58 Assessment of the Danger of Surprise Attack in Europe and of NATO's Vulnerability to Surprise (1977)

ASSESSMENT OF THE DANGER OF SURPRISE ATTACK IN EUROPE AND OF NATO'S VULNERABILITY TO SURPRISE

An INterim Report

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Report 11

Annex A AA1
Cases of Surprise and Deception in General War 1941-1968

Annex B BB1
Surprise in NATO Context

Annex C CC1
Selected Case Studies for Intensive Investigation

Annex D DD1
Part One: Strategic Surprise in the 1944 Soviet Summer-Fall Campaign (Case Study)

Annex D DD27
Part Two: Surprise in the Battle of the Bulge 1944 (Case Study)

Annex D 839
Part Three: El Alamein, 23 October 1942 (Case Study)

Annex E E1
The Soviet Concept of Surprise

Annex F F1
AGENDA: Conference on Stddy on "Surprise in the NATO C Context;" Dunn Loring, VA; July 20, 1977

ASSESSMENT OF THE DANGER OF SURPRISE ATTACK IN EUROPE, AND OF NATO'S VULNERABILITY TO SURPRISE

An Interim Report

This interim report is being submitted under Contract F49620-77-C-0026 as modified by Revised Statement of Work dated 1 August 1977. Since the modification terminated the work as described in the original contract, and directed the balance of the work under that contract toward a completely different objective, this is of necessity an incomplete study and the report being submitted as agreed under the terms of the modification includes the portion of the work which has been done. It is not to be considered final, and all elements of it are subject to revision and addition at length. Had the work on this study not been halted a different and much more complete report would have been submitted.

The objective of the study as originally contracted was to examine relevant historical experience and documentary evidence to assess the likelihood of a possible surprise attack in Europe by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, and the vulnerability of NATO and the United States to such surprise. Particular attention will be given to the following five sub-objectives:

a. Analyzing and assessing the likely importance of surprise as an element of Soviet planning for potential military operations as revealed by methods, techniques, and goals evident in past cases of strategic and tactical surprise by Soviet armed forces, and in Soviet speeches and writings;

b. Analyzing the potential relevance to the NATO context of other cases of strategic and tactical surprise in modern history, particularly those affecting Europe and the United States;

c. Analyzing the problems of interpreting information which was available and could have revealed the surpriser's intentions in the cases examined;

d. Cataloguing and categorizing the factors, mechanisms, and processes that have been, or are likely to be, significant in the achievement, or frustration, or surprise--both strategic and tactical;

e. Surveying potential actions whereby NATO and the United States could undertake to assure (1) maximum alertness and readiness to preclude surprise and, simultaneously, (2) appropriate contribution to NATO's deterrent posture through observable alertness and readiness.

As of 20 July, the date upon which work toward this objective halted, the following work had been done:

1. Using the research of Barton Whaley* as a basis, tentative and incomplete lists of surprise operations, definitions, and categories were developed. These lists were to be reviewed constantly as the study progressed. It was intended that a final list of definitions, as agreed by the participants, would be submitted with the final report. The discussion at the review conference emphasized the need for arriving at clear, agreed definitions of surprise in all its facets and categories. No decision had been made as to what purpose the other two lists were to serve or in what form they would be represented in the final report. The three lists in their tentative form are attached as Annex A.

2. A preliminary outline of the final report was prepared as a guide for work on the study. This was to be subject to considerable revision on the basis of the research to be done. It is attached as Annex B.

3. A selection of operations involving surprise to be studied was made. From this list, divided into Soviet-related, Middle East, and Western Europe and Asia, the operations to become case studies were to be selected on the basis of availability of material. The list is attached as Annex C.

4. Work was begun on three case studies: The Soviet Summer-Fall Campaign of 1944; The Battle of El Alamein (1942); and the Battle of the Bulge (1944). First drafts to these were written, but they were not revised after being reviewed by all the participants. It was intended that further research should be done to seek answers to questions that reviewers have raised and to improve and focus the content. The case studies are attached as Annex D. They are not to be considered final HERO products.

5. On the basis of some research in Soviet sources a rough first draft essay was prepared, entitled, "The Soviet Concept of Surprise." It was intended that further research be done for this section and that it be revised on the basis of the case studies and comments of the participants in the study. The draft is attached as Annex E. It is not to be considered a final HERO product.

6. The review conference that had been schedules at the start of the contract was held as planned on 20 July. Many useful points were made and it is considered to have been fruitful as a guide toward areas that should be studied when the project is resumed. The agenda and a summary of the discussion is attached as Annex F. Also attached is a paper entitled, "Some Notes on the Phenomenon of Surprise in Military Affairs," prepared after the conference by one of the participants.

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*Unpublished manuscript entitled, "Strategem: Deception and Surprise in War."

Comment

Although none of the partial objectives was achieved,,sufficient research was done to establish a firm foundation for continuing the work to its completion. No conclusions can be drawn at this stage, but a few observations can be made.

1. The Soviet case study, when viewed with the case studies on El Alamein and the Battle of the Bulge, shows signs of common factors which stand out strongly even though the protagonists were different, only the Germans being participants in all three. For example, the role of airpower operating in cooperation with ground elements to establish an environment in which surprise could be achieved was important in all. And techniques for secretly moving large mechanized formations into position to launch a surprise attack were in all three cases a major element in the achievement of surprise. It can be expected that these and other factors will be found in many other operations to be studied.

2. Of particular importance from the point of view of the defender in an operation is the danger of conscious or subconscious preconceptions. As in the case of the Germany high command in 1944, which was convinced that the Soviets were going to attack in the Ukraine when the main effort actually was directed at the forces north in Byelorussia, preconceptions can easily result in misinterpretation of intelligence and of indications of pre-assault preparations.

3. There is need for clear definition of what constitutes surprise and of various categories of it. The documents in Annex A reflect only the beginning of an attempt to identify them. From the conference discussion it is apparent that it is important to understand it in all its aspects.

4. Study must be made of the context in which surprise occurred in the past and in attempt to gain insights into conditions which in current or future time frames might be conducive to being surprised.

5. In view of the fact that the Soviets consider surprise the most important element of the military art it is essential that further study be made of their writings on the subject and of the operations which they stress as particularly important examples of it.

6. The work done to date on this study makes it clear that it is a highly important subject and that considerable advantages would come from further study of it. HERO recommends that this study be completed as planned and that it be expanded to include:

- review of classified and unclassified studies of surprise in its various aspects

- a study of the Soviet politico-military conceptual framework and of the Soviet concept of ours, so that we can recognize a developing atmosphere that might signal an imminent attack

- deeper investigation than this study permits of the influence of the nuclear potential on the climate for surprise.

The potential benefits accruing to the United States and its strategic planners from completion and expansion of the study are of such magnitude, and the fraction that has been completed seems so promising, that it is believed essential that it be continued as soon as possible.

- deeper investigation than this study permits of the influence of the nuclear potential on the climate for surprise.

The potential benefits accruing to the United States and its strategic planners from completion and expansion of the study are of such magnitude, and the fraction that has been completed seems so promising, that it is believed essential that it be continued as soon as possible.

CASES OF SURPRISE AND DECEPTION
IN GENERAL WAR

1914-1968

Liege, 4 August 1914
Ostend Demonstration, 27 August 1914
Tanga, 2 November 1914
Winter Battle of Masuria, 7 February 1915
Neuve Chapelle, 10 March 1915
Second Battleeof Ypres, 22 April 1915
Gallipoli, 25 April 1915
Gorlice, 2 May 1915
Suvla Bay, 6 August 1915
Serbia, 7 October-31 November 1915
Evacuation of Suvla Bay and Anzac Beach 20 December 1915
Evacuation of Helles Point, 9 January 1916
Verdun, 21 February 1916: Operation "GERICHT"
Lake Naroch, 18 March 1916
Battle of Jutland, 31 May 1916
Brusilov Offensive, 4 June 1916
Invasion of Ramania, August 1916
Battles of Scarpe and Vimy Ridge, 9-11 April 1917
Battle of Messines, 7 June 1917
Hutier's Riga Offensive, 1 September 1917
Caporetto, 24 October 1917
Third Battle of Gaza, 31 October 1917
Cambrai, 20 November 1917
German Somme Offensive, 21 March 1918
German Lys Offensive, April 1917
Chemin-des-Dames, 27 May-6June 1917: GOERZ
Hamel, 4 July 1918
Second Battle of the Marne, 15-17 July 1918

Amiens, 9 August 1918
St. Mihiel, 12 September 1918
Megiddo, 19 September 1918
Meuse-Argonne, 26 September 1918
Warsaw, 16 August 1920
Battle of Eskishehir, 9-20 July 1921
Dumlupinar, 26 August 1922
Battle of the Jarama River, 6 February 1937
Guadalajara, 12 March 1937
Brunete, 6 July 1937
Ebro, 25 July 1938
Battle of Khalkhin-Gol (Nomonkhan), 20 August 1939
Poland, 1 September 1939: Operation "WHITE"
Denmark, 9 April 1940: Exercise "WESER SOUTH"
Norway, 9 April 1940: Exercise "WESER NORTH"
Netherland, 10 May 1940: Case "YELLOW"
Belgium, 10 May 1940: Case "YELLOW"
France, 10 May 1940: Case "YELLOW"
Dakar, 23 September 1940: Operation "MENACE"
Sidi Barrani, 9 December 1940: Operation "COMPASS"
Italian East Africa, February-May 1941
Mersa el Brega, 31 March 1941
Yugoslavia, 6 April 1941: Understaking 25
Crete, 20-31 May 1941: MERKUR
Russia, 22 June 1941: Case "BARBAROSSA"
Kiev, 25 August 1941: Fuhrer Directive No. 34--Supplement
Sidi Rezegh, 19 November 1941: Operation CRUSADER"
Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941: Operation "Z"
Malaya, 7/8 December 1941: Operation No. 1
Mersa el Brega, 21 January 1942
Burma, Sittang River, 18-23 Feb 1942
Burma, Lorkaw-Taunggyi, 18-23 April 1942
Kerch, 8 May 1942: Operation "BUSTARD"
Gazala (Western Desert), 26 May 1942: Fall "VENEZIA"
Midway, 3 June 1942: Operation "MI"
Tobruk 20-21 June 1942: Operation "DOUBLE BED"
Summer Offensive in Russia, 28 June 1942: Case "BLUE"
Makin Atoll, 17-18 August 1942
Dieppe, 19 August 1942: Operation "JUBILEE"

Makin Atoll, 17-18 August 1942
Dieppe, 19 August 1942; Operation "JUBILEE"
Alam Halfa, 31 August 1942
Alamein, 23 October 1942: Operation "LIGHTFOOT"
North Africa, 8 November 1942: Operation "TORCH"
Kasserine, 14 February 1943:. Operation "SPRING WIND"
Medenine, 6 March 1943
Massicault, 6 May 1943: Operation "STRIKE"9(also "VULCAN")
Huon Peninsula, June-September 1943: Operation "ELKTON III"
Sicily, 10 July 1943: Operation "HUSKY"
Bougainville, 1 November 1943: Operation "CHERRYBLOSSOM"
Tarawa, 20 November 1943: Operation "GALVANIC"
Battle of the Sangro, 28 November-7 December 1943
Monte Camino, 2-10 December 1943: Operation "RAIN COAT"
Anzio, 22 January 1944: Operation "SHINGLE"
Kwajalein Atoll, 1 February 1944: Operation "FLINTLOCK"
Second Counteroffensive at Anzio, 29 February-March 1944
Chindit Operations, Burma, March 1944
Crimea, 8 April-12 May 1944
Myitkyena, April-May 1944
Hollandia, 22 April 1944: Operation "RECKLESS"
4th Battle of Cassino, 11 May 1944: Operation "DIADEM"
Normandy, 6 June 1944: Operation "OVERLORD"
Karelia, 10 June 1944
Siapan, 15 June 1944: Operation "FORAGER"
Belorussia, 22 June 1944
Imiphal, 5 March-22June 1944
Tinian, 24 July 1944: Part of Operation "FORAGER"
Normandy Breakthrough, 25 July 1944: Operation "COBRA"
Southern France, 15 August 1944: Operation "DRAGOON:
Battle of the Gothic Line, 25 August 1944: Operation "OLIVE"
Anehem-Najmegen, 17-26 September 1944: Operation "MARKET GARDEN"
Leyte Island, 20 October 1944: Operation "MUSKETEER II"
Leyte Gulf, 24 October 1944: Sho I
Ardennes, 16 December 1944: Operation "WATCH-ON-RHINE"
Luzon, 9 January 1945: Operation "MUSKETEER III"

Bavarian Redoubt: January-May 1945

Battle of the Reichswald, 8 February 1945: Operation "VERITABLE"

Irrawaddy, 13 February 1945: Operation "EXTENDED CAPITAL"

Iwo Jima, 19 February 1945: Operation "DETACHMENT"

Po Valley, 9 April-2 May 1945

Hiroshima, 6 August 1945: The S-1 Program

Manchuria, 9 August 1945

Palestine, 15-22 October 1948: Operation "YOAV"

Galilee, 28-30 October 1948: Operation "HIRAM"

Israel, 22 December 1948: Operation "AYIN"

Korean War: North Korean Invasion, 25 June 1950

Korean War: Russian Intervention, 1950-1953

Inch'on Landing, 15 September 1950: Operation "CHROMITE"

Yalu River, 25 October 1950

Kojo Feint, 15 October 1952: Operation "DECOY"

Dienbienphu, 20 November 1953-7 May 1954; Operation "CASTOR"

Sinai Campaign, 29 October 1956: Operation "KADESH"

Suez Canal, 31 October 1956: Operation "MUSKETEER"

Bay of Pigs (Cuba), 17 April 1961: Operation "PLUTO"

Cuban Missile Crisis, 1961

Six-Day War, 6 June 1967

Tet Offensive, Vietnam, 1968

Czechoslavakia, 20 August 1968

Categories

Major Categories:

- Surprise not sought nor achieved
- Surprise not sought but achieved
- Surprise sought and achieved without deception
- Surprise sought and achieved with deception
- Surprise sought but not achieved without deception
- Surprise sought but not achieved with deception
- Strategic surprise } - applies to each of the above categories
- Tactical surprise }
- Defensive/Offensive/Counter attack (all of above may be one of these three)

Types of Surprise:

- Intent
- Place
- Time
- Strength
- Method

Means of Surprise:

a. Active
   - Playing on preconceptions
   - Secrecy/security
   - Mobility
   - Deception
   - Tactical variation/New technology/Dilemma
   - False alarms
   - Intelligence breakthrough
   - Terrain
   - Weather/visibility
   - Insanity/Irrationality

b. Passive
   - Ignored warnings
   - Failure to perceive/accept option
   - Intelligence failure
   - Excessive security
   - Bureaucratic failure
   - Panic/Irrational Behavior

Types of Deception:

- Diplomacy/Negotiation
- Diversion (demonstration, feint, false operators)
- Concealment (camouflage, hide)
- Physical simulation
- Disinformation

Types of Disinformation:

- Overload
- Discredit
- False cover story
- False communications

SURPRISE DEFINITIONS

Surprise - A military action by one adversary which is not anticipated by the victim and catches the letter off balance. The victim's role may be passive (he overlooks or is unaware of the adversary's chose option), or active (he is led to chose the wrong option). G.B.

Tactical Surprise - A surprise action affecting battlefield operations. T.N.D.
Locus of command rests with a field commander in a narrow zone of battle. G.B.
A dondition gained on the field of battle. USMA

Strategic Surprise - A surprise action which affects national military strategy or theater strategy of the opponents. T.N.D.
Locus of command rests with political leaders or military authorities above the tactical field commander and removed from a narrow zone of battle. G.B.
A condition gained outside the realm of the field of battle. USMA

Deception - Act(s) intended by the surpriser to mislead the intended victim concerning all or part of a projected military action. G.B.

Surprise of Intention - The victim fails to anticipate the nature or concept of an operation being planned by the surpriser. G.B.

