Mystics & Statistics

IDF Wounded-to-Killed Ratios

We have the following data for the Israeli Defense Forces from their website here: IDF Fallen and Wounded in War | ATC (www.idf.il).

Killed:

Killed since the beginning of the war (7 October 2023): 639

Killed: 290 dead (fighting in the Gaza Strip from 27 October 2023 to 29 May 2024 among those “whose names were permitted to be published”)

Now, 639 – 290 = 349 killed on 7 October or shortly thereafter.

Fatalities from operational accidents: 44 (this in 22 from 
two-sided shooting, 5 from “shooting anomalies” and 17 from “accidents”). Data from fatalities from operational accidents is correct as of 15 May 2024.

Now, I do not know if operational accidents are included in the war dead. I am assuming they are not, so 290 + 44 = 334 or 639 + 44 = 683

 

Wounded:

Wounded since the beginning of the war (this means from 7 October):

3,643

  • 2,124 “easy”
  • 955 “medum”
  • 564 “hard”

“Casualties” (do they mean wounded? – I assume so) from the beginning of the maneuver (this means from 23 October):

 1,831

  • 874 “easy”
  • 591 “medum”
  • 366 “hard”

 

Injuries:

Injuries for operational accidents in the Gaza Strip

714

  • Accidents: 453
  • Shooting anomalies: 36
  • Two-sided shooting: 57
  • Road accidents: 49
  • Other: 119

 

Okay, time for some simple math:

 

A. Wounded-to-killed ratios:

Overall force Wounded-to-killed ratios (not counting operational accidents): 3,643/639 = 5.33-to-1

Gaza Strip operations wounded-to-killed ratios: 1,831/290 = 6.31-to-1

7 October wounded-to-killed ratios: (3,643 – 1,831)/639-290) = 5.19-to-1

 

B. Accidental killed versus injures

Gaza Strip operations: 714/44 = 16.20-to-1

This is not a surprising figure, but not one that I have calculated before.

From “two-side shootings” and shooting anomalies: (57 + 30)/(22+5) = 3.20-to-1

From “two-sided shootings” (57/22) = 2.59-to-1

This are not surprising figures, being from I assume mostly direct gunfire.

 

C. How about friendly fire?

Percent killed by friendly fire in Gaza Strip: 22/(290 + 22) * 100 =  7.05 %

Note, the percent of expected friendly fire casualties has never been firmly established. Traditionally the figure from WWII was 1 or 2%. Many people considered these estimates low. It was clearly higher than that in Vietnam (1965-1973), but no one has assembled any systematic data. It was much higher than that in the Gulf War (1991).    

 

Some past references:

Wounded-To-Killed Ratios – The Dupuy Institute

Also note on page 187 of War by Numbers there is a discussion of weapons effects in the 1982 Israeli-Lebanon War.  The lethality figures of bullets was 0.31 and for “small arms” was 0.28. This comes out to wounded-to-killed ratios respectively of 3.23- and 3.57-to-1. 

Russia withdraws from Kharkiv province?

It appears that Ukraine has retaken parts of Kharkiv province: Zelenskiy Confirms Ukrainian Forces Regain Control Over Kharkiv Border Amid Russian Offensive (msn.com). The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelelskyy, announced on Friday (24 May) that Ukraine had retaken control over the border areas. Russia is still claiming to control half of Vovchansk, which is 3 miles (5 km) inside the Ukrainian border. 

Map of Vovchansk area (courtesy of @War_Mapper).

My conclusion is that this Kharkiv attack was a diversion. Not sure I believe the claims of high Russian losses.

There is still fighting around Kupiansk and in the Pokrovsk sector (in the center of front in the Donbas region, to the west of Bakhmut, Donetsk and Avdiivka). See: General Staff: Most Combat Engagements Recorded In Pokrovsk Sector (menafn.com) and Ukrainian defenders hit 16 clusters of Russian military personnel – General Staff (msn.com). There is fighting around Ocehretyne, which is less than 10 miles (16 kilometers) NW of Avdiivka (which is just NW of Donetsk).

