Schedule for the Center for the Study of Guns and Society Fall 2023 conference, 13 – 14 October.

I will be a panelist on Saturday the 14th October at the Fall 2023 conference for the Center for the Study of Guns and Society. The panel will be on “Quantifying Lethality in Historical Terms and Policy Implications.”

The entire conference schedule is here: Fall 2023 Conference Agenda – Center for the Study of Guns and Society (

It is at Wesleyan University of Middletown, CT. There is no cost to attendance.

Schedule for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17 – 19 October 2023

This is the ninth provisional schedule for the second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC). We currently have 32 presentations scheduled by 25 speakers and two group discussions planned. Each slot is an hour long, so planning for a 45-minute presentation and 15 minutes of discussion. I am still looking for a half-dozen more presentations.

The conference is at 1934 Old Gallows Road, Suite 350, Vienna, VA 22182. This is basically across the street by Tysons Corner Shopping mall and the Marriot Hotel on Route 7. It is right off the Route 7 exit from 495 (the Beltway). It is at the corner of Route 7 (Leesburg Pike) and Old Gallows Road. It is in the building above the restaurant called Rangos. Parking is in the parking garage next door to it.

Conference description is here: The Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 in Tysons Corner, VA | Mystics & Statistics (

Costs, Hotels and Call for Presentations: Cost of the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17 -19 October 2023 | Mystics & Statistics ( and Hotels for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 | Mystics & Statistics ( and Call for Presentations for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 | Mystics & Statistics (

The cost of the conference is $150 for entire conference or $60 a day. Please pay through PayPal ( to The conference is priced to cover the costs of the conference facility. We are also set up to take credit card payments by phone. Call The Dupuy Institute during working hours at (703) 289-0007.

We are set up for virtual presentations and virtual attendees. We are exploring the costs of having the presentations professionally recorded.


Schedule: Pike and Gallows Conference Center

Updated: revised 22 August 2023



Day 1: Analysis of Conventional Combat

0900 – 0930    Introductory remarks – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

0930 – 1030     Addressing the Decline in War Question with New Disaggregated Data – Dr. Michael Spagat (Royal Holloway University of London)

1030 – 1130      A Cautionary Tale: Alternative Interpretations of the Same Data – Jim Storr – virtual

1130 – 1230 Land Operations – consistencies and discrepancies between theory, historical analysis and doctrine – LtC. Trygve Smidt (Norway)

1230 – 1400    Lunch

1400 – 1500    World War 2 Operational Research Revisited – John Magill (UK)

1500 – 1600 Temporal and Geographic Patterns of Fatal Casualty Rates in WWI and WWII – Sasho Todorov, esquire  

1600 – 1700    Force Ratios – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1700 – 1800    Grinch in Ukraine – Carl Larson


Evening (1900):          Group Dinner – Rangos



Day 2: Analysis of Unconventional Warfare

0900 – 1000    Iraq, Data, Hypotheses and Afghanistan (old) –  Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1000 – 1100     Evidence of Fabricated Survey Data Collected during the War in Iraq – Dr. Michael Spagat (Royal Holloway University of London)

1100 – 1200  Unburdened by History: Understanding Russia’s Growing Influence in Haiti – Dr. Christopher Davis (UNCG)

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400    The Right Way to Do Risk Analysis: A Primer and Update, With Examples from Pandemics – Dr. Doug Samuelson (InfoLogix)

1400 – 1500    Close  Combat Overmatch Weapons (SLAMMER) – Joe Follansbee (Col., USA, ret.)

1500 – 1600    Chemical Weapons in Syria – Jennifer Schlacht, M.A. – virtual

1600 – 1700    Group Discussion: The Next Middle East Wars


Evening (1900):          Group Dinner – BJs



Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare

0900 – 1000   The AEF and Consolidation of Gains Operations During the Meuse-Argonne Offensive  – Dr. Christopher Davis (UNCG)

1000 – 1100   The French Air Force in the 1940 Campaign – Dr. James F. Slaughter

1100 – 1200   The Application of the Scientific Method to Military History – Clinton Reilly (Computer Strategies, Australia) – virtual

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400 Russian Information Warfare Against Western Democracies Since 2013: A review and update – Dr. Doug Samuelson (InfoLogix)

1400-1500     The Future of TDI and work of the conference (new) – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1500 – 1600    open

1600 – 1700    open


Evening:         Happy hour – Rangos 



Schedule: Einstein Conference Room


Day 1: Poster and Book Room

Opened at 0800


Afternoon Day 1: Air Warfare Analysis

1400 – 1500   French Aerial Bombing Problem 1914-1940 – Dr. James F. Slaughter

1500 – 1600   Soviet WWII Aerial Photography – Eugene Matyukhin

1600 – 1700    Air Combat Analysis on the Eastern Front in 1944-45 –  Daniel Horvath – virtual


Day 2: Analysis of Conventional Combat

0900 – 1000    Wargaming 101 – William Sayers

1000 – 1100    Urban Warfare (old) – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1100 – 1200    none

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400  Penetrate, Dis-Integrate and Exploit: The Israeli Counter-Offensive at the Suez Canal, 1973 – LtC. Nathan A Jennings, PhD – virtual

1400 – 1500 Beaches by the Numbers – Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill (Concordia University, Quebec) – virtual

1500 – 1600   Operation “Sea Lion”: Simulating the German 1940 invasion of England – Dr. Niall MacKay (University of York) – part 1 – virtual

1600 – 1700   Operation “Sea Lion”: Simulating the German 1940 invasion of England – Dr. Niall MacKay (University of York) – part 2 – virtual

– with Dr. Ian Horwood, Dr. Chris Price, and provisionally Dr. Jamie Wood 


Day 3: Researching Operations

0900 – 1000  The Red Army’s Plans for a Preemptive Attack in 1941 – Dr. Richard Harrison

1000 – 1100   Kursk Photo Analysis – Eugene Matyukhin

1100 – 1200   The Red Army’s Offensive Operations in Ukraine, 1943-44 – Dr. Richard Harrison

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400   Patterns of Explosive Violence Harm in Ukraine Before and After the 24 Feb. Invasion   –  Chiara Torelli (AOAV) – virtual

1400 – 1500   Wagner Group structure and new infantry tactics – Carl Larson

1500 – 1600    Competing Proxy Strategies in the Russo-Ukrainian War and a War of Attrition – LtC. Amos Fox

1600 – 1700    Group Discussion: Russo-Ukrainian War


The presentations from all three days of the first HAAC are here: Presentations from the first HAAC – all three days | Mystics & Statistics (

The New York Times casualty reports

Turns out the New York Times, based upon citations of unnamed U.S. officials, is providing the following estimates of losses:

1. Russia: up to 120,000 killed and 170,000 to 180,000 wounded.
2. Ukraine: close to 70,000 killed with 100,000 to 120,000 wounded.