Surprise of Place - The victim fails to anticipate the true location of the surpriser's planned surprise action. G.B.

Surprise of Time - The victim fails to anticipate the date and/or hour of the surpriser's planned surprise action. G.B.

Surprise pfiser is Strength - The Victim fails to assess correctly the strength which his surpriser is planning or able to employ in an operation. G.B.

Surprise of Method - The victim fails to anticipate the tactics and/or new technology which the adversary is planning to employ in an operation. G.B.

Diversion - Movement of units intended to imply a main attack which is used to divert the victim's attention and strength away from the surpriser's main effort. G.B.

Demonstration ---A diversion involving a commitment of some forces to battle designed to lock the victim's forces in combat and draw off his reserves into an operation of relatively minor significance to the opposing objectives. G.B.

Feint - A diversion in which the victim is given the false impression that the surprise is building up forces for an imminent operation: it is employed to divert the victim without tying down ones own forces or incurring battle losses. G.B.

False Operations - A diversion involving reconnaissance, bombardment, etc. against much wider areas than are scheduled for attack in order to obscure the exact location of the planned operation. G.B.
A diversion involving a series of deceptive operations to include feints designed to obscure the exact location and time of the planned operation. R.B.

Physical Simulation - The placing of dummy equipment, weapons and/or facilities with the intent of implying to the enemy that forces exist at a given location but which, in fact, are not there. G.B.

Concealment - Hiding or withdrawing from observation units or equipment. Can include use of undercover or underground facilities, night movements and/or camouflage, G.B.

Camouflage--Action taken to make equipment and/or forces appear to be something they are not. G.B.
flage

Disinformation - The deliberate distribution of information with the intent of misinforming or confusing the enemy. G.B.

Overload - The deliberate producing of a heavy volume of communications traffic or information with the intent of so overloading the enemy's processing capability in order to obscure the truth about an intended action. G.B.

Discredit - To sow information through credible channels which, in turn, will cause the enemy to doubt the veracity of his own reliable sources. G.B.

False Cover - The generation of false information and/or rumor designed to mislead the enemy concerning one's own true intentions. G.B.

False Communications - The generation of communications which imply the existence of forces at a location when such forces do not exist in reality. G.B.

Victim - The individual or collective body whose response to aggression is impaired by unexpected activities of the surpriser. R.B.

Surpriser - The individual or collective body which perpetrates actions which gain advantage over an opponent by employing a variety of confusing and deceiving measures. R.B.

KEY to initials: G.B. Gordon Brown
R.B. Ray Bell
T.N.D. Trevor Dupuy
USMA United States Military Academy

ANNEX B

SURPRISE IN NATO CONTEXT

Study Outline

PREFACE

-Purpose and scope of study
-Credit to key predecessors: Fuller, Leeb, Whaley, Shlaim (?)
-Case selection
-Criteria
-Why non-surprise cases excluded
-Study limitations

INTRODUCTION

-Surprise in Principles of War
-Ethics of surprise
-Brief history of surprise and deception
-New developments

CATEGORIES AND DEFINITIONS

CONTEXT CONDUCIVE TO SURPRISE

CONFRONTING CONCEPTS OF SURPRISE/DECEPTION

-NATO Countries
-USSR

POLITICO-MILITARY CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

PREVIOUS FINDINGS

-Fuller
-Leeb
-Whaley
-Others

ANALYSIS OF SELECTED CASES

-Qualitative analysis of effects/avoidance/methods of achievement
-Quantitative analysis (statistical)
-Comparative assessment of findings
-Relationship to Fuller/Leeb/Whaley findings

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

-What to anticipate from the USSR
-Other potential but non-Soviet forms of surprise

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont)

-Soviet strengths and weaknesses (from past cases)
-NATO strengths and weaknesses (from past cases)
-Redommendations for improvement/new procedures

ANNEX: Case Narratives

ANNEX C

GROUP A Soviet-Related

1940 Karelia (Finland)
1941 Barbarossa
1941 Russian Counteroffensive in front of Moscow
1942 Crimea Amphibious Assault (Kerch)
1943 Stalingrad
1943 Manstein's Counteroffensive (Kharkov)
1943 Kursk
1944 Soviet Summer-Fall Campaign
1945 Manchuria
1968 Russian Invasion of Czechoslovakia

GROUP B Middle East

1917 Gaza
1918 Meggido
1956 Sinai War
1967 Six-Day War
1973 October War

GROUP C Western Europe and Asia

1940 Norway
1940 Invasion of Low Countries
1941 Pearl Harbor
1942 Alam Halfa
1942 El Alamein
1943 Diadem (Rome Campaign)
1944 Hollandia
1944 Invasion of Normandy
1944 Battle of the Bulge
1947 Chines Operation
-48
1950 North Korean attack
1950 Inch'on Landing
1950 Intervention of Chinese

ANNEX D

D R A F T*

STRATEGIC SURPRISE IN THE 1944 SOVIET SUMMER-FALL CAMPAIGN
(Case Study)

The experience of World War II, as emphasized in many Soviet writings, not only illustrates the major role played by surprise, but also indicates that to achieve surprise on the strategic level, while the war was already going on, was extremely complicated. This can be explained primarily by the fact that with the enemy in possession of a skillful and aggressive intelligence organization it was difficult to conceal not only regrouping and massing of forces, but also the strategic intention of the high command. This is why, the Soviets point out, in order to achieve strategic surprise it was necessary to carry out complex measures of camouflage and deception.

In the spring of 1944, the Soviet High Command faced the problem of how to conceal preparations for the forthcoming summer campaign in Byelorussia and in the Ukraine, and surprise the Germans. Having the strategic initiative, the Soviets believed, would help them immensely in achieving surprise; for it would permit the Soviet Command to dictate its will, and put the Germans in a wait-and-see situation. In other words, the Soviet Command, having the strategic initiative, could concentrate its forces at will, and launch the attack in a time and place which in its view would ensure the best results.

The Soviets realized that to achieve surprise in the forthcoming campaign they must, in the first place, take all measures to conceal the preparation for the offensive. After almost three years of war they had accumulated considerable experience in surprise and deception. Now, the time had arrived to adapt past experience creatively and add new elements which would fit the situation.

* Subject to expansion and revision.

As the preparation for the offensive commenced the Stavka issued a special directive to the army group commanders in which it was said that:

- all troop movements connected with the regrouping and concentration in the assembly areas were to be carried out at night, with strict adherence to blackout rules;

- the intensity of all types of fire should continue unchanged;

- procedures for firing artillery registration guns should be so designed that the main concentration of artillery would not be detected;

- in the sectors marked for future active offensive operations work should continue on defensive measures;

- combat reconnaissance should be carried out along the entire front and not only in the zones of army groups scheduled for the offensive;

- radio silence should be strictly adhered to;

- no written orders or directives with regard to the future offensive should be issued. Instead, all orders should be given orally only directly to those who would carry them out;

- only a limited number of officers should take part in the planning of the operation.

An extremely important element of strategic surprise was the problem of how to deceive the Germans with regard to the objectives of the operations and to the sector and direction of the main effort. With this in mind the preparation for the campaign was carried out in several sectors of the front. The Soviets decided that they would start the campaign in the secondary sectors (e.g., advance of the Leningrad Army Group toward Vyborgsk) several days before launching the offensive in the main sector.

Only a narrow circle of officers was directly involved in the planning of the summer-fall campaign. Even this limited group did not know all the details of the entire operation. The plan of the campaign in its entirety was known to only six individuals, namely to the Supreme Commander (Stalin), his First Deputy, the Chief of Staff and his deputy, and the Chief of the Operations Directorate and his deputy. Similar restrictions on the number of men involved in planning were placed on the army group and armies. The plan of the operation was hand-written in only one copy. The army group commanders reported details of their plans personally directly to the Commander in Chief.

Soviet writers stress that the concealment of the preparation for the offensive was greatly helped by the Soviet practice of sending representatives of the Stavka to army groups. This made it possible to resolve many problems facing an army group immediately on the spot, without the necessity of carrying on bulky correspondence between the army groups and the General Staff or Stavka.

The success in deceiving / the Germans as to the sector of the main effort in the forthcoming offensive was facilitated by the actual deployment of Soviet forces at the end of the spring (1944) operations. The peculiarity of this deployment lay in the fact that the main forces of both sides, and especially their tank troops, were in the southwestern sector of the Soviet-German front. Thus, at the beginning of May 1944 the Soviets had all six of their tank armies and seven separate tank and mechanized corps deployed south of the Pripet River. In that area they had 27 out of 37 tank and mechanized corps, nearly 75% of their total armor strength. Facing these Soviet tank forces was the majority of the German panzer formations deployed on the eastern front, 22 out of 27 panzer divisions.

It was known to the Soviets that, after analyzing the available information on the deployment of Soviet troops, the German Command had concluded

that when the Soviets unleashed the new summer campaign they would launch the main effort in the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. This was a major miscalculation. Of course, it was in the Soviet interest to keep them misinformed, and they were doing their best to keep the Germans unaware of the real Soviet intentions.

To make sure that the Germans would continue to believe that the major Soviet offensive would take place on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front, the Soviet High Command developed a highly complex and sophisticated deception scheme. The commander of the 3d Ukrainian Army Group was ordered to concentrate a large force consisting of eight rifle divisions, two artillery divisions, and one tank corps in the Kishinev area. Four railroad stations were selected as ostensible places for troop unloading. Between 29 May and 14 July dummy movements of troops and equipment from these stations to various assembly areas were carried out. From 15 June to 5 July the Soviets made it appear that the concentration of forces had been completed and increased the activities of troops in the area in an effort to convince the Germans that they were going to launch a major assault toward Romania. This was intended to prevent the Germans from transferring part of their forces from the south to Byelorussia. Formations and units which took part in the deception were given false identification numbers of rifle and artillery divisions and tank corps, to give the impression of the arrival of fresh troops. In dummy concentration and assembly areas huts and dug-out shelters were built, and models of guns, tanks, airplanes, depots, and radio stations were erected. The dummy concentration areas were defended (protected) by "real" elements of antiaircraft defense and by fighter aviation.

At the same time, the Soviet Commander of the Long Range Air Force was directed to concentrate a large part of his force in the areas to the west and

southwest of Kiev to give an impression that his planes were targeted toward the southwest.

The German Command did not remain indifferent to the Soviet deception moves. It transferred part of the reserves of the Southern Ukraine Army Group from the rear to the tactical defense zone and through increased activities of air reconnaissance tried to find out as much as possible about Soviet intentions.

The inability of the Germans to divine the true Soviet plans, that is, the direction of the Russian main effort, is corroborated in German OKH's Bulletin No. 100 of 21 May 1944* in which the German Command evaluated the

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* OKH Foreign Armies East Section, "Brief Evaluation of the Enemy Situation." US National Archives, T-311, Roll 466, Frames 6446152-3.

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situation on the Soviet-German front in the Southern and Northern Ukraine Army Groups' sectors. The bulletin reported that in front of both army groups railroad traffic, including flat cars with tanks, continued to be quite heavy. This, according to the Germans, implied that the Soviets were carrying out large-scale activities aimed at troop reinforcement. "The Soviet deployment," the bulletin pointed out, "suggests that the enemy is preparing his future operations very carefully, and that their aim, as before, is tied to the 'Balkan Decision' (that is a Soviet advance southward toward Romania and Bulgaria.)"

Assuming that the main attack would come south of the Pripet River, OKH ordered Army Group Center to transfer its LVI Panzer Corps to the Northern Ukraine Army Group, effective 30 May 1944. To compensate in part for the loss of the corps, the German Army High Command moved the border line between the two army groups farther north. However, in a message to Colonel General Zeitzler,

Chief of the Army General Staff, Army Group Center's commander complained that the change meant that Army Group Center would give up 6% of its front, but would lose 15% of its divisions, 88% of its tanks, 23% of its assault guns, and a fourth to a third of its artillery.* This is one more proof of the effec-

* War Diary, Army Group Center, 21 May 1944.

tiveness of Soviet deception.

The 30 May issue of the same Bulletin (Bulletin No. 101)* reported that

* T-311, Roll 466, Frame 6446153.

information received from air reconnaissance indicated heavy railroad traffic in the Dnepropetrovsk, Kiev, Rovno, and Ternopol areas. The Germans concluded that the Soviets were transferring formations from the Crimea to that front. As the troop echelons were moving primarily to the Balta, Ternopol, Rovno, and Kovel areas, they would be used to reinforce Soviet troops deployed for the attack against the Southern and Northern Ukraine Army Groups.

Concealment of Strategic Regroupment of Soviet Forces and Preparations for the Offensive

The prime objective of the regroupment of Soviet forces was the concentration of most of the Soviet Army in Byelorussia. It should be emphasized that for the offensive the Soviets transferred to Byelorussia six combined arms armies, two tank armies, and one air army, three separate rifle corps, four cavalry corps, five tank corps, and one mechanized corps, and a large number of air and artillery formations. The Soviets also moved huge quantities of various supplies into the area.

The regroupment of forces and the transport of supplies was carried out mostly by rail. However, automotive transport was also widely used. During

the period between 1 and 22 June, 77,000 box cars with troops, equipment, and supplies were moved to the front. At the destination stations in the rear areas of the four army groups assigned to the Byelorussian operation, 100 railroad trains arrived daily. The 1st, 2d, and 3d Byelorussian Army Groups received over 85,000 tons of supplies by truck. In addition, large redeployments of forces were carried out by each of the army groups and armies. This intensive traffic was well camouflaged. The Stavka and the commands of army groups and armies paid special attention to the concealment of movements, concentration, and deployment of troops. To be certain that even in the areas far away from the front nobody would know the final destination of the transports, each day rail traffic control officers received a new code which was to be used in all telephone and telegraph messages.

While transporting tanks and artillery, the Soviets made sure that all the ordnance and equipment was camouflaged by special nets, tarpaulin, boards, bales of hay, or brush. Commanders of echelons were not permitted to show the destination documents to anyone, including the military commandants of railroad stations. Detraining stations were at a distance of some 100 kilometers from the front line. They were also chosen as far as possible from each other. The detraining took place at night only, with strict observance of the blackout rules.

As soon as units and formations detrained, they were immediately moved to areas which provided good protection from enemy air observation, and were carefully camouflaged. To conceal the arrival of armies and separate corps from the General Headquarters reserve in the frontal zone, they were assigned to the army group reserves and assembled 50 to 100 kilometers from the front. The flying personnel of the newly arrived air formations were not permitted to make familiarization flights over enemy territory.

Advance of the troops from the assembly area toward the front line to the waiting area was carried out five to seven days before the start of the offensive. The waiting areas were no closer than 12 to 20 kilometers from the German lines. Here again, the troops were well camouflaged and concealed. Battalions of the first echelon divisions did not move to jump off positions until one day before the start of the operation or on the eve of it.

For the advance from the assembly area to the waiting area, marching orders were issued for the divisions only and these covered only one day. Tank and mechanized corps which arrived from the GHq reserve were not given written orders at all; communications with them were oral. As was the case with rifle units, the mechanized formations moved by night only, with lights out. Floating bridges were operative at night and dismantled for the daylight hours.

At short halts (rests), day halts, and in new concentration areas, the troops usually set up their camps outside settlements. Along the routes of march of tanks, self-propelled artillery, and artillery towed by tractors, special prime movers with attached travois and branches were sent to obliterate the marks. Officers from superior headquarters were attached to subordinate units to see that camouflage directives were carried out, and if necessary to prevent irregularities in observing the established rules for the march, halts, and in the concentration areas. The quality of camouflage was also checked by visual air observation and by aerial photography.

All fresh units and formations which were assigned to the first echelon of combined arms armies were forbidden to conduct combat reconnaissance without special permission from the army group commander. By and large, reconnaissance was carried out by units and formations formerly deployed at the front line. The Soviet command directed that reconnaissance be carried out only in small groups, and only by men in infantry uniforms and insignia. Reconnaissance was

conducted on a wide front in passive sectors as well as the main offensive one.