(courtesy of @War_Mapper).

I am beginning to think I might actually be right about this: There may not be a major Russian spring/summer offensive – The Dupuy Institute

There is a Rusi article on the subject that I am not sure of: In Ukraine, Russia is Beginning to Compound Advantages | Royal United Services Institute (rusi.org)

First, where does the figure of 510,000 troops come from?

Then the is the issue of the length of the front. They are saying 1,200 kilometers. That is really not a properly representative figure. If Kharkiv province is back of list of contested areas west of Kupyansk, then we are really looking at a front from Kupyansk to Kakhovka Reservoir of maybe 400-500 kilometers (250 – 300 miles). This is the action front. Vovchansk is around 80 kilometers from Kupyansk. See: The front is really not 1,200 kilometers long – The Dupuy Institute

In the end nibbling is not the same as a major offensive.

The front is really not 1,200 kilometers long

Lot’s of people throw out the figure that the front line is 1,200 kilometers long. Not really. The length of the border of Ukraine (pre-2014) with Russia is 1,974 kilometers (1,227 miles). This is the land border. The length of the border with Belarus (which I do not think is going to re-enter this contest) is 891 kilometers (554 miles). The entire coastline of Ukraine is 3,783 kilometers (2,351 miles).  I think this last figure includes Crimea.

(courtesy of @War_Mapper, map dated 18 May 2024)

But, they really are not fighting from Chernihiv to Sumy and have not done so since April 2022. This is a large portion of that 1,200 kilometer figure. They do share a border with Russia so Ukraine obviously has to protect these areas, but there really has not been any fighting in these areas for over two years. We do not expect that will change.

Second, they really cannot do major operations along the Dnipro River from Kherson up to the Kakhovka Reservoir. There was, in the best of times only three bridges across this river, and I gather that number is three less now. This creates supply issues and with all the drones, missiles and air support, hard to see how this is corrected. No one has yet to do any major military operations across the Kakhovka Reservoir. This takes a significant chunk of miles off any active front.

Therefore, for all practical purposes the front runs from the western border of Kharkiv province over to Kupyansk, down through the Donbas and then through Zaporizhzhia Oblast to the Kakhovka Reservoir. This is about 800 kilometers, vice 1,200.

Slightly more precise measurement using Google Earth:

Distance along Kharkiv Oblast border (To Kupyansk): 225 kilometers
From Kupyansk to Bakhmut: 124 kilometers
From Bakhmut to Vuhledar: 107 kilometers
From Vuhledar to Reservoir: 144 kilometers
Total = 600 kilometers
Multiply by 1.25 (a little figure borrowed from Napoleon): 750

If it was measured more precisely the front might be a little longer. 

One kilometer is 0.62 miles. Therefore an active front of roughly 800 kilometers or roughly 500 miles.

There may not be a major Russian spring/summer offensive

There may not be an actual major spring/summer Russian offensive. Let’s look at the scenario for a moment:

1. They are aware that their deployed strength is similar to the Ukraniain strength. They have at best a 1.5-to-1 advantage and may have less. See: Overview of the War in Ukraine going into the Spring/Summer Offensive Season – The Dupuy Institute

2. They are aware that they are not outspending their opponent. See: Dueling Defense Budgets – The Dupuy Institute

3. While they have not achieved the objectives initially set for this campaign, they still hold territory. They may have decided that holding that territory is the best they can do and they are satisfied with that.

4. They may be warring to improve their position at the negotiating table.

Let us take a look for a moment at that. They have conducted a few limited offensive efforts in recent times. The most significant was the attacking and taking of Avdiivka (10 October 2023 – 17 February 2024). This was the town closest to the city of Donetsk, capital of DPR. In fact, it was only 9 miles (14 kilometers) away from it. They have taken that, and then expanded their control beyond this. This is all part of Donetsk province, which Russia has annexed as of 30 September 2022.