I have lots of heartburn with these figures.

First… wounded-to-killed ratios:

The wounded-to-killed ratio for WWII was 3:1. The wounded-to-killed ratio for Soviets troops at the Battle of Kursk (1943) was around 2.5:1 (2.48-to-1). Specifically, in the Voronezh Front from 4-11 July it was 2.29-to-1 and from 12-18 July 1943 it was 2.68-to-1. For the opposing Germans it was 5.11-to-1 and 4.54-to-1 respectively. See Kursk, page 1374 (not too many people can say “see page 1374 of my book”).

Since World War II, wounded-to-killed ratios have risen to 5-to-1 or higher. It was 10-to-1 for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan (and 13-to-1 for the USMC). The Donets People’s Republic (DPR) reported a wounded-to-killed ratio for 2022 of 4-to-1 (4.16-to-1).

So, they have for the Russians a wounded-to-killed of 1.5-to-1. Really? Read my book War by Numbers, Chapter 15, and then come back with some intellectually valid estimates. These are not!

They have the wounded-to-killed ratios for the Ukrainians at between 1.42 or 1.71 to one. Same ballpark as the Russians. Yet the Soviet Union has a wounded-to-killed ratio at Kursk in 1943 of 2.5-to-1. Are you saying that medical care and evacuation in the Russian and Ukrainian armies now are considerably worse that of the Soviet Union in 1943, when they did not have penicillin? The argument is absurd.

Second… Russian killed:

The only systematic reporting of Russian killed that I am aware is the BBC/Medizona reports by name of people killed. As of 11 August, this was a total of 30,003. These figures are gathered from a mix of obituaries, newspaper reports, formal death certificates, contacts with the families, reviewing graveyards and gravestones, and I gather a number of catch-as-catch-can methods. I have not reviewed their data collections efforts in detail. From my correspondence with them, they believe they are accounting for about half of the dead. This seems like a reasonable assumption, although it is an assumption. This would mean that total Russian dead from the war is perhaps 60,000 or more killed. Not sure how we get from there to 120,000.

Third… Ukrainian killed:

The reporting we have on Ukrainian dead is worse than what we have for Russian dead. Now, I am sure the Ukrainians have a better count, but they have not provided any reporting in a very long time (since summer of last year). My sense is that Ukrainian dead is probably less than Russian dead at this point. Maybe 75% of Russian dead, although this is a guesstimate based upon no solid data. So, their estimate of 70,000 Ukrainains versus 120,000 Russian dead sort of matches. It is 58% of the Russian dead or a casualty exchange ratio of 1.71-to-1. I really don’t buy into that. Ukrainian definitely took some casualties in the Kherson operations August-October 2022, possibly more than the Russians. They are on the offensive now against prepared positions. If they have significant artillery superior it is possible they could have a 2-to-1 exchange ratio, but Russia does have some active artillery, as the 47th Mech Bde videos in June showed. So, I do question the 1.71-to-1 exchange ratio.

So, if Russian killed are 60,000, then Ukrainian killed could be 45,000 or higher. I am still guessing that the wounded-to-killed ratio is 4-to-1 or higher. So maybe for Russian 60K killed and 240K wound for 300K casualties (which actually does match the totals in the New York Times article). For Ukraine maybe 45K killed (or more) and at least 180K wounded for a total of 225K casualties or higher.

Of course, these are estimates based upon little actual data. But, while it is hard to tell what the correct estimate is, it is pretty easy to tell if there is an issue with an estimate if they cannot provide a reasonable wounded-to-killed ratio. If they can’t provide a reasonable interpretation of that fairly well documented relationship (again see War by Numbers or Dupuy’s Attrition), then it does make one wonder what can be trusted in such an estimate.


P.S. If you take the estimate of 120K Russian killed and assume 4-to-1 wounded, then you end up with 600,000 casualties which is hard to explain in an army that has only deployed 300,000+ to Ukraine. It does appear that people keep dicking with the wounded-to-killed figures so they can report more killed without producing outrageously high total casualty figures. 

The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 541

Ukraine continues incremental advances. They have taken 1) the north part of Robotyne, 2) all of Urozhaine and 3) more territory around Bakhmut. None of this is earthshaking, but it shows a continued pattern of 1) Ukraine on the advance, 2) Russia struggling to defend it all, and perhaps, 3) Russia being over-stretched and maybe slowly losing this war. Is at some point, Ukraine going to launch a major attack or just continue just inching forward for months on end? 

As U.S. General Milley describes it (via WP): “The Russians are in pretty rough shape. So they’ve suffered huge amount of casualties. Their morale is not great. Their leadership is questionable and spotty….Logistics is not great.” This assessment does appear to have some validity.

Ukraine continues making incremental gains on the battlefield, especially south of Bakhmut and south of Orikhiv. This includes 1) advancing (a total?) of 1.7 kilometers towards Melitopol (Ukrainian claim on 7/14) and 1.4 kilometers in the Berdiansk direction (Ukrainian claim on 24 July), 2) advancing on both sides of Bakhmut, especially to the south. One Ukrainian paper reported they gained 3 square kilometers of territory last week. This is not earthshaking.  3) taking artillery dominance over and around Bakhmut, and we suspect 4) starting to win the artillery war (see: Is Russia losing the artillery fight? | Mystics & Statistics ( There is some suspicion that we will see an actual Ukrainian offensive later in August.