To prevent German intelligence agents from gaining information, great attention was paid to concealing and protecting troop concentration areas, railroad stations, and road junctions. All movement of soldiers, individually and in groups, was strictly controlled. All suspicious-looking individuals were stopped and thoroughly investigated.

In May and June, defensive engineering works were built by the forces of the 1st Baltic, 2d, and 3d Byelorussian, and the right wing of the 1st Byelorussian Army Groups. Under cover of these works which were built to a considerable depth, Soviet forces prepared waiting areas and jump-off positions for the assault groups, including trenches, and communication trenches. To give an impression of serious defensive work, many false trenches were dug and imitation obstacles built.

On 16 June, the Stavka ordered the commanders of the 2d and 3d Baltic Army Groups and the 1st Ukrainian Army Group to conduct combat reconnaissance operations in several sectors of their respective army group zones between 20 and 23 June. The strength of the reconnaissance group was to be between a reinforced company and a battalion. These measures, plus combat reconnaissance carried out by the 1st Baltic and the three Ukrainian Army Groups, made it difficult for the Germans to identify the sector(s) of the Soviet main effort.

As a result of the false information and camouflage measures conducted on all levels from the Stavka down, the Soviets believe that they were able to conceal the dimension of the forthcoming offensive in Byelorussia and delude the Germans as to the time and place of their main effort in the 1944 summer campaign. To prove the point, Soviet historians quote General Keitel, Chief of Staff of the OKW, who in a speech delivered before a group of high ranking

German officers said in May 1944 that the situation on the eastern front was stabilized to such a degree that one could relax because the Soviets are in no position to start an offensive soon. Then he (Keitel) stated that "based on the available data on the regroupment of Soviet forces and on the overall political and military situation, it /was/ correct to assume that the Russians would probably concentrate their main forces in the southern sector of the front. At present they /were/ not in condition to attack on several main directions simultaneously."* The same was said by the former chief of the operational branch

* Operatsii Sovetskiky Voopuzhonnykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyne, 1941-1945 (Moscow, 1958), p. 285.

of the OKW, General Jodl, during the Nuremberg trial. "We assumed," said Jodl, "that the Russians would attack in the south, namely toward the Romanian oil fields, and this is why most of our tank divisions were concentrated in the area of the southern army groups."

Even in June, when numerous indications such as the concentration of fresh troops in Byelorussia, deployment of new forces between Polotsk and Zhlobin, and increased artillery activity pointed toward preparations for an offensive in Byelorussia, OKH continued to assume that the Soviets would attack in the south. Bulletin No. 104 of 13 June 1944 reported: "There have been movements lasting for weeks into the entire area between the Black Sea and the Pripet River with the main effort apparently in the area in front of the Northern Ukraine Army Group. In addition, especially in recent days, the enemy seems to be bringing new forces into the area opposite Army Group Center. . . . The main thrust is still to be expected between the Carpathians and the area north of Kovel. . . . The operations against the Southern Ukraine Army Group and Army Group Center will be launched first in order to deceive the German Command

and to draw reserves away from the area between the Carpathian Mountains and Kovel. The attack toward Lvov will follow in the second wave."*

* "Comprehensive Evaluation of the Enemy Situation opposite the German Eastern Front, and Expected Major Soviet Objectives." T-311, Roll 466, Frames 646151-66.

Still, doubts as to the Soviet objectives were beginning to appear in the German estimates. The bulletin continues: "Soviet goals in the area of Army Group Center will be more significant than had been anticipated. This conjecture is based on the increase in forces, some credible agent reports, and several radio intercepts. We must count on the possibility that the enemy has expanded his plan beyond containment attacks and is planning an offensive operation from the greater Gomel-Smolensk area, with Minsk as a final objective."

However, it was still being concluded from the testimony of PWs and from rail reconnaissance that most of the formations from the Crimea had probably been moved into the area opposite the Northern Ukraine Army Group. And, the bulletin continues, "Upon conclusion of the attack preparations, which to some extent are already completed in part in the area of the Southern Ukraine Army Group and possibly finished on the other fronts, we must count on the resumption of attacks in strength comparable to those of recent months. The coming development will presumably, as already indicated in the "Comprehensive Evaluation of the Enemy Situation . . ." of 30 March, lead to a very great need for German forces in the southern part of the eastern front. This appears to make it necessary to prepare reserve forces there immediately."

On 16 June, only a few days before the major Soviet offensive in Byelorussia commenced, the commander of the Northern Ukraine Army Group, General Model, sent a teletype to the Chief of the Army General Staff (with a request

that it be shown to Hitler), which read: "The Army Group evaluates the enemy situation as before, with the expectation that the enemy is preparing most carefully the major attack into the areas Kilomya, Horodenka, Czortkov, north of Ternopol, and on both sides of Brody and Luck-Kovel. The attack area at Kovel has been extended to the army group's northern border. . . . Preparations must now be regarded as so far advanced that the offensive, after a rapid deployment of the assault troops, which may take two or three nights, may break out at any time."*

* Teletype Model to OKH, T-311, Roll 466, Frame 6446351-2.

Three days later Army Group Center's "Comprehensive Evaluation of the Enemy Situation," reported activity that indicated:

> "In summary it can be established that attacks to be expected at the front of the Army Group, against Bobruisk, Mogilev, Orsha, and possibly northwest of Vitebsk, will have more than a local character. Judging by the commitment of army and air forces, their overall goal will be to bring about the collapse of the army group's salient arc at several points, tearing up the front. On the other hand, the picture of Red Army forces, as recognized or estimated, does not yet reflect a remote objective, such as Minsk, for example. To be sure, attention must be drawn to the disporportion between army and air strengths, and also to the difficulties in reconnaissance, which are especially great at this time."*

* AG Center, "Comprehensive Evaluation of the Enemy Situation, 19 June 1944." T-311, Roll 233, Frames 1061-66. Attached as Annex A.

The German Command still could not believe that the Soviet main thrust would be in Byelorussia. General Gottfried von Erdmansdorf in his memoirs mentioned that during a meeting of high ranking German officers in Sonthofen on

19 June 1944 General Keitel declared that he did not believe that the Russians would attack in the central sector of the front. He reckoned on the possibility of a Soviet offensive in the southern sector toward Lvov and Romania, but not immediately, at some time in the future.

The Soviets stress that the efficient redeployment of their forces, combined with firm adherence to the rules of camouflage, gave positive results. Despite the fact that the Germans were doing their best to determine the real intention of the Soviet Command and prevent surprise they were unsuccessful. True, German intelligence gave its command quite detailed data on the deployment of the first echelons of Soviet armies and army groups, but it erred in assessing the concentration of reserves in operational and strategic depth. This was one of the basic reasons that the Germans failed to evaluate the situation at the Soviet-German front in its totality correctly.

The fact that German intelligence did not have a clear picture of major Soviet transfers and redeployment is illustrated by an OKH situation map of 22 June 1944 reproduced from captured German documents (Map 1)++ showing the deployment of Soviet forces as the OKH believed it was. German inability to learn about the transfer to Byelorussia of several major Soviet formations such as tank and combined arms armies added greatly to the surprise. The Germans believed that the Soviet Second and the Third Guards Tank Armies were deployed on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front north of Yassy, whereas in fact the Second Guards Tank Army was at the time already in the Kovel area in the 1st Byelorussian Army Group sector, and the Fifth Tank Army was south of Smolensk with the 3d Byelorussian Army Group. It is interesting to note that, as the Soviets claim, even after the start of the offensive the Germans expressed doubts that the Fifth Guards Tank Army would be committed in the central sector of the front. Thus, in the German Bulletin No. 108 of 2 July 1944*, ten

* T-311, Roll 466, Frames 1446173-4 OKH.
++Rough draft included.

days after the start of the Byelorussian offensive, it was stated that: "the question of the transfer of the Fifth Guards Tank Army from the sector of the Southern Ukraine Army Group to that facing Army Group Center arises again. However, all available information still does not give a clear picture as to the whereabouts of the Fifth Guards Tank Army. We can merely make the following comment with respect to the possibility of the army's deployment opposite (German) Army Group Center: Withdrawal of the Fifth Guards Tank Army from the area of the Southern Ukraine Army Group would mean a reduction of one-sixth of the tank corps available for an offensive, a drop from 13 to 17 Tank Corps to 11 to 15 Tank Corps. Even then (in case of transfer) the enemy tank strength in front of the Southern Ukraine Army Group would be adequate for a strong, decisive offensive against Romania. /Underlined in the German report./* This

* T-311, Roll 466, Frames 1446173.

is quite strange, since the Fifth Guards Tank Army was committed to combat in the sector of the Soviet Fifth Combined Arms Army of the 3d Byelorussian Army Group in the morning of 26 June.

As for combined arms armies, the Germans did not learn of the transfer of the Eighth Guards Army to Byelorussia, and as of 22 June showed it still east of Tiraspol in the 3d Ukrainian Army Group. They considered the Twenty-eighth Army to be north of Odessa, whereas in fact it was moved from the Nikolayev area to the 1st Byelorussian Army Group and took part in the offensive at Bobruisk. German intelligence was also unable to detect the transfer of the Second Guards and Fifty-first Armies from the Crimea to the Smolensk and Gomel areas, that is, to the sectors of the main effort. The arrival of the Polish First Army in the area east of Kovel was also not discovered.

German intelligence continued to locate all [illegible] south between the Black Sea and Ternopol. Hence, the German Command reached the wrong conclusion with regard to the Soviet main effort.

In addition to the measures used by the Soviets to conceal the true aim of the summer campaign already mentioned, radio silence also played an important role in the overall surprise scheme. To deprive the Germans of the possibility of discovery of certain measures taken by the Soviets with regard to the preparation of the campaign, through interception of radio messages, in May of 1944 the Stavka barred the use of radio in all army groups and army radio nets, except for the air force, antiaircraft defense and reconnaissance elements. Artillery was permitted to use radio for fire registration.

Actually, the effects of radio silence might have been a two way street and blown the surprise element if it had not been combined with other deception measures. German Bulletin No. 99 of 10 May pointed out that the almost total Soviet radio silence which had prevailed from 9 May along the entire eastern front could augur, as previous experience showed, the end of the Soviet preparation period and their readiness for the offensive. "We have to consider the possibility of (Soviet) attack at any time and most probably in the sector of the Northern Ukraine Army Group and the right flank of Army Group Center (Kovel area)." The last sentence of the bulletin states that the enemy (Soviet) command might try local attacks at first, in order to improve their positions, (for example, establishing bridgeheads west of Ternopol).

The diagram prepared by the OKH in October 1949 shows that in the spring and summer of 1944 the Germans had many indications pointing to Soviet attacks south of the Pripet River. The diagram refers only to the Kovel Area.

How important radio intelligence was to the Germans was recorded in the 14 June issue of the bulletin*, which said that due to the Soviet radio silence

* T-311, Roll 466, Frame 6446150.

the German Command had lost one of its most important sources of intelligence. And then the bulletin adds, "Because radio intelligence activities are no longer effective, difficulties in establishing Soviet deployment have arisen. At present, air intelligence is much more difficult to carry out than before because of the constant increase of the Russian antiair defenses. This is why the details of the concluding phase of the Soviet strategic deployment is impossible to ascertain."

The Results of the Strategic Surprise

In the morning of 23 June 1944 Soviet forces launched what turned out to be a surprise offensive in Byelorussia. Almost simultaneously the Soviets struck in five different sectors on that front, broke through the German defenses on a 500 kilometer zone, and in the following six days advanced some 150 kilometers.

German military historians and German generals captured during the operation certified to the fact that the Soviet attack was a surprise. While assessing the Soviet assault in the Vitebsk area, the German military historian Tippelskirch* wrote that the Soviet advance northwest of Vitebsk was particularly

* Kurt Von Tippelskirch, Die Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkriegs (Bonn: Athenaum, 1954).

sickening because it was a total surprise and it struck in a particularly lightly defended sector of a decisive zone.

Lieutenant General Alfons Hitter, commander of the 206th Infantry Division, testified after his capture, "We knew little about the Russian preparation for

the offensive. By and large, most of us believed that the Russian offensive would take place in the south. . . . Before the start of the Russian offensive, I as well as many others, thought that in the Vitebsk area, and possibly in other places, only diversionary or secondary operations would take place." Another high ranking German officer, Lieutenant General Hilmar Moser, testified that the advance of Soviet troops was carried out with surprising strength, vigor, and speed. Lieutenant General Everhard von Kurovski, commander of the German 110th Infantry Division, stated after his capture that one of the reasons for the total defeat of Army Group Center was that the plans and aims of the Russian command were not fully detected by German intelligence.

Due to the swift advance of Soviet forces, the German situation in Byelorussia became critical. In order to stabilize the front line, the German Command was forced to transfer a considerable number of troops from the other sectors of the Soviet-German front. This in turn weakened the Germans in sectors where the troops had been transfered and contributed to the success of the subsequent Soviet offensives in the Ukraine and the Baltic States.

During the last nine days of June (that is, from the time the Soviet offensive started) and in July the Germans transferred 16 divisions from other sectors of the Soviet-German front to Byelorussia. Of these three infantry and one panzer divisions were taken from Army Group North, six infantry and four panzer divisions from the Northern Ukraine Army Group, and one infantry and one panzer divisions from the Southern Ukraine Army Group.

In addition, three divisions and two brigades were transferred to Byelorussia from Germany, two divisions from the OKH reserve, and from Norway and Holland one division each. Thus, during this period the German Command reinforced Army Group Center with 23 divisions and two brigades.

Taking all this into consideration, it is reasonable to assume that the achievement of strategic surprise in Byelorussia was not only helpful in the defeat of German Army Group Center, but it caused the weakening of other German forces, especially the Northern Ukraine Army Group. Transfer of German forces to Byelorussia from different sectors of the front caused a peculiar kind of chain reaction, when the Germans, not having enough reserves to counter Soviet blows in Byelorussia, had to divert large forces from the Lvov sector. This weakened the Northern Ukraine Army Group. In turn, when in the second half of July 1944 the Soviet 1st Ukrainian Army Group commenced the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, the German Command transferred seven divisions there, including three panzer divisions, from the Southern Ukraine Army Group. Subsequently, this facilitated a quick defeat of the Southern Ukraine Army Group when it was attacked by the Soviet 2d and 3d Ukrainian Army Groups.

General Conclusions:

The experience of the 1944 summer-fall campaign suggests that, in comparison with past wars, the achievement of surprise in World War II had become more difficult and complicated. Whereas in previous wars the defender could receive information about the attacker's preparation for the offensive primarily through agents, PWs, and defectors, in World War II his capabilities increased considerably by adding such effective means of gathering intelligence, as air reconnaissance, and radio intelligence. Under these circumstances it was very difficult to secure a surprise.

Despite increased intelligence and reconnaissance means the German Command was unable to find out the operational aim of the Soviet Command, and could not define the sector of the main effort. The secrecy of the preparation for the main attack in Byelorussia was achieved by carrying out a system of carefully-planned and brilliantly executed measures of which the most important were:

- speed and [illegible] operations
- effecti[illegible]
- hidden re[illegible]
- firm adhere[illegible]ge rules
- radio silence
- curtailment to the minimum of [illegible] communications [illegible] General Staff and the staffs of army groups, as well as between the army groups and armies, and down to lower units



Deployment of Soviet forces on the Eve of the Belorussian Operation

PROBABLE DATES OF ATTACK IN THE KOVEL AREA IN 1944 BASED ON NUMBERS OF POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE INDICATORS



From a diagram prepared by OKH, Octobe 1944.

APPENDIX A

Army Group Center Hq., Dept. IC/AO

Intelligence: Operations 19 June 1944.