Now, they are doing a limited advance in Kharkiv province to set up buffer zones according to them. They have advanced up to 6 miles (10 kilometers) into Kharkiv province taking some rural areas and small towns and taking parts of Vovchansk (pop. 17,459 2022 est,). Maybe we should take them at their word that this is not a major offensive, but instead are just them creating buffer zones.

(courtesy of @War_Mapper)

They have made marginal advances in a few other areas, including around Kupyansk, towns around Bakhmut (Bilohorivka and Chasiv Yar), the areas to the west and northwest of Donetsk and some very limited advances in  Zaporizhhia province.

Right now they hold the majority of Donetsk and Lugansk provinces. There are still two major cities from Donetsk province not in their hands (Slovyansk and Kramatorsk). They tried to take them during the summer of 2022, but could not. They hold all of Crimea and Sevastopol. They hold a minority of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia provinces and in neither case hold the main city/capital, although they have annexed both provinces. In the case of the part of Kherson province that they hold, it is naturally well defended by the Dnipro River and the Kakhovka Reservoir. Holding these two areas gives them overland access to Crimea and secures their water supply there (this was an issue before). They also have control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station since March 2022.

Their air and missile campaign is focused (once again) on shutting down the Ukranian power grid. They are having some success. This may all be an attempt to force Ukraine to the negotiating table.

Perhaps their focus is on 1) taking as much territory that they can easily grab, 2) setting up a buffer zone north and east of Kharkiv, 3) increasing the pain on the Ukrainians, 4) and holding what they have until they can force Ukraine to the negotiating table. This might be victory for now for them,

Are we looking at no major Russian offensive this spring and summer?

 

Overview of the War in Ukraine going into the Spring/Summer Offensive Season

I am being told by “advisors” to start blogging again about the war in Ukraine. “That is what everyone really cares about, not the little things that you have been posting about.”

Anyhow, my last direct blog post on the war was day 699: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 699 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). A more detailed post was done for day 589: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 589 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Since then, I have not blogged extensively about the war. In part, because the changes and shifts over time were incremental and in part because I was busy getting a book done on The Siege of Mariupol. It is now day 811 of this war (or 2.2 years or over 70 million seconds). 

So, let’s look at the war at the moment:

Ukrainian Forces Deployed: At least 300,000 are deployed along the front line. Last year Zelenskyy was saying that they have over 700,000 troops mobilized. There is a difference between people mobilized and people deployed. There is a difference between regular army and reserves and militia. What is actually deployed is a wild-eyed guess. We actually don’t know, and the people that do know are not saying.

Russian Forces Deployed: Probably about 400,000 or more. Putin said 617K and was immediately contradicted by Ukraine intelligence, which said 450K. I tend to believe the latter figure, except I suspect the tendency of the intel people is to overestimate. So, “more than 400,000” become the SWAG figure I used. 

So, Russia may have a 1.5-to-1 force ratio advantage (say 450K to 300K) or it may be roughly closer to 1-to-1 (say 400K to 400K). Not sure. Either way, this does not seem decisive: Analysis of Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – fourth and final continuation | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). In particular look at Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – continued | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Now what are Russia’s advantages:

  1. Artillery ammunition
  2. Air support *
  • Note that Russia still has 2,000+ aircraft and has maintained around 500 or so in the theater. This is more than enough to counteract the handful of F-16s that the Ukrainians have received. 

What are Ukraine’s advantages:

  1. Artillery (once ammunition issue is resolved)
  2. Air Support with Drones?
  3. Observation/Intelligence ?
  4. Morale
  5. Training
  6. Doctrine ?

Each of these is a long discussion. I may get to them later. These points are covered in three slides of my updated briefing I am doing on Force Ratios at HADSS in UK in July Schedule for HADSS 2024 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and at HAAC in October: Next Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8 – 10 October 2024 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

But Russia has been advancing. They have over the last few months taken Avdiivka (Battle of Avdiivka is dated 10 October 2023 to 17 February 2024). They have pushed out a little beyond that. This is not militarily significant terrain, but it is of political value, as Avdiivka is near the non-operational Donetsk International Airport, and has been in Ukrainian hands since 2014. So, it has some importance if the Russian political objective is to seize the rest of Donetsk province before the start of peace negotiations.

