By the same token, if one were to adapt Dupuy's theories and formulas to the Information Warfare era, they would need to be adjusted to account for disparities in opposing forces' C3.

Thanks for your comments, let me see if I can address them adequantly

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Mike J:

<<but my impression was that his system tended to ignore the role of C3 (Command, control, communications) as a combat multiplier.>>

This is basically true, although there is much subsumed into CEV (Combat Effectiveness Value). There are no specific factors for C2 (Command and Control) in the QJM (or the TNDM for that matter). If one looks at page 33 of NPW (Numbers, Predictions and War), one sees a number of "intangibles" that would make up C2. These include technology, leadership, logistics, etc. Still, when it comes down to it, it is not modeled, except to the extent that it is incorporated as an element of CEV (which is effectively Human Factors).
This is not an issue if the problems are similar for both sides, but.....

<<I think that the C3 disparity between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht is not really factored into the equation and is part of the reason for the TLI disparity between Soviet and German units of equivalent numerical strength.>>

The Soviet Army had a large number of problems in a wide range of areas (doctrine, leadership, generalship, training, morale, cohesion, doctrine, organizational habits, etc.). The noticable differences in performance relative to the Germans would not began to be covered by just one factor.

<<It also explains why the Soviets did dramatically better in breakthrough operations, which were so thoroughly planned they reduced the handicap of inferior C3.>>

Not sure about this. The model does include a "set-peice" factor, which I gather was placed in there to help address the Egyptian ability in 1973 to function well in the early part of the war when they had the benefits of clear planning. In effect, a good plan will reduce the negative effects of lack of experience and poor initiative (and other such factors).

<<By the same token, if one were to adapt Dupuy's theories and formulas to the Information Warfare era, they would need to be adjusted to account for disparities in opposing forces' C3.>>

Thanks for your comments, let me see if I can address them adequantly

<<It also explains why the Soviets did dramatically better in breakthrough operations, which were so thoroughly planned they reduced the handicap of inferior C3.>>

Not sure about this. The model does include a "set-peice" factor, which I gather was placed in there to help address the Egyptian ability in 1973 to function well in the early part of the war when they had the benefits of clear planning. In effect, a good plan will reduce the negative effects of lack of experience and poor initiative (and other such factors).

I would argue that the "set-piece factor" is what happens when a C3-inferior force has a chance to plan an operation down to the last minute detail and execute it. In such conditions, since the Plan is so detailed, as long as the attacker has the initiative, his operations are as smooth as if there were no C3 disparity. Coming back for a second to the artillery doctrine issue, during WW2 the Red Army in general could not provide effective on-call fires. It simply did not have the technology to do it, which is why its artillery tactics resemble those of Western Front circa 1918. In fluid battles that meant that Soviet units could only count on direct fire support of attached artillery units. In a breakthrough operation, however, the Soviet artillery preparation plan, backed up by extremely thorough reconnaissance and intelligence work, was almost as efficient in providing fire support to maneuver units as a well developed artillery fire direction system would.

Therefore I would argue that the "set piece factor" is almost entirely a reflection of C3 disparities. The thorough preparation inherent in a breakthrough operation did not really improve the initiative or the level of training of individual Soviet commanders, at least not to a greater extent than of German or Allied commanders in similar circumstances. But it did shorten the Soviet forces' "decision loop", or the "Boyd cycle," if you will. As long as the plan was going, well, according to plan, the Soviet units' inferior ability to adjust to unforeseen changes (due to the Soviet command and control shortcomings) were not a disadvantage. I think the senior Soviet leadership were aware that if the Germans were able to catch their breath and regain the initiative, the C3 inferiority would make itself fully felt, and they were willing to keep up the tempo even at the cost of frightful casualties. Reading Soviet battle accounts, I was struck by the importance attached to "keeping up the tempo," almost regardless of cost. I think they knew that if they lost their tempo and the Germans regained their footing, the Soviet forces would be at a considerable disadvantage because the better C3-equipped German units would quickly get into their "decision loop."

At any rate, that's my theory. One way to test this is to see whether the "set piece factor" is present in set-piece battles involving forces with different training levels but of the same C3 level.

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Originally posted by Mike J:
I would argue that the "set-piece factor" is what happens when a C3-inferior force has a chance to plan an operation down to the last minute detail and execute it.....Therefore I would argue that the "set piece factor" is almost entirely a reflection of C3 disparities.

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Well, it would certianly be part of it, but I do not think that it is the majority of it (not that I am sure Trevor Dupuy ever outlined what was included in the factor and what was not, he just noticed that is seemed to exist and the results were X).

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The thorough preparation inherent in a breakthrough operation did not really improve the initiative or the level of training of individual Soviet commanders.....

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Not improved, but help masked their weaknesses in these areas. Note that the set-peice factor applies (see page 203 of NPW) "When there is a subsantial combat effectiveness difference known or suspected between the opponents (CEV of 1.5 or more), a set-peice factor must be calculated whenever the force with lower combat effectiveness has an opportunity to make detailed, thoroughly planned and (often) rehearsed preparations for an operation."

Again, I think there are a number of factors in play here, not just C2. The Soviet obsession with "keeping up the tempo" probably had to do with a lot more things other than C2.

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One way to test this is to see whether the "set piece factor" is present in set-piece battles involving forces with different training levels but of the same C3 level.

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Here is a review I copied from amazon, it is dead on:
"...Van Creveld traces the history of command systems in organized warfare. His conclusion is that successful command systems did not employ breathrough technology but, rather, so organized themselves that they could function with less information flow. They did this by either compressing the organization so less communication was needed (e.g., the phalanx) or decentralizing decision making so that information did not have to flow as far up or down the organization. Added to this informational efficiency was a "directed telescope" that permitted commanders to focus on essential points in the system in detail, which had the secondary purpose of keeping lower level commanders honest through fear of intense scrutiny from on high. Finally, informal channels of communication existed to grease the wheels of the formal system, as well as to permit temporary but essential circumvention of the formal system in emergencies."