Comprehensive Evaluation of the Enemy Situation*

I. The enemy picture has changed considerably since 2 June (see Brief Evaluation of the Enemy Situation).

What we had to reckon with up to then were local attacks, regrouping and pulling together available sources with the goal of operational containment. Now events at the Army Group's eastern front, especially in the Gomel area and east of Orsha, give evidence of expansion of enemy undertakings.

II. No essential change has taken place with respect to known formations in the power scheme. However, we can surely assume that new forces, as yet not identified by name (Crimean troops?) are on their way into the Gomel area--currently these are believed to be 12-14 rifle divisions and 3-4 tank organizations--and the 11th Guards Army (8-10 rifle divisions, 2 tank organizations) is most probably moving into the area east of Orsha.

In addition, there are believed to be some troop movements of lesser extent, probably primarily army troops, heading into the Krichev area and southeast of Vitebsk.

The buildup of strong points is assumed to be considerably greater in the air forces (6th Air Army, Kovel - 400; 16th Air Army, Gomel - 1600; 1st Air Army, Smolensk - 1600; 3rd Air Army, south of Nevel - 900 planes, making a total of 4,500 out of altogether 11,000 planes without ADD /ābbr. unknown/.

*T-311, Roll 233, Frames 1061-66.

A comparison of Red Army and Red Air Force strengths leads to the question whether still more Red Army Forces have not been moved up undetected. (One disturbing factor is, for example, the appearance of Marshal Rotmistrov's name--commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army--in the Yartsevo area, according to a secure source.) Then, however, the overall evaluation would no longer be accurate. According to Army High Command (OKH) information, however, there is still no reason for this assumption.

III. In this connection, the difficulties of reconnaissance in all fields must be cited again. The weakness of air reconnaissance is sufficiently known. Recently it has provided essentially only rail reconnaissance and air photography of enemy artillery positions, but has been unable to identify large movements even in the area close to the front.

Likewise, no further mention is needed of the difficulties of maintaining secure sources. The agent reconnaissance especially set up in the army group has achieved some very good results in the area of Second Army, but is scarcely able to penetrate the tightly closed fronts of the eastern front and recently also of the northeast front (Vitebsk-Polozk). Unfortunately, commitment of parachute agents has not brought the results we had hoped for, and casualties have been great, presumably as a result of betrayal outside the army.

Few PW's and deserters have been picked up.

IV. In Second Army, enemy evaluation on the whole has not changed. Despite active agent reconnaissance, it was not possible to confirm the presence of strong operational reserves in the rear area of the Seventieth and Sixtieth Armies.

As before, we will have to reckon with expansion of the expected attacks against Army Group North Ukraine into the south flank of VIII Army Corps. No data is yet available on forces which would confirm plans for an attack in the direction of Brest, which might be expected because of certain considerations. However, mention must be

made of increasing reconnaissance activity northwest of Kamen Kashirsk in view of the condition of the 12th Hungarian Reserve Division.

After an increase in the front on both sides of Horyn, local attacks in this sector cannot be excluded.

In the Ninth Army there is a clear indication of intent to launch a concentrated attack on Bobruisk. In this area just now, presumably since 3 June, there has been a rail movement in progress, the extent of which is not yet known. By careful calculation, 12-14 rifle divisions and around 4 tank organizations can be brought up by 18 June, with a great part of the transportation facility used to strengthen the air force in this area. By using the main lines from Kiev it seems possible, and this has also been reported by PW's, that troops have been brought forward from the Crimea, as we know from a secure source has been done for the air forces.

Based on enemy behavior and especially an increase in artillery, the following areas appear to be the assembly positions:

a) SW of the Beresina, between Kobylshchina and Chirkovichi;

b) Between the Beresina and the Dnieper, in the area both sides of Morma;

c) The Drut sector and north of Rogachev.

The main concentration point, according to the strength picture (artillery) and on the basis of operational considerations, might lie southwest of the Beresina.

In Fourth Army as before, we must count on attacks against Mogilev, however, with the addition of a new operation against Orsha. While it was not possible to make any determination of the supposed strength total southwest of Chaussy, the buildup of a main concentration point in the area around Ryassna, already assumed after the arrival of the Thirty-third Army and on the basis of ground observations and agent reports, is coming to light. Air photographic interpretation reveals an artillery

increase to 125 batteries (80 according to artillery reconnaissance). This number seems somewhat high for the eight-ten rifle divisions known to be available...at the junction of the Forty-ninth and Thirty-third armies. With a continual increase in the use of the railroad line, the shipment of new individual formations via Krichev is possible. One PW statement on the unloading of 200 tanks at Krichev needs confirmation; however, we must reckon with the presence of some small tank organizations.

A definite deployment has been under way on the highway since 10 June. A secure source has reported the arrival of a new Guards Army (11th?). There have been strong movements from the north via Dobromyssl (11th Guards Army? Two divisions of this have been confirmed by PW's.) and also from the east on the highway as detected by ground observation. Air photography has also shown an increase in artillery to 213 batteries (140 according to artillery reconnaissance). Upon confirmation of the 11th Guards Army, we must reckon with the arrival of Nine Guards rifle divisions and two-three tank organizations.

The frontal attack against Orsha apparently is to be supported this time by a simultaneous thrust from the north over the Suchodrovka sector (direction of Orsha or Seno?). This thrust will strike the southern part of the Third Panzer Army. The picture of the forces here is also unclear. Besides six position formations, we can also assume the presence of the V Guards Rifle Corps and the V Artillery Corps, and the commitment of three organizations each from the army reserves and the GHQ reserves. Above and beyond this, in view of the heavy traffic on the Smolensk-Liosno railraod between 10 June and 15 June, we may also have to expect a limited use of the rails to bring troops forward. It is still unclear what role is to be played by an unidentified command staff reported by a secure source.

We cannot eliminate from the enemy picture at present the objective of a concentrated

attack on Vitebsk. Considerations not only speak for it, but there have also been secure reports from partisan sources. This is all the more possible in view of the apparent withdrawal of the V Guards Rifle Corps from the east front of Vitebsk to the Sucholdrovka sector in the south. Clarification of the enemy picture on and north of the Surash-Vitebsk road will probably give us an answer to this question. There are no special indications at the north front; however, the identification of heavy army artillery (one brigade and at least two regiments) northwest of Vitebsk speaks for attack objectives that, to be sure, are not reflected in the infantry picture. Nevertheless, the main point of effort for the enemy forces can be assumed to be in front of the southern flank of the Tank Army.

V. In summary, it can be established that attacks to be expected at the front of the Army Group, against Bobruisk, Mogilev, Orsha, and possibly northwest of Vitebsk, will have more than a local character. Judging by the commitment of army and air forces, their overall goal will be to bring about the collapse of the army group's salient arc at several points, tearing up the front. On the other hand, the picture of Red Army forces, as recognized or calculated, does not yet reflect a remote objective, such as Minsk, for example. To be sure, attention must be drawn to the disproportion between army and air strengths, and also to the difficulties in reconnaissance, which are especially great at this time.

Signed Worgitzky (Intelligence Officer)

Note- The Deputy Chief of the General Staff and the Commander-in-Chief have been briefed on this evaluation. As ordered, no written report will be made.

Handwritten question in margin: "Why?"

DRAFT*

CASE STUDY

SURPRISE IN THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE 1944

There is no doubt the German attack in the Ardennes in 1944 achieved effective surprise. Analysts attribute the German success to a gross failure by Allied ground and air intelligence. Germans, on the other hand, cite the thoroughness of deceptive and camouflage measures as the reason for obtaining complete surprise. Both are correct. The achievement of surprise is particularly noteworthy in light of the overwhelming Allied air superiority, the limited area in which the Germans had to assemble large formations, and the overall defensive posture of the German armed forces. Using an elaborate deception scheme, placing great store in an extensive camouflage program, and insisting on strict secrecy, the Germans successfully persuaded the Allies not to reinforce the weak four-division force in the area chosen for the breakthrough which was designed to capture the vital logistics complex at Antwerp as well as to sever the Allied front.

The German plan called for the Sixth SS Panzer Army under SS General Sepp Dietrich, the Fifth Panzer Army commanded by General von Manteuffel, and the Seventh Army led by General Brandenberger to launch a coordinated offensive against the American VIII Corps deployed along the Ur River in Luxembourg and Belgium on 16 December 1944. The beefed-up Sixth SS Panzer Army was to advance as rapidly as possible in a north-west direction and capture Antwerp. The Fifth Panzer Army was to attack toward the English Channel and secure the area around Brussels. The Seventh Army was given the mission, with its four infantry divisions, of securing the Fifth Panzer Army's southern flank. The result of this maneuver was to be to force the 21st Anglo-Canadian Army Group and the Ninth and First U.S. Armies to withdraw from the continent a la Dunkirk 1940. Preparations for the offensive were to be masked by a special plan to mislead the Allies.

The German deception plan relied on using the operations around Aachen as a cover

* Subject to revision and expansion.

for massing troops. The Americans had been heavily engaged in front of Aachen since September, and the American 2d, 4th, and 28th Infantry Divisions had suffered badly as a result of the heavy fighting there. They were relieved and removed from the battle area when their combat effectiveness was substantially reduced, and transferred to "quiet" sectors. The 28th and 4th Infantry Divisions found themselves moved to the precise area where the Germans planned the breakthrough, while the 2d Infantry Division was so placed that it was drawn into the German offensive by virtue of being on the northern flank of the attack when it was launched. This placement alone of weakened allied divisions is a stark indicator of the lack of importance the Allies assigned to the proposed area of operations for the German counteroffensive and shows the American discounting the lessons to be learned from the French debacle in 1940.

The German ploy was to mass their divisions behind the Aachen front so that the Americans would assume that these German forces would be deployed in battle there, or that they would be employed to counterattack if the Americans managed to break through to the Rhine. These formations were then moved southwest to their jump-off positions shortly before they were to attack. This technique minimized the revelation to the Allies of the intended area of operations.

To intensify this ploy, the Sixth Panzer Army, which was to play a major role in the attack, was chosen as the major vehicle of deception. Four of its armored divisions assembled in the vicinity of Cologne, northwest of which was the army's headquarters. Much movement was made in daylight, and the intensification of rail and road traffic which began about mid-November was only partly concealed. There was increased road repair, radio traffic, and antiaircraft support, all to reinforce the thesis that the Germans really feared a breakthrough and drive to the Rhine from the Aachen area. A ghost army, the Twenty-fifth, was even organized and publicized to emphasized the German concern.

At the same time that German formations were massing opposite US forces in Aachen,

Measures were taken to ensure that an illusion of normality was maintained opposite the American divisions in the Ardennes. Thus elaborate security measures were adopted in the intended area of operations. The sector had been quiet since the Allied dash across France had halted in September. The German divisions identified there were battle-weary, understrength, and seemed to require rest and refitting. Although fresh divisions had appeared from time to time, their stay had been brief. The Germans intended to perpetuate this illusory situation.

The array of small villages in the Eifel, the heavily wooded terrain where the Germans assembled for the counteroffensive, was skillfully exploited to hide large formations. Although individually the villages were not worthy of Allied intelligence consideration, collectively they assumed great importance. The clustering of these villages made dispersion of numbers of troops possible while at the same time maintaining unit cohesiveness since the villages were fairly close together. The Germans exploited the use of camouflage, an art which they had become very skillful in, especially since the Allies had gained air superiority. The numerous wooded areas of the Eifel also made it possible to conceal troop locations and unit movements.

In addition to the natural cover afforded by the terrain, special measures were taken to assure the facade of normalcy. Strict traffic regulation confined movement to night time. Vehicle park size was controlled by special security detachments. Charcoal was issued to troops for fuel for their field kitchens and heating stoves to reduce the amount of tell-tale smoke generated in troop areas. A special demarcation line was established behind which field and antiaircraft artillery troops and bridge units were kept. A radio blackout was thrown over the concentration area except for those units actually facing the enemy. No artillery registrations was permitted by weapons on line, and these were permitted to fire only a few rounds per day. Reconnaissance was restricted, with only a handful of higher ranking officers being permitted to reconnoiter. Combat patrolling was also limited, and most of it

was done to locate and destroy American patrols.

Strict security extended from Hitler down to the soldier in his fighting position. Indeed, security was so tight that key German generals felt that it became a hindrance in executing their plans. (There is much evidence to support this view in the actions of the attacking units once they crossed the line of departure. There were good reasons for the failure of the German operation, including stiff US resistance, Allied air superiority, and particularly inadequate German resources to sustain a drive of this magnitude against an adversary with superior mobile assets. But the inability of the Germans to adhere to their timetable and thus reach objectives on time must be attributed in part to lack of familiarity with the concept and area of operations by combat troops which were deprived of sufficient information and preparation time to launch and maintain an effective effort.)

On 3 November 1944, Hitler held a command briefing for a small selected group of high ranking officers at which Colonel General Alfred Jodl, chief of the Army High Command's operation staff, outlined the draft plan for a "decisive offensive" in the West. Prior to the briefing each attendee had to pledge himself to preserve complete silence concerning the information to be divulged. The penalty for disclosure was to be death. This meeting and the pledge set the tone for the entire operation, and, although effective in assuring surprise, the extreme secrecy is blamed for later muddles.

In addition to an elaborate deception plan, the extensive use of camouflage, and strict security, the Germans sought to achieve surprise in launching their attack by varying the timing and method of attack. Thus, the initial attack was launched at 5:30 in the morning instead of the originally projected 7:30. The purpose of the time change was not only to confuse and thus surprise the Americans, who were not accustomed to early morningattacks in winter, as to what was happening, but to give the Germans more daylight in which to gain initial objectives. Tank formations were also to move forward at night of the first day so as to be in position

to attack at dawn of the second day. As to the method of attack, each infantry division formed a special "storm battalion", which was to penetrate deep into American lines and bypass resistance at the front so as to attack American positions from the rear and thereby ease the advance of the following troops. These measures to obtain local surprise on launching the attack met with varied success, since factors like American readiness and weather heavily influenced their effectiveness.

Surprise, both tactical and strategic, was achieved by the Germans. The reasons why the Americans were surprised cover a wide spectrum, but fundamentally the Allied commanders did not think the Germans were capable of launching another offensive because of their conviction that Hitler did not possess the forces or resources to launch a decisive counterstroke.

From a strategic point of view, the Allies developed a preconception that the Germans were incapable of such an attack. This preconception served as a screening device for all information obtained and filtered back up the chain of command. This preconception allowed the Americans to place battle-weary and untried troops in the front lines grouped in an army corps (the VIII) rather than disperse them among more combat ready or fresher troops. The preconception could also justify the placing of such formations in an area where combat was considered unlikely, to wit the Ardennes. Thus when the Germans launched their counteroffensive they surprised an Allied high command which underestimated the enemy's capabilities while misinterpreting his intentions.

The Allies were surprised by the strength of the enemy attack and by its location. Why? As part of the preconception the Allies' planning was incomplete. The courses of action open to the Germans were inadequately analyzed. According to the official U.S. Army history of World War II an offensive of the magnitude contemplated by Hitler appeared out of the question, especially since the Americans "knew" that Field Marshal von Rundstedt was commanding in the West. Allied intelligence assessed

him as a commander who could be expected to act according to the rules of the military art. He was a general who would husband his dwindling resources and then counter-attack at an appropriate time, falling back to the Rhine for a major defensive battle. The only flaw was that Hitler, not von Rudstedt, commanded, and intuition, not conventional professional judgment, determined the course of action. The Allies' idea of who was in command, i.e. von Rundstedt, then, colored the thinking of those responsible for the analysis of enemy courses of action to a marked degree, and Allied planning did not take into account the possibility of a bold counterstroke.

Likewise the Allied high command misjudged the terrain restrictions in front of the VIII Corps. The 1940 French and Allied experience was lost on the Americans as evidenced by their placing troops at less than peak fighting condition on line in the Ardennes. The French did the same thing in May 1940. The Americans, however, did not have to labor under the same restrictions the French had to, since Belgium was not neutral in 1944, and the Americans had been on the ground since early fall. As a result, through the sophisticated means available to the Allies, it was possible to develop a very detailed and valid picture of the terrain and analyze its features, by hypothesizing at the same time how a German attack might be launched, and with sufficient strength succeed. This failure on the part of the Allies must be attributed to poor judgment, then, in light of their knowledge of the terrain and the 1940 French experience.