Now, the Russians have been advancing along the border next to Kharkiv. Kharkiv is a significant objective, being the second largest city in Ukraine and the largest Russian-speaking city in Ukraine. So, far, they have been advancing just along the border, it is not certain that these areas were even defended. This is either preparatory advances in anticipation of a major offensive, is an intended distraction, or is just taking some local territory because they can. So far, we have not seen what I would call a major offensive. Probably conditions are not quite right to start such: When does the campaign season start? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Still, regardless of army size, it does appear that both sides are spending roughly equally on this war: Dueling Defense Budgets | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

All evidence points to this war being stalemated, but for the last few months, Russia has been slowly advancing.

  1. Is this because Russian gained an advantage due to a proper build up of its armed forces over 2023/24, unlike what it did in 2022/23? This has probably helped.
  2. Is this because Ukraine failed to properly mobilize over 2023/24, taking its eye off the ball, to use a sports analogy? Maybe. This is what some people claim: Russia is exploiting Ukraine’s lack of manpower to thin out the front line and seek a breakthrough, military expert says (msn.com).
  3. Is this because Russian had an abundance of artillery shells (thanks to North Korea) and were outshooting the Ukrainians 5-to-1 or 10-to-1 according to Ukrainians sources (which I was never able to verify). Maybe. Theoretically, over time, this Russian advantage will disappear and may turn into a Ukrainian advantage. U.S. shell production was 25,000 a month and is now being ramped up to 125K a month. Europe has similarly ramped up its shell production. Once this is up to speed, then this may turn from a Russian advantage to a Ukrainian one.
  4. Is this because the U.S. congress held up the $61 Billion dollar aid package for six months? It may have had an impact. This is, of course, what many of the people opposed to the delay were saying. Have no idea how true that is. It is the nature of the political discourse that the effects of not doing something get overstated. For example, the delay in getting F-16s and 300km range ATACMs. So, don’t know how vulnerable the U.S. delays in the aid package made Ukraine, especially as there were no such delays in the European aid or Ukraine’s own defense expenditures. Still, the delay was hard to justify.

So, Russia may hold a slight advantage for now. I suspect that advantage does not result in any major breakthroughs. Over time, I suspect that the Russian advantages will disappear, and things will stabilize. After that, it will be up to Ukraine to see if they can develop any advantages that allow them to move forward. Needless to say, if Ukraine can start to steadily advance, this war will go in their favor. On the other hand, if Russia can get one significant breakthrough operations this spring/summer, it could be a very different story. We will have to see as it is hard to predict.

Territory Fought Over:

It appears that the fighting will be stretched from Sumy or Kharkiv down to Zaporizhzhia. This is a long line. It does not appear that it will include Kyiv (except for missile attacks). It does not appear that it will include Odessa, which is now well behind Ukrainian defensive positions. It does appear that Ukraine has won the Battle for the western Black Sea. Not only has it deprived Russia access to that area after sinking Russia’s largest ship on the Black Sea, and damaging several others, but it is now regularly moving tankers and cargo transports from the Bosporus Strait to Odessa and back. Russia is not intercepting these. Added to that Russia has replaced the admiral in charge. This does happen when you lose the largest warship on the Black Sea (the cruiser Moskva) in addition to losing control of the western half of the Black Sea. 

It also does not appear that Kherson and Kherson province is a major theater. The Dnieper or Dnipro River divides that province, with Kherson and the Ukrainian Army on the north bank and the Russian army on the south bank. And then there is large Kakhovka Reservoir to the east of that the cuts off a significant section of front (see map). It does appear the effective front starts to the east of the reservoir (near Zaporizhzhia).