Previous discussion of Prigozhin, Russian commanders being killed or fired, the Crimean bridge being hit, are a few other things are in the posting for Day 518:  The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 518 | Mystics & Statistics ( 

On 24 July Ukraine did another attack on Moscow with two drones. They also struck Moscow again on 30 July and on 1 August. No real significant hits or casualties, but repeated drone strikes against the Russian capital does get their attention. An entertaining video from the site of the strike by 1420: Why do they keep attacking Moscow? – YouTube. There were attempted strikes on Moscow on 10 August, with two drones shot down in the area. There was another attempted drone strike last night (the 17th). This resulted in all traffic as Moscow’s airports being halted. While these tend to be fairly small drone strikes, they are sending a message. 

Also, there were over 20 reported attempts in Russia this month to burn conscription centers. This was done all across Russia, not just Moscow and St. Petes.  I am guessing this is local (meaning Russian protestors): Russians rise up — over 20 military commissariats targeted with Molotov cocktails in wild 24 hours (

Spring (now Summer) Offensive: The Ukrainians are doing limited attacks in at least three locales in the south from west to east: 1) south of Orikhiv (at the outskirts of Robotyne, 12 km south). They continued to advance here, now taking the northern part of Robotyne on 10 August. 2) near Huliaipole and 3) near Veyka Novosilka. Staromaiorski (pop. 839 in 2001) was reported taken by Ukraine on 27 July, the Russians claimed to have retaken it on 30 July and Ukrainians clearly had it under control on 31 July. It was reported liberated by the 35th Marine Brigade. This village is six kilometers south of Velyka Novosilka, so it does appear that Ukraine is again making progress in this area. To the south of there, they reported taking all of the village of Urozhaine on 14 August. This was done by 35th and 36th Marine Brigades, in addition to others. The defending units included the Russian special forces Vostok Bn.

They are also attacking around Bakhmut, both to the 4) north and 5) south of it. 6) Ukraine also has a bridgehead across the Dnipro River near Kherson. This sector appears quiet. On the other hand, the Ukrainiians have crossed to the northeast of there at Kazachi Laheri and pushed some forces further into Russian positions. It is claimed that this vulnerability in the Russian line was created by them transferring their 7th Airborne Division to reinforce lines in Zaporizhzhia province, leaving this area weakened. Is this a sign that the Russian positions are now being over-stretched? Is Russia being stretched until their lines break? Parts of the 7th Airborne Division are now reported at Robotyne. 7) There has been some action reported around Kreminna. For a while, people were talking about a Russian counteroffensive of over 100,000 from there. I never bothered to repeat this rumor and it now seems to have disappeared. I have been hesitant to repeat all the various reports out there. 8) There does some to be some back-and-forth fighting in the areas to the west of Svatove, 9) Ukraine did report Russian attack in the north part of the line near Krupyansk. They do not appear to be doing much.

It does appear that primary action is now around Bakhmut, of all places. It does appear that Ukraine is still making some progress there. It is defended by Russian airborne troops, among others. Bakhmut may be the first place to fall to a Ukrainian offensive. On (25 July) Ukraine took Andriivka to the south of Bakhmut (the small village of Andriivka just south of Klishchiivka) and had advanced into Klishchiivka (pop. 512 in 2001) as of 23 July. Russia was reported to be counterattacking near Klishchiivka a week later.

Overall, it appears that Ukraine tried a limited one-week offensive during the week of June 5. This was not the Spring offensive that many people were expecting with 12 brigades chopped to the effort. They did get one advancing brigade shot up (47th MBde) and that was pretty much it. The 47th Mechanized Brigade is still conducting operations, as observed in videos. It is near Robotnye. Have also seen videos of 118th MBde doing operations near Robotyne as of 26 July. Also committed to the fighting is the 33rd MBde and the 21st MBde (reported engaged as of 9 August, and probably earlier). Ukraine does appear to again be making slow progress in this area.

The 82nd Air Assault Brigade, with 14 Challenger IIs, 40 Marders and 90 Strykers has not yet joined the fight. There are videos of Challengers supposedly near the front.

It appears that Ukrainian offensive operations started on Monday, 5 June with a series of serious “shaping operations.” See: So has the Spring Offensive started? | Mystics & Statistics ( Some are saying the offensive started 4 June.

On 6 June Russia (probably) blew the Kakhovka dam. On 20 June Ukraine’s Interior Ministry reported that 21 people have died. Other people are reporting higher figures. This has temporarily shut down any operations in Kherson province.

On Thursday, 8 June, Russia released images showing a Ukrainian column moving up and being interdicted by artillery. They were supposedly near a village called Novopokrovka, probably the one in Zaporizhzhia Oblast to the NNE of Melitopol. As least one German Leopard 2A4 tank was destroyed along with 4 U.S. M-113s. See this video for a discussion: Update from Ukraine | The Counterattack Start is not good | Leopard-2 Convoy was Ambushed – YouTube. The unit was pretty compacted while it was travelling. I gather it was the 47th Mechanized Brigade, which was reported back in March to be armed with T-55S and Bradleys: The nine new brigades for the spring offensive – organization | Mystics & Statistics (

On 10 June, Neskuchne (pop. 644 in 2016) was taken (or earlier). On 11 June, Blahodatne (pop. around 1,000) was taken by the Ukrainian 68th Jager Brigade. On 11 June Makarivka was taken. On 11 or 12 June Storozheve was taken by 35th Naval Infantry Bde. These are all small towns clustered to the northwest of Mariupol. A breakthrough here would effectively isolate Crimea and all points to the west. Lots of potential here, although it is still a fairly limited advance. Makarivka is 56 miles (90 kilometers) from Mariupol.

One twitter report on the action at Blahodatne said that 60 people from the 68th Jager Brigade attacked, and 4 were killed (see @armedMaidan for June 17). If this is true, this is a company-level attack by a brigade-sized force. I think this is fairly typical of what is happening across the front.