A very important Allied failure which also contributed to the surprise obtained by the Germans was the lack of cooperation between the Allied air and ground reconnaissance elements and the inadequate caliber of information generated by such cooperation as did exist. The intelligence staff at von Rundstedt's headquarters on 15 December determined that there was a lack of interest in the sector chosen for the operation when it noted how little Allied aerial reconnaissance was being conducted over the area.

The VIII Corps divisions asked on numerous occasions for air reconnaissance during the five days preceding the German attack, but only three missions were flown directly opposite the corps area and those were on 14 December over Trier. In November, before the final assembly for the attack began, a large number of missions were flown, but during the first half of December, while the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Group (IX Tactical Air Command) consistently included Eifel targets in its missions orders, the missions were often scratched because they had such a low priority. No one really appeared interested in what was going on in the area. Even when VIII Corps requests were accepted by higher ground echelons and forwarded to air headquarters, these missions retained such a low priority, when compared to demands for air reconnaissance on the Roer and Saar fronts, that they often dropped right off the mission list when the tasks were distributed to the group's squadrons. From 16 November to 15 December, then, there was a rapidly decreasing amount of air intelligence information being made available to the ground forces.

Because of priorities the small amount of current information made available to VIII Corps might be justified, but there was an additional problem, and that was interpretation of the results of those missions flown. The 67th Group supported the entire First U.S. Army and, as noted, flew many reconnaissance missions along the Roer and Saar fronts. These missions identified a large increase in rail activity west of the Rhine on 30 November, and there were sightings of a large number of hospital trains, searchlights, and flatcars bearing Tiger tanks indicating preparations for attack. Lights indicating large scale night movements were consistently reported by night fighter squadrons.

But again preconceptions colored the interpretation of this information. Both the Allied air and ground headquarters expected the enemy to reinforce the areas where the First and Third U.S. Armies were attacking, that is north and south of the Ardennes. Interpreters then concluded that indications of increased activity in the

Eifel actually reflected movements of troops only to the Roer and Saar battle areas. For example, trainloads of Tiger tanks were seen on a rail net which ran to the Roer, but a rail branch of the net also led south to the Eifel. The interpreters were interpreting just as the Germans wished, evidence the German deception plan was effective.

Also distressing was the poor liaison between the air and ground headquarters with regard to the initial interpretation placed by the air forces on the data collected through air reconnaissance which resulted in a loss of confidence between the branches. The U.S. Army Air Forces' official history attributes this shortcoming to a matter of organization and admits to a twilight zone between air and ground headquarters in photo interpretation where responsibility had not been sufficiently pinned down. The result was a tendency to downgrade the reliability attributed to such interpretation.

On 15 December, the Allied air commanders were told by the SHAEF G-3 that the German armor had not moved in response to the Allied attempts to capture or destroy the Roer dams, thus insuring a successful penetration in the area. There was nothing to report on the VIII Corps front, which was considered normal since nothing was expected in the region anyway. The A-2 stated that the Luftwaffe's activities were moving westward, but these were only defensive in nature.

Information from ground sources was as sketchy as that from the air. Intelligence summaries, periodic reports, and briefing precis up to 16 December provided only fragmental and skeletal information on the enemy opposite. During the period 13-15 December only seven intelligence items which could give cause for alarm appeared in VIII Corps unit reports. They were treated in the same light that most information was, that is that important happenings transpired north and south of the Ardennes, but never at that location.

The 28th Infantry Division reported increased vehicular activity to its front

on the nights before the offensive. The division discounted this activity by noting that this often happened during an enemy frontline relief and that the same thing had happened when a German unit had been relieved some weeks previously. The 106th Infantry Division also reported increased activity, but being green did not know what weight to assign to this information. There appears to have been no further effort to develop additional information about such movement.

On 14 December a woman line-crosser reported masses of German equipment located in the Bitburg area to the 28th Infantry Division commander. Her information was considered reliable enough to have her dispatched through VII Corps, and, at corps behest, to the First Army headquarters, where she arrived on 16 December, the day of the attack.

The four other incidents involved prisoners taken shortly before the attack was launched. Two were deserters. Their reports of fresh troops and an impending all-out attack were treated lightly, and the two men were dispatched to the prisoner of war cage. The other two prisoners were wounded, and although they also spoke of new units and a counteroffensive in the offing, not much stock was placed in their reports either.

The VIII Corps received four intelligence reports. Three prisoner reports from its subordinate units were not forwarded to corps, having been discounted as unreliable rumors. The First Army received the four reports from the corps, but only one of these was forwarded to the 12th Army Group. This report was about the large amount of traffic, but it was assessed as the predicted relief of the German 326th Infantry Division and dismissed as having no special significance.

The set in the minds of the Americans as to the lack of importance of the Ardennes evidently contributed to the lack of aggressive patrolling and reconnaissance along the VIII Corps front. An almost indifferent attitude, accentuated by the greenness of some troops and battlewearines of others, seems to have prevailed in seeking out enemy information. But it also is evident that the German deception plan was working since everything appeared to be reasonably normal across the battle lines.

assassinate General Eisenhower.

In conclusion, the Germans successfully lulled the Allies into believeing that they would not launch a major counteroffensive in the Ardennes through an elaborate deception, camouflage, and security scheme. The Americans were surprised principally because they had preconceived ideas as to German capabilities and intentions; they improperly assessed the Ardennes' potential as an avenue of attack; they placed insufficient priority on their air and ground intelligence effort; and they were duped by the German efforts to conceal the projected German counteroffensive. Yet, in spite of the surprise gained, the results of the attack were disappointing, as Antwerp, the objective, was not gained; the Germans lost excessive numbers of men and material; and only a few weeks' respite were gained. Precious German reserves and material had been expended, and few resources remained to stop the impending disaster in the East. This campaign, then, must be viewed as an outstanding example of a strategic operation which failed even though almost complete initial surprise was obtained.

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ANNEX D (cont)

D R A F T*

CASE STUDY

EL ALAMEIN, 23 OCTOBER 1942

On 23 October 1942, artillery of General Montgomery's Eighth Army, composed of British, Commonwealth, and Allied units, opened fire on the combined German and Italian armies under the temporary command of the German General Stumme at El Alamein in Egypt. Fourteen days later defeated Axis formations began to retreat along the northern coast of North Africa. Field Marshal Rommel, overall commander of the troops facing the British Eighth Army, had returned on 26 October, three days after the initial diversionary attacks began on the southern flank, but in the end even his charismatic presence could not inspire his devoted troops to beat back the tremendous main attack in the north. The Commonwealth infantry, followed by Montgomery's three armored divisions, penetrated the minefields and "Devil's Gardens" in the sector between the Mediterranean Sea and Ruweisat Ridge. The overwhelming superiority of Allied might could not be stopped, and the Axis troops were forced to retreat to the Mareth Line in Tunisia.

Montgomery prepared this offensive with characteristic great deliberation. He was forced to punch a hole through a well prepared German-Italian position 32 miles long, anchored on the Mediterranean Sea on the north and the quick-sand filled Quattar Depression on the south. The Axis forces had spent more than three months building their defenses. Triple belts of minefields and well defended positions adorned the northern sector, while the southern defenses, if not so formidable, were sited to canalize penetration. No practicable way was offered to take this line in flank.

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* Subject to expansion and revision.

Opposite the Allies was a line of Italian infantry divisions interspersed with German paratroop units, situated behind minefields up to 9,000 meters deep. Behind the static foot units were six mobile divisions, with the 15th Panzer Division and the Italian Littorio Armored Division in the north and the 21st Panzer Division and the Italian Ariete Armored Division in the south. Echeloned to the rear along the sea were the German 90th Light Division and the Italian Trieste Division.

Montgomery planned his main attack against the German position in the north, using a feint in the south to hold down the enemy reserves located there. He sent his engineers and infantry in first. Because many of the German minefields were not covered by fire, clearing lanes through many of the fields was accomplished with relative ease. But the Germans and Italians prevented a quick breakthrough in hard fighting. Reversing standard tactics and procedures, Montgomery sent in the infantry followed by armor, the combination of which was too much for Rommel's inadequately supplied but tenacious defenders.

The Eighth Army's initial dispositions for the offensive were established with two thoughts in mind. The first was to concentrate the maximum combat power at the point of decision, and the second was to conceal from the enemy the time, strength, and location of the main effort. In order to accomplish the latter, an elaborate deception plan was executed. A brief examination of the Commonwealth and Allied order of battle reveals the foundation upon which this plan was based.

The XXX Army Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Oliver Leese, occupied the northern sector of the front. It consisted of the 9th Australian Infantry Division, 51st Infantry Division (Highland), 2d New Zealand Infantry Division supported by the 9th Armored Brigade, 1st South African Infantry Division, 4th Indian Infantry Division, and the 23d Armored Brigade. This infantry-heavy

force was to make the main effort, but its composition, i.e., five infantry divisions and two armor brigades, was contrary to the modus operandi in the desert for mobile operations, where the tactics called for tanks leading and infantry following. The Axis, on analyzing these dispositions, could reasonably assume, in light of past experience and method of operation in North Africa, that this corps would conduct diversionary operations in any offensive.

The XIII Army Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Brian Horrocks, held the southern sector. The corps contained a Greek Brigade, the 50th and 44th Infantry Divisions, the 1st Free French Brigade, and the 7th Armored Division. The composition of this organization suggested two possibilities to the Germans. The 7th Armored Division, the famous "Desert Rats," was the only Allied armored division on line. Its deployment gave the Allies the capability of launching a mechanized attack in the south, a capability Montgomery wished to imply to the Axis. Second, one armored division could not hope to break through a prepared position with four comparable hostile armored formations waiting in reserve to pinch off the attack. Obviously additional armored divisions would be required, and the Axis could gauge the timing of the anticipated attack on the rate of reinforcement in this area. By this standard the Allies were not yet ready to attack.

The third major formation Montgomery had was the X Corps, made up of two armored divisions, the 1st and the 10th. They were not placed close to the line where raiding parties could identify units and strengths, but were held 80 kilometers behind the front, although the Germans did capture one trooper of the 10th Armored Division's reconnaissance regiment. These divisions were to pass through the minefield lanes swept by the allied engineers and attempt to encircle the Axis forces and destroy them.

Once the battle opened in the south, and diversionary attacks were executed, the British 50th Infantry Division and the 7th Armored Division were pulled out of line and dispatched north to join the armored divisions of the X Corps to add weight to the offensive. The entire attack went as Montgomery had planned, but the tenacious Axis defense slowed the forward push, and Montgomery had to use all resources at hand to accomplish his mission.

These initial dispositions formed the framework of a most ingenious cover plan. The most elaborate and sophisticated measures were taken to suggest a major attack in the south, while concealing the arrangements for the real offensive in the north, and at the same time making it appear that arrangements in the south were still incomplete. Great pains were taken to insure surprise as to the exact time, weight, and direction of the attack. It was felt, however, that strategic surprise could not be secured, since the enemy knew that the Allies were planning an offensive. Rommel, looking at the possibility of his launching an attack on Cairo, provides an insight into just how difficult it was achieving any kind of surprise in the desert. General Thoma, commander of the German Afrika Korps until captured at the battle of El Alamein, says Rommel knew that he needed surprise in order to throw the British off their balance, but he did not see how he could possibly achieve surprise in face of the Alamein defense., i.e., the Allied positions. In spite of the difficulties, however, the British sought every advantage for beating the Axis and an attempt at surprise was not to be for saken.

Montgomery's deception plan was initiated early in October 1942, when a pattern of materiel concentrations in the forward areas was set up, using spare and dummy vehicles. As strength was accumulated for the big push, these dummies were replaced with actual equipment of different types, which offered a picture of constant density to Axis aerial observation during the buildup. In the

attack positions tanks were concealed beneath dummy vehicles of all sorts. Dummy trucks were parked in gun positions. Then the guns were brought up and hidden beneath the dummies. Slit trenches were dug and camouflaged to accomodate assaulting infantry that would be dispatched forward at the last moment. In the rear areas, tanks and guns which had been moved forward were in their turn replaced by dummies. This activity took place principally in the northern sector to mask the strength of the main attack. Most movement was also done at night, troop moves were rigidly controlled, and efforts were made to guard against tell-tale tracks in the sand. Lieutenant General Bayerlein, who took over the Afrika Korps after Thoma was captured, says this part of the plan was so successful that the British succeeded in concealing from the Axis two newly arrived armored divisions with a strength of 240 guns and 150 tanks in the northern sector.

In the southern sector a ploy was made to indicate that the main attack would be launched there and that the attack could not be made before November. Large dummy supply dumps and water installations were prepared. A dummy fuel pipeline with fake gasoline stations and storage areas was built, using empty gasoline barrels laid end to end to simulate the line itself. Vehicle movement in the southern area indicated a gradual buildup of strength, and camouflage efforts were purposely less expert in the south than they were in the north. Tell-tale tracks and sloppy camouflage were condoned in an effort to lead the Axis reconnaissance to interpret the main attack as being planned for the south, but care was taken not to give the impression this was a deception scheme.

Radio traffic was employed to strengthen the impression that the enemy main thrust would be in the south (south of the Ruweisat Ridge). The presence of the 7th Armored Division and its wireless traffic, combined with the establishment of a fake radio net, the sole purpose of which was to mislead the

German intercept service, also helped to divert Axis attention from the north. On the night of the attack, a spare armored division headquarters was employed to create radio traffic that would indicate the movement of large armored forces to the southern sector.

Thus did the Allies seek to mislead the Axis as to where the main attack was to be launched. In trying to deceive the Axis as to the timing of the attack, which the Germans knew had to come, a subtle scheme was adopted. The first element involved control of the skies, while the second concerned the rate of the dummy buildup.

Montgomery exhibited a lively appreciation for the role of airpower in the land battle, and Commonwealth air-ground cooperation provided a model for the basic doctrine which is still valid today. In this vein, as early as 22 September, Air Vice Marshal Coningham, Commander Western Desert Air Force (WDAF), outlined the air force's role in the up-coming offensive to a meeting of all group captains and wing commanders. Stepped-up counter-air force action was to commence on 20 October to gain a high degree of air superiority without which Montgomery would not move. The preliminary air offensive emphasized destruction of the enemy air force. At least 800 counter-air force sorties were flown before the infantry moved to its assault positions on the night of 22/23 October, and as a result the Allied concentrations were not molested from the air at a time when the roads were clogged with their transport, which also denied to the Axis knowledge of where the main thrust was to be launched. The enemy air being dislocated, the WDAF could intervene freely in the ground battle and, it was hoped, insure a certain initial tactical surprise by denying the enemy air reconnaissance.

Coningham's efforts worked, as the Axis were denied air reconnaissance. That reconnaissance which did take place was in the south, where the Axis air observers noted the buildup of Allied forces. They noted, however, that the buildup rate was slow and concluded that an Allied attack could not be launched before November. The expansion of the dummy depots and supply dumps was calculated by Montgomery to indicate long and careful preparations. But perhaps the best deceptive device was the fuel pipeline and the progress being made in laying it. Its progress was measured simply by observing how much "pipe" was laid each day and how incomplete it was. By measuring the daily construction, it was simple for German intelligence analysts to calculate when it could be expected to be operational. Allied air superiority, however, prevented Axis air observers from getting too close a look at the pipeline to see if it was real or not. The combination of dummy construction and limited exposure to Axis air reconnaissance provided good reason for the Germans to misinterpret Allied capabilities to launch an attack in October.

Montgomery, then, by allowing some enemy air penetration to discover his preparations, succeeded in deceiving the enemy as to the timing of the attack. This success in gaining surprise was a combination of using deception and achieving security through air superiority.