The 1420 YouTube site decided to quit doing street interviews

Turns out the lead of the 1420 site decided to quit doing street interviews because after four years of doing this, he wanted to move on to other things. His new site is here: (1) Daniil Orain – YouTube

His explanatory video is here: Why I stopped doing the street interviews (youtube.com)

The interviews are archived here: (1) Archives of 1420 by Daniil Orain – YouTube

The previous article on 1420 is here: It looks like 1420 may have quit broadcasting | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

French Estimate of Russian Killed in Ukraine

Seems like everyone in and out of NATO has their own estimate of Russian losses. The current French estimate, according to their foreign minister, is 150,000 Russian soldiers killed and a total of 500,000 casualties. See: France’s Shocking Estimation: 150,000 Russian Soldiers Dead in Ukraine War (msn.com)

First reality check: Wounded-to-killed ratios. 500,000 – 150,000 = 350,000 wounded. Wounded-to-killed ratio of 2.33-to-1. The Soviet Army mostly on the attack in the southern salient of the Battle of Kursk from 12-18 July 1943 had a wounded-to-killed ratio of 2.68-to-1 (see Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka, page 1374, this is also in Chapter 15 of War by Numbers).

Are they saying the Russian medical care is worse now than in 1943, before they had penicillin, or in many cases no painkillers other than Vodka? They also had in 1943 a shortage of trained doctors, the rear hospitals were not brought forward that spring to be near the front, and they had a poor medical evacuation system.

Anyhow, another estimate to ignore. What data are these estimates actually based upon?

It looks like 1420 may have quit broadcasting

One of my favorite channels on YouTube to watch has been a site called “1420.” I did mention it yesterday during the question and answer period of my podcast on The Battle for Kyiv

It is a series of street interviews done in Moscow, St. Petersburg and at other locales across Russia asking people some irreverent questions and sometimes very pointed political questions. It is useful to get a feel of the opinions and range of opinions among the Russians. Hard to do so otherwise with limited independent polling and rather stacked elections.

They appear to have quit adding new interviews. Don’t know why. Their newest street interview is now one month old and they are now listed under “Archives of 1420”. See: Archives of 1420 by Daniil Orain – YouTube

My past references to this site on my blog are here:

  1. 1420 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
  2. 1420 – second posting | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
  3. 1420 – third posting | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
  4. 1420 – fourth posting | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
  5. 1420 – fifth posting | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
  6. CBC on 1420 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
  7. 1420 – sixth posting | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
  8. Presidential Elections – 2024 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Analysis of Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – fourth and final continuation

This is the fourth and final continuation of our previous four posts: Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – continued | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Analysis of Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – second continuation | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Analysis of Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – third continuation | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).  It is a part of a briefing on forces ratios I will be giving at HADSS in UK: Schedule for HADSS 2024 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and at HAAC near DC: Next Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8 – 10 October 2024 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

All of this analysis of the CaDB was for a reason, it was to determine if odds (force ratios) play out difference at higher level of operations (meaning army level). Are they different at the operational level vice the tactical level of warfare. The answer appears to be no. I do not know of anyone who has actually specifically explored this issue before, so I am not sure there is an existing or countervailing opinions out there.

Of course, my real interesting in looking at this (which I did last year) was because of the war in Ukraine and the upcoming Ukranian spring/summer offensive in 2023. I did brief this at the Second HAAC (October 2023) and in Norway (November 2023). The question I had was does a minor advantage in force ratios or combat power ratios lead to a bigger advantage at the operational level of combat. The answer appears to be no, as this was reinforced by limited movement of the front line in Russo-Ukrainian War since the fall of 2022. 

My final slide in the briefing was “Does this relate to the fighting in Ukraine?” I then asked two questions:

  1. What are the odds?
    1. What is the strength of the deployed Ukrainian Army?
    2. What is the strength of the Russian Army deployed in Ukraine?
  2. What other advantages does the Ukrainian attacker have?
    1. Artillery
    2. Air Support? (Drones?)
    3. Observations/Intelligence
    4. Morale
    5. Training

Now, as it appears that Russia will be on the offensive this spring/summer, then I may need to restructure this slide and also add another point “artillery ammunition supply.”

 

I am probably going to do some more blog posts on this subject, looking at other levels of combat.