The 47th Mech Bde is one of the 9 new brigades raise for this offensive. The other two units listed above have been around since early in the war (April 2022 for the 68th) and from the beginning (in the case of the 35th Naval Infantry Bde). See: The nine new brigades for the spring offensive – organization | Mystics & Statistics (

Some Ukrainian loss figures are coming in. The attack on the advancing tank company on 8 June resulted in at least one Leopard tank and 4 M-113 destroyed. It appears that four Leopards have been confirmed as lost overall along with 2 AMX-10RCs. A total of 16 U.S. Bradleys have been killed (see: Ukraine loses 16 US-made armored vehicles, group says, but still gains territory | CNN). This would indicate that the brigades involved include 47th Mech Bde (with 99 M-2 Bradleys) and the 37th Bde with 14 AMX-10s. It does appear that 2 of 9 new brigades slotted for this spring offensive have been committed to action. Some people are saying they have committed three new brigades (they are not named), see: Ukraine deploys 3 of 12 brigades in counteroffensive, main battle still ahead − Reuters ( Article also notes that “Muzyka believes that the counteroffensive initially progressed quite well, but progress seems to have stopped 5 or 6 days after the start of this significant phase. The analysist has no idea why it happened. The current count of lost Bradley’s according to Oryx and other sources is 34 destroyed or damaged. This is 15 destroyed, 15 damaged and 4 damaged and abandoned (see: Attack On Europe: Documenting Ukrainian Equipment Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine – Oryx ( This is out of at least 99 provided and maybe as many at 109. With them all assigned to 47th Mech Bde, and there being around 30 Bradley in each of three mechanized battalions, this indicates that two of their four manuever brigades have been shot up.

Also of note is 3 Leopard 2A4s lost (1 destroyed, 2 damaged) and 5 Leopard 2A6 lost (2 destroyed). So, at least 3 Leopards lost (33rd Bde?), along with 1 PT-91 Twardy (117th Bde?), 1 M-55S (47th MBde?), up to 4 AMX-10 (37th Bde), 41 M-113 (28 destroyed – possibly 118th MBde) and 54 M1224 MaxxPro MRAPs (38 destroyed – possibly 32nd or 33rd Bde). See: The nine new brigades for the spring offensive – organization | Mystics & Statistics (

Probably the most significant loss was four Leopard mine plow tanks were killed at the same time and place, along with an MRAP and a Bradley. Finland provided Ukraine with up to six of these modified tanks. Not sure what killed them but picture leaves one to suspect they were taken out by mines, which is kind of what they were supposed to sweeping. One wonders if this was an equipment shortfall.

On 12 June, Russian MG Sergei Goryachev, the COS 35th CAA, was reported killed by Russian bloggers. On 14 June Kadyrov (Chechen leader) reported that one of his commanders, Adam Delimkhanov, age 53, is missing and then later denied it. This guy: Adam Delimkhanov – Wikipedia.

On 11 July LtG Oleg Tsokov was killed in Berdiansk when the Ukrainians struck the 58th Combined Arms Army command post. He was 51 years old and deputy commander of the Southern Military District. He had previously been wounded in September 2022 while commanding the 20th Guards Combined Arms Army.

On 11 July is was announced the MG Ivan Popov, commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army was relieved of command and his message of protest was published by a deputy of the State Duma the following day. See: First Prigozhin, now Popov | Mystics & Statistics (

I will put any changes/updates since my last post in italics. A link to a blow up of the map is here: Wikipedia mapIt is dated 18 August. The map now has three updates for 2023, Soledar on 16 January, near Orkhiv on 9 June 2023 and near Velyka Novosilka on 11 June 2023. They are also showing Bakhmut in Russian hands and Ukraine across the Dnipro River near Kherson. They are also showing the crossing at Kozachi Laheri and Klishchiivka (south of Bakhmut) in Ukrainian hands.

Russia currently occupies five cities: Lysychansk (pop. 95,031), Severodonetsk (pop. 101,135), Mariupol (pop. 431,859), Berdyansk (pop. 107,928) and Melitopol (pop. 150,768). Kherson (pop. 283,649) was retaken by Ukraine on 11 November.


We have been looking at six major areas of operations. Only the Donbas appears to be active right now:

1. Kyiv (pop: 2,962,180): It appears that Kyiv is secure.

2. Odesa (pop: 1,015,826): Odesa was bombed for a few days in response to the attack on the bridge to Crimea. Civilian casualties are low, which is good. It shows that Russia was concentrating primarily on industrial and economic targets, vice civilians, although they have also taken out a classic church. Mykolaiv was also attacked. Two civilians were killed there.

The grain deal ended on 17 July. As of 17 July, the amount of grain shipped from Ukrainian ports and across the Black Sea under this initiative was 32,861,707 metric tonnes carried in 1004 ships according to posts on twitter by @exit266. Renegotiation is under way. Russia apparently wants some sanctions lifted. Also, Turkey did hand over 5 detained Mariupol defenders to Ukraine and has agreed to allow Sweden to join NATO. This does put Erdogan at odds with PutinThere may not be another grain deal and Ukraine is expanding its shipments by rail to the southwest.

Russian attacks on Odesa have reportedly destroyed over 180,000 tons of grain, in addition to attacking the storage and rail infrastructure.

Russia is claiming that they destroyed the Ukrainian 1,192-ton landing ship Yury Olefirenko, which is supposed to be Ukraine’s last warship. It was launched in 1970.

The Russian intelligence collection ship the Priazovye (3,470 tons full load) was attacked in the Black Sea by six sea-borne kamakaze drone. They were all intercepted and destroyed.

The Rapucha class landing ship Olenegorsky Gornyak was damaged on 4 August by Ukrainian sea drones, as Ukraine continues to make the Black Sea inhospitable for Russia. This occurred in or around the port of Novorssiysk, to the east of Crimea.

On 10 July, 6 AM, the commander of the submarine Krasnodar as executed in Krasnodar, Russia with four shots with a 9mm at close range.  He was jogging in the rain. Stanislav Ryhitsky was 42. The Krasnodar conducted a missile attack against Vinnytsia in July 14 that killed 27.

Not directly related to this war, but Russian is now down to only one active Kirov class battlecruiser (the Admiral Nakhimov). They used to have four, but the two were scrapped in 2021 and now the Peter the Great (Pyotr Velikiy) is being scrapped. They are based in the Baltic (which is becoming a NATO sea).

3. Kharkiv (pop: 1,433,886): Kharkiv looks to be secure. Still, it is near the Russian border, so this can change suddenly. Kharkov Oblast was shelled this last week.