On the night of the attack, Montgomery fleshed out his scheme to gain surprise by simulating a landing behind the enemy's lines.

On the afternoon of 23 October a British attack convoy simulating an amphibious force sailed from Alexandria. It proceeded westward as if it were to stage an envelopment from the sea of the Axis forces' left flank. Under the cover of darkness, however, the ships, with the exception of a few fast craft, returned to port. These fast ships proceeded to off-shore positions behind German lines and at H-Hour plus three for the main effort opened fire on coastal

installations and troop concentrations with direct fire weapons and mortars mounted on the ships. Debarkation noises were simulated, and light signals were transmitted back and forth from ship to ship to indicate feverish activity. Once German response was drawn to these Allied ships, the demonstration force disengaged and returned to home port.

That surprise was achieved is hard to challenge. Many narratives from the Axis side of the battle tell of the visit of Colonel Liss of the intelligence service of the Armed Forces Supreme Command, who was sent from Rastenburg in Germany to Africa to inform the Axis forces that Montgomery could not possibly attack in October. In addition, the Germans felt that Rommel's presence could be spared before November because he was permitted to return to Germany for medical treatment. On 23 September, ULTRA, the top secret Allied decyphering and decoding operation, provided Montgomery information from intercepted German signals that Rommel had quit the desert to be treated for a variety of serious ailments. He did not return until the 26th of October, three days after the attack commenced. Liss's visit and Rommel's absence, however, did not mean that the Axis did not anticipate the inevitable and were completely unprepared, but they were set up to be surprised.

The initial disposition of the Axis belied the uncertainty as to the place of attack. They had most contingencies covered, but in doing so they left themselves vulnerable to a concentrated attack. Thus two infantry divisions, including the German 90th Light, were placed in echelon along the coast to block an amphibious attack. Four armored divisions were spread out evenly behind the front lines.

Neither Field Marshal Rommel nor General Stumme had any idea of the intentions of General Montgomery. Without this knowledge the Germans anticipated that the attack would be along the heights of Ruweisat. So they divided the

four armored divisions into two groups so as to pinch out the Allied attack as it came over the ridge through the minefields. Unfortunately, this disposition to cover the most likely contingency, as falsely perceived by the Germans, resulted in the 15th Panzer Division and Littorio Armored Division being pulverized when the British attacked in the north.

In spite of this lack of knowledge, the Germans had the advantage of having their flanks protected, and they took full advantage of this by laying the minefields and establishing formidable defenses. The 220th (21st Panzer Division), the 33d (15th Panzer Division), and the 900th (90th Light Division) Engineer Battalions were responsible for this massive task, and they once again proved their worth and competence. The Axis prepared as best they could in spite of tremendous logistical problems as well. They were not unprepared, but they were not so ready as they would have liked to have been. Nonetheless they were lulled into a false sense of security, because they developed a strong misconception as to when the attack was to be launched, and, of course, the British tried to foster this misconception.

German problems in intelligence gathering began well before the El Alamein offensive. Rommel held German intelligence reports in low esteem; so how much reliance he placed in them is open to question. Certainly Rommel's lack of confidence seems justifiable in light of subsequent events, such as the sending of a special envoy all the way from Germany to say that the Allies could not attack before November. Rommel also did not have the best relationship with his supporting air, and this hampered his ability to gather required information.

Then early in September a source of information which the Germans found extremely useful dried up. Tobruk, a strong British position that was encircled by the Axis along the North African coast and which was supplied by sea, was forced to capitulate in the summer of 1942 through the unwitting help given

Rommel by the US Military Attache in Cairo, Colonel Bonner Fellers. Every detail of British operations had been radioed by Fellers to Military Intelligence in Washington--and, because they had broken the State Department's Black Code, which Fellers was using--to the Germans as well. Every morning at breakfast, General Rommel had been presented with a concise appreciation of his opponent's plans, location of units, morale, and strength. Since January 1942, Rommel had been receiving the very information needed to reverse his fortunes. The Afrika Korps, for instace, had been driven back during the previous year, but on 21 January 1942 Rommel rebounded with such elasticity that the British were forced to retreat rapidly for seventeen straight days. Then there was also the unexpected fall of Tobruk. Finally, British traffic analysis of enemy transmissions concluded that Rommel was getting advanced information from the US Embassy in Cairo, and the leak was plugged.

The coordination between air and ground in the Axis forces was made more difficult by the condition of the German air force, which was deployed well forward and expected to provide the main opposition but had deteriorated so badly as to cause serious concern in Berlin. Major General of the Luftwaffe, Galland, flew to Fuka on the North African coast in September, interviewed von Waldau, who commanded the air forces, and looked over the situation. Air Field Marshal Kesselring is reputed to have resented Galland's inspection. Further, according to Galland's possibly apocryphal story, Goering dismissed as dummies half of the 800 aircraft shown to be on RAF fields. Rommel, not on good terms with his supporting air, neglected to ask for reinforcements until too late.

Goering might have done better to take the aerial photographs more seriously. On 16 October the RAF had 1,098 aircraft--813 in commission (628 fighters, 383 bombers of all types, and 87 sea reconnaissance aircraft).

The Axis air forces could muster only 218 Italian and 165 German fighters, about 150 bombers, 75 Italian CR-42 attack planes, and smaller numbers of seaplanes and reconnaissance aircraft. Clearly the capability to penetrate Allied air space and conduct effective air reconnaissance was limited.

An examination of the German Armed Forces Supreme Command's War Diary for the period 8-24 October underlines the tenor of Axis air activities. Starting on 8 October, the Air Force's reporting indicated air attacks against allied transport parks, artillery positions, armor assembly areas, and other ground targets. On 11 October, truck and tank parks at El Alamein were attacked for the first, and according to diary entries, the last time. Then on 12 October air efforts were turned toward the Ruweisat Ridge, which divided the Allied north and south battle sectors. For four days, until 15 October, attacks on an ammunition dump (dummy?), trucks, and antiaircraft positions were recorded. From that time on, air attacks on allied concentrations were reported, with the middle sector, that is around Ruweisat, receiving additional attention. Then on 24 October, heavy Allied activity and fighting were reported. In the night of 23/24 October, light enemy sea forces were reported to have landed behind the front, but the attack was beaten back by Stuka dive bombers and Italian aircraft. The boats retreated east--as the British had intended as part of their deception plan.

These cryptic reports lacked a sense of urgency. The targets were assemblies of vehicles or supplies, not troop movements, which indicates that the sorties were probably conducted during the day. There was no evidence from the reports that a general offensive was expected. In addition, the large degree of air activity in the south and central battle areas indicated particular interest by the Axis in those areas, which was desired by the Allies. There was also no mention of discovering any dummy positions, nor was the fuel pipeline

reported, but it must also be expected that the War Diary at the highest level recorded material that had been susceptible to pruning as it made its way up the chain of command. There can be no doubt, however, that Rommel's troops were not getting much worthwhile information from their air counterparts. Certainly, no indications to preclude surprise were reported by the Luftwaffe.

On the other hand, activity on the ground between 7 and 24 October did not prove a bonanza for German intelligence either, as the War Diary shows. On 7 October there was both artillery and reconnaissance activity on both sides. A marked increase in the number of tent encampments was noted as far to the rear as Cairo. This was the sole notation of a buildup of troops to be found in the army section of the War Diary between 7 October and the start of the offensive, although on 10 October heavier Allied movement in the south and middle battle sectors was noted and credited to reinforcements. These two reports were the only indicators that the enemy was building strength to attack. This information was not unusual, since the Germans were expecting an offensive, but not in October. Allied security can take credit for the paucity of information. The fact that the movement was discovered in the south and middle sectors can be attributed to Montgomery's deception plan.

The Allies, however, did not have a fool-proof system for preventing the Axis from gaining information, for on 8 October a trooper of the British Household Cavalry was captured. The unit, the reconnaissance regiment of the 10th Armored Division, had recently returned to Egypt and been on line for only a few days. What the reconnaissance regiment of an armored division of the army reserve was doing on line is open to question in light of Montgomery's attempt to gain surprise by first concealing the magnitude of his force and second keeping from revealing the types of units, especially the armor he had in his force structure. The Germans, however, provided no additional information on

the capture, and there is no indication the trooper knew much of importance, certainly not the place and time of the offensive. Interestingly enough, there are no further reports of any more Allied prisoners being taken prior to the offensive.

Except for the one order of battle report and the two reports on increased Allied movement and growing troop encampments, all other notations in the War Diary are of an inconsequential nature right up until 23 October. Thus on 11, 13, 14, and 18 October there are no reports at all. The 17th of October was a quiet day, and on 21 October there was a report on the poor state of Axis supplies. On 20 October active Allied reconnaissance was reported, and there was heavier than usual artillery activity in the south. But no change in enemy organization was noted. On 22 October the artillery fire and reconnaissance was back to normal with no changes in the Allied picture. On 23 October much activity was noted, as were air attacks on troop positions, airfields, and coast roads. Then on 24 October "active" air and artillery fire was reported, and for the first time an apparent response to Allied activity was noted when German Infantry Regiment 47 was ordered to Africa--too little, too late.

For the Axis side the picture is one of limited information on their enemy. It also indicates lack of aggressive information seeking, acceptance of misinformation, or draconian security measures by the Allies. Again, however, the War Diary must be viewed in the perspective of the possibility of screening of information at lower levels. But although the intelligence summaries were brief, they did contain essential information when it was available; so it appears there was a real paucity of "hard" information. It is easy to see, however, how the intelligence staff in the "Foreign Armies West" Section could come to the conclusion that the British would be unable to attack in October.

The Axis soldier in the foxhole on the front line may not have been surprised, as the security provided by deep minefields gave him sufficient stand-off time and distance to react to his enemy. But the commanders, already plagued by shortages of equipment, fuel, and spare parts, gained scant warning of what was confronting them. Montgomery's tactics of sending in infantry first, his diversionary attacks in the south, his tight security, and his masterful deception plan allowed him to put his maximum strength at the place he chose, when he wanted to. The Germans, on the other hand, were misled by the Allies' initial dispositions; they were denied essential information required to make correct decisions through Montgomery's deception and security efforts; they lacked smooth air-ground cooperation; and they fell victim to a false sense of security derived from adopting a preconceived notion as to the timing of the attack. The result was surprise.

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ANNEX E

FIRST DRAFT*

THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF SURPRISE

> Surprise stuns the opponent, paralyzes his will, and deprives him of the opportunity to offer resistance.
>
> -- Field Manual of the Red Army, 1941.

Soviet field manuals and military writings since well before World War II have emphasized the importance of surprise as the best aid to achieving victory in modern war. Soviet planners incorporated the concept of surprise in all their operations in World War II and successfully carried out a considerable number of operations with strategic, operational, and tactical surprise.

The Soviets define surprise as activities unexpected by the enemy which contribute to success in a battle, operation, or war. Surprise, which in their view is one of the most important principles of military art, consists of selecting time, place, methods, and means that make it possible to deliver a blow when the enemy is least of all ready to repulse it, with the result that his will to resist is paralyzed.

The Soviets state that surprise can be achieved by:

- deluding the enemy with regard to one's intentions,
- keeping the concept of the operation secret,
- adopting new weapons and tactics unknown to the enemy,
- sound selection of the sector of the main effort and of the time of the attack,
- unexpected air artillery and tank attacks, and sudden employment of all available fire means,
- rapid maneuver, resolute actions, and forestalling the enemy in carrying out an assault (mounting an attack)

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*N.B. This draft is subject to extensive revision.

- conducting deceptive operations and using camouflage,

- making the best use of the terrain, weather, season, and time of day.

The Soviets emphasize that the greatest success is attained by the side which uses surprise in combination with initiative and boldness. An enemy which is unprepared to counter a surprise attack is forced to change his plans hastily, and has to adapt to the activities of the side which gained the initiative. When both sides are of approximately equal strength, surprise makes it possible to secure the best results with the minimum loss of resources, manpower, and time. However, the advantage of the surprise factor is only temporary. How long it continues depends on the ability of the surprised side to find ways, means, and methods for the necessary countermeasures to nullify the initial effects the surprise had on the battlefield, operation, or even on the war as a whole.

The Soviet officer corps is constantly being taught that surprise, if used skillfully, creates the most favorable conditions for the destruction of the enemy, and that the ability to achieve surprise is a testimony to a commander's craftsmanship. The sooner the situation which results from the surprise action is taken into account and acted upon, the longer the effects of the surprise will last.

The Soviets distinguish three types of surprise: strategic, operational, and tactical. The distinction depends on the scale of the operation and on the results achieved.

Strategic surprise can be achieved both in the beginning of a war (taking advantage of the opponent's unpreparedness for war or as a preemptive strike), or while carrying out strategic operations in the course of war. The latter includes unexpected use of new weapons whose commitment would render strategic results, application of new strategy, skillful selection of the axis of the main effort, and disinformation. The Soviets point out that by taking advantage of surprise and of the strength of the deployed forces ahead of time, the attacker can usually gain considerable success at the start of the war. Countries which

were victims of a surprise Axis attack during World War II either suffered a total defeat as Poland did in 1939, capitulated without exhausting all means of defense like France and the Low Countries in 1940, or lost considerable parts of their territories and for quite a time were unable to capture the strategic initiative, like the USSR, or the US after Pearl Harbor in the Japanese attack.

In the attack on the USSR in June 1941, the German High Command relied heavily on surprise. The sudden invasion of the Soviet Union, the superiority of the German forces, and their almost two years of experience in waging wars, combined with unpreparedness for war on the part of the Soviet troops, gave the Germans a serious strategic advantage at the start of the war and put the Soviet Armed Forces in a very difficult situation.

During World War II, the Soviet Command was able to achieve strategic surprise many times. The most significant were the counteroffensives of Soviet forces at Moscow (1941/42), Stalingrad (1942/43), Kursk (summer 1943), and in Byelorussia (summer 1944). The unexpected transition of Soviet troops from the defense to a counteroffensive put the strongest German forces at a disadvantage and abruptly changed the situation on the Soviet-German front. In these operations the Germans were deceived by the Soviets with regard to the intention of the Stavka (the Soviet Supreme Command), the place, and the time of delivering the main attack.

The Soviet command tried to take maximum advantage of the effects of surprise by gradually increasing the strength of the attack in order to maintain momentum, thus forcing the Germans to change their plans repeatedly. The German command, not having enough information on the direction and date of the future main Soviet attacks, did not have time enough for carrying out large strategic redeployments from one sector of the front to the other. Ultimately, this inability resulted in defeat.

It should be noted that the crisis of the German defensive and offensive strategy was in a great degree caused by the sudden commitment to the operation of massive Soviet GHQ reserves. Timing of the commitment played a prominent role.

Operational surprise can be achieved by:

- concealment of preparations, forestalling the enemy's deployment in battle formations, and sudden commencement of an operation,
- selecting the sector of the main effort in the sector where the enemy does not expect it,
- using new methods of operation or new weapons which may have an effect on the battle,
- suddenly launching a counterattack by an army group or an army.

During World War II, the Soviet Command achieved many operational surprises, with considerable effect. Even in the summer of 1941, when Soviet troops were retreating eastward, they realized that in this disadvantageous situation local surprise attacks might turn out to be very useful. Thus, a sudden attack delivered between 14 and 18 July 1941 in the Soltsy area by the Soviet Eleventh Army resulted in splitting and defeating the German 8th Panzer Division and parts of the 3d Motorized Division, and the advance of Soviet troops for a distance of some 40 kilometers. During the Stalingrad counteroffensive, the Soviet XXIV Tank Corps, in difficult snowy conditions and on bad roads, broke through the German defenses and in the following five days advanced some 240 kilometers. The tank corps appeared unexpectedly in the German rear zone, and captured the Tatsinskaya railroad station and a large airfield with aircraft on the ground. The German Command was forced to divert its 11th Panzer Division, 306th Infantry Division, and other units previously scheduled to reinforce the main effort. Thus the tank corps's unexpected activities helped to achieve success in the operation.

