states that Marines think anybody though High Ranking Soviet Generals were included in statements about infelxibilty. Obviously Zhukov was NOT reading from some script.

Heres the quote:
"The Soviet officer has been portrayed as inflexible and very rigid in executing tactical operations. For many years we have been told his inflexibility was our (the Western allies) greatest asset. This assumes that U.S. officers practice innovative tactical procedures as well as boldness of action on the battlefield in order to take instant advantage of the Soviets predictable ways. There are a considerable number of U.S. Marine officers who question the accuracy of the previous two statements. This study contends that the senior Soviet officer at the operational level of war (corps, front, and army level) will be extremely flexible and will take risks in the form of bold actions in order to secure military objectives. Based on this review, U.S. military officers must reexamine Soviet doctrine at the operational level of war."

Even though the online OPFOR manuals are ten years to young they do still have some concpets carried over from the older manual that I have. Heres a a brief example:

"Figure 5-20. Sample Ammunition Expenditure Norms.

Notes:

"1. Reduce expenditure by 25% when engaging with observed fire or adjusting from a known point.

2. Increase expenditure by 10% when range to target is greater than 10 km.

3. To achieve expenditure norms for annihilation multiply rounds required for suppression by three."

http://fas.org/man/dod-101/army/docs/st100-7/chapter05/Chap5I.htm

OPFOR attempted to physicaly look like the potential enemy. Its manuever and tactics were enemy tactics. The Army coined them the best trained Soviet Regiment in the world. Up to my time. Only one BLUEFOR unit had ever beaten OPFOR.

Okay I found My OPFOR Field Pocket Reference.
TAB D A7 describes Battalion radio nets. The Company commander is the lowest echelon to have relay. Platoons are not on the Battalion net and there is some assesments that they dont have ability to trasmit at all. Thats the first key element. Reasons for this as explained at the time were that Communist poltical ideals were not consistant with individual thought and that deviation from the battel script should not be entrusted to soldiers in these postions. They were to only follow orders and thus had no need to be transmiting on the net. This dove tailed with practical military matters as conscripted soldiers had truncated training cycles and did not have the experince for such descion making.

In the war the training problem was compounded by atrition.

Strict formations are drilled into Soviets for purposes of command and control and massing. Battalions are completely scripted in speed, spacinng and formation depending on situation.

I’ve always read about centralized control and lack of individual initiative with the Soviets.

I always consider this when looking at Soviet attrition and German effectiveness. German lethality was accentuated by Soviet centralize control at the tactical level.

I have often considered degrading dispersion slightly for the Soviets in QJM, just to see what happens.

I also occasionally read of the idea that casualties were disregarded as long as ground was gained. This idea is much less prevalent then the C&C issues mentioned. I think this idea is an assumption of the West based at least partly on Stalin’s statements about quantity having a quality all its own.

A document discussing battalion level Doctrine.
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll2&CISOPTR=2441&CISOBOX=1&REC=1

Page 109 discusses command and control conclusions. Page 20 discusses maneuver.
Other sections of the document point to some minor contradictions.

I surmise these contradictions are a kind of “tug of war” between politically motivated impositions into military operations and actual military thought on the issue.