4. The Donetsk and Luhansk provinces (the Donbas): Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics ( The Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is reporting as of 16 December that they had 4,133 soldiers killed and 17,379 wounded (4.20-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio). This includes the 13 killed and 50 wounded reported from 01.01.22 to 02.25.22. For the period of 16 – 22 December (overlapping dates on 16 December) they report 43 killed, but do not report the wounded. Through the 16th, this is 108% casualties out of an estimated initial force of 20,000. Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) is reported as of 5 April to have had 500-600 killed out of an estimated force of 14,000. This is 21% casualties, assuming a 4-to-1 killed ratio.

On the evening of 27 June, a restaurant in Kramatorsk was hit by a Russian missile killing 11. Lviv has now been hit, killing 9.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics ( Google maps has updated its images of Mariupol to show the city as it is now (extensively shelled) vice how it used to look before the war.

Russia is putting 22 prisoners from Mariupol on trial. They are all members of the Azov Battalion, which Russia has designated a terrorist organization. Eight of the prisoners are woman, who are reported to have worked as cooks for the Azov Battalion. Two other prisoners who had been charged have been exchanged in prisoner exchanges.

Prisoner Exchanges: Russia has claimed that they captured 2,439 prisoners from the siege of Mariupol. Russian claimed on 30 June that they held 6,000 prisoners. Ukraine stated in early July that they had more than 7,000 missing. Now Ukraine is stating as of 30 December that Russian holds 3,400 prisoners and 15,000 Ukrainians are missing.

In 2022 there were 1,447 prisoners of war exchanged, 112 civilians and five foreigners. Of those, at least 427 were from Mariupol/Azovstal and up to 53 others were killed in captivity. Latest prisoner exchange on 8 January was for 50 prisoners. Another prisoner exchange on 4 February of 116. Some of these Ukrainian prisoners had been in captivity for almost a year. Latest prisoner exchange, on 16 February, was for 100 soldiers and one civilian for 101 Russian soldiers. 94 of them were defenders of Mariupol, including 63 soldiers from Azovstal. There was another prisoner exchange on 7 March with 130 Ukrainians exchanged for 90 Russians. This included 87 Mariupol defenders (71 from Azovstal). 35 of them were soldiers captured in Bakhmut and Soledar. Most of the Ukrainian and Russian prisoners were seriously injured.

The Ukrainian Omsbudsman has stated in late January that 800 severely wounded Ukrainians are held as POWs. He also stated that they hold 200 severely wounded Russians.

There was a prisoner exchange in early May of 42 soldiers and two civilians for what I assume was a similar number of Russians. On 7 May, Russia exchanged 45 defenders of Azovstal, including 10 officers for only just 3 pilots. I gather Russia is still holding thousands of more prisoners than Ukraine does.

Zelenskyy said on 6 June that they have recovered around 2,500 prisoners, including 370 civilians., The last count I had of Ukrainian captured was around 6,000.

There was yet another prisoner exchange on 11 June for 95 POWs. There was a prisoner exchange on 7 July of 45 Russian soldiers for 45 Ukrainian soldiers and 2 civilians.

On 8 July. the five Ukrainian Azov battalion officers who were held in Turkey in accordance with an agreement with Russia, were released to Zelenskyy to return to Ukraine. This is an odd maneuver, as it appears that Erdogan violated his agreement with Putin. I believe they were supposed to be kept in Turkey until the war was over. This will create difficulties going forward. Added to that, the American Trevor Reed, who was detained by Russia for three years, was released on 27 April 2022 and then travelled to Ukraine starting 1 November. He was wounded two weeks ago fighting for Ukraine around Bakhmut. Unfortunately, I think this all makes the argument that Russia should not be making prisoner exchanges nor releasing detained Americans.

There was a prisoner exchange on 7 August 2023 for 22 soldiers, so apparently these efforts have not ended the prisoner exchanges. Russia still holds thousands of more prisoners than Ukraine does. Furthermore, 22 of them are still facing trials.

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): Kherson is now back under Ukrainian control as of 11 November. Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics ( Also see for updates:  The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (

Due to the dam being blown, as of the end of June, the Kakhovka Reservoir has been drained by 10 meters. Only 24% of its previous surface is now covered with water. This still does not make the area a prime choice for military operations.  

On 4 August the bridge from Kerch to Crimea was again attacked. The previous attack on the bridge occurred on 17 July by 3 naval drones. That attack shut down one lane. It appears that Ukraine is working on isolating Crimea.


Weather: Kharkiv at 5 PM: It is 84 degrees (29 Celsius) and mostly sunny. Rain forecasted for Monday and Tuesday, otherwise mostly sunny and warm. 0.05″ of rain expected on Monday.

Kherson is also 88 degrees (31 Celsius) and sunny. Weather is clear for the next ten days, mostly sunny and hot.

Ukrainian Army Build-up: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics ( Updates are provided in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (

Denmark and Netherlands are ordering up and buying another 14 Leopards for Ukraine. They will be arriving in January. Belgium is offering up 40-50 more M-113s. Latvia is sending Ukraine all of its helicopters and Stingers. It does make more sense geopolitically to disarm yourself now to support Ukraine, then to hold onto war material at the expense of Ukraine’s war effort.

Ukraine has lots more material on the way, including 25 Leopard IA5 (the older, less armored Leopards), 40 Marder 1A3 IFV (this adds up to a total of 100 provided by Germany). The U.S. is providing another 32 Bradleys and 32 Strikers. Bulgaria, which was initially hesitant to support Ukraine, is now providing 100 Soviet-era BTRs to Ukraine. It is now claimed that the M-1s will be arriving in September and this still appears to be the case. Also, there is an effort by Belgium to refurbish from a pool of 50 old Leopards and ship another 30 Leopards I to Ukraine. Germany has almost committed to sending yet another 40 Marders, 6 Bergepanzers, 2 mine clearing tanks, and 11 T-72s mine plows (which have already arrived). 

The U.S. had added another 32 Strykers in the latest late July aid package to Ukraine. Also, Spain is sending them another 4 Leopard II, upping the number of Leopards they have provided to 10.