Between 25 and 28 October 1943, on the eve of the battle for Kiev, the Third Guards Tank Army was secretly transferred from the Bukrinsk bridgehead to the Lyutezh bridgehead, and then, on 4 November, after a three-day preparation period, struck suddenly in the main sector of the 1st Ukrainian Army Group. This surprise attack predetermined the success of the operation.

Tactical surprise can be achieved by:

- well concealed deployment of troops in the jump-off positions for the offensive,
- forestalling the enemy's deployment for combat,
- unexpected use of new weapons and/or tactics,
- taking advantage of the terrain, weather, season, and time of day for the delivery of the attack,
- diversity in carrying out the attacks, combat reconnaissance, artillery preparation, etc.

An important element in achieving tactical surprise is, in the Soviet view, sudden opening of fire from all available guns, counterattacks, and daring and audacious raids by task forces or groups on tactically important enemy installations, positions, or terrain features. It should be noted that great surprise was often achieved during World War I by the sudden use of gases and tanks.

The first time the Soviets employed a battery of multiple rocket launchers on 14 July 1941 in the Orsha area (Western Army Group), caused a panic among the Germans. In the sectors in which these new weapons were used, the Soviet forces met almost no resistance.

Another example of tactical surprise was a feint attack executed by specially designated platoons some 30 or so minutes before the end of the artillery preparation along the entire front of the Fifth Guards Army of the 1st Ukrainian Army Group in the Vistula-Oder operation of January 1945. The Germans assumed that

the feint attack was a real one, moved out their forces from the shelters, and subsequently suffered heavy losses from the artillery fire.

Soviet military historians pay great attention to the role played by surprise in major operations carried out by Soviet forces in World War II. During the first period of the war,* despite great difficulties caused by the surprise

*The Soviets divide the Soviet-German war into three periods: /first from the start of the war(22 June 1941) to 19 November 1942, that is to the start of the Stalingrad counteroffensive; the second from 19 December 1942 to the end of December 1943; and the third from the beginning of January 1944 to the end of the war.

German invasion and the resultant heavy losses suffered by the Soviet Army, the Soviet Command carried out a number of offensive operations in which surprise played a paramount role, among them the offensives at Toropetsk-Kholmsk, Varvenkovo-Lozovsk, Rzhev-Kholmsk, and above all the Moscow counteroffensive.

In the counteroffensive at Moscow, the Soviets made skillful use of the miscalculations of the German command in its assessment of the situation at the front and exploited their own capabilities to master all available resources to launch a counteroffensive. An entry in the personal war dairy of the Chief of the German Army General Staff (OKH), General Halder, proves the Soviet point. Halder wrote on 2 December 1944 three days before the major Soviet Moscow counteroffensive: "Enemy defense (capability) has reached its peak. No more reinforcements available."*

*Franz Halder, The Private War Journals of Colonel General Franz Halder, Tr. Arnold Lissance (Dunn Loring, Virginia, 1976).

However, as it turned out, the Soviets had secretly massed their reserves east of Moscow and early in December 1941 with troops of the Western Army Group they launched a successful counteroffensive. Some 50 German divisions were defeated and retreated westward up to 250 kilometers. It should be noted that

at the time of the counteroffensive the Soviets had only a very slim advantage in the air, and overall strengths in men, artillery, and tanks were almost equal. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of strategic surprise was so great that it assured the Soviets a victory.

Again and again the Soviets emphasize that the basic reason for the successful achievement of surprise at Moscow was their correct evaluation of the erroneous German estimate of Soviet capabilities, their correct estimate of German unreadiness for a winter campaign, and of course German intelligence failures. They point out also that the Soviet Command selected the proper axis and time for launching the main attack, committed their reserves to the battle directly from the march after they had proceeded quite a distance from the concentration areas in the rear to the front line in an extremely short time, and exploited unfavorable weather conditions, time of day and terrain.

After the Moscow battle, the Soviets tried to improve the art of surprise in many ways, but first of all by better "operational camouflage," the Russian term for deception, by applying new methods of combat operations unexpected by the Germans, and by more skillful use of the terrain and weather.

Soon, disinformation became an organic part of deception. In the Toropetsk-Kholmsk operation of the Soviet Northwestern Army Group (9 January to 6 February 1942), in addition to the main attack in a 100-kilometer sector, two simulated attacks were carried out. This action led the Germans to spread their reserves and helped in achieving surprise in the main sector. In the Barvenkovo-Lozovsk operation of the Southwestern and Southern Army Groups (18-31 January 1942) for the first time the Soviet command issued false information by radio, implying the arrival and concentration of five fresh rifle divisions at the left wing of the Southern Army Group.

Another example of disinformation occurred during the offensive operations of the Western and Kalinin Army Groups in the Rzhev-Vyazma battle in the winter

1941/42. There, due to false radio broadcasts by the Sixteenth Army, the Germans got the impression that the entire army had been transferred to the Sukhinichi area, whereas in fact only the army staff had moved there.

In the Rzhev-Sychev operation (July-September 1942) of the Kalinin and Western Army Groups, the Soviets were able to conceal the concentration of their striking task force, the Twentieth and Thirty-first Armies, and to feign preparation for an offensive in the zones of the Forty-third, Forty-ninth, and Fiftieth Armies.

According to Soviet historians, cohesive, timely and strictly executed deceptive measures made it possible to mislead the Germans with regard to the axis of the main effort, composition of the main striking force, and the time of the attack. Thus for example, in the fall of 1942 the command of German Army Group Center saw danger to its Orlov force in what later turned out to be pretended offensive actions. The Germans transferred three panzer divisions and one infantry division to the Yukhnov area, leaving the right wing of the Soviet Western Army Group inadequately protected. The Soviets claim that the attack of the main forces of the Soviet Western Army Group committed on its right flank caught the Germans by total surprise. The German defenses in that sector were broken, and the troops of the Western Army Group advanced 30 to 45 kilometers, defeating elements of the German Ninth Field and Second and Third Panzer Armies. The Soviets note that this offensive diverted considerable German forces from the Stalingrad and Caucasian fronts.

German military historian General Kurt Tippelskirch, discussing this engagement, wrote, "Localization of the breakthrough can be explained only by the fact that three panzer and several infantry divisions which were readying themselves for the transfer to the south were, instead, first committed to stop the Soviet advance and then to launch a counterblow.*

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*Kurt Tippelskirch, History of World War II (Moscow, 1955). Translated into Russian from German.

Soviet authors give numerous examples of how skillful selection of the axis of the main effort could often be surprising to the enemy. For instance, in the Toropetsk-Kholm operation the main effort was launched in a wooded, roadless area covered with deep snow. Attack in such difficult terrain was by itself very unusual, and the German command had considered it impossible. Because of this, German defensive positions in the sector where the Soviet Third and Fourth Shock Armies launched the offensive were not continuous, but were based on individual strongpoints. The Soviets also claim that in this operation German intelligence did not detect their striking force, and consequently the German command did not take any measures to increase its defense capabilities in the forthcoming zone of attack. This, in turn, permitted the Soviets to achieve substantial numerical superiority.

As the result of the surprise offensive, the Soviet Third and Fourth Armies advanced up to 250 kilometers toward Vitebsk, and created a deep wedge between German Army Groups North and Center, endangering their operational cooperation.

In their analysis of surprise during the first period of the war the Soviets point also to the mistakes they made during this phase, in successful as well as unsuccessful operations. However, they emphasize that in the unsuccessful operations there always were defects in their deceptive measures. For example, in May 1942, during the preparations for the Kharkov offensive, the command of the Soviet Southwestern Army Group did not take adequate measures to conceal the transfer and concentration of forces, especially at the Barvenkovo bridgehead. Describing the operation Marshal V.S. Moskalenko wrote, "Large troop movements took place without proper organization and secrecy. For this reason there is no wonder that the German-fascist command discovered our intentions."*

*K.S. Moskalenko, Na Yugo-Zapadnom Napravlenii (Moscow, 1969).

In a number of successful operations where surprise was achieved, there were nevertheless some errors made in measures taken to achieve surprise. Often there was inadequate coordination of surprise measures with plans, force deployment, and disinformation. For example, during the Toropetsk-Kholmsk operation, there were instances when troop movements took place during the day, and combat reconnaissance was carried out only in those sectors where the attack was scheduled. In the Barvenkovo-Lozovsk operation, radio disinformation was totally ineffective, because it was not corroborated by false concentrations in one area and normal troop activities in another. In the Demyansk offensive of the Soviet Northwestern Army Group (July 1942) the false and the real axis of the main attack in essence coincided.

The Soviets claim that in due course these and other faults were corrected. Stavka and the army groups commands took all the necessary measures to eliminate the shortcomings in carrying out deception and in efforts to misinform the enemy.

During the second period of the war the importance of surprise increased greatly because of

- the increase of firepower and maneuverability of forces;
- better knowledge of German strategy and tactics;
- the necessity to break through deeply echeloned German defenses
- the attempt to decrease Soviet losses and prevent the Germans from parrying Soviet blows.

The rise in the importance of surprise demanded, in turn, perfection of methods for its attainment. At the end of 1942, the Soviet officer corps, in general, was considerably better than during the first year of the war. It had gained rich experience in carrying out defensive and offensive operations, and had become well acquainted with German combat methods. This helped the Soviet high command to conduct large deceptive operations.

The experience of the Stalingrad counteroffensive showed that surprise in strategic operations of a group of army groups could be achieved only by cohesive and continuous conduct of various measures aimed at securing secrecy and imparting false information. Such operations, the Soviets believed, must be centralized and carried out under the general direction of the Stavka.

In the Stalingrad battle, the intention of the Soviet high command was kept totally secret, and the camouflage of the strategic regroupment of the Soviet forces was successful. This assured surprise. In addition, active operations against German Army Group Center in the Mozdok area, ordered by the Stavka, apparently convinced the Germans that the main events in the winter 1942/43 campaign would come in the central sector of the Soviet-German front, and not in the south.

Strategic and operational miscalculations by the German command were the result of an intelligence failure; the Germans had not detected the forthcoming Stalingrad counteroffensive, in which eleven armies, several independent tank, mechanized, and cavalry corps, 13,500 guns and mortars, 979 tanks, and 1,350 airplanes took part. The Chief of Operations of the OKW, Colonel General Alfred Jodl, admitted after his capture in May 1945, "We entirely missed the concentration of huge Russian forces on the flank of the Sixth Army (at the Don River). We did not have the slightest idea of the strength of the Russian forces in that area."*

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*Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, No. 4, 1961.

Strategic surprise at Stalingrad was successfully complemented by operational surprise. The Germans were surprised by the unexpected breakthrough of their defenses in seven sectors of their 400-kilometer zone of defense, by commitment of large tank formations into the breakthrough and by determined action deep behind the original front.

By and large, it can be said that the commencement of the second period of the war brought with it a considerable improvement in methods of surprise. Thus, for example, in November and December 1942, the Voronezh Army Group carried out a complex deception. In order to achieve surprise at Stalingrad, the Voronezh Army Group twice successfully feigned preparations for an attack in the Fortieth Army sector of the Storozhevsk bridgehead. The third time, in the second half of December 1942, in the Voronezh area, the Soviets simulated the concentration of the army group's main forces. This time, however, it was in order to achieve surprise in the sector of the Fortieth Combined Arms and Third Tank Armies. At the same time the command of the Fortieth Army carried out most of the real preparatory work for the Ostrogozh-Rossosh operation under the cover of false activities. The Germans were deceived once more. This assured an operational surprise, and consequently great success for the operation.

Soviet writers believe that from the summer of 1943, that is, after the battle for Kursk, it became more difficult than before to achieve surprise, because the Soviets were using larger attack groups and consequently there were more troops in the departure area. In addition, the German command, which had often been deceived by the Soviets during the winter of 1942/43, increased its vigilance, improved its intelligence procedures, and evaluated the situation more realistically. Thus the Soviets were forced to improve their methods, and apparently they were successful. For example, in the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive in the summer of 1943 the Voronezh Army Group carried out special diversionary activities, including demonstrative actions in the Sudzha area which gave the Germans the impression that the Soviets were preparing to attack toward Belovody and Vorozhba. Consequently they reinforced that sector with panzer and infantry divisions.

In planning surprise the Soviets were able to anticipate German miscalculations. Thus, during the last phase of the Kursk battle, on 13 July 1943, the

commander of German Army Group South, Field Marshal Eric von Manstein, assured Hitler that he had defeated Soviet forces defending Kursk from the south, and that the Soviets not only were unable to attack any more, but they could not even hold their defensive lines. Convinced of the correctness of this statement, OKH (Army High Command) transferred the Fourth Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf to the Donbass area in the Ukraine and to the Orel area five panzer and one motorized divisions.

After learning about the German decision the Stavka requested that the Voronezh, Steppe, and Southwestern Army Groups turn to the offensive in the shortest possible time. The attack prepared in only ten days came much sooner than the Germans expected. Soviet writers point to this as an illustration that a short period of preparation can result in surprise. In this operation two to three times as much artillery was used in the breakthrough sectors, and there were coordinated thrusts by the adjacent wings of two army groups. Moreover the initial infantry successes of the Voronezh Army Group were promptly exploited by tank armies. The Germans anticipated none of these and they all contributed to the effect of surprise.

The Soviets see in the battle for the Dnieper River in the fall of 1943 a progression from tactical to operational to strategic surprise. The various participating units arrived swiftly at the river bank, crossed the river under cover of darkness, using improvised and locally obtained crossing equipment, and captured tiny bridgeheads, in a tactical surprise operation. By decisively and rapidly enlarging the bridgeheads they made the surprise become operational. And finally the destruction of the so-called Eastern Wall on the Dnieper River in a short time the Soviets consider strategic surprise.

In the Kiev offensive, 3 to 13 November 1943, the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Army Group in great secrecy transferred his main effort from the Bukrinsk bridgehead to the Lyutezh bridgehead. He effectively carried out demonstrations

by the Fortieth and Twenty-seventh Armies and concealed the concentration of an enormous artillery force (344-416 guns and mortars per kilometer of the breakthrough sector). Then he stunned the Germans by a night attack of the Third Tank Army, striking through the darkness with their headlights blazing.

In the third period of the war Soviet forces were able to take the offensive more often and consequently there were more opportunities to surprise the enemy, but at the same time achievement had become more difficult. The length of the front had narrowed considerably, and consequently it was easier for the Germans to detect not only where offensives were likely to be launched but also the sectors where the effort at breakthrough would probably be made. Moreover, the Soviets were using larger striking forces, and it was extremely difficult to conceal their concentration. An additional problem was the fact that the war had moved outside the territory of the USSR and into areas where the Germans had had an opportunity to organize and leave behind an effective intelligence network. The Stavka in this period continued to exercise responsibility for the complex measures that could assure strategic surprise.

Soviet analysts note that among their successes in the third period was the defeat of German Army Group Center in Byelorussia in the summer of 1944, where the achievement of surprise was greatly assisted by German misconceptions about Soviet plans. In May 1944 the Chief of the German OKW, Field Marshal Keitel, discussing the operational situation with the army commanders of the eastern front, concluded that the situation had stabilized and the Russians were in no position to start an offensive in the near future. The German Bulletin for the Evaluation of the Situation on the Eastern Front of 13 May 1944 reported that Soviet preparations for attack against Army Group Center were aimed at "deluding the German command with regard to the Soviet main effort and drawing German reserves away from the area between the Carpathian Mountains and Kovel."*

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*See the case study, "Strategic Surprise in the 1944 Soviet Summer-Fall Campaign."

This German misconception resulted from a series of Soviet measures, of which the most important was secrecy. Concealing their true intentions was not an easy task. The Soviets had to assemble six combined army armies, two tank armies, five separate tank corps, two mechanized corps, four cavalry corps, and eleven air corps, as well as tens of independent regiments and brigades in the designated areas. In addition they had to amass enormous quantities of supplies. (Over 28,000 tons were brought up by trucks alone.)