As of 25 July, Ukraine is now using U.S. provided cluster munitions in the fighting around Bakhmut. It was being reported they were being used as early as 20 July. There are reports that Ukraine was using Turkish provided cluster bombs as early as November 2022.

It is claimed that the U.S. and its allies have now trained 63,000 Ukrainian troops. The current Ukrainian armed forces is certainly in excess of 300,000, so over 80% of their troops have been trained by themIt is reported that some of the troops are learning how to use some equipment from YouTube videos.

Russian Army Build-up:  Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (

Prigozhin reported that 32,000 prisoners who fought for Wagner have now returned home. So far, they have only committed 83 crimes since they left his employment. He was claiming on 23 June that he has 25,000 troops.

Zelenskyy does claim that 21,000 of the Wagner Group were killed and 80,000 wounded. The math does not work on this claim.

The Wagner Group claimed this last week that they had 22,000 killed and 40,000 wounded out of a force of 78,000. They report that 49,000 of the force were convicts (meaning 29,000 were regular contracted soldiers). Some Wagner troops are moving to Belarus.

According to Putin, from May 2022 to May 2023 Russian paid the Wagner group 86 billion rubles and paid Prigozhin’s catering company (which is supplying the Russian Army) 80 billion rubles. This is over a billion U.S. dollars in both cases.

On the other hand, other people are pointing out that the now returned Wagner freed prisoners have conducted at least four murders since their return home: The Wagner Murders In Russia Are An Omen Of Deaths To Come | by Barry Gander | May, 2023 | Medium.

We did a report from Daudov this last week that stated that 29,000 Chechens have fought in this war, 13,000 of them volunteers. More than 7,000 OMON and Akhmatova fighters remain.

The state of Russian morale is open to question. Last week, one Russia lieutenant defected to Lithuania.

Opposing forces: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (

Economics and the Home Fronts: The complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 380 | Mystics & Statistics ( of oil (Brent Crude) has declined this week down to 84.01 as of 10:50 AM EST. Ruble had moved back up with state support. It is now at 92.50 to the dollar.

On 6 May “right-wing” activist, Yevgeny Prilepin, was seriously injured near Nizhny Novgorod when his car was blown up. His bodyguard died. On 2 April, Vladlen Tartarsky, 40, a pro-war Russian blogger, was assassinated in St. Petersburg. The accidental assassin, who was also wounded, was Darya Trepova, 25. The previous war-related assassination was of Darya Dugina, 29, back on 20 August 2022. Not sure who was responsible for any of these three efforts.

There are still some political protests in Russia in June, with a female protester being arrested in Moscow and in Kazan. It is reported that over 100 protesters were arrested: Russian police arrest more than 100 Navalny supporters, group says (

Casualties: The commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian miliary, Valerii Zaluzhny, on 21 August stated that almost 9,000 Ukrainian military have died in the war. This is a lower estimate than most people have given (although we have leaned towards the lower estimates). Not sure if these figures included militia losses (like Azov Regiment). If Ukraine lost almost 9,000, then hard to believe the Russian losses are that much higher. On 1 December a presidential advisor stated that Ukraine has lost between 10,000 and 13,000 troops killed. On 17 March, the Ukranian Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council argued that total Ukrainian losses are less than 100,000 killed and wounded. As of 24 March 1,509 bodies have been returned to Ukraine.

The U.S. estimate is that Russian casualties are now at 220,000 (killed and wounded). The U.S. estimate provided on 9 November was “well over 100,000.” Did they really loose another 100,000 troops in the last five months? For 18 November BBC/Mediazona reported that 9,001 Russians had been killed based upon media accounts, obituaries, funeral notices, and so forth. Now their count is 18,023 as of 24 March. This is a doubling of their recorded count of people who have died. This is still considerably lower than the Ukrainian claims of 173,360 Russians killed as of 31 March (which would imply 693,440 to 866,800 total casualties, which does not mesh well with the reports of forces deployed). I do have some doubt about this suddenly increase in U.S. claims, see BBC/Mediazona Figures Over Time | Mystics & Statistics ( and Russian Losses over Time | Mystics & Statistics ( Needless to say, if I have doubts about the U.S. DOD estimates, then I don’t buy into the Ukrainian claims of Russian casualties, or the similarly high Russian claims of Ukrainian casualties.

The various versions of the briefing books did have Ukrainian and Russian casualty figures. They estimated that Ukrainian losses were 15,500 – 17,500 killed and 124,500 – 131,000 total casualties. This estimate may be a little “light,” but it is certainly within the ball park. They appear to be using a wounded-to-killed ratio of around 7.5-to-1 for this. This is kind of high. These figures may also include missing and captured (at least 6,000 were captured).

The Russian estimates are 35,500 – 43,000 killed and 189,500 – 223,000 total casualties. This may be on the high side. Ukraine is claiming over 180,000 Russians killed, which I think can be dismissed. BBC/Mediazona reports as of 7 April are counting 19,688 Russian killed by name. They appear to be using a wounded-to-killed ratio of around 5-to-1 for this.

Mediazona, through Dr. Olga Ivshina (BBC) @oivshina stated on 25 April that “…if we have 20,000 names we think the real toll may be around 40,000 KIA.” The exchange is here: The Dupuy Institute (TDI) on Twitter: “@oivshina Question: Do you mean that you suspect the actual count of dead is 1.5 times the count on your list, or is it 2.0 times the count on your list?” / Twitter.

These wounded-to-killed ratios open up a lot of questions. 1) why are they different for the Ukrainian vice the Russians, 2) I have been saying it is at least 4-to-1. They are using figures higher than that. What is that based upon?, and 3) some people on the “twittersphere” have criticized me for even using a 4-to-1 ratio and have used lower figures than that. Is it time for them to revise their estimating practices?

John Kirby, the NSC spokesman, said on 1 May that Russia has suffered 100,000 casualties since December, including over 20,000 killed (implying a 4-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio). Half of the killed are from the Wagner Group.

The previous, more detailed older casualty write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 394 | Mystics & Statistics (

The UN is reporting as of 30 July at least 9,369 civilians confirmed dead in the war. They are reporting another 143 killed from 1 – 30 July 2023. 18 of these were in territory occupied by the Russian Federation. Updated chart from the UN provided the following chart showing civilian losses by month through June.

More than 60,000 people have died in this conflict: 30,003 or more (Russian Army – Mediazona count as of 11 August) + 16,000 or more (Ukrainian Army – U.S. DOD estimate) + 9,369 (Civilians) + 4,176 (DPR in 2022) + 600 (LPR April 2022) = 60,148It is probably in excess of 80,000 total deaths depending on Ukrainian and Russian military deaths and the real count of civilian losses. Suspect the BBC/Mediazona count is off (undercounted) by at least 50% and they say it is by a factor of two. The last figure from Ukraine of 13,000 was dated 1 December, so is also now probably off by at least 50%. Mediazona is now reporting that Donetsk and Lugansk losses were in excess of 8,000. If the Russian Army losses are indeed above 50,000 and Ukrainian Army losses are similarly high, then we could be looking at over 100,000 killed in this war. Another recent estimate done by Mediazona, based upon excess deaths, show that by the end of May at least 47,000 Russians have died in the war. This is not out of line with their other estimates. See: A new study finds that 47,000 Russian combatants have died in Ukraine ( and How many Russians have died in Ukraine? Data show what Moscow hides – Los Angeles Times (

An eighth American has been killed in Ukraine, Nick Maimer, 45, of Boise. He was a former Green Beret who was training Ukrainians. He was hit by artillery sometime in May.

Ammo: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (

The U.S. is reporting that it is now producing 24,000 155mm shells a month. This is up from 14,000 before the war.

Air Power: Previous discussion of air power is in the Day 443 post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (

On 13 May, Russia lost 4 aircraft in one day, two Mi-8 helicopters, one Su-34 and one Su-35. This was their highly daily losses since the first month of the war. They were shot down just inside of the Russian territory, in Bryansk province.

Ukrainians will began training on F-16 this month according to Zelenskyy. I gather this will not be a quick process, as there are a limited number of Ukrainian pilots available with a good command of English. The U.S. did confirm this week (on 18 August) that we will allow third parties to provide Ukraine with F-16s. It will probably be a while before Ukraine has the planes.

Missile Defense: Discussion of previous missiles attack is in the Day 443 post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics ( It was updated in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (

End of the War: Looks like this war will be continuing onto until at least fall of 2023. Complete write-up of this section is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 380 | Mystics & Statistics (

Atrocities: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics ( Updates are provided in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (

Ukrainian reforms: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics ( The Ukranian defense minister appears to be staying. On the other hand, this last week Zelenskyy removed all the officers in charge of recruiting over corruption issues. 

Other Issues:

U.S. Support for Ukraine: Write-up on U.S. support for Ukraine is in the Day 443 post here: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics ( It is going to be a long campaign season until November 2024, so certainly we will revisit this issue at some point. The total amount of support committed by the U.S. to Ukraine is $133 Billion.

The U.S. resolved its “debt crisis” with the debt limit being suspended until 2025. Defense spending is capped at $886 billion, or 3.5% increase over the previous year. This matches the current administrations budget request. Spending on defense is limited to a 1% growth in 2025, or up to $895 billion.

A few dates to keep in mind for the American political campaigns: 1) Fourth (and final?) indictment of Donald Trump issued on 14 August, 2) the first (of two?) Republican primary debates is set for 23 August, 3) The DOJ Special Council has requested to start the trial on 2 January for charges related to the 6 January incidents, 4) the Iowa caucuses will be on 15 January 2024, 5) the Nevada primary will be on 6 February 2024, 6) the New Hampshire primary is scheduled for 13 February 2024, 7) 24 February is SC primary, then MI, 8) the trial by Fulton County Georgia is currently scheduled to start 4 March, 9) on 5 March 14 states will hold their primaries and between 9 – 23 March another 15 states/territories will hold their primaries. The Republican nominee could be decided by then, 10) 25 March is the trial date for Donald Trump’s Stormy Daniel’s related case, 11) 20 May is the trial date for Donald Trump’s classified documents case, 12) last Republican primary is 4 June 2024. I actually do think this is war related news as the currently the three leading Republican presidential candidates do not support Ukraine.

Former VP and Republican presidential candidate Mike Pence was in Ukraine in July. He fully supports the war effort. On 13 July, the House took a vote on cutting off aid to Ukraine. The vote was 358-70 rejecting the amendment. All 70 opposed votes were Republican. See: Here are the 70 House Republicans who voted to cut off all US military aid to Ukraine ( There are 222 Republicans in the house, so this is a minority opinion in the party supported maybe a third of Republicans in the house. It is also the opinion that appears to be held by their two presidential nomination front runners.

Also, see the Day 443 posts for previous reports on the EU, NATO, Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh. On 20 May, Lavrov’s daughter (Lavrov is the foreign minister of Russia) attended a wedding in Georgia. There were protests by the Georgians, with her car egged. She was forced to leave because of the public reaction.

Belarus: Prigozhin and elements of Wagner are now based in Belarus. Supposedly 10,000 troops. There have been at least 14 convoys observed moving Wagner troops to Belarus. It was reported that two Belarussian helicopters violated Polish Air space. Supposedly Wagner troops are operating near the Suwalki Gap: Suwalki Gap | Mystics & Statistics (

I don’t take this very seriously. The Polish Army is over 70,000 troops. There is also at least 20,000 NATO troops in the area (including 10,000 U.S. troops). Not sure why they are saber rattling, as it only increases Western hostility, and therefore aide to Ukraine. This seems to work against Russia.

Meanwhile, Prigozhin was in St. Petersburg during the Putin’s Africa summit. Prigozhin met with some of the delegates from Africa.

Also, Belarus has signed an agreement on 25 May with Russia about basing tactical nuclear weapons there, with some sources claiming they have been deployed there. I still doubt that they will join the war. Belarus has 60,000 troops and now they are trying to recruit another 20,000. This is from a country that the government was almost overthrown two years ago by popular acclaim. Ukraine has an 891-kilometer border (554 miles) with Belarus, so Ukraine must maintain some forces there. Reports are now saying that only about 4,000 Russian troops are in Belarus, and no nuclear forces are there.