To mislead the Germans as to where the main effort would be, the Soviet command carried out fake offensive preparations in the south in the 3d Ukrainian Army Group zone and in the north, in the Baltic States, in the 3d Baltic Group zone.

Leaving their tank armies in the south was also an interesting Soviet ruse. German intelligence kept these tank armies under constant surveillance. Because they did not move to another area, OKH concluded that the offensive would be launched in the south.*

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*S.M. Shtemenko, Genralnyy Shtab v Gody Voyny (Moscow, 1968).

The Yassy-Kishinev operation carried out by the Soviet 2nd and 3d Ukrainian Army Groups in August 1944 presents an excellent example of how the Soviets misled the Germans. To be sure that they would achieve surprise, the Soviets had to devise an entire system of deceptive measures. The Soviet aim was to convince the Germans that the Red Army would attack along the western bank of the Seret River and hit Kishinev from the northeast.

How successful the Soviet deception measures were is testified by the former commander of the German Army Group Southern Ukraine, General G. Frisner, "I thought that the second (Soviet) deployment in the Tiraspol area--the 3d Ukrainian Army Group--would be ordered, at first, to contain the /Romanian/ Dumitrescu Army Group."* General Frisner also incorrectly assumed that the

*G. Frisner, Proigranye Srazheniya (Lost Battles) (Moscow, 1966). Translated from German.

main effort of the 2d Ukrainian Army Group would come from the area east of Yassy down along the Pruth River. In reality this attack was launched from the area northwest of Yassy toward Vasluy. At the end of the first day of the operation (20 August), the staff of the Dumitrescu Army Group concluded that the Soviet offensive south of Tiraspol was a typical breakthrough operation, and not as it was previously thought, a local attack.

Achievement of surprise was an important factor in the successful operations of the 2d and 3d Ukrainian Army Groups, which resulted in the encirclement and destruction of most of the forces of the German Southern Ukraine Army Group, and created favorable conditions for advancing deep into Romania and Bulgaria.

The Soviets point out that because of surprise this sizable victory was achieved with only small losses, 11,000 men. This figure should be compared with the 146,000 lost by the 1st, 2d, and 3d Baltic, and the Leningrad army groups in the first period of the operation in the Baltic states, where surprise did not play such an important role.*

*Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhonnykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyne 1941-1945 (Moscow, 1958), v. 3.

Although the German command often knew about the preparations for forthcoming Soviet offensives, it did not know how large they would be and consequently was unable to respond correctly. For example, when in the summer of 1944 the Soviets were preparing the Proskurov-Chernovitz and the Umansk-Bogoshansk operations in the Ukraine, the Germans learned only about the forthcoming attack of the 1st Ukrainian Army Group in the Ternopol sector. Seeing a possible danger to its flank in the Ukraine, the German command transferred six panzer divisions (five from the Uman area) and three infantry divisions to this flank. However,

by strengthening that sector the Germans weakened the one in front of the 2d Ukrainian Army Group, where they overlooked Soviet offensive preparations. Subsequently, the troops of the 2d Ukrainian Army Group in a surprise attack defeated the Germans with much greater ease than the forces of the 1st Ukrainian Army Group.

In the Korsun-Schevchenkovskiy operation, due to errors made by the Soviets in their false radio transmissions, and because of ineffective deceptive measures, the Germans discovered the preparations for the offensive in the Novo-Mirgorod sector. However, they did not take any effective countermeasures because they failed to find out which of the Soviet activities were real and which were deceptions. By the time the Germans launched a counterattack, on the fifth day of the offensive, it was too late. Soviet rifle divisions had already broken through the tactical defense zone, and the tank formations had reached Shpola, after an advance of about 50 kilometers.

An excellent example of achieving surprise by attacking in the sector where the enemy expected it least, was, according to the Soviets, the Crimean offensive in the spring of 1944. In this operation the commander of the 4th Ukrainian Army Group, General of the Army. F.I. Tolbukhin, decided to deliver the main blow in the zone of the Soviet Fifty-first Army, deployed on the bridgehead to the south of the Sivash marshes and salt lagoons. The Fifty-first Army could be supplied only by two crossings which were under constant German artillery and air attacks. The decision to strike in this particular sector was bold and correct, for the Germans did not expect the assault would be launched there, because of supply difficulties.

In their literature, the Soviets point out that in the last period of the war Soviet forces perfected several measures leading to the achievement of surprise. Among them, the most important were:

- concealment of troop regroupment, especially of the second echelons and reserves
- unexpected transfer of effort from one axis to another,
- bold and resolute maneuver,
- skillful use of weather, terrain, and time of day.

In most operations a combination of these measures was used.

In the Vyborg operation of the Leningrad Army Group (June 1944), the Soviets were able to conceal the preparation for the offensive by well organized deception. The Finns, against whom part of the attack was directed, were totally surprised. The Soviets emphasize that the offensive was so unexpected that the Finns, being unaware of the preparations, had granted leave to 11% more of their troops than usual, so that they could work on their farms.

The Soviet Twenty-third Army contained the Germans along its entire front by active demonstrations on 10 June, making it impossible for the Germans to detect the Soviet main effort. This in turn helped the Twenty-first Army to break through the German first defense zone. General Govorov, Commander of the Leningrad Army Group, then transferred the main effort to the sector of the CIX and CVIII Rifle Corps. During the night, the Soviet command regrouped the artillery and moved the CX Rifle Corps behind the CIX and CVIII Corps. The transfer of effort from one axis to another was totally unexpected by the Germans and greatly influenced the outcome of the battle. Between 10 and 20 June the troops of the Leningrad Army Group broke through three heavily fortified defense zones, advanced some 130 kilometers, and captured the city of Vyborg.

Other examples of transfer of effort from one axis to another in order to achieve surprise can be seen in the Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy (1st Ukrainian Army Group), Uman-Botoshansk (2d Ukrainian Army Group), and Memel (1st Baltic Army Group) operations. In the Memel operation, the troops of the 1st Baltic Army Group in a ten-day period between 24 September and 4 October 1944 carried out

a large scale regroupment of forces. Transferred to the Shyaulya area were the Fourth Shock, Forty-third, Fifty-first, Sixth Guards, andFifth Guards Tank Armies, two tank corps, one mechanized corps, and the entire support artillery. As a result of various deceptive measures, the Germans did not detect the transfer of the Soviet main effort to the Memel axis in time.

The Soviets consider decisive troop maneuver most important in achieving surprise. As an example they point out that in the Lvov-Sandomierz operation of the 1st Ukrainian Army Group in the summer of 1944 a bold and swift thrust by the Third Guards Tank Army, followed by penetration of the Fourth Tank Army deep into the German rear, assured the breakthrough of the German defenses and the encirclement and destruction of the German forces at Brody. Subsequently the advance of the Third Guards Tank Army to the Yavorov area west of Love and a simultaneous unexpected thrust along two axes, one toward Lvov, the other toward Przemysl, led to the defeat of the German forces and liberation of both cities.

Soviet analysts have pointed out many examples of skillful use of terrain, weather, and time of day in order to achieve surprise. There was for example the night attack by the Steppe Army Group on Kharkov in August 1944, and the liberation of the city of Zaporozhiye by the Southwestern Army Group in a surprise night assault. And in the Berezne-Snigirev operation an army group mobile force was committed to combat during the night in pouring rain along roads that were little better than quagmires.

With the development of new means of combat, the importance of surprise, according to Soviet military writers, has increased sharply. It reached its high point with the advent of nuclear missiles and other new and powerful means of destruction. The Soviets believe that the availability of nuclear weapons, combined with high mobility and maneuverability of troops, will present excellent opportunities for employment of the most diversified methods of surprise. Being

in constant combat readiness and possessing tremendous destructive power, the new weapons can deliver sudden blows with highly effective results.

The increased speed of aircraft has sharply enhanced the possibility of surprise air attacks against the most important enemy facilities, installations and defensive positions. The Soviets believe that aviation can deliver surprise attacks against missile launching pads, enemy air forces, ground forces, and military-industrial targets. In addition, air power can disrupt or even immobilize land and sea communications, thus preventing the enemy from taking effective counter-measures against surprise attack.

Soviet military theorists give serious attention to the role of surprise in airborne operations. They say that surprise is a basic element in such operations. Surprise is achieved, in their view, by rapid preparation and concentration of troops in the departure area, as well as by swift landings. Nights are the best time for a surprise airborne landing, because it is easier to make a secret approach to a selected target under the cover of darkness.

Taking into consideration that the effects of surprise are only temporary, the reinforcement of the landing zone must be carried out quickly and continuously. This will prevent the enemy from concentrating adequate means for a counterattack and destruction of the airborne force.

Particularly important in Soviet concepts for achieving surprise are demonstrations, disinformation, camouflage, and various means of deceptions. However, the indispensable ingredient in preparations for surprise is almost always strict secrecy in guarding the intentions of the commander. Contributing to secrecy, and making it easier to preserve, is reducing preparation time to the absolute minimum, and concealment of major weapons. This will be particularly important for nuclear missiles.

The Soviets suggest that in offensive operations the following basic measures should be taken to achieve operational and tactical surprise:

- direction of heavy fire against secondary sectors in order to divert an enemy's attention from preparations for the main attack
- selection of different hours and methods of starting attacks; in one case simultaneous attack by the entire force, in another a sequential attack with well coordinated groups
- rapid movement of troops from rear assembly areas to their jump off positions immediately before the attack
- concealment of the time of the attack to the very last moment.

In the defense, surprise can be achieved primarily by having a well organized, strong, flexible, and well directed fire system, which will permit delivery of heavy and effective fire in time of need at areas where attack is likely or possible.

Development of technical intelligence means greatly impedes achievement of surprise. Massive introduction of radio-electronic devices greatly increases the chance of detection of the preparation for an attack. The Soviets point out that with the help of modern radio-electronic instruments it is possible to determine with a high degree of accuracy the very moment of missile launching, the take off of aircraft, the approach of naval forces, regrouping and transfer, and other activities.

The availability of new means of detection, Soviet military writers say, calls for more research efforts to discover new ways and methods of concealing from the enemy the deployment of weapons and weapons systems. Additional research should be directed at types of electronic countermeasures which would disrupt enemy intelligence operations. On the other hand, the Soviets realize that the potential opponent, in order to detect in time forces readying themselves for an attack, would use all the available radio-electronic equipment, not only to

detect the preparations for the attack, but also to disrupt the other side's command and navigation system.

The Soviets emphasize that the ability to deliver a surprise attack increases the importance of corresponding counteractions. These can be achieved by various means, primarily by detailed familiarity with the enemy tactics, good knowledge of his combat capabilities and possibilities, timely warning of the forthcoming surprise attack, and by keeping one's own forces in high combat readiness.

A Soviet assessment of the increasing effect of surprise: "Scientific-technical progress is the material basis of those revolutionary changes which have occurred in the Soviet armed forces in recent years. . . . /This/revolution in military affairs to a significant degree has raised the importance of surprise. High combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces is caused by the most important of all the tasks confronting them--that is, to thwart the intentions and provide a decisive and complete defeat to any aggressor. The present capabilities of the Soviet armed forces make it possible to solve this problem."*

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*Colonel General N.A. Lomov, Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs (Moscow, 1973).

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1. Introduction (Dupuy)

   a. Objective of conference

   b. Recent developments

2. Background of the conference (Brown, Bell)

   a. The draft study outline

   b. The matrix

   c. Explanation of relevance

3. "REading Period" Review of additional documents

4. Soviet views on Surprise (Martell)

5. The relationship between possible Soviet surprise and NATO deterrence

6. The morphology of surprise (Dupuy)

   a. Surprise: an action to disrupt (Principle of War)

   b. Surprise-disruption: the effects of successful surprise

   c. Security: action to prevent surprise (Principle of War)

7. The Case Studies as exemplars of surprise and its diversity

   a. Selection

   b. Number required

   c. Types required

8. The narratives

   a. Approach

   b. Style

   c. Relevance

9. Review Outline; possible actions

   a. Approve

   b. Amend

   c. Reject and replace

10. The Interim Report

   a. Form and content

   b. Recommendations

SUMMARY NOTES ON REVIEW CONFERENCE, 20 JULY 1977

Present were:

Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, Executive Director
Lt. Col. John F. Sloan, Staff Associate
Mrs. Grace P. Hayes, Director of Research
Paul Martell, Staff Associate
Ray E. Bell, Consultant
Gordon S. Brown, Consultant
Colonel Angus M. Fraser, Consultant
Brig. Gen. Sidney F. Giffin, Consultant

Colonel Dupuy summarized the work done to date and reported on the decision to terminate work on this project and direct the remainder of the effort under this contract to another study. The purpose of this meeting was to obtain comments from the three consultants on the work done so far, and to plan on what we would have done had the redirection decision not been made. (All papers had been distributed to the participants.)

Mr. Martell spoke briefly about the Soviet concept of surprise as evident in their writings and in the case study on the Byelorussian attack. He emphasized the extreme danger of preconceptions.

Mr. Brown described the work he had done to lay out the direction the study might be expected to take.

The discussion that followed, based on the agenda topics, covered a wide range.

There was considerable discussion of deterrence in relation to surprise. General Giffin pointed out that none of our allies can be expected to spend the money necessary to prepare an adequate defense unless they are really frightened. Do the Soviets really believe that a nuclear war can be fought and won? he asked. Apparently they do if the situation is dangerous enough. The real strategic problem is politico-military. We must determine what over frightens them. What would they really consider reason for going to war? We must avoid tripping traps which will worry or upset them. It is essential to remember that what seems logical to us may seem very illogical to them, and vice versa.

Colonel Fraser pointed out that NATO is only one segment of the US-Soviet confrontation. And as a corollary, only to the US and the USSR is the confrontation worldwide. Our allies don't see it that way.

General Giffin suggested that a strong anti-Soviet Marxist government in western Europe might trigger the Soviets. He also noted that they are obviously concerned about the Carter human rights concept. He suggested two additions to the study outline: 1) the context (particularly the political and international context) in which surprise might occur. (Pearl Harbor is very relevant.)

@] The Soviet politico-military framework and their concept of ours must be understood, so that we can recognize the point of no return. We must guard against their logic being different from ours.

There was considerable discussion of the article "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates" by Avi Shlaim (World Politics, April 1976). There was agreement with his thesis on the need for a carefully thought-out theory of surprise.

Discussion focussed on definitions and theories of surprise. From it emerged three basic aspects of surprise, summarized by Colonel Dupuy as: 1) the action of the surpriser; 2) the effect of the surprier's action on the surprised; 3) action taken by the potential surprisee to avoid being surprised. It became apparent that there must be discussion of semantics, and of the distinction between surprise, ignorance, stupidity, and underestimation and the consequences thereof.

The discussion then returned to the question of deterrence in Central Europe as a means both to prepare for, and to obviate surprise.

Mr. Bell raised the question of what effect it would have on the Soviets if we evacuated (at least from vulnerable areas) dependents of personnel in the forward units in Germany. And what about moving a reserve component and its equipment to Europe?

General Giffin suggested that we would both strengthen ourselves, and deter the Soviets, if we were to concentrate on fortifying a substantial number of PGMs in Europe.

There was also considerable question of the practical and political problems involved in preparation of substantial defensive works in the forward areas just west of the East German frontier. It was agreed that this would have the desired dual effect of helping our forces meet a surprise attack, while giving clear notice to the Soviets that successful surprise will be difficult.

It was suggested that the adaptation to West Germany of the Swiss militia concept could be most effective in terms of defense and deterrence if the Germans would agree to equipping their local militia with substantial numbers of ATGMs, and if the necessary action was taken to incorporate this concept into NATO defensive planning.

General Giffin expressed the view that the study as outlined is too narrow. It raises many questions that will require further research.

In a discussion of the El Alamein case study, its importance as an example of the limitations of surprise was brought out. General Giffin suggested that the air element in the operation should be emphasized.

There was a brief discussion of the existence of considerable classified literature in this area which should be related to this study.