On 16 June Putin did announce that tactical nuclear weapons have been deployed to Belarus. One unconfirmed (and unconfirmable) estimate is that it is 10-12 68 KT weapons. On 20 June the head of Ukrainian intelligence said that no nuclear weapons have yet been moved to Belarus. Since then, Lukashenko has said that nukes have been deployed to Belarus. The Russian nuclear weapons are almost certainly not under control of Lukashenko, no matter how much he huffs and puffs.

NATO: As of 4 April, Finland is a member of NATO. Sweden is still awaiting approval from Hungary and Turkey.  As of 10 July, it looks like Erdogan of Turkey has finally agreed to let Sweden into NATO. Hungary is not expected to block this. Erdogan, age 69, won the election on 28 May with 52% of the vote. Voter turn-out was 84%. Next election is in five years. See Day 443 for more info. Meanwhile, the head of NATO is supporting renewal of talks about Turkey joining the EU.

Sections on Kazakhstan, European Support, Iran and Miscellaneous were last reported in the blog post for day 408 here: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 408 | Mystics & Statistics ( They have been removed from this post.

Wargaming 101 – Summary

Chip Sayers has posted a number of articles to this blog under the title of “Wargaming 101.” He had lots of hands-on experience in the bowels of the Pentagon, so I found this to be a particularly interesting series of posts. He will be making a presentation at the second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC) on 18 October 2023. The presentation is called Wargaming 101. See: Schedule for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17 – 19 October 2023 | Mystics & Statistics (

Anyhow, as a read ahead, all of his Wargaming 101 blog posts are listed below:

Wargaming 101: The Use of Wargames in Training | Mystics & Statistics (

Wargaming 101 – Sayers vs. The U.S. Navy | Mystics & Statistics (

Wargaming 101 – The 40-60-80 Games | Mystics & Statistics (

Wargaming 101 – The 40-60-80 Games | Mystics & Statistics (

Wargaming 101: The Bad Use of a Good Tool | Mystics & Statistics (

Wargaming 101: A Tale of Two Forces | Mystics & Statistics (


A couple supporting posts:

“The Games the Marine Corps Plays” | Mystics & Statistics (

A story about planning for Desert Storm (1991) | Mystics & Statistics (


Also, we are still looking for presentations for the 2nd HAAC: Call for Presentations for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 | Mystics & Statistics (

Air Combat Analysis on the Eastern Front in 1944-45 – Daniel Horvath

We did separate the conference in the afternoon and had two presentations given in another conference room. The first one was on Midway and the Aleutians. We did not record that. The second one was a virtual presentation, so we recorded that. It is here: (10) Air Combat Analysis on the Eastern Front in 1944 45: Horvath – YouTube

The link to the 21 slides for that presentation are here: Presentations from HAAC – Air Combat Analysis on the Eastern Front in 1944-45 | Mystics & Statistics (

The link to the 64 slides for the previous unrecorded presentation is here: Presentations from HAAC – Midway and the Aleutians | Mystics & Statistics (

Understanding Dupuy – Dr. Shawn R. Woodford

The final presentation of the day was Understanding Dupuy: Trevor N. Dupuy’s Theory of Combat by Dr. Shawn R. Woodford. The room was aware enough to restart the zoom recording after cutting Jim Storr’s previous presentation short, so we got this one fully recorded. It was kept short as it was getting late the in the day. 

The presentation is here: (9) Understanding Dupuy: Woodford – YouTube

The slides for the presentation are provided here: Presentations from HAAC – TND’s Theory of Combat | Mystics & Statistics (

Weaponising Historical Analysis – Dr. James Storr

The sixth briefing of the day was Weaponing Historical Analysis by Dr. James Storr. He is the author of three well received books.

Concerning my book War by Numbers, one reviewer stated that:

A great deal of the value of the book to the reader will depend upon how much that reader needs to see the data to believe. If one is prepared to accept the word of an expert, then Jim Storr’s The Human Face of War is the better book and the better read and presents much the same conclusions in briefer form – it would definitely be more suited to the average reader. On the other hand, for the reader that needs to see the numbers, this (along with Rowland and Biddle) is the must read. And for those most interested in the subject, both are very rewarding in different ways.

Anyhow, we only have less than 17 minutes of his presentation. Then the Zoom video recording stopped because it does not record for more than six hours, unbeknownst to us. So we missed the rest of his presentation. What we have is here: (9) Weaponising Historical Analysis: Storr – YouTube

His slides are here: Presentations from HAAC – Weaponizing Historical Analysis: A Case Study of the Introduction of HA Into Doctrine | Mystics & Statistics (

The recording ends of the slide titled “Factors,” which is slide 18 out of 32.  You will have to go here to catch the rest of the slides: HA-Conference-DC-Sep-22-V1.2.ppt ( Sorry, nature of self-funded conferences, we don’t employ professional audio-visual people. 

Killing Captain Hindsight – Dr. Niall MacKay

Our fifth presentation of the day was Killing Captain Hindsight: Quantifying Chance in Military History by Dr. Niall MacKay of the University of York.

It is posted to our YouTube Channel here: (9) Killing Captain Hindsight: MacKay – YouTube

The briefing ends at 57:40 and then there is five minutes of discussion afterwards.

The slides for the briefing are here: Presentations from HAAC – Killing Captain Hindsight: Quantifying Chance in Military History | Mystics & Statistics (

Our first virtual presentation – How Important are Superior Numbers? – by Dr. David Kirkpatrick

This was the first virtual presentation of the conference. It happened after lunch, so we had resolved some of our earlier issues. Not only was Dr. David Kirkpatrick (University College London) able to give a virtual presentation, but Dr. Robert Helmbold was able to attend virtually and discuss the briefing with him. This is kind of how these things are supposed to work.

Anyhow, the presentation was “How important are Superior Numbers?” and it is posted to our YouTube channel here: (8) How Important are Superior Numbers: Kirkpatrick (version 2) – YouTube

There is an earlier version on the channel that is 1:10 longer. That was uploaded first, but I decided to edit out a small section of the presentation.

The briefing ends at 40:20 and discussion continues for 12 minutes afterwards.

The slides for the briefing were previously posted here: Presentations from HAAC – How important are superior numbers? | Mystics & Statistics (